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  1.  21
    The Moral Asymmetry of Juvenile and Adult Offenders.David O. Brink - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):223-239.
    Many commentators agree that the trend to try juveniles as adults fails to recognize that there should be an asymmetry in our treatment of juvenile and adult crime such that all else being equal juvenile crime deserves less punishment than does adult crime. This essay explores different rationales for this asymmetry. A political rationale claims that the disenfranchisement of juveniles compromises the state’s democratic authority to punish juveniles in the same way it is permitted to punish adults. A developmental rationale (...)
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  2.  18
    Our “Barbarians” at the Gate: On the Undercriminalized Citizenship Deprivation as a Counterterrorism Tool.Ivó Coca-Vila - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):149-167.
    Germany is joining a long list of European democracies that have modified or expressed a willingness to modify their citizenship laws to denationalize first and then prevent the return of or expel those citizens accused of having participated in terrorist activities abroad. The formal labelling of citizenship deprivation as an administrative measure outside the scope of criminal justice has prevented scholars of criminal law from undertaking a thorough scrutiny of its legitimacy. In this paper I seek to fill this gap. (...)
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  3.  12
    Reasons for Punishment: A Study in Philosophical Translation.Michelle Madden Dempsey - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):189-201.
    This article is a contribution to a symposium on Kit Wellman’s intriguing monograph, Rights Forfeiture and Punishment. Primarily, the article grapples with Wellman’s claims regarding the moral permissibility of sadistic punishment. The metaphor of “philosophical languages” is employed throughout, to compare Wellman’s use of rights-forfeiture discourse to an approach that is grounded in practical-reasons discourse. This study in philosophical translation allows us to reassess and critique Wellman’s conclusions regarding the moral permissibility of sadistic punishment. On one level, the article is (...)
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  4.  15
    Review of John Lemos’ A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will. [REVIEW]Richard Double - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):299-306.
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  5.  6
    Crime and Punishment.Lindsay Farmer - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):289-298.
    This is a review essay of Lagasnerie, Judge and Punish and Fassin, The Will to Punish. It explores the way that these two books challenge conventional thinking about the relationship between crime and punishment.
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  6.  7
    Yaffe on Democratic Citizenship and Juvenile Justice.Jeffrey W. Howard - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):241-255.
    Why, exactly, should we punish children who commit crimes more leniently than adults who commit the same offenses? Gideon Yaffe thinks it is because they cannot vote, and so the strength of their reasons to obey the law is weaker than if they could. They are thus less culpable when they disobey. This argument invites an obvious objection: why not simply enfranchise children, thereby granting them legal reasons that are the same strength as enfranchised adults, and so permitting similarly severe (...)
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  7.  13
    Forfeiture and the Right to a Fair Trial.Gerald Lang - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):203-213.
    In his Rights Forfeiture and Punishment, Christopher Heath Wellman argues that his preferred ‘strong’ version of rights forfeiture theory makes the moral rights of due process and a fair trial null and void for guilty offenders. They may still possess legal rights to due process, but these are not strong pre-institutional moral rights. I explain here why I disagree with Wellman. I also suggest that he is not entitled, by his own lights, to affirm strong forfeiture theory, at least in (...)
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  8.  3
    Against the Received Wisdom: Why the Criminal Justice System Should Give Kids a Break.Stephen J. Morse - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):257-271.
    Professor Gideon Yaffe’s recent, intricately argued book, The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility, argues against the nearly uniform position in both law and scholarship that the criminal justice system should give juveniles a break because on average they have different capacities relevant to responsibility than adults. Professor Yaffe instead argues that kid should be given a break because juveniles have little say about the criminal law, primarily because they do not have a vote. For Professor (...)
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  9.  18
    I Would Do Anything for Law (and That’s a Problem): Criminalization, Value, and Motives.Jens Damgaard Thaysen - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):169-188.
    It is widely accepted that criminalization creates a prudential reason to refrain from the criminalized conduct in order to avoid punishment, and prudence is the wrong reason to refrain from wrongdoing. According to Michael S. Moore, these facts should lead us to conclude that the criminalization of wrongful conduct corrupts motives by making some who would otherwise have refrained from wrongdoing for the right reason, refrain from wrongdoing only out of prudence. This paper argues that and provide no reason to (...)
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  10.  9
    Clarifying Forfeiture Theory in Response to Dempsey and Lang.Christopher Heath Wellman - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):215-222.
    This paper clarifies and defends my account of the rights forfeiture theory of punishment in response to analyses by Michelle Madden Dempsey and Gerald Lang.
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  11.  12
    Psychological and Political Contributors to Criminal Culpability: Reply to Brink, Howard and Morse.Gideon Yaffe - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):273-287.
    This is a reply to David Brink, Jeff Howard and Stephen Morse’s commentaries on my book, The Age of Culpability.
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  12.  16
    Negligence, Mens Rea, and What We Want the Element of Mens Rea to Provide.Marcia Baron - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):69-89.
    It is widely agreed that the top three Model Penal Code culpability levels suffice for criminal liability, but the fourth is controversial. And it isn’t just the particular MPC wording; that negligence should be on the list at all is controversial. My question is: What makes negligence so different? What is it about negligence that gives rise to the view that it should not suffice for criminal liability? In addressing it, I draw attention to how we conduct the debate, and (...)
