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  1. What Colors Look Like.Hagit Benbaji - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
     
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    Stipulations and Requirements: Reply to Horden.Louis deRosset - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10:74-84.
    In "Analyticity and Ontology," I argued that there are counterexamples to the claim that the sentences analytically entailed by a claim $\phi$ require nothing more of the world for their truth than does $\phi$. The counterexamples involve sentences which, I argued, are analytically entailed by certain truths, but which nevertheless require more of the world for their truth. John Horden has offered two interesting criticisms of this argument. First, he contends that its conclusion is inconsistent. Second, he contends that the (...)
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  3. Are There Ineffable Aspects of Reality?Thomas Hofweber - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
     
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  4. Devious Stipulations.John Horden - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
    Recent attempts to answer ontological questions through conceptual analysis have been controversial. Still, it seems reasonable to assume that if the existence of certain things analytically follows from sentences we already accept, then there is no further ontological commitment involved in affirming the existence of those things. More generally, it is plausible that whenever a sentence analytically entails another, the conjunction of those sentences requires nothing more of the world for its truth than the former sentence alone. In his ‘Analyticity (...)
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  5.  62
    Teleological Dispositions.Nick Kroll - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
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  6. Grounding Grounding.Jon Litland - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
    The Problem of Iterated Ground is to explain what grounds truths about ground: if Γ grounds φ, what grounds that Γ grounds φ? This paper develops a novel solution to this problem. The basic idea is to connect ground to explanatory arguments. By developing a rigorous account of explanatory arguments we can equip operators for factive and non-factive ground with natural introduction and elimination rules. A satisfactory account of iterated ground falls directly out of the resulting logic: non- factive grounding (...)
     
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  7. Dispositions Without Teleology.David Manley & Ryan Wasserman - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
     
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  8. Indirect Directness.Jennifer McKitrick - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
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  9. PSR and Probabilities.Alexander Pruss - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
     
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  10. The Metaphysics of Quantities and Their Dimensions.Bradford Skow - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
     
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  11.  26
    Vague Existence.Alessandro Torza - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
    Ted Sider has famously argued that existence, in the unrestricted sense of ontology, cannot be vague, as long as vagueness is modeled by means of precisifications. The first section of Chapter 9 exposes some controversial assumptions underlying Sider’s alleged reductio of vague existence. The upshot of the discussion is that, although existence cannot be vague, it can be super-vague, i.e. higher-order vague, for all orders. The second section develops and defends a novel framework, dubbed negative supervaluationary semantics, which makes room (...)
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  12. Ersatz Counterparts.Richard Woodward - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
    Counterpart theory has many benefits, but few are happy to accept the metaphysical setting in which this account of de re modality was developed by its architect, David Lewis. I argue here that counterpart theory can be made acceptable by the lights of those who repudiate the existence of merely possible objects. To the "ersatz" counterpart theorist I offer two stories: one about the relate of the counterpart relation and one about the relation itself. With these in place, I then (...)
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