1. PrefaceJust over a year ago, I published a book under the title “What’s Wrong with Rights.”1 The title did have a question mark at the end of it because I intended to evaluate a number of criticisms leveled against the very concept of a right, against the concept of a natural right, and against prevalent rights-talk.

ExcerptJudaism, Christianity, and Islam are each in their own way monotheistic religions–and I would argue that this unifying factor that links together all three Western religions has profound repercussions upon the conceptualization of God and the allowable limits to political behavior in the name of God that each of these religions would be theologically entitled/permitted to advocate. Plato in his dialogue Parmenides forms a significant part of the pedigree to the emergence of monotheism–and, if not a “pedigree,” because there are (...) conflicting views among historians as to when the texts of Genesis and Exodus actually appeared,1 then a cogent presentation of the same theme. Plato’s version is theologically and logically connected to the simultaneous introduction in the Parmenides of the tenets of negative theology, that we can only say what the One is not, but not what He is. Because negative formulations are inextricably grammatically and logically linked to positive formulations (they can always be rephrased in positive form), Plato’s concession to the intelligibility of negative theology is largely rhetorical, and not substantive. (shrink)

ExcerptWhen the U.S. State Department Commission on Unalienable Rights issued its report1 on August 26, 2020, one of the questions most frequently asked by journalists was: “What do you expect to become of it?” Or, as one put it more bluntly, “What will prevent this report from just accumulating dust on some forgotten library shelf?”.

ExcerptRecent advances in the functional power of artificial intelligence (AI) have prompted an urgent warning from industry leaders and researchers concerning its “profound risks to society and humanity.”1 Their open letter is admirable not only for its succinct identification of said risks, which include the mass dissemination of misinformation, loss of jobs, and even the possible extinction of our species, but also for its clear normative framing of the problem: “Should we let machines flood our information channels with propaganda and (...) untruth? Should we automate away all the jobs, including the fulfilling ones? Should we develop nonhuman minds that might eventually outnumber, outsmart, obsolete and replace us? Should we risk loss of control of our civilization?”2. (shrink)

ExcerptIn his insightful book Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, Michael Ignatieff observes that “[t]he challenge of Islam has been there from the beginning.”1 Ignatieff is not alone among Western observers. And in this context, I would like to begin by stating up front that I am neither an opponent of human rights per se nor among those tradition-bound Muslims—though that I am–who abstain from either endorsing the construct or rejecting it outright, presumably as an exercise of sorts in “passive (...) resistance.” Similarly, I do not believe, as another scholar characterizes the position of revealed religion, that “human rights are a secular usurpation of the rights of God.”2 In fact, as I will show, for well over half a millennium, Muslims have theorized on what could only be considered a concept of human rights, while simultaneously recognizing the “rights of God.” Nor do I believe, contrary to popular perception, that the purportedly “secular” roots of human rights necessarily place them outside the reach of Islam, unless, of course, one assumes, as I do not, that the dominant understanding of “secular” in the West is the only meaning the term can legitimately carry. These are among the reasons why, for me, the idea of summarily rejecting human rights seems so unnecessary if not misguided. (shrink)

ExcerptSignificant political changes are taking place in contemporary China. The current Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, has decisively changed the system for the succession of power established by Deng Xiaoping, the architect of Chinese reforms. Xi has eliminated the two-term limit on the presidency that was introduced to the Chinese constitution in 1982. He has centralized the system of governance significantly, reinforced the role of Party bodies in relation to state bodies, and transferred the main decision-making function from the traditional ministries (...) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee departments to numerous governing groups, most of which he personally heads. In foreign policy, Xi has effectively abandoned the principle of “keeping a low profile and biding your time” (tao guang yang hui) put forward by Deng Xiaoping. According to official Chinese ideology, the new theory of government is one of the foundations of the “Xi Jinping thought” that, along with the provisions of the founders of Marxism and some other Chinese leaders, should guide the people of China. This provision was enshrined in the country’s constitution in 2018. However, the most important change, from the point of view of the Chinese authorities, was the implementation of a multifaceted government reform that foreign observers dubbed the “fifth modernization.”1. (shrink)

ExcerptVassilios Paipais, ed. Theology and World Politics: Metaphysics, Genealogies, Political Theologies. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Pp. xiv + 349. Political theology represents one of the most fundamental subfields of contemporary political theory and international political theory. Since the 1920s, when Carl Schmitt introduced the respective terminology in the broader field of social and political sciences, political theology has developed in a dynamic way, composing, one way or another, a broader interdisciplinary field in which philosophy, theology, and politics are fruitfully interconnected.

