This paper critiques the contemporary reliance on linguistic analysis in metaphysics, arguing that it leads to the representational fallacy – a tendency to derive ontological conclusions from linguistic properties rather than from reality. We trace the historical roots of this issue to the Kantian and linguistic turns, which shifted metaphysical focus from ontology to semantics, situating language at the center of the philosophical inquiry. We examine how this fallacy manifests in the debate between A-theorists and B-theorists of time. Both camps (...) rely on Structural Linguistic Representationalism – the assumption that language directly mirrors reality –, presupposing a necessary correspondence between linguistic structures and ontological facts. We argue that this dependence is misguided, as language alone cannot adequately capture the fundamental nature of reality. In addressing this issue, we analyze two approaches within the B-theory of time: the truth-conditions approach and the truthmaker approach. We contend that the truth-conditions approach reiterates the representational fallacy by deriving ontological conclusions from linguistic structures. In contrast, the truthmaker approach presents a more promising framework by shifting focus from language to ontology, grounding metaphysical explanations in the structure of reality in itself. We conclude that the pursuit of an absolute linguistic model to reveal the ultimate nature of reality is unjustified and hinders metaphysical investigation. Instead, we advocate grounding ontological inquiries in reality, using language as a tool rather than a source of metaphysical truth. (shrink)

Analytic Metaphysics represents a recent evolution of one of the oldest philosophical disciplines, now redefined by the methods of analytic philosophy. This contemporary approach reformulates the traditional ontological questions about existence, reality, and the nature of the Universe, prioritizing rigorous logical analysis and language. Analytic metaphysics, contrasted with continental ontology or traditional metaphysics, has surpassed the popularity of classical metaphysics, establishing itself as the predominant metaphysical stream in philosophical thought. In this special issue of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia (Portuguese (...) Journal of Philosophy), we reflect on the current dynamics of analytic metaphysics, emphasizing its continuity with the metaphysical tradition or on new perspectives and pivotal issues driving analytic ontology. Analytic metaphysics, as a contemporary branch of philosophical research, originated from the analytic tradition. This movement emerged in the early 20th century, driven by a desire for greater clarity and rigor in philosophical inquiry. Philosophers such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein were pioneers of this movement, advocating a methodology based on precise linguistic argumentation and rigorous logical analysis. Despite the advancements promoted by analytic philosophy, this period was also marked by a profound crisis for metaphysics. Influenced by the rigidity and the spectrum of the new logical positivism, the philosophical community began to view metaphysics with increasing skepticism, often considering it speculative and devoid of any meaningful or empirical content. This view became dominant, dismissing traditional metaphysical questions as pseudo-questions, i.e., devoid of empirical content and therefore devoid of real meaning. However, this trend began to shift under the influence of figures such as W. Quine, who played a key role in revitalizing metaphysics within the analytic tradition, and is often considered the founder of the new “analytic metaphysics.” Notably, his challenge to the then analytic-synthetic distinction in his famous paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” had profound implications for logical positivism and the verification principle. Quine argued that there was no clear boundary between purely analytic propositions (known through understanding alone) and synthetic propositions (known through experience), thus breaking the dogmatic boundaries between conceptual analysis and empirical representation. This perspective opened the possibility of reappreciating ontological questions that had until then been marginalized. (shrink)

The debate between individualism and generalism (qualitativism) concerns, inter alia, the question of whether qualitative identity implies numerical identity. One important argument against the affirmative answer to this question is based on an analysis of cases known as symmetry-breaking indeterministic processes, including the case of a collapsing tower. Generalism implies that all processes of that kind are deterministic, contrary to our snap judgment. This article contains a multifaceted analysis of the above argument against generalism, taking into account its metaphysical, scientific (...) and modal aspects. It is suggested that the intuition of indeterminism regarding the considered cases can be explained by a distinct phenomenon of indeterminacy affecting the diachronic identity of participating objects. It is also observed that both individualism and generalism are unable to formulate a theory which could make definite predictions that are more specific than the ones made in purely qualitative language. This strongly suggests that the purported indeterminism of the considered scenarios is not genuine. Finally, the modal analysis shows how generalism is capable of expressing the idea of alternative possibilities without violating the fundamental assumption of determinism. This approach is based on the Lewisian counterpart semantics for quantified modal logic with same-world counterparts. (shrink)

The paper addresses the main meta-metaphysical question, i.e., whether it is possible to do metaphysics and, in the case of an affirmative answer, how should we do it? With such an aim in mind, we sketch the broad context in which these meta-metaphysical questions arose in the philosophical literature (§ 1); then, we present what we take to be the three most widespread conceptions of metaphysics that are available in the analytic tradition: the neo-Quinean (§ 2), metaphysics as the science (...) of possibilities (§ 3) and metaphysics as the study of the fundamental structures of reality (§ 4). We criticise these positions throughout these paragraphs before cashing out our proposal (§ 5). Our interpretation aligns with the recently proposed approach known as ‘naturalised metaphysics’ but with crucial differences. In our view, metaphysics is not only constrained by physics; rather, it grows out from all empirical sciences. More precisely, it can be achieved using formal language and the analysis of the results of scientific theories. (shrink)

Many philosophers today accept the broadly Aristotelian view that one can explain de re necessary properties by invoking essence. These ‘Neo-Aristotelian essentialists’ hold that a property F is an essential property of x iff specifying F gives a correct answer to the Aristotelian ‘what is x?’ question. We are sceptical. According to neo-Aristotelian essentialists, essential properties are not themselves de re modal properties, but they are supposed to explain why things have their de re modal properties. Neo-Aristotelian essentialists accept the (...) following principle (ENL): If x is essentially F, then x is necessarily F. We ask: Why? We first clarify the neo-Aristotelian notion of essence via the Aristotelian “what is x?” question. So far as we can see, the only way to do this is by appeal to the notion of a substance sortal. We then consider the notion of a substance sortal itself, and argue that there is nothing in that notion that even so much as suggests that ENL is true. (shrink)

