Logos and Episteme

ISSNs: 2069-3052, 2069-0533

27 found

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  1.  15
    The JTB+S Definition of Knowledge: Solving Gettier’s Problem.Marcoen J. T. F. Cabbolet - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (4):385-387.
    The JTB definition of knowledge has been shown by Gettier to be incomplete: its three conditions are necessary for knowledge, but not sufficient. We argue that the JTB definition can be completed with a very simple fourth condition, namely that the justification for the belief in p must be sufficient to exclude ¬p. It is shown that the resulting JTB+S definition solves the Gettier problem without giving rise to the opposite problem.
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  2.  16
    Epistemic Responsibility: an Agent’s Sensitivity Towards the World.Wai Lok Cheung - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (4):389-403.
    Stewart Cohen’s epistemic responsibility conception of epistemic justification in illustrating the problem of the new evil demon is assessed through some virtue-theoretic attempts, notably by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, whose accounts provide a good departure point to differentiate epistemic blamelessness through epistemic excusability via exercise of epistemic competence with epistemic recklessness. Some failure of epistemic sensitivity is through epistemic recklessness, and its epistemic blameworthiness is understood thus. I shall, having set the stage of epistemic justification in relation to epistemic (...)
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  3.  8
    Navigating the Boundaries of Know-How and Action.Xuanzi Fang - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (4):405-423.
    In recent philosophical exploration, a study delves into the essence of knowledge and intentional action, examining know-how and its connection to success. Carlotta Pavese’s “Know-How, Action, and Luck” (2018) reevaluates know-how, asserting its similarities with know-that. Pavese introduces a novel perspective by exploring the value of know-how and intentional action. Emphasizing the role of knowledge in explaining success, she argues that know-how, as a form of knowledge, accounts for success. Using intentional action as a link to propositional knowledge, Pavese establishes (...)
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  4.  5
    Towards a Categorization of Scientific Models.Virginia Grigoriadou & Frank Coutelieris - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (4):425-444.
    In this paper, we discuss the existence of a specific criterion on which modern scientists and philosophers could focus to determine the basic categories of scientific models. We first examine why the categorization of scientific models is considered significant and why this type of research might be useful for modern philosophers. Moreover, we critically approach Susan G. Sterrett’s scientific models’ categorization, as an initial point for further discussion on this issue. Sterrett’s models’ categorization is based on the nature of the (...)
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  5.  9
    A Non-Axiomatic System Can Deal with Apparent Nonmonotonicity in the Same Way as Human Beings.Miguel López Astorga - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (4):463-473.
    Lukowski argued that four typical examples of inferences used to show that human beings’ natural reasoning is nonmonotonic do not reveal that. Lukowski’s analyses support the idea that those inferences are actually monotonic deductions. My aim here is to check whether a particular non-axiomatic logic is consistent with the habitual conclusions people draw in those kinds of inferences. This is relevant because that nonaxiomatic logic is the logical structure of a computer program. So, if the logic is coherent with the (...)
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  6.  13
    Third-Factor Explanations in Epistemological Explanationism.Christopher Noonan - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (4):475-496.
    According to explanationism about epistemic defeat, our attitude towards the explanation of our belief in P can sometimes defeat our justification for holding that belief. In this paper I argue for the superiority of a particular version of explanationism which is considered and rejected by Korman and Locke (2023). According to this position our belief in P is defeated if we are not entitled to believe it is either (i) explained by P (i.e econnected), or (ii) explained by some third-factor (...)
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  7.  13
    Rethinking Rationality Attributions.Lisa Bastian - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (3):261-283.
    Although much has been written about the property of rationality, its requirements, and whether it is normative, rationality attributions themselves have not received much attention. The main aim of this paper is to address this oversight by focussing directly on rationality attributions and their complexities. After offering a diagnosis for why attributions have been largely overlooked, the paper introduces three problems that have plagued the rationality debate as a result: implausible symmetry, conflicts within rationality, and with reasons. Brunero’s (2012) answer (...)
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  8. Divine Hiddenness Is Costly for Atheists.Perry Hendricks - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (3):353-357.
    I’ve argued that those who endorse the argument from divine hiddenness must give up all pure de jure objections to theism, and this means that endorsing the argument is costly for atheists. Benjamin Curtis claims that this isn’t a significant cost for atheists. I show that—contrary to Curtis—there is a significant cost, and spell out why this is so. Furthermore, I show that my argument functions as a new argument for affirming reformed epistemology—the view that if theism is true, belief (...)
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  9. Luminosity and Dispositions to Believe.Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (3):285-331.
