Jonathan Haidt has exhibited in several publications a strong influence by Hume as his inspiration to build up his Intuitionist Social Model especially in reference to the emotional and intuitive roots of morals. So, this article aims to go deeper into that influence to analyze, review and compare their concepts and hypotheses in order to establish common features in both Philosophers´ programs. By demonstrating some similarities between both authors -both critical to rationalism, and compelled to investigate the roots of morals (...) in Psychology-, their proposals will be compared and analyzed; and taking these critics into account the intuitionist assumptions that both Philosophers assume or could assume will be revised. In order to focus on the motivation of moral statements as a priority in Haidt research, the core of this article is dedicated to that issue. I will also explore Hume’s difficulty to conciliate his Emotivism with the rightness of moral statements that he considered necessary. Finally, my conclusions are that both positions sustain normative consequences ruled by an Ethics of Virtue. (shrink)

This research aims to propose a new theory to account for the functions of biological objects. For this, I will show that the most accepted theories of biological functions fail, and then I will propose a new alternative that overcomes the given counterexamples. The research is divided into the following questions: i) appealing to various counterexamples, noting that there is no robust theory capable of accounting for the phenomenon; finally ii) I will give a minimal provisional / operational theory, which (...) allows us to continue incorporating the functional dimension of the features. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es extender el diálogo entre el intuicionismo social, las perspectivas genéticas de la psicología moral, señalando las contribuciones y limitaciones de cada una de ellas para avanzar en la comprensión de la formulación y transformación de los juicios morales. Particularmente, se ha propuesto un examen del modo en el que han sido abordadas las relaciones entre el sujeto y el objeto de conocimiento a la luz de los aportes de la traducción psicológica constructivista. Además, se (...) analizan las relaciones entre las emociones, el razonamiento y la situación sociales específicas en la que tienen lugar tales procesos cognitivos, a través de las contribuciones de la psicología cultural. Mediante tal examen fue posible apreciar la contribución indudable del intuicionismo social a la psicológica moral, sus limitaciones, y elucidar las tesis que conforman dicha teoría. Justamente, al examinar las relaciones, las convergencias y las profundas diferencias entre el intuicionismo social, el constructivismo y la psicología cultural en sus abordajes sobre el juicio moral es posible contribuir a promover su revisión y elucidación. (shrink)

Jonathan Haidt’s Moral Foundation Theory has been criticized on many fronts, mainly on account of its lack of evidence concerning the genetic and neurological bases of the evolved moral intuitions that the theory posits. Despite the fact that Haidt’s theory is probably the most promising framework from which to integrate the different lines of interdisciplinary research that deal with the evolutionary foundations of moral psychology, i) it also shows a critical underspecification concerning the precise mental processes that instantiate the triggering (...) of our evolved moral intuitions, and that ii) that underspecification coexists with and overspecification of the structure of human nature when it comes to exploring alternatives to capitalist societies. (shrink)

In this work the social intuitionism defended by Jonathan Haidt is explored and compared with the dual reasoning theory, this theory belongs to a family of proposals that maintain that there is a duality in the field of the mental. On the one hand, social intuitionism has argued that it receives support from TDR, on the other hand, TDR has pointed out similarities with social intuitionism; despite the mutual references mentioned, an analysis of what the precise relationship between these projects (...) could be has not been carried out. This work is an attempt to carry out such analysis, in which it is argued that a) it is not clear that the division of social intuitionism between reasoning, intuition, and emotion is equivalent to that of the defenders of TDR; b) social intuitionism has certain differences both with the default-interventionist version and with the parallel version of the TDR; and, finally, c) it is not evident that social intuitionism is an extension of a TDR to the field of moral judgment. It is necessary to carry out more studies that delve into the different elements of social intuitionism and TDR, in order to understand how human beings make judgments and decisions, either within the scope of morality or outside it. (shrink)