The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) asserts that if putative objects x and y share all properties P, then they must be one and the same entity. Since the usual formal rendering of the PII has the same formal structure as the Leibniz Identity, it may be unclear whether it can be used to define identity and objectuality. As identity and objectuality are closely related, this study aims to examine their relationship within the framework of formal ontology. Crucial (...) for the discussion are issues about type and range of quantification and the invariance of the identity predicate coourring in the PII. Ultimately, the analysis reveals that the appeal to PII is insufficient for providing both identity and objectuality. Some further considerations about how the PII sensitively constrains the range of available ontologies or metaphysics are formulated. (shrink)

David Lewis is widely known for maintaining the bizarre thesis known as genuine modal realism (hereafter, modal realism). He argued for modal realism on grounds of serviceability in On the Plurality of Worlds. However, earlier in Counterfactuals, he proposed a different kind of argument: from talk of ways things might be to possible worlds. In this paper, I examine the evolution of the latter argument in Lewis’s thought and evaluate its place in his overall case for modal realism, especially in (...) light of the alternative theory of modality known as magical ersatzism. I argue that Lewis turns the argument on its head in his critique of magical ersatzism, but that his later commitment to Ramseyan humility subjects him to a similar criticism. Therefore, the argument is, ultimately, a poisoned pawn for Lewis. (shrink)

Having recently emerged from the philosophical doldrums, the view that there are extrinsic dispositions has provoked questions about some aspects of their nature. One of the questions is whether causal bases of such dispositions would be extrinsic as well. Adopting the dominant causal conception of dispositional properties, I argue for the thesis of dispositional harmony, or for the proposition that dispositions agree with their bases in respect of intrinsicness (or lack thereof). The proposition is at odds with the claim that (...) the causal bases of extrinsic dispositions are intrinsic. As the claim was supported by appeal to the disposition of a key to open a door, I discuss the disposition, contending that it is intrinsic. Then I deflect a possible rejoinder by pointing out that the disposition is also multi-track. Dispositional harmony entails that if there were extrinsic dispositions, at least some extrinsic properties would be causally efficacious. (shrink)

How can we settle whether key metaphysical questions should properly be stated by relying on a substantial notion of metaphysical priority, like grounding or being metaphysically more fundamental than? Relatedly, how can we settle whether ontology should properly be seen as the disciple that studies either what there is or else only what there is fundamentally? Which way of thinking about ontology brings out its proper metaphysical significance? One challenge to giving notions like grounding or fundamentality key roles in metaphysics (...) is that these notions are insufficiently clear, and that metaphysics tied to them turns into esoteric metaphysics. To make progress on these issues I propose a particular challenge—the cognitive function challenge—that needs to be met for metaphysics based on a substantial notion of priority not to turn into objectionable esoteric metaphysics. I also outline some reasons why other approaches that aim to establish such notions as legitimate for metaphysics fall short and how the cognitive function challenge might be met. (shrink)

David Lewis holds that only some of the things that exist actually exist. He concedes that this is, on the face of it, an incredible view, but he argues that if we do enough philosophy, we can come to see that it is true. I examine and evaluate Lewis’s arguments to that effect.

In this article I briefly discuss two problems of ontology of states of affairs: the issue of negative states of affairs and the so-called slingshot argument. In particular, I consider several objections against negative states of affairs, including this one: if one accepts the existence of negative states of affairs, why not accept the existence of conjunctive states of affairs (or, alternatively, Shefferian ones, or even binegative ones), which results, it seems, in the acceptance of the existence of states of (...) affairs of any logical form. I argue that regardless of this doubt, at least some negative sentences have (non-trivial) ontological correlates. As for the slingshot argument, I argue that it is not the implicated Principle of Extensionality that is at fault, but the principle of the identity of the correlates of logically equivalent sentences (often called ‘Wittgenstein’s Principle’), which is simply false since ‘2+2=4’ and ‘8-5=3’ are just logically equivalent. (shrink)

This paper states and examines a modal argument for universal necessity, that is: for the necessary truth of every true proposition. Deep issues in the metaphysics of modality are bound up with the argument, as is revealed in the attempt to defend, or refute, it.

When doing philosophy, there is one norm-like common basis of which we have our pre-theoretic understanding (the “same-object-recognizing” understanding for short) to the effect that, given an object (to be under examination), there is a way that the object objectively is such that we can all talk about that same object even though we may say different things about it, neither resulting in “anything goes” nor bringing about radically different objects thus without genuine engagement. A theoretic examination of the metaphysical (...) issue of the self-identity (as sameness) of given objects (or, in plain words and in a semantic ascent way, “how is it possible to talk about the same object differently?”) can enhance and refine the “same-object-recognizing” understanding as one significant common normative basis of doing philosophy in a constructive-engaging way. In this essay, with relevant theoretic resources of the enhanced account of relative identity and the refined characterization of the law of identity as explained in the recent literature, I examine the metaphysical issue of the self-identity (as sameness) of given objects in two closely related layers, i.e., the “way” layer and the “being” layer of “the way things are” regarding self-identities of given objects. In a holistic way, I first examine several distinct but representative types of (relative) sameness involved in the “way” part of self-identities of given objects; I then focus on five representative types of existential sameness in the “being” part at the “base” level of given objects. Their relation can be highlighted in this way: metaphysically, in the sense to be explained, distinct types of sameness at the “way” layer without existential sameness at the “being”-base layer is “empty” of base, while existential sameness at the “being”-base layer without distinct types of sameness at the “way” layer is “blind” to differentiation. (shrink)

In this paper, my goal is to delve into several reasons that support adopting modal contextualist frameworks for understanding essences, and to show why they deserve further consideration. Contextualist approaches, in my view, are often dismissed because too much emphasis is placed on their disadvantages. For this reason, I advocate for a discussion that encompasses not only the advantages but also the drawbacks, some of which I believe have been overestimated. Although my main focus will be on David Lewis’s proposal, (...) many of the arguments I put forward can also be applied to other contextualist frameworks. (shrink)

