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  1.  98
    Author’s Reply: Negligence and Normative Import.Katrina L. Sifferd & Tyler K. Fagan - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 22 (August):1-19.
    In this paper we attempt to reply to the thoughtful comments made on our book, Responsible Brains, by a stellar group of scholars. Our reply focuses on two topics discussed in the commenting papers: frst, the issue of responsibility for negligent behavior; and second, the broad claim that facts about brain function are normatively inert. In response to worries that our theory lacks normative implications, we will concentrate on an area where our theory has clear relevance to law and legal (...)
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  2. Minding Negligence.Craig K. Agule - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):231-251.
    The counterfactual mental state of negligent criminal activity invites skepticism from those who see mental states as essential to responsibility. Here, I offer a revision of the mental state of criminal negligence, one where the mental state at issue is actual and not merely counterfactual. This revision dissolves the worry raised by the skeptic and helps to explain negligence’s comparatively reduced culpability.
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  3.  3
    What’s Really Wrong with Fining Crimes? On the Hard Treatment of Criminal Monetary Fines.Ivó Coca-Vila - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):395-415.
    Among the advocates of expressive theories of punishment, there is a strong consensus that monetary fines cannot convey the message of censure that is required to punish serious crimes or crimes against the person. Money is considered an inappropriate symbol to express condemnation. In this article, I argue that this sentiment is correct, although not for the reasons suggested by advocates of expressivism. The monetary day-fine should not be understood as a simple deprivation of money, but as a punishment that (...)
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  4.  6
    We are More Than our Executive Functions: on the Emotional and Situational Aspects of Criminal Responsibility and Punishment.Federica Coppola - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):253-266.
    In Responsible Brains, Hirstein, Sifferd and Fagan apply the language of cognitive neuroscience to dominant understandings of criminal responsibility in criminal law theory. The Authors make a compelling case that, under such dominant understandings, criminal responsibility eventually ‘translates’ into a minimal working set of executive functions that are primarily mediated by the frontal lobes of the brain. In so arguing, the Authors seem to unquestioningly accept the law’s view of the “responsible person” as a mixture of cognitive capacities and mechanisms—thereby (...)
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  5. Neuroscience and Normativity: How Knowledge of the Brain Offers a Deeper Understanding of Moral and Legal Responsibility.William Hirstein - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):327-351.
    Neuroscience can relate to ethics and normative issues via the brain’s cognitive control network. This network accomplishes several executive processes, such as planning, task-switching, monitoring, and inhibiting. These processes allow us to increase the accuracy of our perceptions and our memory recall. They also allow us to plan much farther into the future, and with much more detail than any of our fellow mammals. These abilities also make us fitting subjects for responsibility claims. Their activity, or lack thereof, is at (...)
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  6.  4
    Neuroscience and Normativity: How Knowledge of the Brain Offers a Deeper Understanding of Moral and Legal Responsibility.William Hirstein - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):327-351.
    Neuroscience can relate to ethics and normative issues via the brain’s cognitive control network. This network accomplishes several executive processes, such as planning, task-switching, monitoring, and inhibiting. These processes allow us to increase the accuracy of our perceptions and our memory recall. They also allow us to plan much farther into the future, and with much more detail than any of our fellow mammals. These abilities also make us fitting subjects for responsibility claims. Their activity, or lack thereof, is at (...)
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  7.  13
    The Objective(s) of Responsible Brains.Douglas Husak - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):267-281.
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  8.  10
    Relating Neuroscience to Responsibility: Comments on Hirstein, Sifferd, and Fagan’s Responsible Brains.Michael S. Moore - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):283-298.
    The article explores the agreements and disagreements between the author and the authors of Responsible Brains on how neuroscience relates to moral responsibility. The agreements are fundamental: neuroscience is not the harbinger of revolutionary revision of our views of when persons are morally responsible for the harms that they cause. The disagreements are in the details of what is needed for neuroscience to be the helper of the moral sciences.
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  9.  1
    Is Executive Function the Universal Acid?Stephen J. Morse - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):299-318.
    This essay responds to Hirstein, Sifferd and Fagan’s book, Responsible Brains, which claims that executive function is the guiding mechanism that supports both responsible agency and the necessity for some excuses. In contrast, I suggest that executive function is not the universal acid and the neuroscience at present contributes almost nothing to the necessary psychological level of explanation and analysis. To the extent neuroscience can be useful, it is virtually entirely dependent on well-validated psychology to correlate with the neuroscientific variables (...)
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  10.  9
    Inert.Dennis Patterson - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):319-324.
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  11. Correction to: Inert.Dennis Patterson - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):325-325.
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  12.  2
    Review of Vincent Chiao, Criminal Law in the Age of the Administrative State: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, 270 pp. [REVIEW]Peter Ramsay - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):423-428.
