The concept of psychological trauma is polysemous and remains a subject of ongoing debate among scholars and researchers. One of the most significant discussions surrounding the definition of trauma is the relationship between traumatic events (TE), traumatic memory (TM) and trauma response (TR). Several definitions of trauma provided by world-renowned organizations present the TE as the primary element, suggesting a necessary causal relationship in which the TE is antecedent, and the TM and TR are consequent. I call this the _strong (...) causal view_. In this article, I argue that the strong causal view is problematic as it does not sufficiently account for important trauma-related effects that pose anomalies for the causal position. I argue in favor of two claims. First, in defining psychological trauma, we must move beyond the need for a strong TE-dependent causal relationship and instead adopt a _weak causal view_. To support this, I review the discussion of causation in philosophy of memory that pits causal theories against postcausal theories, and propose two principles that can aid this transition. Second, I propose that among the three elements, TR should be the most critical in defining trauma. My aim is to support those definitions of psychological trauma that focus on TR, as I believe they offer greater explanatory power —especially regarding anomalies that challenge the strong causal view— and are more centered on the survivors' experience than those focused on TE. (shrink)

It is widely known that dreams can be strongly affected by traumatic events, but there may be other ways in which dreams relate to trauma. In this paper, we argue that different types of dreams could both contribute to trauma and alleviate it according to the prediction errors that occur either in dreams or in response to them after waking. A prediction error occurs when an experience contradicts one’s expectation and it is often accompanied by surprise. Prediction errors are involved (...) in memory updating processes that can be long-lasting. Not only nightmares but also unpleasant, and surprisingly, even neutral and pleasant dreams have the potential to contribute to trauma, affecting our waking lives in a similar way to waking traumatic experiences. We postulate that certain dreams can also be beneficial for trauma alleviation. Further, clinical evidence suggests that working with prediction errors that occurred in dreams and during our response to dreams after waking can assist in alleviating the negative effects of trauma. (shrink)

In this paper, I suggest that individuals who suffer trauma are often forced to reproduce that for material gain. After noting the key features of what I define as ‘performing trauma narratives’, I argue that the environments in which these narratives are told place undue epistemic burdens on the victims and fail to account for the differential understanding of listeners and the difficulties in conveying the descriptive and normative features with accuracy and integrity. I argue that this results in two (...) specific forms of epistemic injustice: structurally precarious testimonial injustice’ and binary hermeneutical injustice’. I go on to suggest that these epistemic burdens prevent the healing from the traumatic experience in virtue of causing victims to normatively dissociate from their traumatic experience causing victim’s to not appropriately integrate their memories into their conception of self. (shrink)

The traditional conception of episodic memory, as a capacity that enables the conscious and personal re-experience of a past event, has led to methodological difficulties in attributing it to non-linguistic beings. The present work proposes to study the attribution of this capacity in non-human animals based on animal models of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For this purpose, evidence is presented suggesting that flashbacks, a characteristic symptom of PTSD, are a product of the episodic memory system. If that is true, then (...) the ability to remember episodes is required to develop PTSD and having PTSD would be a compelling reason for attributing episodic memories. In this way, the present work opens a new field of research on the problem of episodic memory attribution in animals. (shrink)

Relational trauma can be understood as a psychological injury that occurs in the context of abusive interpersonal relationships and appears to be correlated with a wide array of mental illnesses. However, one potential harm of trauma that has not received much attention from philosophers is the threat it poses to authenticity. To understand why relational trauma potentially creates impediments to authentic agency, we need to consider two other phenomena that are commonly associated with it: (i) dissociation, and (ii) diminished habitual (...) trust. Whereas trauma-related dissociation commonly involves bodily alienation and detachment from the self, diminished habitual trust often leads to alienation from others. I maintain that dissociative detachment and diminished habitual trust often are mutually reinforcing and that, together, they can cause agents to become disconnected from themselves, others, and the reality of what has happened to them. What implications does this have for authentic agency among traumatized individuals? After outlining existing conceptions, I emphasize the important sense in which authenticity is relational and scaffolded by social connections. I also discuss several competencies that undergird authenticity and argue that the interplay between dissociative detachment and attenuated habitual trust can make it difficult for traumatized individuals to develop and sustain these competencies. Thus, the trauma they have experienced impedes their ability to conduct their lives in accordance with their genuine cares and desires. (shrink)