This article proposes a new account of causal asymmetry and of how it relates to temporal asymmetry. The key concept on which the account is based is that of inclusion, i.e. of an object being “in” another. Thus, part I develops the notion of what is “possible with respect to” a given object, and what is not, based on what is included in it. This leads to a counterfactual dependence asymmetry which is independent of the direction of time. Part II (...) provides a crash course in local time, describing how to derive temporal precedence (“before”) and time’s characteristic asymmetry in terms only of states of physical objects called “recorders”, a derivation which yields a relativistically correct model of time’s arrow. Putting the counterfactual and temporal asymmetries together allows, in part III, to propose an explanation of why causes are observed to precede their effects in time. The upshot is that, even though many of our intuitions about causal asymmetry are profoundly connected to our temporal perspective, there remains a robust counterfactual asymmetry whereby a change in an object requires something distinct from it. (shrink)

This article presents a novel argument for the existence of God based on the metaphysical concept of grounding. Using the methodology of Inference to the Best Explanation, as conceptualised by Peter Lipton, it evaluates six foundationalist theories: Trope-Theoretic Theism, Monistic Substantivalism, Pure Stuff Theory, Mereological Bundle Theory, Extended Simples Theory, and Priority-Based Structural Realism-for their ability to explain the existence of grounding relations in reality. Through rigorous internal and external assessments focusing on coherence, simplicity, unification, and evidential virtues, the paper (...) argues that Trope-Theoretic Theism, which conceives of God as a maximal power trope, provides the most satisfactory explanation for grounding relations. This conclusion offers a new abductive argument for Theism and demonstrates the potential for productive dialogue between metaphysics and religion. (shrink)

This paper challenges the conventional view that grounding relations necessitate the truth of grounded propositions, a principle often denoted as (N). The author proposes an alternative principle (P), suggesting that grounding should instead be understood in terms of “metaphysical probability.” By drawing an analogy with causation, which does not guarantee but increases the probability of an effect, the paper argues that grounding relations similarly support metaphysical probability rather than necessity. Using the framework of possible worlds, the author articulates the concept (...) of metaphysical probability and addresses objections to its coherence and grounding. The paper concludes by emphasizing the significance of adopting (P) for a nuanced understanding of grounding. (shrink)

Analytic metaphysics is usually considered a contemporary form of traditional, pre-Cartesian metaphysics. This paper examines the epistemic legitimacy of analytic metaphysics in the face of scientific dominance. While naturalized metaphysics has found its place within science, analytic metaphysics remains challenged. To meet the challenge, I propose interpreting analytic metaphysics as a form of logical inquiry, positioning logic as its foundation, similarly to how science grounds naturalized metaphysics. The argument is developed through three key points: (1) tracing the historical connection between (...) science and naturalized metaphysics on the one hand, and analytic metaphysics and philosophical logic on the other hand, (2) highlighting similarities between logic and metaphysics, and (3) demonstrating that contemporary analytic metaphysics often operates as a logical inquiry. I show that this strategy preserves classical options at the meta-metaphysical level, arguing that a view of logic as grounded in language is in a better position to safeguard the autonomy from science and the collapse into naturalized metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper challenges the traditional metaphysical assumption that properties can be located in spacetime and examines the ontological implications of categorizing spacetime itself. By introducing a two-category ontology, we argue that attempts to locate properties in spacetime represent a category mistake, as this notion fails to address the fundamental categorization of spacetime. We propose that the notion of instantiation should be conceptually separated from spatiotemporal location, thereby allowing for properties that are Platonic yet immanent. Furthermore, we reevaluate the debate between (...) Platonism and Aristotelianism, advocating that Platonic properties can possess a form of immanence previously thought to be exclusive to Aristotelian frameworks. This reformation not only underscores the need for categorizing spacetime but also reshapes our understanding of the instantiation and immanence of properties within ontological dependence frameworks. (shrink)

This paper discusses arguments from my recent book, Empiricisms: Experience and Experiment from Antiquity to the Anthropocene (2021). I discuss the origin of empiricism in ancient Greek medicine, and its merger with experimental research in the modern period. I also discuss the arguments of recent critics of empiricism, including W. V. Quine, Donald Davidson, and Richard Rorty. I introduce a distinction between theorematic and problematic empiricism and show how this difference divides the various empiricisms of history. My conclusions are: 1. (...) Knowledge requires experience; results have to be tested, which takes experience. 2. The “experience” of empirical philosophy is the experience from which we learn. 3. Experimental values are many, but truth is not one of them. 4. Empiricism began as an antidote to rationalism, and that remains its vocation today. (shrink)

According to the Epicurean tradition, there is something misleading about our common intuition that we are harmed at death. In contemporary literature, we find proponents of the anti-Epicurean view as well as staunch defenders of the no-harm theory. In this paper, I first deal with the question of the possibility of worldly presence after death and, secondly, with the idea of harm due to death of a person. The gist of my claim is that a non-absolutistic approach to the whole (...) problematic of harm seems to have a better explanatory power in this context. In the course of my discussion, I coin and elucidate the phrase “loss of vitality” and assert that it may provide us with a more useful notion in the metaphysical treatment of death and harm. I also distinguish two perspectives with regard to being harmed and claim that there is a notable issue about being harmed at death especially when the matter is regarded internally, in contrast to an external point of view. (shrink)

