Logos and Episteme

ISSNs: 2069-3052, 2069-0533

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  1.  10
    Manne, Moral Gaslighting, and the Politics of Methodology.Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):89-94.
    Kate Manne claims that her account of gaslighting rectifies regrettable deficiencies in existing theories. However, Manne hasn’t done enough to demonstrate the novelty of her view given that she fails to seriously engage with a significant portion of the gaslighting literature. This is an issue in the politics of methodology. Many theorists working on gaslighting exist within the margins, attempting to centre their perspectives over dominant points of view. We must listen to marginalised folk when aiming to understand a phenomenon (...)
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  2.  17
    The Problem of Religious Diversity or Disagreement.Domingos Faria - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):7-23.
    In this paper, we have two goals: Firstly, we intend to examine the most robust recent formulation of the problem of religious diversity or disagreement. We will argue that Sanford Goldberg’s version is better than John Greco’s. Secondly, we aim to examine different solutions and develop a new one based on Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemology as a response to the problem of religious diversity or disagreement.
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  3.  10
    Daniel Whiting, The Range of Reasons: in Ethics & Epistemology.Davide Fassio - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):95-104.
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  4.  4
    A Phenomenological Solution to Gettier’s Problem.Mohsen Hasannezhad - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):25-30.
    In “Is Justified True Belief, Knowledge?” Gettier shows us two counter examples of analyzing Knowledge, as “Justified True Belief” or “JTB”. Lots of scholars have reconstructed similar counter examples to JTB but we can see they follow a similar algorithm. Other scholars have tried to re-analyze knowledge by adding a fourth element to JTB and reformulating knowledge in a “JTB+X” formula and some replaced justification with another alternative component (Y) and proposed a “YTB” analysis of knowledge. In this article I (...)
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  5.  6
    On Defence of Kripke.Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):31-36.
    One of Kripke’s innovations concerning the philosophy of language is the doctrine that the truth of some metaphysically necessary propositions is only known a posteriori. The typical example he gives is the identity statement consists of two different proper names that refer to the same referent, like “Hesperus = Phosphorus”. By metaphysically necessary he means that the proposition is true in all possible worlds and by a posteriori knowledge he means that its truth is known by experiment or investigation. Some (...)
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  6.  4
    Is a Moral Right to Privacy Limited by Agents’ Lack of Epistemic Control?Björn Lundgren - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):83-87.
    In their Unfit for the Future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argued that there is no moral right to privacy, which resulted in a string of papers. This paper addresses an argument in their most recent contribution, according to which there is no moral right to privacy because individuals cannot control their access to information. Here their argument is first denied after which their epistemic conception of a moral right to privacy is criticized.
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  7.  6
    Against Epistemic Akrasia.Ioannis Telios - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):57-80.
    Arguments against epistemic akrasia have been met with counterexamples from the higher-order evidence literature. Here, I present two counterarguments to address these challenges. Firstly, the attitude reclassification argument disentangles reason-responsiveness from the constraints of evidentialism and allows for the adoption of conflicting propositions by coherent doxastic attitudes. Secondly, the failure reclassification argument demystifies the loss of doxastic control in purported cases of epistemic akrasia by appealing to the more comprehensive and distinct phenomenon of self-deception.
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  8.  44
    Providing stability to our world. Identity, Geach and Quine.Olga Ramirez Calle - 2024 - Logos and Episteme (1):37-56.
    The problem of identity is central to epistemic transference. However, relative identity appears to be the only way to work out an epistemic useful notion of identity. Relative identity, on its part, is either parasitic on strict identity or not identity at all. If, on the contrary, we ought for a strict concept of identity capable of satisfying its requirements, we end up with a tautologic and epistemic worthless category. The paper provides an answer to this problem, which, while working (...)
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