Research on interpersonal trauma tends to focus on the effects of traumatic encounters on those one who directly undergo the experience. In this paper, I seek to understand the experiences of the friends and family of the one who has undergone trauma, a paradigmatic case being the relatives of veterans (O’Nell, 1999). I argue that one way we can understand the experiences of friends and relatives is through Pauline Boss’ concept of _ambiguous loss_ (Boss, 1986, 2007). The kind of ambiguous (...) loss relevant for our purposes is when a family member is physically present but psychologically absent, for example, in the case of a relative with advanced dementia. This is what I purport happens in some instances of traumatic experience. I argue that third-person traumatic encounter can be experienced as a loss due to the changes in the person who has undergone the traumatic encounter and that this, in turn, causes changes in the person experiencing the loss and their relationship with their traumatised family member. I argue that first-person traumatic encounter is a transformative experience (Paul, 2014), i.e., an experience which causes personal and epistemic changes in the subject undergoing it, and that third-person traumatic encounter can also be a transformative experience. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that in ancient Greek architecture, it is possible to find a genesis of the geometric modeling of visual perception present in propositions of Euclid's Optics, considering mathematical knowledge as a human wisdom expression. Let us start by emphasizing that mathematical thinking is not exclusively rooted in mathematical disciplines, but also includes the broad spectrum of human activities, including activities that come from everyday life. Based on this, we present a socio-cultural characterization of human experience as (...) the source and sustainer of mathematical knowledge. Thereafter, on the basis of a content and contextual analysis of _Euclid's Optics_, we explain the use and development of geometry in the study of various optical effects of visual perception in the architectural art embodied in the Acropolis of Athens; and we focus our analysis on one of the most important of these effects, the Acropolis of Athens. We focus our analysis on one of the most emblematic architectural works of ancient Greek culture: the Parthenon of Athens. (shrink)

The present paper investigates and provides an account of the feeling of grief evidenced in certain sectors of the Chilean population after the electoral defeat following the constitutional plebiscite of September 2022 in Chile. How can one experience grief at the rejection of a political referendum? We suggest that the experience of grief is importantly related to a loss of life possibilities and disruptions in one’s practical identity. The outpouring of grief experienced by many Chileans at this political loss can (...) be traced to the importance of the constitutional plebiscite for their identities. The grieving process involves a renegotiation, through memory and future oriented imagination, of past, present, and future aspects of one’s practical identity. (shrink)

In recent decades, memory studies in Colombia in relation to the internal armed conflict have become a point of reference for multidisciplinary work with collectives and communities, and are also an important topic on the state agenda. This article explores the remembering subjectivities, narrative marks and cultural trauma that emerge from the experiences and perspectives in a memory work Antiguo Espacio Territorial de Capacitación y Reincorporación (AETCR) de Pondores. In addition, the tensions involved in thinking about cultural trauma from subjects (...) marked by the exercise of armed violence are analyzed. For this purpose, a narrative analysis is developed that integrates thematic recurrences, expression of the experience, features of orality and structure of the story. The methods used to carry out this study include a participatory approach and life stories of reincorporated persons and the surrounding community in the context of the AETCR. The study focuses on the ways in which memory expressed narratively conceives practices such as forgiveness and coexistence as possible experiences, through the experiences and thoughts of the AECTR community. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze the non-conceptualist continuity argument to show that it implies an implausible conception of perceptual experience in animals that are supposed to lack concepts. In order to do this, I show the limitations and implicit premises in the traditional formulations of the argument, and the additional premises needed to use it as an objection against conceptualism. Then, I review studies in cognitive neuroscience, ethology, comparative psychology, developmental psychology, and philosophical considerations to show that the argument implies (...) a conception of animal experience that is at odds with our scientific theories and even with the motivations for adopting non-conceptualism. I conclude that, if we wish to defend the continuity between adult human’s and other animal’s experiences, we should do it by attributing concepts to the latter. (shrink)