Analytic Metaphysics represents a recent evolution of one of the oldest philosophical disciplines, now redefined by the methods of analytic philosophy. This contemporary approach reformulates the traditional ontological questions about existence, reality, and the nature of the Universe, prioritizing rigorous logical analysis and language. Analytic metaphysics, contrasted with continental ontology or traditional metaphysics, has surpassed the popularity of classical metaphysics, establishing itself as the predominant metaphysical stream in philosophical thought. In this special issue of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia (Portuguese (...) Journal of Philosophy), we reflect on the current dynamics of analytic metaphysics, emphasizing its continuity with the metaphysical tradition or on new perspectives and pivotal issues driving analytic ontology. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between social and individual phenomena, advocating for a form of analytical individualism that incorporates both ontological and explanatory holism. The first part of the paper addresses foundational ontological questions, arguing for the reduction of social facts to individual behaviors without equating them in identity. In the second part, the discussion focuses on collective intentionality, particularly through a critical examination of John Searle’s account. I argue that while collective intentionality offers useful insights into the nature of (...) social institutions, it faces principled limitations when applied to broader social phenomena. The paper ultimately supports a non-identifying reductive individualism, which recognizes the social as grounded in individual actions while avoiding simplistic reductions. This approach, I contend, provides a more coherent framework for understanding the complex interaction between individual and social processes, as well as the ontological status of social facts. (shrink)

One of the emerging fields within analytic metaphysics is social ontology. This paper argues for a distinction between social metaphysics and social ontology in order to clear up some of the confusion that is plaguing the field. That terminological distinction has deep historical and philosophical roots which are relevant for the specific case of social reality. According to the proposed distinction, social metaphysics takes up the most fundamental questions pertaining to the very nature and being of social reality, whereas social (...) ontology has the more specific task of drawing an inventory of social reality as it exists and elucidating the properties of its items and categories. The distinction itself is further specified as involving both abstraction and asymmetry. One can abstract from one domain while focusing upon the other, which is different from separating or isolating one domain from the other. There is an asymmetry between the two domains whereby social metaphysics enables and conditions social ontology, but not vice versa. (shrink)

This paper explores the ‘metatheoretical location’ of principles in metaphysical theories, using the debate between Cameron and Goff as a case study. These principles can be situated either in a pre-theoretical framework or within the process of theorizing itself. Traditional truthmaking theorists, like Goff, view truthmaking principles as pre-theoretical assumptions that guide metaphysical inquiry. In contrast, Cameron advocates for a heterodox approach, where such principles are treated as theoretical conclusions reached through contentious debate and argumentation. This distinction has significant implications (...) for how theories are evaluated. By examining this debate, the paper highlights how the metatheoretical positioning of methodological principles influences theoretical discourse in analytic metaphysics. (shrink)

In this text, we point out some obvious commitments of the identity theory of mind which allow the identity theorist to sidestep Saul Kripke’s famous anti-materialist argument. We also argue that a recent paper by Joseph Almog fails to undermine Kripke’s internalism about sensations.

This paper addresses a debate on the immateriality of thought, focusing on James Ross’s argument regarding the indeterminacy of physical processes with respect to pure functions. Ross posits that some human cognitive processes, particularly logical reasoning and mathematical functions, exhibit a formal determinacy that no physical process can have, challenging physicalist accounts of mind. A critical response by Peter Dillard, known as the “schmitosis objection,” attempts to undermine Ross’s argument by drawing a parallel between biological processes like mitosis and formal (...) functions such as addition. This paper defends Ross’s position by highlighting an overlooked distinction between transcendent and formal determinacy. By demonstrating that biological processes like mitosis are transcendentally determinate while pure functions are formally determinate, the paper refutes Dillard’s objection and supports Ross’s claim of the partial non-physicality of thought. The argument contributes to ongoing debates in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics by clarifying the distinct ways physical and non-physical processes relate to determinacy. (shrink)

Gottlob Frege is an aletheic objectualist who regards truth as an object. For him, truth is the truth-value True, which is an object referred to by true sentences. Some interpreters argue that Frege’s claim that the True is an object is merely a byproduct of the technical features of his formal logic, Begriffsschrift. However, Frege’s works instead suggest that aletheic objectualism constitutes his philosophical position on the metaphysics of truth. Although Fregean aletheic objectualism may seem counterintuitive and unfruitful, it is, (...) in fact, quite useful. Viewing truth as an object provides a new explanation for why there is a pro tanto reason to consider false assertion flawed. This explanation in turn strengthens support for the popular view that assertion is a norm-laden speech act. (shrink)

Empirical investigation of the conditions under which people prefer, or disprefer, causal explanation, has suggested to many that our judgements about what causally explains what are context-sensitive in a number of ways. This has led many to suppose that whether or not a causal explanation obtains depends on contextual factors: that causal explanation is context-sensitive. Surprisingly, most accounts of metaphysical explanation, by contrast, suppose it to be context insensitive. Only recently have accounts been developed of metaphysical explanation on which it (...) is context-sensitive. To date, however, there is no empirical evidence about the context sensitivity of metaphysical explanation. In what follows we test the judgements of non-philosophers, and find that amongst non-philosophers, at least, metaphysical explanations are context-sensitive. We then consider the implications of this finding for theorising about metaphysical explanation. (shrink)

This paper is about the pros and cons of measuring degree of causal contribution by Shapley Value (a concept from cooperative game theory). The Shapley Value approach defines degree of causal contribution for a causal factor in terms of a kind of average of its marginal contributions across a range of possible groupings of factors. Some existing literature already explores applying Shapley Values to degrees of causal contributions. This paper supplements this literature by evaluating a range of justifications for applying (...) Shapley Values, addressing several potential problems for the Shapley Value approach, and tying this to recent discussions of the tension between degree of sufficiency and degree of necessity originating with Bernstein. (shrink)

This paper investigates personal identity theories within analytic philosophy and their relation to the Thomistic conception of the human subject. Within it, I argue that by adopting one theory of personal identity over another some distinct feature of the human individual is left out. To encapsulate the underlying truth of what these theories of personal identity seek to present, an examination of the concept of “the self” is given in an attempt to provide cohesion to the various theories of personal (...) identity. However, after delving into “the self,” I show it also leaves out essential parts of the human individual. With the unification of analytic philosophy’s personal identity theories proving difficult within its own attempts via “the self,” I propose looking to the Thomistic tradition to provide a larger structure onto which these theories may adhere. Through Thomistic anthropology, I show that these theories of personal identity are unified through the larger metaphysical picture of the Thomistic human subject. By utilizing the overarching notion of the Thomistic human subject, personal identity theories may be unified as they work to elucidate specifically what Thomism can show foundationally. (shrink)

