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  1.  8
    Motor Intentions and Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action: A Standard Story.Olle Blomberg & Chiara Brozzo - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):137-146.
    According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an action is an intrinsically mindless bodily movement that is appropriately caused by an intention. Those who embrace this story typically take this intention to have a coarse-grained content, specifying the action only down to the level of the agent's habits and skills. Markos Valaris argues that, because of this, the standard story cannot make sense of the deep reach of our non-observational knowledge of action. (...)
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  2.  1
    The Enactive Automaton as a Computing Mechanism.Joe Dewhurst & Mario Villalobos - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):185-192.
    Varela, Thompson, and Rosch illustrated their original presentation of the enactive theory of cognition with the example of a simple cellular automaton. Their theory was paradigmatically anti-computational, and yet automata similar to the one that they describe have typically been used to illustrate theories of computation, and are usually treated as abstract computational systems. Their use of this example is therefore puzzling, especially as they do not seem to acknowledge the discrepancy. The solution to this tension lies in recognizing a (...)
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  3.  8
    Against Quantum Indeterminacy.David Glick - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):204-213.
    A growing literature is premised on the claim that quantum mechanics provides evidence for metaphysical indeterminacy. But does it? None of the currently fashionable realist interpretations involve fundamental indeterminacy and the ‘standard interpretation’, to the extent that it can be made out, doesn't require indeterminacy either.
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  4.  6
    No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):157-166.
    Recently it has been increasingly popular to argue that knowledge is the norm of belief. I present an argument against this view. The argument trades on the epistemic situation of the subject in the bad case. Notably, unlike with other superficially similar arguments against knowledge norms, knowledge normers preferred strategy of appealing to the distinction between permissibility and excusability cannot help them to rebut this argument.
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  5.  11
    Grounding and the Objection From Accidental Generalizations.Brannon McDaniel - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):178-184.
    Monistic grounding says that there is one fundamental ground, while pluralistic grounding says that there are many such grounds. Grounding necessitarianism says that grounding entails, but is not reducible to, necessitation, while grounding contingentism says that there are at least some cases where grounding does not entail necessitation. Pluralistic grounding necessitarianism is a very popular position, but accidental generalizations, such as ‘all solid gold spheres are less than one mile in diameter’, pose well-known problems for this view: the many fundamental (...)
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  6.  4
    Behavioral Circumscription and the Folk Psychology of Belief: A Study in Ethno‐Mentalizing.Rose David, Machery Edouard, Stich Stephen, Alai Mario, Angelucci Adriano, Berniūnas Renatas, E. Buchtel Emma, Chatterjee Amita, Cheon Hyundeuk, Cho In‐Rae, Cohnitz Daniel, Cova Florian, Dranseika Vilius, Lagos Ángeles Eraña, Ghadakpour Laleh, Grinberg Maurice, Hannikainen Ivar, Hashimoto Takaaki, Horowitz Amir, Hristova Evgeniya, Jraissati Yasmina, Kadreva Veselina, Karasawa Kaori, Kim Hackjin, Kim Yeonjeong, Lee Minwoo, Mauro Carlos, Mizumoto Masaharu, Moruzzi Sebastiano, Y. Olivola Christopher, Ornelas Jorge, Osimani Barbara, Romero Carlos, Rosas Alejandro, Sangoi Massimo, Sereni Andrea, Songhorian Sarah, Sousa Paulo, Struchiner Noel, Tripodi Vera, Usui Naoki, del Mercado Alejandro Vázquez, Volpe Giorgio, A. Vosgerichian Hrag, Zhang Xueyi & Zhu Jing - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):193-203.
    Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we (...)
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  7.  1
    Behavioral Circumscription and the Folk Psychology of Belief: A Study in Ethno-Mentalizing.Rose David, Machery Edouard, Stich Stephen, Alai Mario, Angelucci Adriano, Berniūnas Renatas, E. Buchtel Emma, Chatterjee Amita, Cheon Hyundeuk, Cho In-Rae, Cohnitz Daniel, Cova Florian, Dranseika Vilius, Lagos Ángeles Eraña, Ghadakpour Laleh, Grinberg Maurice, Hannikainen Ivar, Hashimoto Takaaki, Horowitz Amir, Hristova Evgeniya, Jraissati Yasmina, Kadreva Veselina, Karasawa Kaori, Kim Hackjin, Kim Yeonjeong, Lee Minwoo, Mauro Carlos, Mizumoto Masaharu, Moruzzi Sebastiano, Y. Olivola Christopher, Ornelas Jorge, Osimani Barbara, Romero Carlos, Rosas Alejandro, Sangoi Massimo, Sereni Andrea, Songhorian Sarah, Sousa Paulo, Struchiner Noel, Tripodi Vera, Usui Naoki, Mercado Alejandro Vázquez del, Volpe Giorgio, A. Vosgerichian Hrag, Zhang Xueyi & Zhu Jing - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):193-203.
    Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we (...)
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  8.  11
    A Simple Dialogue.Jason Bowers - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):122-128.
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  9.  6
    Acting on Essentially Comparative Goodness.John Cusbert - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):73-83.
    Temkin's Essentially Comparative View of moral ideals says that goodness is comparison set dependent: the goodness of an outcome is relativized to a set of outcomes. This view does not entail that betterness is intransitive; indeed, it provides the resources for maintaining transitivity. However, it does entail that the structure of goodness is more complex than is standardly supposed. It thereby demands a modification of the standard connection between goodness and decision. I set out this challenge, canvas some options, and (...)
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  10.  11
    The Numbers Count.Peter A. Graham - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):129-134.
    Numbers Skeptics deny that when faced with a choice between saving some innocent people from harm and saving a larger number of different, though equally innocent, people from suffering a similar harm you ought to save the larger number. In this article, I aim to put pressure on Numbers Skepticism.
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  11.  25
    Deflating the Determination Argument.Jared Henderson - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):167-177.
    This article argues for the compatibility of deflationism and truth-conditional semantic theories. I begin by focusing on an argument due to Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk, and William Lycan for incompatibility, arguing that their argument relies on an ambiguity between two senses of the expression ‘is at least.’ I go on to show how the disambiguated arguments have different consequences for the deflationist, and argue that no conclusions are established that the deflationist cannot accommodate. I then respond to some objections and (...)
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  12.  46
    ‘And’ and ‘But’: A Note.Saul A. Kripke - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):102-105.
    Most philosophers seem to be under a misleading impression about the difference between ‘and’ and ‘but’. They hold that they are truth-functional equivalents but that ‘but’ adds a Gricean ‘conventional implicature’ to ‘and’. Frege thought that the implicature attached to ‘but’ was that the second clause is unlikely given the first; others have simply said they express a contrast between the two. Though the second formulation may seem more general, in practice writers seem to agree with Frege's idea. The present (...)
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  13.  3
    What Is the Specificity of Classical Mathematics?Graham Priest - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):115-121.
    This paper addresses the question of what is distinctive about classical mathematics. The answer given is that it depends on a certain notion of conditionality, which is best understood as telling us something about the structure of the mathematics in question, and not something about the logical particle ‘if’.
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  14.  60
    The Perfect Bikini Body: Can We All Really Have It? Loving Gaze as an Antioppressive Beauty Ideal.Sara Protasi - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):93-101.
    In this paper, I ask whether there is a defensible philosophical view according to which everybody is beautiful. I review two purely aesthetical versions of this claim. The No Standards View claims that everybody is maximally and equally beautiful. The Multiple Standards View encourages us to widen our standards of beauty. I argue that both approaches are problematic. The former fails to be aspirational and empowering, while the latter fails to be sufficiently inclusive. I conclude by presenting a hybrid ethical–aesthetical (...)
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  15.  16
    Grounding is Not Superinternal.Pablo Carnino - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):24-32.
    Whenever a fact P grounds another fact Q, one may ask why that is so. Karen Bennett and Louis deRosset independently argue that grounding facts—such as the fact that P grounds Q—are always grounded in their grounds-part. Bennett calls this the view that grounding is superinternal. My aim in this paper is to argue that grounding is not superinternal. I will do so by showing that superinternality, together with some widely accepted formal features of grounding—namely, transitivity and necessitation—yield implausible claims (...)
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  16.  38
    A Paradox of Matter and Form.Maegan Fairchild - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1).
    In the face of the puzzles of material constitution, some philosophers have been moved to posit a distinction between an object's matter and its form. A familiar difficulty for contemporary hylomorphism is to say which properties are eligible as forms: for example, it seems that it would be intolerably arbitrary to say that being statue shaped is embodied by some material object, but that other complex shape properties aren't. Anti-arbitrariness concerns lead quickly to a plenitudinous ontology. The usual complaint is (...)
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  17.  8
    A Paradox of Matter and Form.Maegan Fairchild - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):33-42.