In recent years, there is an increasingly higher number of people who believe in a prevalence of suffering over welfare in nature. This belief is usually coincident with a sentiocentric axiology according to which what is morally relevant are the mental states of pleasure and pain. This combination leads to the diagnosis that the prevalence of suffering has an enormous moral significance. This paper rejects this traditional line of thought and instead argues that could not be coherent. The claim that (...) there is an ontological prevalence, in the abstract, of suffering in nature is unproblematic. However, the same is not true when considering its moral relevance. A sentiocentrist cannot consider an aggregationist calculation to be morally valuable, strictly speaking, since there is no subject that feels it. Nevertheless, the need for positive intervention in nature with the aim of reducing existing suffering could remain. (shrink)

In recent years, different proposals articulate specific rights for the regulation of neurotechnology, also known as "neurorights". A central concern regarding neurotechnological applications is that of mental privacy. This is the idea that we should have control over access to our neural data and the information about our mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing them. After proposing a detailed conceptualization of mental privacy, I will argue that the protection of this right is relevant because it is (...) at the basis of two fundamental ethical and legal dimensions of persons, identity and autonomy. I claim that mental privacy is presupposed by the relational conception of identity, and that this connection allows us to identify some limitations of current data privacy regulations. I then argue that relational identity is presupposed by the notion of autonomy, and this connection highlights relational dimensions of this concept that are not adequately articulated in current relational theories of autonomous action. This implies that the protection of mental privacy is also necessary for the protection if this second ethical and legal dimension of persons. (shrink)

Symmetry is not an inherent characteristic of mathematical proofs; instead, it is a property that arbitrarily manifests in different modes of presentation. This arbitrariness leads to the conclusion that symmetry cannot be part of the defining or essential properties that characterize proofs. Consequently, contrary to some authors’ claims, symmetry does not significantly contribute to the validity, accuracy, or soundness of mathematical proofs. What is more, it does not even play any critical role in heuristic aspects such as explanatory power. The (...) examples developed in this paper constitute compelling evidence supporting these claims. (shrink)

La hipótesis reduccionista puede ser todavía un tema controvertido entre filósofos, pero entre la gran mayoría de científicos activos creo que es aceptada sin reservas. El funcionamiento de nuestras mentes y cuerpos, y de toda la materia animada o inanimada de la que tenemos algún conocimiento detallado, se supone, son controladas por el mismo conjunto de leyes fundamentales, las cuales, excepto en ciertas circunstancias extremas, sentimos que conocemos bastante bien.

The classical limit problem refers to how the classical or Newtonian dynamics can be recovered from the principles of quantum mechanics. In other words the problem is how to reduce classical physics to quantum theory. It is commonplace to find in popular quantum mechanics texts that the problem is solved, nevertheless here we present a critique of these supposed solutions to the problem and we show why they are not really satisfactory. What we propose is to approach the problem from (...) the alternative theories to the standard quantum formalism; in particular from the pilot-wave theory and also GRW (with mass density). Both theories are better equipped to deal with the classical limit problem because they have a clear and precise ontology, which makes it easier to link their theoretical elements to the world of experience. This notwithstanding, there still remain some obstacles to overcome for said theories and here we propose how a general solution to this should look like. (shrink)

Our conscious experiences seem to elude any explanation in scientific terms. They present paradigmatic case of reduction failure and they are the main motivation for postulating relations of emergence. Thus, various authors have pointed out that phenomenal properties must be something more than mere collections of physical properties. This leads to the rejection of physicalism. As a consequence, phenomenal properties either have to be added to the list of fundamental properties, or emerge from them. Alternatively, the physicalist must be able (...) to explain how that failure in the explanation can be compatible with their position. The aim of this paper is to clarify the concepts of reduction and emergence in the context of this debate in philosophy of mind, clearly distinguishing different types of epistemological relationships and their ontological consequences. This will allow us to have a better understanding of the commitments and the challenges different positions face. (shrink)

This article briefly reviews some classical arguments in the debate on reductionism, both in support and against, emphasising the importance of not conflating epistemological limitations with ontological issues—a distinction that, in some cases, appears to be overlooked. To achieve this, we focus on another classic text in the reductionism debate, in addition to Anderson’s contribution in this monograph: ‘A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience’ by Gold and Stoljar (1999). Drawing upon analogies intended to enhance comprehension of the debate, (...) we question the philosophical relevance of the impossibility of a reductionist _explanation_ for the ontological dependency relationship. (shrink)

As an introduction to the monograph on reductionism and emergence, we provide a theoretical context for the contemporary debate. We will talk first of the naturalistic approach in philosophy (§2), as well as two of the most important characteristics of the emergency: autonomy and universality (§3). Finally, based on contemporary literature (mainly Patricia Palacios and Jessica Wilson, together with Mario Bunge and Alicia Juarrero) we present some definitions and distinctions to better understand the debate (§4).