ExcerptThe reasons why individual nations and even individual people subscribe to notions of human rights vary enormously. Rationales range from idealism to realpolitik and sound in competing registers of theology, social contract, nature, utility, and game theory.1 Pervasive in discussions of human rights is the dignity of each person as both a reality and a normative guide. Capacious and ambiguous, this notion of dignity may invite agreement precisely because different people project different meanings onto it. Its recognition, though, can inspire (...) attitudes of respect and civility even when we disagree. Dignity thus serves less as a foundation and more as a lodestar, an aspiration. Justice Thurgood Marshall once explained, “A child born to a [B]lack mother in a state like Mississippi… has exactly the same rights as a white baby born to the wealthiest person in the United States. It’s not true, but I challenge anyone to say it is not a goal worth working for.”2. (shrink)

ExcerptHuman rights organizations for the past few decades have generally attempted to promote international law against the principle of state sovereignty in order to establish human rights norms worldwide. This approach presumes the universality of human rights is in fundamental opposition to the principle of sovereignty because this principle can be used by governments to shield themselves from outside criticism. By contrast, the U.S. State Department’s Report of the Commission on Unalienable Rights has outlined an approach that emphasizes not just (...) the compatibility between universal human rights and state sovereignty but even their dependence on each other.1 We see the results of this clash in the response to the Report by Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch and one of the expert witnesses during the commission’s proceedings.2 He sees in the Report’s foregrounding of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “a frontal assault on international human rights law” because it shifts attention away from international law and toward more informal documents such as the Universal Declaration, which lays out a set of goals rather than legally binding commitments. (shrink)

ExcerptOne of the most disappointing human rights debacles in the last few years was the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. For those who still take an interest,1 the human rights situation there has become horrendous, with Human Rights Watch documenting the denial of schooling and employment to women, extrajudicial killings, and torture.2 Moreover, in a severe rebuttal to those who supported the withdrawal, Taliban rule has created the conditions for a renewal of terrorist groups that can now develop and (...) train in Afghanistan with impunity.3 There is also a good case to be made that the U.S. withdrawal there emboldened Putin to invade Ukraine, calculating that the United States and its allies no longer have the stomach for protracted conflicts in order to prevent human rights abuses. It may be that we have traded a low-grade conflict in Afghanistan for a high-intensity one in Ukraine.4 The lesson here is that the struggle for human rights, while beginning as a moral problem about our common responsibilities, can only be taken seriously when we consider its political ramifications. What do we owe to our fellow humans, and what sacrifices should we make in order to fulfill those responsibilities? (shrink)

ExcerptFred Siegel’s passing on May 7th of this year was a profound loss for us all. A frequent guest and participant at our events, he contributed to Telos from the 1980s to the 2020 publication of his last book, The Crisis of Liberalism: Prelude to Trump. His ideas had a defining impact on Paul Piccone and the journal’s development, laying the foundations for what would become the Telos populist critique of liberalism. With a keen ear for the right turn of (...) phrase to describe a complex idea, he titled his seminal essay for Telos “Is Archie Bunker Fit to Rule? Or: How Immanuel Kant Became One of the Founding Fathers.”1 Setting Archie Bunker as the representative of democracy against the intellectual Immanuel Kant, Siegel succinctly crystallized what was at stake as well as the audacity of his argument, especially for a Telos readership that was inclined to support German philosophy over American pop culture. In making his case for Archie Bunker, Siegel attacked with eloquence and perspicacity the intellectual foundations of liberal thinking. (shrink)

ExcerptThe University of Notre Dame Kellogg Institute’s 2021 conference on “Inalienable Rights and the Traditions of Constitutionalism” was, for me, a breath of oxygen because it brought together many who understand that human rights are more than simply reflections of particular political preferences of some societies at particular times, and that to understand human rights that way reduces them to the level of arbitrary positive law. Human rights are based in human nature, and in nature itself, not simply in international (...) legislation. Today, the idea of human rights serves many masters: utilitarianism, consequentialism, communitarianism, socialism, postmodernism, intersectionality—not to mention numerous regimes that defend human rights violations with human rights rhetoric. But the conferees seemed to generally agree that human rights are principles, rooted in human nature, that can protect our moral and political freedom. (shrink)