    Defences of Williamson’s Anti-Luminosity Argument (ALA) that employ doxastic propagation principles—i.e., rules by which cases of beliefs and/or dispositions to believe are inferred from other such cases—risk running into sorites. Since these principles are explainable by an ineffective capacity to phenomenally discriminate between two adjacent cases, luminist rejections of the ALA can halt sorites by denying doxastic propagation, thereby reaffirming these discriminative capacities as appropriately effective. One potent method of resisting the luminist involves recharacterizing discriminative capacities in terms of a (...)
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  10. The End of Thought Experiments?Mark Maller - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (3):359-367.
    This reply is a refutation of Santiago Vrech’s article “The End of the Case? A Metaphilosophical Critique of Thought Experiments” (2022) which argues that thought experiments used in argumentation cannot hold in All Possible Worlds (APW) modality, and thus should end. Cases are used to justify or refute a philosophical theory, but should not have the power to refute an entire theory, especially ad infinitum. Significant variations in intuitions, he argues, invalidate cases and are not proven. I argue some variation (...)
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  11.  3
    A Proposition Is Epistemically Possible If and Only If Its Negation Is Not Obvious.Chris Tweedt - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (3):333-349.
    According to a prominent account of epistemic possibility endorsed by John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley (“H-S Account”), a proposition q is epistemically possible for a subject just in case what the subject knows doesn’t obviously entail not-q. I argue that H-S Account is false by its own lights by first showing that H-S Account entails a different account of epistemic possibility—q is epistemically possible for a subject just in case not-q is not obvious to that subject (“Obvious Account”)—and then showing (...)
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  12. Charles Mills’ Epistemology and Its Importance for Social Science and Social Theory.Eric Bayruns García - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (2).
    In Charles Mills’ essay, “White Ignorance,” and his trail-blazing monograph, The Racial Contract, he developed a view of how Whiteness or anti-Black-Indigenous-and-Latinx racism causes individuals to hold false beliefs or lack beliefs about racial injustice in particular and the world in general. I will defend a novel exegetical claim that Mills’ view is part of a more general view regarding how racial injustice can affect a subject’s epistemic standing such as whether they are justified in a belief and whether their (...)
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  13.  17
    The Resurrection Shuffle.Murray Clarke & Fred Adams - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (2):207-222.
    Several years ago, John Williams posted his final response to Clarke, Adams and Barker in an ongoing debate about the status of Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking account of propositional knowledge and Fred Dretske’s early “Conclusive Reasons” account of knowledge. In this paper, we respond directly to his “Still Stuck on the Backward Clock” paper. We think that Williams’ Backward Clock Example fails against both Nozick and Dretske. Moreover, other objections by Williams against our views are shown to be either false or (...)
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  14.  10
    The Case of Patient Smith.Elliott R. Crozat - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (2):223-228.
    Can a pain-belief such as “I feel pain” be fallibly justified and luckily true? In this discussion note, I provide a Gettier-type example to show that a belief about one’s own pain can be held on fallible justification and a matter of epistemic luck for its believer. This example underscores the significance of introspection and direct awareness in such epistemic situations. Moreover, perhaps surprisingly, the example suggests that one can, at the same time and with regard to the same body (...)
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  15. Knowing One’s Own Motivating Reasons.Seyyed Mohsen Eslami - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (2):121-135.
    Reasons are not the same. Normative reasons need to be distinguished from non-normative reasons. Then, due to some considerations, we have to draw a distinction between explanatory reasons and motivating reasons. In this paper, I focus on a rather implicit assumption in drawing the explanatory-motivating distinction. Motivating reasons are mostly characterized as those reasons that the agent takes to be normative. This may imply that the agent always knows the reasons their motivating reasons. This I call the infallibility or transparency (...)
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  16.  15
    Group Know-How.Xuanzi Fang - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (2):229-242.
    In recent work, Palermos and Tollefsen develop a novel account of group know-how (GKH)—know-how applicable to a group as a whole—and which they take to be superior to envisioned accounts of group know-how that reduce the group know-how to that of individuals. While their argument has promise, I aim to show that it succumbs to several objections, an appreciation of which gives us a better sense of what desiderata a satisfactory account of group-level know-how will need to meet.
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  17.  21
    Why Be Virtuous? Towards a Healthy Epistemic Social Environment.Dominik Jarczewski - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (2):163-183.
    The paper argues that, although the role of responsibilist epistemic virtues is unclear in the framework of traditional knowledge-centred individualist and idealised epistemology, it can be properly understood if one considers other epistemic goods and activities, adopts insights from social epistemology, and acknowledges the non-ideality of our epistemic world. It proposes to explain the value of epistemic virtues in terms of their contribution to a healthy epistemic social environment. Specifically, it is argued that responsibilist virtues are essential (1) for respecting (...)
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  18.  16
    GroundUp Ontology.Mark Maller - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (2):185-204.