Hegel has not been considered a philosopher of trauma. But the fact is that trauma is one of the themes most elaborated by Hegel in his Anthropology under the notion of mania (_Wahnsinn_). Mania was considered as a series of pathological behaviours because of fixed ideas or elements that triggered it. This causes a bad associative habit, whose hold is involuntary and unconscious. This is sedimented in the human being in memory and recollection. Hegel will state that memory and recollection (...) are necessary for representation, which means that if these are associated by habituation with traumatic experiences, then the person generates pathologized representations. This Hegelian theory of mania is later compared with the DSM-5 to corroborate that Hegel's theory of mania is what we now call trauma. (shrink)

I present and defend in this paper a pluralistic approach to intertheoretical reduction. In this, reduction is understood as a family of models that can help to achieve certain epistemic and ontological goals. I will then argue that the reductive model (or combination of models) that is best suited to a particular case study will depend on the specific goals that motivate reduction in that case.

In the present article we explore the possibilities of applying Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī's (549/1155 - 587/1191) epistemology of presence outside its own historical and systematic context. Indeed, we are convinced that Suhrawardī's ideas on temporality and modality are not only fruitful for analysing the work of his predecessors, but also offer new avenues for an epistemological understanding of logic – that is, a perspective in which logic is conceived as the theory and method of acquiring knowledge through demonstration. As noted (...) in the conclusion, the approach offers a new deontic logic that can be generalised for ethical and legal contexts beyond Islamic thought. (shrink)

After introducing the paper (§1), I will review the most general and central aspects of the literature on grounding (§2); I believe this task to be valuable since there are no general and updated reviews in Spanish on the subject. I will then argue that grounding is not a measure of physical complexity, and that, without a necessary link to complexity, there is little reason to think that grounding unites the different strata of physical reality, which is one of the (...) most important motivations to introduce dependence relationships (§3). (shrink)

In the past two decades, there has been a sudden increase of inquiry within the branch of analytic philosophy on the nature and role of intuition in philosophy. Philosophers began to investigate what intuition is, how it should be defined, what role it plays in philosophy, what its epistemic status is and many more. There is also a growing number of philosophers arguing that the whole debate rests on a mistake: intuition in philosophy plays no role whatsoever and philosophers do (...) not use it as (a source of) evidence for their philosophical claims. This strategy is often conducted by differentiating among the two senses in which intuition is supposed to play an evidential role in philosophy. Intuition, thus, can be understood as a state of intuiting something or a propositional content that is intuited. Intuition in the first sense, the argument goes, cannot be treated as evidence as it would present the risk of psychologizing evidence in philosophy. If, however, we take intuition as evidence in the second sense, there is nothing distinctive about it: ultimately, all evidence in philosophy is of propositional nature, regardless of the intuitiveness of a given proposition. -/- In my paper, I argue that this strategy fails and propose, instead, the view on intuition that, firstly, explains why the aforementioned distinction does not render the intuitiveness of the content irrelevant to its epistemic status, secondly, is in accord with the current findings in psychology, and, thirdly, is minimal enough to allow the different views of intuitions to be incorporated under that umbrella. In particular, I argue that it is an intuitive judgment, characterized by its non-inferentiality and defeasibility, that serves as evidence for particular philosophical claims, while its source is an intuition understood as a state of non-propositional character that can be examined empirically. (shrink)

This paper aims to vindicate the expertise defense in light of the experimental philosophy of free will. My central argument is that the analogy strategy between philosophy and other domains is defensible, at least in the free will debate, because philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuition by enabling expert philosophers to understand philosophical issues correctly and to have philosophical intuitions about them. This paper will begin by deriving two requirements on the expertise defense from major criticisms of (...) it. First, precisely how philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuitions requires explanation (Contribution); second, it must be explained how philosophical training immunizes philosophical intuitions from distorting factors (Immunity). I shall argue that the Contribution requirement is crucial for the expertise defense and that this requirement can be satisfied at least in the domain of free will: recent research shows that most novices are unable to understand determinism correctly, suggesting that having intuitions about determinism requires philosophical expertise. I then discuss how this proposal can be applied to other philosophical disciplines. (shrink)