    In the face of the puzzles of material constitution, some philosophers have been moved to posit a distinction between an object's matter and its form. A familiar difficulty for contemporary hylomorphism is to say which properties are eligible as forms: for example, it seems that it would be intolerably arbitrary to say that being statue shaped is embodied by some material object, but that other complex shape properties aren't. Anti-arbitrariness concerns lead quickly to a plenitudinous ontology. The usual complaint is (...)
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  18. Homunculi Are People Too! Lewis's Definition of Personhood Debugged.Cody Gilmore - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):54-60.
    David Lewis defends the following "non-circular definition of personhood": "something is a continuant person if and only if it is a maximal R-interrelated aggregate of person-stages. That is: if and only if it is an aggregate of person-stages, each of which is R-related to all the rest (and to itself), and it is a proper part of no other such aggregate." I give a counterexample, involving a person who is a part of another, much larger person, with a separate mental (...)
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  19.  9
    Truth and Existence.Jan Heylen & Leon Horsten - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):106-114.
    Halbach has argued that Tarski biconditionals are not ontologically conservative over classical logic, but his argument is undermined by the fact that he cannot include a theory of arithmetic, which functions as a theory of syntax. This article is an improvement on Halbach's argument. By adding the Tarski biconditionals to inclusive negative free logic and the universal closure of minimal arithmetic, which is by itself an ontologically neutral combination, one can prove that at least one thing exists. The result can (...)
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  20.  4
    Classicality Lost: K3 and LP After the Fall.Matthias Jenny - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):43-53.
    It is commonly held that the ascription of truth to a sentence is intersubstitutable with that very sentence. However, the simplest subclassical logics available to proponents of this view, namely K3 and LP, are hopelessly weak for many purposes. In this article, I argue that this is much more of a problem for proponents of LP than for proponents of K3. The strategies for recapturing classicality offered by proponents of LP are far less promising than those available to proponents of (...)
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  21.  2
    Attitude Reports, Cognitive Products, and Attitudinal Objects: A Response to G. Felappi On Product‐Based Accounts of Attitudes.Friederike Moltmann - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):3-12.
    In a range of recent and not so recent work, I have developed a novel semantics of attitude reports on which the notion of an attitudinal object or cognitive product takes center stage, that is, entities such as thoughts claims and decisions. The purpose of this note is to give a brief summary of this account against the background of the standard semantics of attitude reports and to show that the various sorts of criticism that Felappi recently advanced against it (...)
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  22.  10
    A Normative Argument Against Explosion.Mark Pinder - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1).
    One strategy for defending paraconsistent logics involves raising ‘normative arguments’ against the inference rule explosion. Florian Steinberger systematically criticises a wide variety of formulations of such arguments. I argue that, for one such formulation, Steinberger's criticisms fail. I then sketch an argument, available to those who deny dialetheism, in defence of the formulation in question.
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  23.  5
    A Normative Argument Against Explosion.Mark Pinder - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):61-70.
    One strategy for defending paraconsistent logics involves raising ‘normative arguments’ against the inference rule explosion. Florian Steinberger systematically criticises a wide variety of formulations of such arguments. I argue that, for one such formulation, Steinberger's criticisms fail. I then sketch an argument, available to those who deny dialetheism, in defence of the formulation in question.
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  24.  14
    Time Travel, Ability, and Arguments by Analogy.Ryan Wasserman - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1).
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  25.  3
    Time Travel, Ability, and Arguments by Analogy.Ryan Wasserman - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):17-23.
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  26.  18
    Ambivalence for Cognitivists: A Lesson From Chrysippus?Bill Wringe - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):147-156.
    Ambivalence—where we experience two conflicting emotional responses to the same object, person or state of affairs—is sometimes thought to pose a problem for cognitive theories of emotion. Drawing on the ideas of the Stoic Chrysippus, I argue that a cognitivist can account for ambivalence without retreating from the view that emotions involve fully-fledged evaluative judgments. It is central to the account I offer that emotions involve two kinds of judgment: one about the object of emotion, and one about the subject's (...)
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  27.  1
    Explanatory Circles, Induction, and Recursive Structures.Tomasz Wysocki - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):13-16.
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  28.  18
    Biscuit Conditionals and Prohibited ‘Then’.Julia Zakkou - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):84-92.
    It is generally agreed that there are two kinds of indicative conditionals that do not contain conditional 'then.' There are hypothetical conditionals such as 'If Mary has done the groceries, there is beer in the fridge' and there are biscuit conditionals such as 'If you are thirsty, there is beer in the fridge.' There is also broad consensus that we cannot find an analogous distinction between hypothetical and biscuit conditionals within indicative conditionals that do feature 'then.' Conditionals containing 'then,' it (...)
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