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  13.  18
    Reckless Enabling.Christopher Cowley - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):51-67.
    The 2016, the UK Supreme Court case of Jogee confirmed a long-standing convention in English law. In cases where D is assisting or encouraging P to commit an offence, D will only be liable as an accessory for that offence if she intentionally assists or encourages P and if she knows the essential features of the offence. In this paper, I discuss and develop some of the arguments from Sanford Kadish’s 1996 article “Reckless Complicity.” I argue that a special sub-category (...)
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  14.  11
    Special Issue on Recklessness and Negligence.Christopher Cowley & Beatrice Krebs - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):5-8.
    This paper introduces the Special Issue on Recklessness and Negligence. It highlights the main issues and controversies that surround these concepts and then briefly introduces each of the papers that comprise the Special Issue.
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  15.  3
    Special Issue on Recklessness and Negligence.Christopher Cowley & Beatrice Krebs - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):5-8.
    This paper introduces the Special Issue on Recklessness and Negligence. It highlights the main issues and controversies that surround these concepts and then briefly introduces each of the papers that comprise the Special Issue.
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  16.  1
    Special Issue on Recklessness and Negligence.Christopher Cowley & Beatrice Krebs - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):5-8.
    This paper introduces the Special Issue on Recklessness and Negligence. It highlights the main issues and controversies that surround these concepts and then briefly introduces each of the papers that comprise the Special Issue.
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  17.  12
    John Gardner, in memoriam.Michelle Madden Dempsey - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):3-4.
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  18.  18
    Epistemic Responsibility and Criminal Negligence.Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):91-111.
    We seem to be responsible for our beliefs in a distinctively epistemic way. We often hold each other to account for the beliefs that we hold. We do this by criticising other believers as ‘gullible’ or ‘biased’, and by trying to persuade others to revise their beliefs. But responsibility for belief looks hard to understand because we seem to lack control over our beliefs. In this paper, I argue that we can make progress in our understanding of responsibility for belief (...)
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  19.  10
    Review of Mark Dsouza’s Rationale - Based Defences in Criminal Law. [REVIEW]Zachary Hoskins - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):135-140.
    Mark Dsouza’s new book, Rationale-Based Defences in Criminal Law, aims to shed new light on the question of how to conceptualize justifications and excuses as defenses against criminal liability. His offers an alternative to the common account on which justifications negate the wrongness of acts whereas excuses negate only the actor’s blameworthiness but not the act’s wrongness. Instead, Dsouza contends that the justification–excuse distinction is entirely a matter of the quality of the defendant’s reasoning. His account of justifications is generally (...)
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  20.  9
    Review of Richard Dagger, Playing Fair: Political Obligation and the Problems of Punishment. [REVIEW]Piero Moraro - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):141-147.
    Richard Dagger purports to solve the problem of political obligation and the problem of punishment simultaneously, by employing the principle of fair play. Notwithstanding the valuable contribution his book makes to the philosophical debate, I argue that Dagger does not defeat long-standing objections faced by fair play-based justifications of the duty to obey the law and of state punishment.
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  21.  12
    Recklessness Without the Risk.David Prendergast - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):31-50.
    Risk is at the core of criminal recklessness, but its exact constitution comes into focus only in unusual cases. In rethinking criminal law, Larry Alexander and Kimberley Kessler Ferzan say that risk in criminal recklessness ought to be constituted by the subjective belief of the person whose action is being evaluated: the gravity of the harm risked and its probability of resulting is what the person believed it to be, not what it actually was. This means that recklessness can be (...)
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  22.  4
    Recklessness Without the Risk.David Prendergast - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):31-50.
    Risk is at the core of criminal recklessness, but its exact constitution comes into focus only in unusual cases. In rethinking criminal law, Larry Alexander and Kimberley Kessler Ferzan say that risk in criminal recklessness ought to be constituted by the subjective belief of the person whose action is being evaluated: the gravity of the harm risked and its probability of resulting is what the person believed it to be, not what it actually was. This means that recklessness can be (...)
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  23.  8
    The Reasonableness in Recklessness.Findlay Stark - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):9-29.
    Recklessness involves unreasonable/unjustified risk-taking. The argument here is that recklessness in the criminal law is best understood as nevertheless containing an element of reasonableness. To be reckless, on this view, the defendant must reasonably believe that she is exposing others to a risk of harm. If the defendant’s belief about the risk being imposed by her conduct is unreasonable, she should not be considered reckless. This point is most important in relation to offences of endangerment where recklessness sets the outer (...)
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  24.  17
    Taking Responsibility for Negligence and Non-negligence.Garrath Williams - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):113-134.
    Negligence reminds us that we often do and cause things unawares, occasionally with grave results. Given the lack of foresight and intention, some authors argue that people should not be judged culpable for negligence. This paper offers a contrasting view. It argues that gaining control is itself a fundamental responsibility, with both collective and individual elements. The paper underlines both sides, focussing on how they relate as we ascribe responsibility or culpability. Following the introduction, Section 2 argues that conscious awareness (...)
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