What is the fundamental nature of the physical universe? This paper generates new insights into this question through examining how brute fact metaphysics intersects with our best cosmological theories of the universe’s origin. To do this, I first make the case that fundamental physical things are – by necessity – ontologically brute. Ontological bruteness, I maintain, provides a rationale for the counterfactual claim that there is no reason why a fundamental has one physical identity rather than another. The paper then (...) gives an overview of modern cosmology. This empirically oriented analysis is enjoined to a metaphysical argument that – since science’s candidate fundamentals are impermissibly complex – we can appeal to brute fact metaphysics to meaningfully entertain the possibility of simpler fundamentals. The paper then investigates a particular simple fundamental I take to be most plausible: consciousness (understood as the intrinsic nature of matter). This discussion draws on cosmic-level evolution and panpsychism. While I remain agnostic about whether consciousness’ instantiation in fundamental-level physics and cosmology will be empirically verified, the paper draws attention to a number of emerging experimental paradigms that can – at least in principle – contribute to this project. (shrink)

The debate on the nature of the artefacts is very important for contemporary metaphysicians. In this paper we will discuss the standard position in the debate, what we will call it Artifacts’ Intention-Essentialism – such as Baker, Evnine or Thomasson –, that considers the essence of artifacts in terms of intentions of the makers. The aim will be to introduce a new criticism to this proposal based on the undesirable metaphysical and moral consequences that this proposal involve. To do this, (...) in the first section an important notion into the feminist metaphysics, and we will be inspired into this in order to introduce a new important notion for our debate: the artifactification. Nextly, we will explain the debate on the nature of artifacts and the Artifacts’ Intention-Essentialism. Consequently, we will introduce two different scenarios based on the artifactification’s notion that it will show problems for Artifacts’ Intention-Essentialism because they show how easily would be produce artifacts using persons as their matter, that involve undesirable consequences. (shrink)

Investigating Habermas’s radicalization of the ontological turn in the philosophy of language that eventuated in his universal or formal pragmatics, this article finds that he has not pursued his avowed radicalization far enough. By contrast with his claim that due to its conceptual thrust his type of formal pragmatics is required over and above the empiricist approach to sharpen social analysis, it emerges that his three world-concepts are social-theoretically underspecified. The direction in which the proposed radicalization beyond Habermas is pursued (...) is determined by the core assumption that the ontological properties at issue are of a cognitive nature. The central argument is therefore that the ontological turn in Critical Theory represented by Habermas needs to be cognitive-sociologically radicalized, the result of which is the introduction of the concept of the cognitive order of society. The unique ontological status of the cognitive order thus also needs explication. Finally, that the lack of this concept systematically leaves a conspicuous theoretical gap in contemporary Critical Theory is briefly indicated with reference to some recent key publications by Honneth and Forst and Günther. (shrink)

In this article, to revitalize the discussion on semantic externalism’s implications on the issue of content self-knowledge, I will argue that semantic externalism generates in fact two related but distinct skeptical puzzles concerning the presumption of truth attached to our mental self-ascriptions. The first is to explain how I can correctly ascribe mental states to myself, and the second is to explain how others can ascribe thoughts to me by taking my expressions of such self-ascriptions at face value. In my (...) view, although the first has been sufficiently addressed in the literature, the second has been more or less neglected. Furthermore, as I will argue, theorists must respond to both of the questions to fully show the compatibility of our ordinary conception of self-knowledge and semantic externalism. As a case study, I will introduce Dorit Bar-On’s neo-expressivism as an account of self-knowledge that provides a promising answer to the first question and argue that it is still incomplete in that it does not address the second skeptical puzzle. To shed light on the nature of the puzzle in question further, I will also explore its possible solutions in the neo-expressivist framework. (shrink)

This article examines the trajectories of contemporary academic Marxism through three hypotheses: Marxism as an economic science, a science of history, and a political ideology. We criticize the reduction of Marxism to mere economic or historical science, highlighting the intricate relationship between Marxism and revolutionary politics. And we argue that Marxism, as a philosophy, must be intrinsically linked to revolutionary practice to maintain its significance. In this sense, the term ‘Marxism’ refers to a multifaceted framework that encompasses all levels of (...) analysis and understanding, particularly in its relation to political practice. Rooted in the concept of class, Marxism serves as a dynamic force driving collective action, aimed at inventing new practices capable of overcoming inherent divisions in the perception of societal components. Its core objective lies in weaving together unified outcomes from diverse perspectives, oriented towards irreversible change. (shrink)

If the object of Althusser’s main theoretical work was Marx’s historical materialism, the form this work took was philosophy. Philosophy was his most important object. His reflections focused on the question of the existence of a Marxist philosophy, on philosophy as practice, the practice of philosophy and its role in ideological and political class struggles. This article sets out to understand how what is somewhat improperly called Althusser’s ‘last’ philosophy, the materialism of the encounter or aleatory materialism, is the philosophy (...) that renounces the dominant form of philosophy to take the form of what I would call a counter-philosophy. (shrink)

After the publication of L’essence de la manifestation and his research on Maine de Biran, Michel Henry devoted two volumes to the work of Karl Marx. Published in the 1970s, at a time when Marxism dominated the cultural and political scene, Henry is quick to gloss over the Marxist debate of the time, without interesting for political implications of Marx’s work and questioning it in the light of the phenomenological proposal he had initiated in his early works. In particular, he (...) shows how Marx’s work can be understood if the phenomena he discovers (praxis, history, alienation) are manifested in the horizon of life. In order to grasp this horizon, I will propose to follow the overturing that Henry’s phenomenology enacts; an overturing that is both thematic and more authentically philosophical, aiming to highlight life as the invisible reverse of phenomena. To do this, I will first explain the meaning of the overturing; secondly, I will outline the main lines of Henry’s phenomenological proposal; thirdly, I will introduce in this framework Henry’s reading of Karl Marx’s work. (shrink)

