How can events in part of the Stoic cosmos be contingent, when all events are necessary? Why does Chrysippus hold that the impossible may flow from the possible, or that while it is possible Dion die, ‘this person be dead’ is impossible. This article constructs a naïve model of Stoic modality in which truth evaluations are grounded in spatial location and motion. This is shown to provide a best fit for the Stoic doctrine, generating the six events which Chrysippus groups (...) into the four Stoic modal categories, and explaining why the Stoics espoused doctrines attacked as contradictory by their opponents. (shrink)

This article explores, from an epistemic perspective, the scope of some key notions of the Stoic theory of action at the moment of a rational agent’s deliberation. It is argued that deliberation consists primarily in a critical examination of impulsive presentations (φαντασίαι ὁρμητικαί) and that indifferent objects (ἀδιάφορα), as carriers of a kind of selective value (ἀξία ἐκλεκτική), rather than a reason to act constitute a reason to believe (Klein, 2015). Finally, it is concluded that virtue, contrary to what has (...) sometimes been interpreted, is not part of the deliberative process as one among other considerations about the indifferent because the moral value of virtue is incommensurable with the natural value of the indifferent. However, virtue enters decisively into deliberation insofar as the practical end of the rational agent is to reason perfectly (εὐλογιστεῖν) in full consonance with the demands of destiny. (shrink)

The focus of the study is the understanding of self-sufficiency [αὐτάρϰεια] in early cynicism. A focused approach reveals that autarky in this context is a multidimensional concept that cannot be limited to the classical understanding of the physical or external renunciation of goods but goes beyond it. At least five dimensions can be named: (i) self-sufficiency due to physical depletion, (ii) self-sufficiency due to external reduction of goods, (iii) self-sufficiency through socio-cultural asset relativization, (iv) self-sufficiency through political relevance and ultimately (...) (v) self-sufficiency through educational and scientific relativization. The thesis of this study is that this multidimensional understanding of self-sufficiency can be seen, firstly, as the constitutive pivot of the practical-political approaches of the early cynicism, but secondly, has a further aim and is translated into a broader term: ἐγκράτεια, understood as the all-encompassing rule of man over himself. (shrink)

In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle states that human beings are starting points of things that could be otherwise and that the eph’hemin are this kind of things. Famously, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle endorses the thesis of habits’ unidirectionality, according to which the agent who already possesses moral habits, hexeis, will perform only actions consistent with the habits she possesses. Despite this apparent inconsistency, I aim to show that the two texts can be harmonized and that the Eudemian Ethics can (...) actually provide a theoretical background for habits’ unidirectionality. (shrink)

Plotinus criticizes the view that individual human souls are parts of the world-soul arguing that they would lack individual agency since their alleged actions would have to be attributed to the whole they are parts of (iii.1.4). He nevertheless holds that individual souls are parts of a larger whole, the so-called hypostasis soul, a soul that does not ensoul any body but encompasses and produces all individual souls including the world-soul (iv.3.4.14–21; iv.8.36–12; iv.9.5). In this paper, I ask whether Plotinus, (...) in the face of his own arguments, can consistently attribute agency to individual souls and hold that they are parts of the hypostasis soul. I argue that Plotinus’ model of intelligible mereology (vi.2.20) allows individual souls to depend on the hypostasis soul as parts in a way that grounds their agency by providing them with the capacity for rational thought. (shrink)

Epicurus’ original version of atomism takes atoms to be physically indivisible but not completely unanalysable: each atom contains a finite number of minima. This paper explores the nature of the minima by focusing on a specific question: in which sense are the minima minimal? I do so by investigating the notions of parthood and divisibility into parts that are at play in paragraphs 56–59 of the Letter to Herodotus, where the theory of minima is introduced. By focusing on the analogy (...) (noticed by Francesco Verde) between Epicurean minima and Aristotelian limits, I argue that the minima should be understood as the minimal realiser of the atom’s physical functions. This allows me to keep together two very plausible but apparently incompatible claims: (i) the minima are supposed to block the paradoxes of theoretical divisibility, but (ii) their existence and their indivisibility can only be justified in physical (rather than geometrical) terms. (shrink)

What does Plato mean when he declares at Soph. 250b8 that Theaetetus is positing Being in his soul (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθείς) as a third something encompassing Change and Rest? Is he merely clarifying that the act of positing is a mental act? Or is he making a further point? This paper argues that the locution ‘in the soul’ plays a significant role in the passage in alerting to a contrast between the way Being and its relation to Change and (...) Rest are intelligible to Theaetetus and the way Being really is and relates to those two other kinds. This interpretation is set against another interpretation, defended by Leigh, according to which the phrase should be understood as drawing a contrast between what is done by the agency of the soul and what is done by the agency of the body. The paper then explores the consequences of the proposed interpretation for our understanding of the broader context of the passage. In particular, it argues that the claim that Being is a third something encompassing Change and Rest is more problematic than critics have usually assumed. To account for Theaetetus’ depiction, it develops the notion of ‘conceived parthood’, which are part-whole relations posited by the mind for the needs of a philosophical enquiry. (shrink)

The non-identity argument at Phaedo 74b–c is among the most studied and disputed arguments in Plato’s dialogues. In the passage, equality is distinguished from perceptible equals insofar as the latter sometimes appear (phainetai) unequal. A long-standing crux is whether the distinction concerns perceptible equals’ merely appearing unequal or actually being so. A fresh approach to the construal of the verb phainomai is taken here and shown to favor the latter view, thereby securing a stronger argument for non-identity.

A genus contains its species, and the species implies its genus. Does it mean that the species is a part of the genus and also the genus is a part of the species? But how can they be part of each other without being identical? In the context of kinds, in what sense is ‘part’ applicable? We argue that for Aristotle, a species and its genus are mutual parts, standing in different parthood relations to each other, viz. the genus is (...) a prior part of its species, while the species is a posterior part of its genus. Furthermore, we show that prior and posterior parthood concerning the genus and its species is grounded on the relations between matter and form in a matter-form compound. (shrink)