This article explores the connection between habits and the performing arts, arguing that habits are not only fundamental to the practice and appreciation of these arts but also inherently performative in nature. Drawing on insights from various philosophical traditions (including cognitive science, pragmatism, and phenomenology), it examines how habits function within artistic processes as resources for creativity and adaptation. Engaging critically with Noë’s interpretation of the entanglement between art and life, this article highlights the dual nature of habits: as routine (...) practices that scaffold artistic expression and as dynamic, transformative elements responsive to specific cultural and performative contexts. By focusing on key notions such as gesture, style, and rituality in the performing arts, this article discusses the role of habits in aesthetic experiences, highlighting how habits shape both artistic performances and audience engagement. This perspective challenges traditional views that oppose habits to creativity, defending instead the idea that habits are creatively operative in both the performing arts and their reception. (shrink)

There is a hard relationship between law and techno-science; two powers that shape reality. In principle, these powers shape reality by acting as two poles of a battery, i.e., endowed with opposite charges: techno-science is a mechanism for overcoming the limits that human beings encounter in their relationship with nature; law, on the other hand, reveals its face by imposing limits on human action, which, by nature, is free of certain bonds. From a general point of view, certain unavoidable normative (...) requirements seem clear in the effort to regulate new technological applications. Artificial intelligence poses new questions for legal theory and tests both the responsiveness of the system and the traditional and current conceptual categories. The challenge stems from the need to adapt the law, through normative or hermeneutic evolution, to a reality that is changing at a frenetic pace and with unpredictable mutations. All attempts to regulate AI to date have declared that scientific innovation must be brought within the framework of human rights. However, there is a question, rather a more general, I would even say preliminary, challenge to be faced without epistemic prejudice: do the applications of AI in any way affect the very meaning of the human? AI has a huge potential to improve the human condition (provided we can clarify what ’improve’ means) but, at the same time, increases, in terms of rights, unforeseen and unforeseeable challenges for existing treaties. This is due not only to the crisis of the legal dimension but also to the fact that its impact influences the notion of what we have hitherto conventionally considered as human beings. (shrink)

The recent publication of Merleau-Ponty’s work from the late Forties contributes valuable material for those interested in reconstructing a specifically Merleau-Pontian theory of value. In this paper, I examine how, in these texts, Merleau-Ponty’s political concerns show themselves to expand upon the famous analysis of the case of Schneider in Phenomenology of Perception. This retroactively offers an opportunity for a normative reading of the case of Schneider and for identifying Merleau-Ponty’s practical philosophy as concerned with preventing and healing agnosia in (...) politics and ethics. On the basis of this negative hypothesis—that the ethical project is to oppose agnosia—it becomes possible to formulate a positive ethics. There, the unpublished texts also expand upon the Phenomenology of Perception: they propose a humanism which relies on the notion of hermeneutic freedom as the chief practical virtue and elaborate, somewhat unexpectedly, an analysis of play as the existential attitude that corresponds to this virtue. I conclude with a meta-ethical assessment of the merits of this ethical construction. (shrink)

Scientists often disagree on the best theory to describe a scientific event. While such debates are a natural part of healthy scientific discourse, the timeframe for scientists to converge on an ideal method may not always align with real-life knowledge dynamics. In this article, I use an event from the history of chemistry as inspiration to develop Agent-Based Models of epistemic networks, exploring method selection within a scientific community. These models reveal several situations where incorrect, simpler methods can persist, even (...) when substantial evidence supports a more complex method. This becomes particularly evident when different evidence-sharing timeframes are analyzed. The network structure connecting the scientists plays a crucial role in determining how and when convergence on the correct method is achieved, guided by real-world evidence. This framework provides a foundation for further exploration of scientists’ behavior in past and future discoveries, as well as how agents internalize scientific information. (shrink)

This article examines whether social media users can validly consent to their own use of social media. It argues that, whether or not social media use is analogous to public health interventions, there is an obligation to provide users with information about risks and benefits, and absent that provision, there is no valid consent. Many or most users, in any event, do not have the capacity to consent, according to the criteria for capacity articulated in the ‘four abilities’ model: the (...) ability to express a choice, the ability to understand the facts pertinent to the decision in question, the ability of a subject to believe that the information applies to them, and the ability to reason—in the sense of being able to consider and weigh (with reference to the patient’s own concerns, circumstances, and values) the main possible outcomes of the decision to opt for the intervention and the decision to opt not to undergo it. Even if an individual social media user is capacitous according to these criteria, many will fail to be judged capacitous if (as it is argued should be the case), a further criterion, identified by Jennifer Hawkins must be satisfied, namely that the individual can look after their own interests at least as well as most other people can. It follows from this consideration that not only can regulation of social media (in the form of a ban) be justified under Mill’s harm principle, but that non-regulation cannot be justified. (shrink)

The discourse concerning musical expression hinges on a fundamental analogy between music and language. While the extant literature commonly compares music to language, this essay takes the reverse direction, following Wittgenstein’s approach. The discussion contrasts the theoretical underpinnings of the “music as language” simile with those of the “language as music” simile. The emphasis on characterization, performance, mutual tuning-in relationships, the interaction between language and music, and the open-ended effort to reorient ourselves as we draw in significance challenges the “informing (...) paradigm” that has been paramount across contemporary philosophical theories of musical expression. One of the most promising philosophical avenues that emerges as we move beyond the “informing paradigm” is recognizing the inseparable relationship between musical expression and our power to shape our own language. (shrink)