The holist and inferential condition that, according with Davidson, defines imperatively the cognitive process collides with the existence of the intuitive believes, that is to say, those believes that are of themselves the fundamentum and that, thus, don’t require other belief for their grounds. Nonetheless, if, for one part, is adopted the way in which Peirce understands the term “intuition” and, for another, is accepted the extension of inferential holism, is allowed, even so, to admit the existence of intuitive believes, (...) without transgressing the Davidsonian prohibition. Indeed, if the inferential basis of supported belief is located beyond of the individual agency of who support that belief, the very belief would count as intuition of the agent and would respect the Davidsonian holist constraint, in the sense that such a belief would be a belief whose basis would be in another belief, even when that belief was one that was in an external agency. The key for to accomplish this purpose is to sustain a reasoning extended theory —analogous to the Clark and Chalmers (1998) extended theory of mind—, by virtue of which the agent can obtain, from an intuitive assistant —as alien inferential authorship — what he cannot get by his own inferential authorship. Precisely, in this work we will expound a Davidsonian type of linguistic interaction model —namely, dialogic and triangular—, for cognitions persuasive transfer, by means of one’s reasons (the assistant) become other’s intuitions (the assisted). (shrink)

En las dos últimas décadas, se ha producido dentro de la filosofía analítica un aumento repentino de la investigación sobre la naturaleza y el papel que juea la intuición. Los filósofos empezaron a investigar qué es la intuición, cómo debería definirse, qué papel desempeña en la filosofía, cuál es su estatus epistémico, entre otras cosas. También hay un número creciente de filósofos que sostienen que todo el debate se basa en un error: la intuición en filosofía no desempeña papel alguno (...) y los filósofos no la utilizan como (fuente de) prueba para sus afirmaciones filosóficas. Esta estrategia se lleva a cabo a menudo diferenciando entre los dos sentidos en los que se supone que la intuición desempeña un papel evidencial en filosofía. Así, la intuición puede entenderse como un estado de intuir o como un contenido proposicional que se intuye. En el primer sentido, se argumenta, la intuición no puede ser tratada como evidencia, ya que presentaría el riesgo de psicologizar la evidencia en filosofía. Sin embargo, si tomamos la intuición como evidencia en el segundo sentido, no hay nada distintivo en ella: en última instancia, toda evidencia en filosofía es de naturaleza proposicional, independientemente de la intuitividad de una proposición dada. En mi artículo, sostengo que esta estrategia fracasa y propongo, en su lugar, una visión de la intuición que, en primer lugar, explica por qué la distinción mencionada no hace que la intuitividad del contenido sea irrelevante para su estatus epistémico; en segundo lugar, está de acuerdo con los hallazgos actuales en psicología; y, en tercer lugar, es lo suficientemente mínima como para permitir la incorporación de las diferentes perspectivas sobre las intuiciones. En particular, sostengo que un juicio intuitivo, caracterizado por su no inferencialidad y revocabilidad, sirve de prueba para determinadas afirmaciones filosóficas, mientras que su fuente es una intuición entendida como un estado de carácter no proposicional que puede examinarse empíricamente. (shrink)

As a non-representationalist form of integrating methodological naturalism with ontological naturalism, this work proposes a distinction between phenomenic and rational intuitions. Since this is not a static distinction, it offers a way of observing in which sense the apparent circularity between mental and theoretical representations is not a vicious one. The argument’s plausibility will have to be reinforced through considerations about the unstability of ontologies and about how to conceive conflicting intuitions.