This paper aims to review the meaning and scope of the Heideggerian notion of serenity. In accordance with this purpose, the research is articulated according to four thematic units that allow reconstructing and synoptically exposing the most significant aspects that Heidegger elucidates throughout his conference, given in 1955 with the title of Gelassenheit. These points read as follows: the meaning and semantic scope of the word serenity; the condition of autochthony and the threatening nature of calculating thought; technique, violence and (...) alienation; the Heideggerian sense of serenity according to the meaning of equanimity. For the interpretation of the documents, the methodology commonly used in studies concerning the history of philosophy is adopted, which consists of a hermeneutical and critical reading of the texts selected for analysis, together with the unavoidable support favored by the specialized bibliography. (shrink)

El abordaje de cuestiones como el bien y el mal desde la filosofía nos lleva a especificar lo que se entiende por ética y por moral. Canónicamente, la ética es una rama de la filosofía que estudia y sistematiza dichos conceptos y tiene como objetivo definir de forma racional qué constituye un acto bueno o virtuoso, independientemente de la cultura en la que se enmarque. La moral se define como el conjunto de normas que rigen el comportamiento de las personas (...) que forman parte de una sociedad determinada, contribuyendo así al mantenimiento de la estabilidad y de la estructura social. A partir de estas definiciones, la naturalización consiste en buscar fundamentos en las ciencias empíricas para justificar los principios morales. El objetivo de este trabajo es ver cómo las disciplinas científicas pueden aportar conocimientos que fundamenten la ética y los principios morales, un proyecto basado en la naturalización de la filosofía, cuestionando cualquier apriorismo que haga caso omiso de la ciencia. En primer lugar, se examinará el programa naturalizador y sus principales variantes en la filosofía. En segundo lugar, se analizarán dos propuestas desde la filosofía de la ciencia que pueden enmarcarse en el naturalismo, a saber: Philip Kitcher y Patricia S. Churchland. A continuación, se abordarán algunas de las principales tesis que proporcionan explicación científica del comportamiento humano desde el punto de vista de las virtudes morales. (shrink)

More than 30 years after the fall of the soviet block and because of the social and political crisis that have occurred in various places of the world in recent years, there have been important political and academic debates about the meaning of the concept of communism. The current article attempts to contribute theoretically to this discussion by highlighting the different becomings within which communism can be understood in the actual context. Among those are the performative importance of the word (...) “communism” in political and symbolic terms; communism as a process that precedes and modulates capitalist development; communism as a specter and multiplicity; and the relationship of communism with new forms of capitalist exploitation and political subjectivity. (shrink)

Problematizing the production of gender -and specifically of the feminine in the school context- is particularly complex. For some time now, it has been the students themselves who have pointed out the disagreement with an educational system that persists in implementing both institutional and daily actions that shape and produce sexist differences in a significant way. The school has thus become a space of dispute and territory in conflict, where new perspectives of girls and young women coexist in relation to (...) the demands for rights, to make their voices heard and to publicly express their disagreement, in the current context of mobilizations that question the prevailing neoliberalism. From the above framework and context, ethnographies conducted in two educational establishments, during 2014-2018, will be analyzed. In them, it is possible to identify two relevant argumentative axes that account for the production of women as second-class subjects, accentuating the analysis in the crossing between the forms of economization of life in a neoliberal key, and the implications of this from a gender perspective. (shrink)

Do we empathize with the others because first we have recognized them as somehow equals, or do we recognize them as equals because first we have empathized with them? This article explores the relation between affective empathy, the moral recognition of the others, and personal identity. I defend that, to recognize others as valuable and act in line with this, one must be able to feel affective empathy for their situation, and, to do so, one has to 1) be curious (...) about them to surpass indifference, and 2) feel that your identity is not threatened by recognizing the others. Otherwise, rationalizations and justifications of antisocial behaviors would arise. Thus, I focus on how the construction of the self plays a key role in prosocial behaviors and the activation of affective empathy, which has been overlooked by moral philosophy in the debate on empathy. In order to do so, firstly, I explore cases where moral recognition is broken, secondly, I explore the dichotomic debate on the role of empathy for moral recognition and moral agency, and, thirdly, I try to enrich the debate by shifting the focus to the prerequisites to feel empathy, such as curiosity, a well-integrated self and healthy narcissism, addressing so how the construction of the self plays a key role in the possibility of empathizing with others and, therefore, in epistemic virtues and moral agency. As a result, I advocate the importance of psychological education for moral agency. (shrink)