ExcerptMany people assume that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was an exclusively or primarily Western project, imposed on the rest of the world by the European and American powers that emerged victorious from World War II. Harvard Law professor Mary Ann Glendon’s 2001 book, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, suggests otherwise. It was not the great powers but small powers that pushed hardest for a declaration of rights. And it (...) was often great powers—and one must acknowledge, great powers dominated by people of European ancestry—that did not like the idea of being pushed around by politically and economically weaker inhabitants of the Global South, who were just beginning to emerge from centuries of Western colonialism and other forms of oppression.1. (shrink)

ExcerptIn the spring of 2021, the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, received a non-paper titled “West Balkans—A Way Forward.” The scandalous paper envisaged a redrawing of several national borders in the West Balkans. Among other changes, it proposed “the unification of Kosovo and Albania” and the “joining of larger parts of the Republika Srpska’s territory with Serbia.”1 However, this scandalous proposition, which the EU preferred to meet with silence, was not limited to a redrawing of the borders. What (...) was also scandalous was the ratio of the proposed territorial changes. The redrawing was proposed along the lines of ethnic majorities populating the regions in question (Albanians in Kosovo or Serbs in the Republika Srpska). While the state borders were drawn following a logic of ethnicity, the idea of a multiethnic nation seemed to exceed the imagination of the paper’s authors. For them, nations were to be ethnically homogeneous. (shrink)

1. IntroductionConstructing narratives that can combat people’s unease about their sense of belonging, by providing a sense of certainty and steadfastness, is a recurrent affect in the history of humanity.1 Perhaps change is, however, the only constant in this history. Over a hundred years ago, Max Weber bemoaned the transition to a rationalized modernity as “the disenchantment of the world,”2 which in turn had been inspired by similar concerns expressed by Friedrich Schiller in his poem “The Gods of Greece” (“Die (...) Götter Griechenlands”) at the end of the eighteenth century.3 Intensifying scholarly debates across the humanities and social sciences, asking questions about what people experience as fundamental changes to the fabric of their lived realities and how they cope with it, further indicate that Western societies are in transition in the present day. There is, however, disagreement over whether the human condition simply observes changes or whether it transforms into a qualitatively new stage, one that has been termed postmodernity, late modernity, and liquid modernity.4 Nevertheless, there is a consensus among scholars that contemporary realities unfold in contrast to social imaginaries that have defined Western societies and senses of belonging since the “global transformation” took place in the nineteenth century. This transformation still “underpins core aspects of contemporary international relations,” as Barry Buzan and George Lawson contend.5 Even today, social imaginaries are narrated—and criticized as such—in grand terms, often with a focus on the nation and a (however conceived) glorious future. (shrink)

1. IntroductionIn a recent editorial, the Lancet reported that one of the consequences of pandemics is the detrimental impact “on the mental health of affected populations,” and the current COVID-19 one is no different. Since its out-break at the end of 2019, “depressed mood, anxiety, impaired memory, and insomnia” are constant companions of people around the world. Many even experience “stress, burnout, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder.” Amongst its concerns, the Lancet notes the rising “misuse of substances” as a consequence (...) of these mental health problems.1 One of the reasons for this global mental health crisis is the way the pandemic affects peoples’ practices of community building and rituals of belonging. Having to wear masks, being required to keep at least 1.5 meters apart, not being able to meet (vulnerable) friends and family members, and even more drastic measures like weeklong lockdowns fundamentally disrupted everyday lives and reduced opportunities to socialize. What is normally taken for granted is being challenged. Around the world, these measures have been met by increasing demonstrations, often based on conspiracy theories and against commonsense precautions for preventing a potentially lethal disease. This conflict between reasonable precaution and emotional stress and pressure suggests disruptions of common narratives of belonging. (shrink)

ExcerptDavid Graeber and David Wengrow, The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021. Pp. 704. The Dawn of Everything is not just a massive book in terms of its total number of pages but also in the amount of archaeological evidence discussed concerning human “prehistory.” The authors range over current disputes within their disciplines as well as discussing in some detail political philosophies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In spite of its (...) size and range, the book has been widely reviewed and has had a publication success rarely seen with academic works. Attention to it may be in part due to the publishing career of its co-author David Graeber, who tragically died in 2020 just before the book appeared in print. The reason I mention this point is that Graeber’s work had both an academic and non-academic audience, in such books as Bullshit Jobs: A Theory, Debt: The First 5,000 Years, and The Democracy Project: A History, a Crisis, a Movement. He also had a public profile during the Occupy Wall Street movement beginning in 2011, which highlighted his advocacy of anarchism. Graeber’s political philosophy plays a significant role in this book. (shrink)