Este artículo pretende reivindicar la defensa de la pericia a la luz de la filosofía experimental del libre albedrío. Mi argumento central es que la estrategia de analogía entre la filosofía y otros dominios es defendible, al menos en el debate sobre el libre albedrío, porque la formación filosófica contribuye a la formación de la intuición filosófica al permitir a los filósofos expertos comprender correctamente las cuestiones filosóficas y tener intuiciones filosóficas sobre ellas. Este artículo comenzará derivando dos requisitos para (...) la defensa de la pericia a partir de las principales críticas a la misma. En primer lugar, es preciso explicar con precisión cómo contribuye la formación filosófica a la creación de intuiciones filosóficas (Contribución); en segundo lugar, debe explicarse cómo la formación filosófica inmuniza a las intuiciones filosóficas frente a factores distorsionadores (Inmunidad). Argumentaré que el requisito de Contribución es crucial para la defensa de la pericia y que este requisito puede satisfacerse al menos en el dominio del libre albedrío: investigaciones recientes muestran que la mayoría de las personas inexpertas son incapaces de entender correctamente el determinismo, lo que sugiere que tener intuiciones sobre el determinismo requiere pericia filosófica. A continuación, discuto cómo esta propuesta puede aplicarse a otras disciplinas filosóficas. (shrink)

En las tres últimas décadas del siglo XX, muchos filósofos analíticos han abordado cuestiones de ética práctica, ampliando radicalmente el campo de la filosofía moral más allá de los temas metaéticos que habían sido su foco principal durante la mayor parte del siglo. Sin embargo, abordar este tipo de controversias prácticas rápidamente hizo surgir la cuestión de cómo justificar las afirmaciones morales normativas. Muchos filósofos analíticos se basaron en el intuicionismo, que tiene un linaje muy antiguo dentro de la filosofía (...) moral anglófona. Este artículo evalúa tres formas en las que los filósofos analíticos del siglo XX recurrieron a las intuiciones para apoyar o rebatir las afirmaciones morales. Argumentamos que esos métodos fracasaron en su objetivo de promover un conocimiento moral digno de confianza porque se basaron en supuestos que, cuando se presumen en contextos de injusticia epistémica estructural, son sistemáticamente engañosos. A pesar de que las intuiciones se encuentran entre las fuentes de conocimiento en las que los agentes morales deben confiar, la epistemología moral debe prestar especial atención a los procesos sociales a través de los cuales se recogen, refinan y evalúan las intuiciones y otras formas de evidencia. Producir un conocimiento moral digno de confianza requiere procesos de razonamiento democráticos que sean sensibles a la omnipresencia de la injusticia epistémica y la dominación, así como desarrollar estrategias para contrarrestarlas. (shrink)

Cappelen (2012) argumenta en contra de la Tesis de la Centralidad, es decir, en contra de la idea de que los filósofos analíticos usan las intuiciones como evidencia para defender sus teorías. Para ello, ataca el denominado “Argumento del vocabulario de intuiciones”, es decir, la idea de que las intuiciones deben jugar un papel determinante en los argumentos de los filósofos analíticos porque estos usan vocabulario de intuiciones de manera profusa. Este artículo examina empíricamente esta afirmación, determinando en qué medida (...) el vocabulario de intuiciones aparece en partes centrales de los argumentos; más concretamente, si el vocabulario de intuiciones suele coincidir con marcadores de razonamiento que indican la presencia de premisas y conclusiones. Para ello, primero compilaré un corpus de artículos sobre desacuerdos de gusto. Segundo, llevaré a cabo dos tipos de análisis: un análisis de listas de frecuencias, y un análisis de la dispersión de ambos tipos de vocabulario a lo largo del corpus. (shrink)

Desde un enfoque ecológico, puede decirse que una persona trata de identificar la acción óptima para ella mediante un conjunto de diferentes acciones posibles a través de la intuición. El debate sobre las ‘teorías del proceso dual’ recoge esta idea y postula dos vías diferentes para evaluar las posibilidades de decisión: una vía lógico-analítica y otra intuitiva (Magrabi y Bach, 2013). Predominantemente, se asume que la vía lógico-analítica está relacionada con la racionalidad y, por tanto, es la vía a la (...) que hay que aspirar en la toma de decisiones racionales. Sin embargo, la ciencia ha demostrado que hay que asumir una racionalidad limitada. Por lo tanto, la cuestión de hasta qué punto las emociones o los sentimientos, y en este contexto también las intuiciones, son racionales ha pasado a primer plano (De Sousa, 1987; Evans y Cruse, 2004). En este trabajo, las intuiciones se consideran como un sentimiento con intencionalidad. Las intuiciones siempre se refieren a un entorno apropiado y se dirigen a una decisión que da lugar a una acción. Damásio (1994; 2013) demuestra que una intuición es un sentimiento que se distingue por actuar como un indicio o señal. Asumiendo el supuesto de racionalidad ecológica (Gigerenzer, Todd and ABC Research Group, 1999; Todd and Gigerenzer, 2012; Todd and Brighton, 2016), se puede demostrar que las decisiones intuitivas se basan en el conocimiento experiencial y el reconocimiento implícito de estructuras (Magrabi y Bach, 2013). En consecuencia, con el enfoque de racionalidad ecológica se puede demostrar que una decisión intuitiva es racional en el sentido de que una persona interactúa con éxito con su entorno de forma rápida y energéticamente adaptada y, por lo tanto, identifica la acción óptima para sí misma. Esto puede reconocerse como una ‘corazonada’ o ‘intuición’. En este artículo se explican dos retos: la influencia de un entorno negativo en las decisiones intuitivas y la confusión de una intuición con una emoción u otro sentimiento. (shrink)