    The first pathway toward a new conceptualist answer to the existence of universals begins with Descartes. The article is guided by a Cartesian method of starting anew in metaphysics and our knowledge of mind-dependent universals. Relevant examples and learning experiments defend and validate the pragmatic utility of conceptualism. It is past time for analytic ontology to set aside its assumptions, reevaluate its methodology and simplify itself. I raise novel objections through metaphor and analogy against standard and Platonic realism. Independent universals (...)
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  19.  38
    Manne, Moral Gaslighting, and the Politics of Methodology.Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):89-94.
    Kate Manne claims that her account of gaslighting rectifies regrettable deficiencies in existing theories. However, Manne hasn’t done enough to demonstrate the novelty of her view given that she fails to seriously engage with a significant portion of the gaslighting literature. This is an issue in the politics of methodology. Many theorists working on gaslighting exist within the margins, attempting to centre their perspectives over dominant points of view. We must listen to marginalised folk when aiming to understand a phenomenon (...)
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  20.  41
    The Problem of Religious Diversity or Disagreement.Domingos Faria - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):7-23.
    In this paper, we have two goals: Firstly, we intend to examine the most robust recent formulation of the problem of religious diversity or disagreement. We will argue that Sanford Goldberg’s version is better than John Greco’s. Secondly, we aim to examine different solutions and develop a new one based on Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemology as a response to the problem of religious diversity or disagreement.
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  21.  24
    Daniel Whiting, The Range of Reasons: in Ethics & Epistemology.Davide Fassio - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):95-104.
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  22.  19
    A Phenomenological Solution to Gettier’s Problem.Mohsen Hasannezhad - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):25-30.
    In “Is Justified True Belief, Knowledge?” Gettier shows us two counter examples of analyzing Knowledge, as “Justified True Belief” or “JTB”. Lots of scholars have reconstructed similar counter examples to JTB but we can see they follow a similar algorithm. Other scholars have tried to re-analyze knowledge by adding a fourth element to JTB and reformulating knowledge in a “JTB+X” formula and some replaced justification with another alternative component (Y) and proposed a “YTB” analysis of knowledge. In this article I (...)
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  23.  22
    On Defence of Kripke.Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):31-36.
    One of Kripke’s innovations concerning the philosophy of language is the doctrine that the truth of some metaphysically necessary propositions is only known a posteriori. The typical example he gives is the identity statement consists of two different proper names that refer to the same referent, like “Hesperus = Phosphorus”. By metaphysically necessary he means that the proposition is true in all possible worlds and by a posteriori knowledge he means that its truth is known by experiment or investigation. Some (...)
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  24.  24
    Is a Moral Right to Privacy Limited by Agents’ Lack of Epistemic Control?Björn Lundgren - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):83-87.
    In their Unfit for the Future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argued that there is no moral right to privacy, which resulted in a string of papers. This paper addresses an argument in their most recent contribution, according to which there is no moral right to privacy because individuals cannot control their access to information. Here their argument is first denied after which their epistemic conception of a moral right to privacy is criticized.
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  25.  21
    Against Epistemic Akrasia.Ioannis Telios - 2024 - Logos and Episteme 15 (1):57-80.
    Arguments against epistemic akrasia have been met with counterexamples from the higher-order evidence literature. Here, I present two counterarguments to address these challenges. Firstly, the attitude reclassification argument disentangles reason-responsiveness from the constraints of evidentialism and allows for the adoption of conflicting propositions by coherent doxastic attitudes. Secondly, the failure reclassification argument demystifies the loss of doxastic control in purported cases of epistemic akrasia by appealing to the more comprehensive and distinct phenomenon of self-deception.
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  26. Suspended Judgement Rebooted.Benoit Guilielmo - 2024 - Logos and Episteme (4):445-462.
    Suspension of judgment is often viewed as a member of the doxastic club, alongside belief and disbelief. In this paper, I challenge the widespread view that suspension is a commitment-involving stance on a par with belief and disbelief. Friedman's counterexamples to the traditional view that suspended judgement merely requires considering a proposition and being in a state of non-belief are criticized. I introduce a refined conception, emphasizing that suspension involves a proximal causal link between examining a proposition and the resulting (...)
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  27. Providing stability to our world. Identity, Geach and Quine.Olga Ramirez Calle - 2024 - Logos and Episteme (1):37-56.
    The problem of identity is central to epistemic transference. However, relative identity appears to be the only way to work out an epistemic useful notion of identity. Relative identity, on its part, is either parasitic on strict identity or not identity at all. If, on the contrary, we ought for a strict concept of identity capable of satisfying its requirements, we end up with a tautologic and epistemic worthless category. The paper provides an answer to this problem, which, while working (...)
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