In this study, we aim to revisit the autobiography of Louis Althusser, titled «L’avenir dure Longtemps, suivi de Les Faits», in order to reflect upon the author’s substantiated belief that his dream, of 10 August 1964, is premonitory of the homicidal act he committed against his wife, Hélène Rytmann, on 16 November 1980. Based on the revisitation of this autobiographical testimony, we propound the following theses: 1) a sacrificial interpretation of the aforementioned dream by the French philosopher, in retrospect of (...) the fateful event, through the lens of hyper mimesis (René Girard), which is inherent to Althusser’s behavior and probably lies at the root of his deep-seated discomfort; 2) the possibility of a non sacrificial interpretation of the dream, hence bearer of a meaning with the potential to liberate (Jacques Derrida; Jean-Luc Marion) the dreamer from a certain mode of operation. With this perspective, we aim to emphasize the idea that the main purpose of the dream consists in psychological individuation (Carl G. Jung) vis-à-vis undifferentiation and uniformization phenomena, typical of socialization (René Girard), as well as to highlight the notion of gift, outlined by Althusser. (shrink)

This article places Angela Davis’s analysis of why the modern individual trends towards self-isolation in conversation with Alexis de Tocqueville’s competing account in Democracy in America. I argue that Davis misidentifies the problem of isolation as a ‘systems problem’, rather than as a ‘people problem’ (as Tocqueville implies), and that she underestimates the extent to which people’s self-understanding can evolve within the capitalist system. She argues that women’s oppression is a consequence of the isolation which emerges under capitalism, so she (...) believes that the overthrow of capitalism is required to overcome it. Yet much progress in redressing women’s oppression has been achieved within capitalism as a result of its recent troubles. Accordingly, I suggest that Tocqueville offers a plausible theory of reform that can help feminists continue to rectify women’s oppression within the capitalist system. Specifically, feminists should heed Tocqueville’s counsel, that smart institutional interventions can help reform how people understand themselves, and focus on designing policies which can encourage people to move away from the belief that women are more naturally suited to domestic labour than men. (shrink)

In this paper I will attempt to reconstruct Mark Fisher’s theoretical path, his analysis of capitalism and his revival of marxism. Therefore, I will focus in the first part of the essay on Fisher’s text, Capitalist Realism, to examine the structural features of today’s capitalism and, in a second part, on Fisher’s 2016 lectures and conferences at Goldsmiths University in London, in which the libidinal link between desire and capitalism is investigated. Finally, I will analyze Fisher’s other writings in which (...) he tries to develop a series of strategies to exorcise the fear that a revolt against the lack of economic, social and cultural alternatives that torment our present is impossible. The purpose of this article is to emphasize how the originality of Fisher’s interpretation of marxism lies in his awareness of shaping new political subjects, forms of social aggregation and new cultural and libidinal structures removed from the dominance of capitalist realism, eschewing easy solutions that appeal to spontaneity and nostalgic vagueness anchored in a rhetoric of failure and defeat. (shrink)

In our present early Twenty-First Century epoch, in bold contradistinction with the 1989-91 end of the Cold War and subsequent reassurances of the 90s, that ‘The End of History’ had arrived, the past decade has seen the rise of populism and authoritarian would-be leaders worldwide. Similarly, both nationalism and outright fascism have once again become credible threats, whilst ‘the left’ has largely failed to respond or offer feasible answers to multiplying social problems. This belated and misfiring reaction to capitalism in (...) crisis, simply the year: 2008 will give all that is needed to explain what is being referred to. What has occupied the energies of substantial sections of populations angry at elites seemingly operating as usual and the same limited and fatally flawed system continuing as before. Those individuals and institutions who helped it teeter on the brink of terminal failure, were able to profit from this whilst populations suffered as states socialized debt making society pay with austerity measures. This left a power vacuum to which any adequate response was noticeably lacking. From 2016, and the date bookends the year in which populism and authoritarian leaders ‘first appeared’, the wave of similar populist reaction has continued globally. Part of this has been the contention over what constitutes ‘the truth’ and facts themselves and misinformation, disinformation and ‘fake news’ continue to persist as serious problems. The bigger issue it might be argued is the implication that these methods can be used to attain power, either political or in any other sphere: a secondary and no less alarming problem also covered by this essay. Explicating a materialist analysis of what exactly the problem and threats populism and authoritarianism embody, and ‘where they came from’, the essay is most heavily influenced by the dissident and unorthodox Marxism of the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research). This paper takes as its subject the weapons of Marx and the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory to critically analyze the concept of Ideology Critique, and how Marx and Marxism remain the ‘bad conscience of philosophy’. It also applies takes as its subject the concept of ideology critique to the unnerving predominance of right-wing and authoritarian narratives, still very much vying for political power in 2024. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to present the influence that Marx’s philosophy of praxis had on the formation and consolidation of Henry’s phenomenology of subjective praxis. From Marx’s philosophical work, Henry emphasizes the primacy of the practical over the theoretical. This is a theme that he had been developing in his works, but a new perspective opens up with Marx. He shows that work is carried out by a living subjectivity, therefore, subjectivity performs the action and is carried out (...) in it, and thus culture is born. The study presents the connection between praxis, life and culture and from this is born a phenomenology that aims to enable the self-realization of each individual. (shrink)

This article intends to return to Marx’s theory of the State to show that this author left us numerous and fruitful elements, the analyzes of which deserve to be meditated on today. From the conception of the State as an alienated expression of civil society to that of the organization of the dominant class, then from that of the apparatus or machine to that of the lever of the revolution, Marx’s interpretation has evolved to become more complex, and enriched. We (...) should also know how to situate this State at the heart of the dynamic of capital accumulation, in particular through its role relative to money, itself located between value and profit, but also in its interventions in colonial and commercial policies. Finally, the article insists on the fact that capitalism is today in an impasse and doomed, its State being experiencing more and more difficulties in the face of the deep contradictions of this system. This is the reason why Marxism still remains an essential theoretical reference. (shrink)