Identifico la naturaleza y el estatus epistémico de un sub-tipo de intuiciones lingüísticas que llamo intuiciones icónicas (IIs). Por medio de estas intuiciones, los hablantes son capaces de detectar correspondencias icónicas consistentes entre formas lingüísticas y significados. En primer lugar, identifico los principales rasgos del fenómeno lingüístico detectado por las IIs: el sonoro-simbolismo. Las correspondencias en las cuales consiste son icónicas porque están conformadas por diferentes tipos de semejanzas percibidas o asociaciones basadas en similitudes entre estímulos -uno de los cuales (...) es lingüístico. Luego analizo las principales caracterizaciones filosóficas y psicológicas alternativas de las intuiciones, y su rol evidencial, centrándome en las intuiciones lingüísticas. Sobre estas bases, concluyo que las intuiciones tendrían que ser concebidas como un constructo heterogéneo. En segundo lugar, argumento que las IIs no son ni creencias, disposiciones a la creencia, juicios o pareceres intelectuales con contenidos proposicionales, sino más bien pareceres perceptuales. Ellas consisten en la capacidad o sensibilidad para detectar correspondencias o asociaciones icónicas. En otras palabras, los inputs sonoros “rastrean” directamente los significados transmitidos por ellos. Se caracterizan por su peculiar fenomenología presentacional y su componente evaluativo. Ahora bien, de acuerdo al tipo de contenido y de procesamiento cognitivo involucrado, se puede distinguir entre las más puramente perceptuales, basadas en procesos asociativos y aquella que involucran experiencia acumulada, procesos analíticos y manipulación conceptual. Después de revisar la literatura psicolingüística experimental basada en intuiciones acerca del sonoro-simbolismo, argumento que las IIs son intuiciones de primer nivel, y como tales, una fuente confiable de evidencia directa y prima facie acerca de los rasgos icónicos en el lenguaje. Finalmente, argumento que estas IIs ofrecen una “ventana” privilegiada para explorar las relaciones entre lenguaje y percepción (y afecto/emoción). Concluyo argumentando que esta clase de intuición es un input no prescindible para la reflexión filosófica y la investigación científica sobre el lenguaje. Así, aunque defiendo la relevancia de las intuiciones para entender el significado lingüístico, las IIs no son de la misma clase ni requieren los mismos métodos para estudiarlas que aquellas que interesaron más a los filósofos. (shrink)

Como introducción al monográfico sobre reduccionismo y emergencia brindamos aquí un contexto teórico al debate contemporáneo. Hablaremos primero del acercamiento naturalista en filosofía (§2), así como de dos de las características más importantes de la emergencia: autonomía y universalidad (§3). Finalmente, basándonos en la literatura contemporánea (principalmente en Patricia Palacios y Jessica Wilson, además de Mario Bunge y Alicia Juarrero) presentamos algunas de las definiciones y distinciones más importantes para entender mejor el debate sobre la emergencia (§4).

Después de introducir el artículo (§1), repasaré los aspectos más generales y centrales de la literatura sobre la fundamentación (§2); esta tarea me parece valiosa ya que no existen revisiones generales y actualizadas en español sobre el tema. Después, argumentaré que la fundamentación no es una medida de complejidad física, y que, sin un vínculo necesario con la complejidad, quedan pocas razones para pensar que la fundamentación une a los diferentes estratos de la realidad física, que es una de las (...) motivaciones más importantes para introducir relaciones de dependencia (§3). (shrink)