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  13.  1
    Author’s Reply: Negligence and Normative Import.Katrina L. Sifferd & Tyler K. Fagan - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):353-371.
    In this paper we attempt to reply to the thoughtful comments made on our book, Responsible Brains, by a stellar group of scholars. Our reply focuses on two topics discussed in the commenting papers: first, the issue of responsibility for negligent behavior; and second, the broad claim that facts about brain function are normatively inert. In response to worries that our theory lacks normative implications, we will concentrate on an area where our theory has clear relevance to law and legal (...)
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  14.  4
    Review of A du Bois-Pedain and A Bottoms, eds., Penal Censure: Engagements Within and Beyond Desert Theory: Studies in Penal Theory and Penal Ethics. Oxford: Hart (2019) 328 pp. [REVIEW]Gabrielle Watson - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):417-422.
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  15.  7
    Review of Alexander Brown and Adriana Sinclair, The Politics of Hate Speech Laws. [REVIEW]Sebastien Bishop - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (1):223-229.
    This review critically summarises Alexander Brown and Adriana Sinclair’s excellent book, The Politics of Hate Speech Laws. The review proceeds by canvassing the main arguments presented in each of the book’s nine chapters, while also seeking to highlight the book’s overarching themes and ideas. Ultimately it is suggested that the book will be of use to anyone interested in the political and philosophical aspects of the highly vexed issue of hate speech regulation. In particular the review praises the book’s pluralistic, (...)
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  16.  45
    A Review of Elinor Mason’s Ways to be Blameworthy. [REVIEW]Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (1):215-221.
    In this review, I summarize Elinor Mason’s Ways to be Blameworthy and raise some worries concerning three aspects of her book: her account of the knowledge condition on moral responsibility, her notion of blame and its justification as well as Mason’s conception of extended blameworthiness.
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  17. What is Criminal Rehabilitation?Lisa Forsberg & Thomas Douglas - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (1):103-126.
    It is often said that the institutions of criminal justice ought or—perhaps more often—ought not to rehabilitate criminal offenders. But the term ‘criminal rehabilitation’ is often used without being explicitly defined, and in ways that are consistent with widely divergent conceptions. In this paper, we present a taxonomy that distinguishes, and explains the relationships between, different conceptions of criminal rehabilitation. Our taxonomy distinguishes conceptions of criminal rehabilitation on the basis of the aims or ends of the putatively rehabilitative measure, and (...)
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  18.  8
    Intervening Agency and Civilian Liability.Helen Frowe - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (1):181-191.
    Adam Hosein has recently proposed that a sufficient degree of intervening agency between a person’s contribution to an unjust lethal threat and the posing of that threat can exempt the contributor from liability to defensive killing. Hosein suggests that this will exempt most civilians from liability to lethal defence even if they contribute to unjust killings. I argue that intervening agency does not bear on a person’s responsibility for a threat, and does not exempt her from liability to defensive killing.
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  19. The Merits and Limits of Conscience-Based Legal Exemptions.Jocelyn Maclure - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (1):127-134.
    Exemption claims remain a tangled and divisive moral and legal issue both in academia and in the public sphere. In his book Exemptions: Necessary, Justified, or Misguided?, the constitutional scholar Kent Greenawalt zeros in on the vexed question of whether exemptions from rules of general applicability based on the conscientious convictions of individuals or groups are sometimes justified or prudent by discussing a wide range of cases drawn from the American jurisprudence. Although he does not engage in a significant way (...)
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  20.  38
    Dark Mores: Some Comments on Tommie Shelby’s Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform.Charles W. Mills - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (1):29-43.
    Tommie Shelby’s Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform is a major contribution to black political thought and the theorization of racial justice more generally. In these brief comments, I begin by situating Shelby’s work both in the Anglo-American political tradition and the Afro-modern political tradition. While praising the accomplishment that Shelby’s book represents, I nonetheless go on to point out some obstacles to his project arising from the tensions between these traditions. Using the concept of “dark mores”, I argue that (...)
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  21.  2
    Dark Times, Black Light: A Reply to Yankah, Kelly, and Mills.Tommie Shelby - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (1):45-55.
    Replies to symposium commentaries on the book Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform.
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  22.  14
    Conceptualizing Coercive Indoctrination in Moral and Legal Philosophy.Evan Tiffany - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (1):153-179.
    This paper argues that there are compelling grounds for thinking that coercive indoctrination can defeat or mitigate moral culpability in virtue of being a form of non-culpable moral ignorance. That is, I defend a two-tier account such that what excuses an agent for a wrongful act is the agent’s ignorance regarding the moral quality of their act; and what excuses the defendant for their ignorance is that coercion or manipulation deprived the defendant of a fair opportunity to avoid that ignorance. (...)
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