One of the most difficult, yet interesting change in theseventeenth-century natural philosophy was that of chemistry. This essayfocuses upon Cartesian re-evaluation of the philosophical disciplines,arguing that, from a systematic perspective, chemistry cannot find a place innatural philosophy. Chemistry, in its seventeenth-century form of“chymistry” shares a number of common features with other traditions andpractices. Descartes and his first-generation of followers discussed in thisessay – Jacques du Roure, Robert Desgabets, and Jacques Rohault – willreact precisely to this discipline of “chymistry,” opposing it (...) to their physicsbuilt on a combination between theory of matter and mechanicalexplanations. The very restrictive Cartesian theory of matter will come intotension with any intermediate explanatory entity, such as the chymicalprinciples. This essay will investigate such tensions, arguing that they arecaused by both ontological and epistemological commitments. For example,the principles of the chymists contradict the one material extension of theCartesian world. At the same time, Cartesians require a more thoroughreductive process then the one provided by chymical explanations. In thissense, chymistry is good for practical purposes, but fails in providing anexplanation in natural philosophy and, hence, to represent a science. (shrink)

Both Gassendi and Descartes used fables in order toaccount for the formation of the world. The first aim of this paper is to arguethat, in both cases, the use of fiction does not merely wish to avoidcompeting with the account of Genesis. On the contrary, fiction appears tobe a proper conceptual tool. Subsequently, I will claim that Gassendi’s andDescartes’ fables of the world, in spite of their resemblances, serve ratherdifferent goals: Gassendi used the fictional account to underline the limits ofthe (...) physical explanation in cosmology, while Descartes used his fable toaccount for the functioning of the world. (shrink)