This essay examines how university inter-group dialogue programs function, arguing that a common dynamic in dialogues about race is that members from privileged, majority groups (e.g., white, cis-het males) turn to members of so-called “minority” groups to disclose personal experiences. This paper examines four dialogue models and describes preliminary data from the Diversity Dialogue Project, a unique social justice dialogue program at a state university in Pennsylvania. Creating all-White groups where participants can probe the White problem may prevent burdening people (...) of color with the role of educator. Campus dialogue programs that emphasize the need to be courageous when talking about race may unintentionally entrench White power. (shrink)

The paper examines the integration of virtue epistemology into the philosophy of science, emphasizing its potential to deepen our understanding of scientific inquiry. The article begins by considering the limitations of traditional epistemological frameworks that focus on beliefs. The discussion is set in the context of the “value turn” in contemporary epistemology. Arguments are made to move towards recognizing the significance of intellectual virtues and the nature of epistemic agents. The current gaps in definitions of intellectual virtues about reliabilist and (...) responsibilist approaches are examined and conceptual steps are proposed to bridge these gaps. It is suggested that the local and general epistemic goals of science should be clearly distinguished and then different ways of knowing should be attributed to these goals. These ways of knowing are proposed to be seen as exemplifying the realization of reliable skills and intellectual character traits. In sum, the article argues that adopting a virtue epistemology not only enriches the discourse on scientific knowledge but also promotes a culture of responsibility and integrity in the scientific community. (shrink)

The authors would like to make the following corrections to the published paper [...].

A central question within contemporary debates about the structure of self-love concerns the place and status of the other. Is self-love identical to, or at least vulnerable to, the accusation of self-absorption and narcissism? Whereas contemporary critiques of self-love argue self-love is in principle impossible, the present essay suggests that self-love can be integrated with the love of the other at an a priori level. This material a priori, distinct from the Kantian formal a priori, entails resources such as commitment (...) to myself, to the other, and to us as relational unit, as well as to the enforcement of boundaries that protects against acts of injury and abuse instigated against that relational unit; I suggest such resources overcome the charge of narcissism levelled at the very idea of self-love. Prior to that, a brief contextual discussion of key moves about philosophical anthropology, focused on the concept of the monad in Leibniz, Husserl and its extreme repudiation in Jean-Luc Marion, is to be addressed. Finally I assess the intimate relationship between self-love and the love of the other inspired in large part by Augustine’s anthropology. (shrink)

This paper aims to map out the transformations in contemporary performance art during the current ‘age of extinction’. The first section extends Claire Bishop’s notion of “delegated performance” in order to categorize a turn towards the inclusion of other-than-human entities in the performance field. This operation leads to the concept of ‘performative animism’, referring to the strategies of re-animation of reality through artistic performance. The second section works out the idea of ‘planetarization’ of the performance field, which designates its opening (...) to spatial and temporal fluxes coming from a dimension that overcomes the scale of human experience, that is, the planetary dimension. The third and final section interprets the meaning of these two transformations by introducing the concepts of ‘exbodiment’ and ‘excarnation’, which tie closely to a new political task for performance art. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty’s specific theory of negation has received surprisingly little attention within the literature. Given his engagement with Sartre, not to mention Hegel and Marx, one would think that this concept and its surrounding issues and problems would occupy a more central place within various readings and interpretations. This essay attempts to give some indications of how to think about a Merleau-Pontian theory of negativity specifically. By re-reading the “Temporality” chapter from Phenomenology of Perception in dialogue with later writings and lectures, (...) I propose a theory of “integration” and “disintegration” of temporal passage in place of a dialectic of pure being and nothingness. This theory organizes various themes in Merleau-Ponty’s work, including sense-genesis and his references to the “scream of light”. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa has long been a leading advocate of a virtue-theoretic approach to the traditional problems of epistemology. However, in a recent book his thoughts take a striking new turn. Appealing to our epistemic competencies, he argues, will not suffice to meet the skeptical challenge to our claim to have knowledge of the world around us. We must recognize that our epistemic competencies are exercised against a background of “proper default assumptions”: commitments concerning the world and our place in it (...) that we cannot justify but can rely on without incurring epistemic fault. Sosa finds anticipations of this idea in Wittgenstein’s appeal to propositions “hinge” propositions which, though not known, “stand fast”. However, mere fast-standing beliefs, “unhinged from any broader virtue epistemology”, cannot explain how we come to have knowledge of a world whose character is independent of what we happen to think about it. I argue that the claim that our everyday knowledge of the world rests on a body of assumptions is a serious concession to skepticism, which Wittgenstein shows we need not make. Hinge propositions are not mere “standfast” beliefs: they are known with certainty. Wittgenstein offers a way of thinking about knowledge that Sosa does not consider. He also poses a challenge to commonly held views about how epistemology, to the extent that there is such a subject, should be pursued. (shrink)