This work intends to study the status of some emotions in a practical environment. I shall focus specifically on two: anger and hatred. My first objective will be to show that the distinction between the two is not as simple as might appear at first sight. This is because, as I will show, anger and hatred appear to be neighboring emotions. It is therefore necessary to analyze them conceptually to pull aside the veils of appearance and thus identify their relevant (...) differences. My second objective is to show that the conceptual distinction I seek is not in pursuit of a merely analytical interest. I shall claim that the conceptual differences here have a practical impact, especially in the political environment, because anger and hatred should be dealt with differently in the realm of democracies. (shrink)

El artículo analiza y critica el uso político de la psicología de colmena propuesto por Jonathan Haidt que recurre a los “empujoncitos” del paternalismo libertario. El artículo presenta el paternalismo y discute la teoría de los empujoncitos, y en base base a esa discusión examina el uso político de la psicología de la colmena y sostiene que los empujoncitos no respetan a las personas como seres autónomos, y las políticas de la colmena son peligrosas. En su lugar, bien valdría asumir (...) una perspectiva cosmopolita. (shrink)

El abordaje de cuestiones como el bien y el mal desde la filosofía nos lleva a especificar lo que se entiende por ética y por moral. Canónicamente, la ética es una rama de la filosofía que estudia y sistematiza dichos conceptos y tiene como objetivo definir de forma racional qué constituye un acto bueno o virtuoso, independientemente de la cultura en la que se enmarque. La moral se define como el conjunto de normas que rigen el comportamiento de las personas (...) que forman parte de una sociedad determinada, contribuyendo así al mantenimiento de la estabilidad y de la estructura social. A partir de estas definiciones, la naturalización consiste en buscar fundamentos en las ciencias empíricas para justificar los principios morales. El objetivo de este trabajo es ver cómo las disciplinas científicas pueden aportar conocimientos que fundamenten la ética y los principios morales, un proyecto basado en la naturalización de la filosofía, cuestionando cualquier apriorismo que haga caso omiso de la ciencia. En primer lugar, se examinará el programa naturalizador y sus principales variantes en la filosofía. En segundo lugar, se analizarán dos propuestas desde la filosofía de la ciencia que pueden enmarcarse en el naturalismo, a saber: Philip Kitcher y Patricia S. Churchland. A continuación, se abordarán algunas de las principales tesis que proporcionan explicación científica del comportamiento humano desde el punto de vista de las virtudes morales. (shrink)

La comprensión psicológica es una capacidad requerida para la competencia moral en el sentido en que entender las intenciones, creencias e intereses de otros es un input crítico para evaluar las responsabilidades involucradas en sus comportamientos y comprender, a su vez, cómo interactuar con ellos para alcanzar nuestros propósitos. Por su parte, la interacción con otros está en el corazón de ambas capacidades, dado que una y otra son componentes esenciales y estrechamente relacionados de la vida social humana. Mi objetivo (...) en este trabajo, en relación con ambos supuestos, será poner de relieve una semejanza estructural entre la cognición psicológica y la cognición moral ordinarias, mostrando cómo ciertos tipos diferenciados de explicaciones en uno y otro dominio, permiten identificar un marco teórico consistente que, a su turno, puede dar cuenta de las relaciones entre ambas. Para ello, me referiré en primer lugar, sintéticamente, al Modelo Intuicionista Social de J. Haidt, en tanto ejemplifica un enfoque no clásico y dual de la cognición moral en el cual las intuiciones morales desempeñan un papel más básico que las razones. En el ámbito de la cognición psicológica, me referiré con más detenimiento al enfoque interactivo o de segunda persona, enriquecido por el enfoque dual de la cognición, en particular, por las propuestas sobre variedades implícitas o “mínimas” de atribución mental. En ese contexto, identificaré los llamados comportamientos expresivos: su naturaleza y su papel en la conducta y las interacciones humanas y su importancia como base evidencial de la comprensión mental. Ellos constituyen los objetos primarios de las intuiciones psicológicas. Espero mostrar que las señales expresivas son “legibles” por medio de las capacidades intuitivas que las detectan y comprenden su significación psicológica de maneras eficientes. Una vez expuestas las afinidades teóricas entre el MIS y el enfoque interactivo-dual, pondré de relieve que, así como para el primero, las intuiciones morales vienen primero y las razones después, también para el enfoque interactivo-dual de la comprensión psicológica, las intuiciones psicológicas vienen primero y las razones después. (shrink)