ExcerptDavid Lloyd Dusenbury, The Innocence of Pontius Pilate: How the Roman Trial of Jesus Shaped History. London: Hurst Publishers, 2021. Pp. 272. The Innocence of Pontius Pilate by David L. Dusenbury of the Danube Institute is a profound reflection on the differentiation of secular and religious authority that should excite theologians, historians, believers, as well as historical sociologists. The point of departure is the question of the innocence or guilt of Pilate, the Roman magistrate who condemned Jesus to death, which (...) has been a contested issue from soon after Jesus died to modern New Testament criticism. Was Pilate guilty of the highest crime— deicide—or had he been, in some sense, innocent or even just? More interesting than a mere overview of how different epochs and authors received the Pilate story, Dusenbury’s book investigates the ramifications of the only sense in which Pilate was innocent: he was innocent of an understanding of a kingdom not of this earth. As Paul puts it succinctly in I Corinthians: “None of the rulers of this age (saeculum) understood this [other kingdom]—for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory” (55). (shrink)

1. IntroductionIn 2020, when the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certified Chinese salted pickled vegetables from Sichuan called pao cai, hina’s media, including the state-run Global Times newspaper, reported the news as if China had won the international standard for kimchi making,1 although the ISO clearly stated in the certification document that the certification did not apply to kimchi.2 This reporting provoked Koreans, and it quickly became a cultural dispute between the two countries, at least in the media and social (...) media outlets. (shrink)

1. IntroductionIt is an increasingly accepted protocol to situate oneself discursively in order to approach a set of problems. This protocol, consolidated by Donna Haraway’s famous “situated knowledge,” is also evident in everyday Indigenous Australian practice.1 I begin, therefore, with my long association with the Goolarabooloo community in Broome, North-West Australia, and in particular with Paddy Roe, who started teaching me in the late 1970s. This text attempts to translate his sense of belonging to that territory, an attachment he had (...) to struggle to maintain, both in the face of ongoing destructive colonization and also in the face of other Aboriginal territorial claims. These collective attachments are therefore inflected by history—not just settler history, but Indigenous history that has changed in relation to colonization. These changes are wrought through overwhelmingly rapid material changes, shifting institutional alliances, contested concepts, and new practices. This ethnographic history is an attempt to provide an overview of some of these changes in the North-West corner of Australia over the last forty years. (shrink)

IntroductionThis paper employs Confucianism to illustrate a kind of differential or benevolent love, which people give in accordance with their relations and roles. In this sense, Confucian benevolent love is more of a duty to create mutual belonging than an emotion of solidarity.1 This benevolent love contrasts with the universal love of liberalism and the resultant solidarity that those who express this form of love feel for one another—these people often being the distant and unacquainted—whose presence would puzzle Confucian leaders (...) in terms of their roles and duties. Confucian roles are, in comparison, contextual, evolving, and reciprocal in order to cope with encountered strangeness. The liberal belief in everyone being ontologically equal and free de-emphasizes the relevance of experiencing the other’s strangeness. As a result of this, a Confucian’s and liberal’s love for one another may ironically cause, in both, a moral outrage qua deprived belonging.2. (shrink)

ExcerptAndrei S. Markovits, The Passport as Home: Comfort in Rootlessness. Foreword by Michael Ignatieff. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2021. Pp. 328. The Passport as Home: Comfort in Rootlessness is the autobiography of the well-known American political scientist Andrei S. Markovits and was published in 2021 by Central European University Press. After the 328 pages of text in American English, readers will recognize the author’s great fondness not only for analytical political science, sports, Italian opera, the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, (...) and the Grateful Dead, but also for different languages—Romanian, Hungarian, German, and English—and will enjoy Markovits’s beautiful style and the many linguistic nuances and subtleties the book offers. (shrink)

1. IntroductionHaving been adapted into a movie by Martin Scorsese in 2016, Silence is Shūsaku Endō’s most famous novel outside of Japan. Initially published in 1966, the novel is about seventeenth-century Jesuit missionaries who secretly make a voyage to Japan in search of their spiritual Father who has reportedly renounced his faith after being tortured by local authorities. In his foreword to Endō’s Silence, Scorsese, a devout Catholic and long-standing admirer of Endō’s work, claims that the novel is “about the (...) particular and the general. And it is finally about the first overwhelming the second.”1 Not only did Endō acknowledge an inevitable conflict between experience and belief, but he also creatively adapted his faith for a different reality. Endō described Catholicism as “Western clothing my mother gave me,” which, throughout his life, he tried to tailor into a Japanese kimono that would fit him.2 Suffering from an unhappy marriage, his mother turned to Catholicism, and Endō followed her in this pursuit at the age of eleven. (shrink)