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  1.  4
    Making Sense of the ‘is’ of Constitution.Ezequiel Zerburdis - 2021 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 361 (1).
    I consider a problem that arises in connection with cases of coincident objects and that affects the two main accounts that have been given of such cases, namely, Pluralism and Monism. The problem is that both views seem committed to accepting strained interpretations of some of the statements used to describe the situation. I consider Pickel’s arguments against the Pluralist’s strategy of interpreting ‘is’ as expressing constitution in sentences such as ‘The statue is the lump of clay’, and provide reasons (...)
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  2. No Matter Who: What Makes One a Relativist?Eduardo Pérez-Navarro - 2021 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 36 (2):231-242.
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  3. No Matter Who: What Makes One a Relativist?Eduardo Pérez-Navarro - 2021 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 36 (2):231-242.
    As part of her argument that relativism and contextualism are nothing but notational variants of each other, Stojanovic holds that contextualism is flexible enough to achieve whatever relativism might do if the matter is what truth-value is assigned to each pair of sentence and context. In this paper, I reply to this statement by arguing that contextualism cannot be made as flexible as relativism without in fact turning it into a version of relativism. The key to my response to Stojanovic (...)
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  4.  5
    Fictionalism and Meinongianism.Nathaniel Gan - 2021 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 36 (1):49-62.
    Fictionalism about a kind of disputed object is often motivated by the fact that the view interprets discourse about those objects literally without an ontological commitment to them. This paper argues that this motivation is inadequate because some viable alternatives to fictionalism have similar attractions. Meinongianism—the view that there are true statements about non-existent objects—is one such view. Meinongianism bears significant similarity to fictionalism, so intuitive doubts about its viability are difficult to sustain for fictionalists. Moreover, Meinongianism avoids some of (...)
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