According to one highly influential approach to moral responsibility, human beings are responsible for what they do because they are responsive to reasons. However, this amounts to a descriptive assumption about human beings that may not be borne out by the empirical research. According to a recent trend in moral psychology, most human judgment is caused by fast, nonconscious, and intuitive processes, rather than explicit, conscious deliberation about one’s reasons. And when humans do engage in explicit deliberation, it primarily serves (...) to provide post hoc rationalization of their intuitive judgments. If this is correct, it is tempting to conclude that most of our judgments—and the actions we perform on their basis—are not genuine responses to reasons. The reasons-responsiveness approach would thus appear to be committed to the implausible conclusion that we are not responsible for very much after all, including, most problematically, our implicit biases. I argue that the reasons-responsiveness approach can avoid this conclusion by showing three things: that affective and intuitive processes can be reasons-responsive; that the responsiveness of those processes can be bolstered by the agent’s environment; and that practices like blame are one of the key ways in which human beings are attuned to reasons over time. I argue that the first and second of these items, despite their initial plausibility, are insufficient on their own to explain why humans can be held accountable for things like implicit biases, and that the way forward is to appreciate what holding each other accountable does—i.e., its effects. (shrink)

En este trabajo me valgo de la teoría de Jonathan Haidt para explorar una disposición afectiva a la que llamo “simpatía indolente”. Argumento que esta disposición impide que un grupo considerable de seres humanos se solidarice con los millones de personas que se encuentran en condición de pobreza o extrema pobreza. Para demostrarlo, presentaré primero dos casos disímiles que muestran el tipo de disposición afectiva que deseo someter a consideración del lector. En segundo lugar, discutiré las principales características de esta (...) disposición afectiva. En tercer lugar, expondré el modelo intuicionista social, destacando los aspectos que me ayudarán a dar cuenta de la simpatía indolente. Por último, leeré la simpatía indolente a la luz de la teoría de Haidt y explicaré una de sus características más importantes: la brutalidad. (shrink)

In this article I analyze the academic reception of Jonathan Haidt’s seminal article The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. My thesis is that in the spheres of philosophy and psychology, this article was initially studied within the neurocentric paradigm, which dominated the field of scientific reflection in the fifteen years following its publication. This neurocentric reading established a specific interpretation of the text with several limitations. However, more recently a digital paradigm has (...) emerged and come to prevail in academia, providing a new perspective from which to return to Haidt’s text. Indeed, this approach makes it possible to unravel elements of the famous article that in the neurocentric paradigm went unnoticed by researchers. Moreover, the digital paradigm manages to better integrate Haidt’s seminal article into his later work as a whole. (shrink)

This article aims to investigate, starting from both the analysis of Haidt’s Theory of Moral Foundations, and his Intuitionist-social Model, if there is any implicit normative assumption in the author in relation to the value assigned to moral intuitions, both in relation to to its content and possible adaptive functionality, as well as to the mechanisms that trigger such intuitions. An attempt is made to unravel whether the author, beyond considering emotional intuitions as the true cause of moral judgments, ascribes (...) a positive or negative value to this situation. To this end, the motivations underlying various moral intuitions are examined, in order to analyze Haidt’s contributions to the clarification of a problem of normative metaethics of great impact. at present: can the same normative weight be attributed to any moral foundation in force in human societies; or are only some orientations rational, and therefore morally justifiable? Do they all reveal genuine moral concerns, or do some reflect relevant but not specifically moral adaptive interests, or even selfish aspirations functional to the interests of hegemonic sectors? The implications of the FMT are analyzed as a valuable heuristic guide to interpret the moral concerns of conservatives from an evolutionary meta-ethical approach that allows to overcome the monism of the liberal ethical code, for which the spectrum of genuine moral concerns is reduced to questions of justice, rights and protection of the weakest. The need to achieve a clearer articulation between the SIM, which puts more emphasis on the processes of acquisition of intuitions through learning and social interaction, and the FMT, that focuses on its content and its possible links with various adaptive interests. (shrink)