This essay critically re-examines Marx’s youthful analysis of the separation of church and state and his complex views about the function of rights in the modern state. I argue that Marx’s condemnation of Christian nationalism and endorsement of citizenship for Jews is consistent with his view that the modern, secular state cannot emancipate itself entirely from religiosity, as evidenced by the continuing legacy of nationalism and cultural identity politics today. Although Marx correctly follows Hegel in identifying modernity with a structural (...) differentiation between civil society and state, I argue that he misunderstands the nature of this separation and, along with it, the relationship between private property rights, on one side, and civil, political, and social rights on the other. I conclude that Marx’s mistake resides in his failure to adhere to his own Rousseau-inspired social understanding of rights. In the final analysis, far from rejecting the deontological moral intuition underlying rights according to which individuals possess a human dignity (social nature) that merits protection, he rather upholds this idea against what he perceives to be its degradation in service to narrow sectarian self-interest, whose pursuit obstructs rather than promotes the full development of our humanity. (shrink)

This article analyzes Teilhard’s references to Marxism, highlighting his dialogue with the influential Marxist thought of the 20th century. Despite not deeply engaging with Marx’s works, Teilhard acknowledges the significance of Marxist ideas within the cultural context of the last century. Positioned within the framework of grand narratives, Teilhard’s Christian perspective offers an alternative to Marxism, emphasizing a comprehensive understanding of reality that integrates spiritual and material dimensions. By exploring Teilhard’s interactions with Marxism, this study sheds light on the complex (...) intellectual landscape of the era, where competing ideologies shaped debates about the meaning of human existence and history. (shrink)

In Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1960 declaration that Marxism was the “unsurpassable philosophy of our time,” he acknowledged the relationship between the Marxist interpretation of history and an existentialist philosophy focused on the individual’s subjective experience. However, in the decades since Sartre’s assertion, the philosophical landscape has undergone significant transformations. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to mark the final triumph of liberal capitalism over socialist alternatives. At the same time, the (...) rise of postmodernism in philosophy casted doubts on the grand universal narratives that supported Marxism. Postmodern theorists argued that these overarching meta-narratives were intrinsically totalizing and oppressive, thereby suppressing diversity and plurality. Despite these challenges, Marx’s influence persists, often in complex and mediated ways. Paul Ricœur sees Marx as the first “master of suspicion,” who continues to be relevant (alongside Nietzsche and Freud). These thinkers have taught us to question superficial appearances and unearth the hidden forces and motivations shaping our social and psychic lives. Marx’s analysis of the operations of capitalism, his critique of ideology, and his view of class struggle as the engine of history continue to resonate, even as the details of his theory are disputed. Indeed, as Jacques Derrida argues, Marx remains present even in our attempts to surpass him. The language and concepts of Marxism have infiltrated modern discourse so deeply that we cannot simply dismiss them. Instead, we are haunted by the specters of Marx, which continue to haunt us and demand our attention. Even those who reject Marxism often engage with it, defining their positions in opposition to it. (shrink)

This article argues that dominant social thought is rooted in the material interests of the capitalist class, taking serious Marx’s maxim that “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.” The article identifies three broad tendencies within dominant thought, namely: centrist liberalism, postmodern leftism, and neo-fascist reactionary thought. The article goes on to identify the correlation between each of these tendencies’ inherent anti-Marxism with the ruling class location of each tendency’s primary proponents. In so doing, (...) the article also offers an elucidation of the basic philosophical and political program of the Marxist tradition, highlighting why dialectical materialism remains applicable, convincing, and alluring today. (shrink)

This article explores the intellectual relationship between Paul Ricœur and Karl Marx, focusing on the metaphor of the camera obscura used by Marx to describe ideology in The German Ideology. It provides an overview of Ricœur’s significant references to Marx, which began with a critical appropriation of Marxism in an attempt to reconcile it with a Christian worldview, continuing throughout the 1960s and beyond with the exploration of concepts such as “false consciousness” and ideology. After this overview, the article examines (...) three presuppositions inherent in this metaphor, which implies an inversion of reality. First, it analyzes the notion of “false consciousness” within Ricœur’s hermeneutics, situating Marx among the “masters of suspicion.” Second, the article examines the conditions that make this inversion of reality possible, framed within Ricœur’s broader examination of ideology and the symbolic constitution of the social bond. Third, it discusses the idea of an original state to which one can return by reversing the inversion, drawing parallels with Husserl’s method of retrospective questioning applied to Marx’s reduction in The German Ideology. The metaphor of the camera obscura illustrates the complex relationships between reality and its distorted representations. The discussion around the metaphor used by Marx leads Ricœur to underline the fundamental role of imagination to broaden understanding and overcome interpretative reductionisms. (shrink)

The author aims to highlight how Antonio Gramsci’s reflection, particularly as conveyed in the Prison Notebooks, represents an effort to reinterpret Marxist philosophy as an autonomous worldview, countering any attempt to reduce the validity of Marx’s categories solely to the economic sphere or as tools of historical interpretation. Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis presents us with a “terrestrial” world and humanity, and a history that unfolds, against all determinism and utopianism, as a field of possibilities and relationships that the subject, collectively (...) understood, can orient and construct. Through his hermeneutic effort, Gramsci has led Marx into the twentieth century, by translating his scientific, philosophical, and political voice. (shrink)

The beginning of Marx’s Capital has references to Hegel’s Logic of Being. From the individual commodity considered in isolation, Marx derives the value form as the germ cell of capitalist society. Marx’s materialist inversion of the Hegelian dialectic posits the value form as a spectral objectivity that constitutes the real abstraction specific to capitalism. As the most abstract expression of capital, it rules unconsciously the totality of social praxis as an absolute fetish. Value arises from a double mystification: the reification (...) of capitalist social relations of production in an objective abstract form, and its representation in concrete objects, as commodities and money in circulation. Value, as the real abstraction of capitalist social relations of production, is the disjunctive synthesis between the despotic command of capital in production and the reciprocity of exchange in circulation. In the final chapter on primitive accumulation, Marx identifies its historical genesis in the dispossession of the commons, which, by separating the subjective from the objective conditions of production, gives rise to the capital-wage labour relation. (shrink)

The present article introduces the theory of knowledge of the modern Chinese philosopher Feng Qi (1915–95), who is known as both an explorer of old, and a creator of new systems of comprehension. Although he was a versatile theorist and thinker, he saw epistemology as both the core and mainspring of all his theoretical endeavours. Already before the establishment of the P.R. China, he published his first epistemological thesis under the title On Wisdom and consequently, he never completely abandoned this (...) topic, even though he explored it through the lens of his manifold other interests that were connected with both, traditional Chinese, as well as with Western (including Marxist and neo-Marxist) philosophy. This paper will center its focus on his dialectical exploration of the conversion of knowledge into wisdom, a concept he formulated within the boundaries of his coined “expanded epistemology.” The article expounds on the reasons and methods through which this theory not only addressed epistemological concerns but also entailed ontological and metaphysical dimensions. (shrink)

Alasdair MacIntyre’s relationship to Karl Marx and Marxism has been and remains fundamental in his work. Drawing on a number of important MacIntyrean texts, this paper shows how it has animated his Marxist early years, how it has been a crucial element in the epistemological crisis he experienced and how it has left him an important legacy. At the heart of the history of this relationship are the question of truth, the problematics of the right telos of human action, of (...) the achievement of the individual and common goods, of the desires, the role of the critique of both the capitalist system and the Marxist politics. Understanding how MacIntyre positioned himself in relation to all these issues helps us to understand the reasons that led him to switch from a Marxist to an Aristotelian narrative. Key concepts of Marx and the Marxist tradition find a new life today in the now Aristotelian-Thomist thought of Alasdair MacIntyre. (shrink)

This paper will address the concept of labor through a study of Karl Marx and Michel Henry. While Henry claims to uncover, against the tradition of Marxism itself, the truth of Marx’s philosophical conception of the human being as a laborer within a social context, I will argue that both Marx and Marxism (i.e., Étienne Balibar) can help rectify certain shortcomings in Henry’s view of the matter. Toward this end, I will begin by laying out Henry’s account of Marx’s theory (...) of labor and demonstrate that it is central to Henry’s phenomenology of life. As part of this, I will show that a proper understanding of the concept of labor goes some way toward undermining the dominant view of Henry’s work as one that neglects the role of the human being’s engagement in the world in life’s transformations. For all that, as I will demonstrate, Henry’s work fails to do justice to the ways in which the living labor of human beings is determined by the world. By analyzing the work of Marx and Balibar, this paper will show that these figures provide insights into the inter-affective, even transindividual, character of labor and thereby help remedy these pitfalls and improve Henry’s account of the nature and function of living labor. (shrink)

Descola’s work has profoundly renewed ecological thought by suggesting that the global planetary crisis is linked to the ‘naturalist ontology’, by which modern Westerners distance themselves from non-humans. This article proposes to re-read Descola with Marx in order to critically assess question the genesis of this ontology. Rather than looking to the history of ideas in search of what prepared this naturalism, a close reading of Marx allows to hypothesise a practical origin of naturalism, in the worldly occupations that make (...) up ‘abstract labour’. By shedding light on the practical ontogeny of naturalism, we emphasize that the Marxian analysis of capitalism remains highly needed for thinking about and living through the ecological crisis. (shrink)

This essay aims to investigate, from Augusto Del Noce’s perspective, the two possible outcomes of Marxism following the advent of the affluent society in the 1960s. One is its fulfilment into the new bourgeois spirit, depriving itself of the dialectical-salvific aspect and preserving materialism to the utmost. The other is its opening up to the religious option, on pain of its defeat. It is precisely this last issue, for a possible dialogue between Marxists and Catholics, that measures the distance of (...) Del Noce’s thought with that of his friend Franco Rodano, from whom he had nevertheless drawn the notion of “affluent society”. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to reflect on processes of translation. To this end, it is divided into two parts. The first part provides an in-depth analysis of the central claims made by Walter Benjamin in his seminal essay “The Task of the Translator” (1986 [1968/1955/1923]), also known as “The Translator’s Task” (1997 [1923] & 2021 [2000/1923]), originally published in 1923 under the title “Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers” (1992 [1923]). The paper argues that these claims can be presented, (...) and partially revised, in the form of twenty-five theses. The second part examines some controversial issues arising from the preceding theses. As demonstrated in this section, the careful evaluation of Benjamin’s perspective permits us to shed new light on key issues faced by philosophical and sociological approaches to translation. The paper concludes by suggesting that the critical engagement with the task of the translator illustrates that “trans-ineffability” (that is, the fact that not everything can be expressed “in” language just as not everything can be rendered intelligible “across” languages) is a challenging, but ultimately enriching and empowering, part of the human condition. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of equivalence in translation in the context of Francesca Ervas’ book, Uguale ma diverso. Il mito dell’equivalenza nella traduzione. The aim is to demonstrate that equivalence in translation is insufficient because it fails to account for human understanding of others and the world. To understand the breadth of this concept, three fundamental questions were analyzed: what is a translation? What is the relationship that is maintained with the so-called “original”? What exactly is this relationship? To (...) answer these questions, it is necessary to analyze the various ways of talking about equivalence. Considering that both the origins of the concept of equivalence and the challenges posed by translation suggest the need for an analysis of the concept’s limitations, a new understanding of its meaning can only contribute to philosophical debates on translation when this insufficiency is rethought. (shrink)

Nietzsche is an excellent antidote to Marxism-Leninism, which dominated much of the political life in some countries and philosophy during the 20th century. Indeed, it shows that this ideology has remained a prisoner of a will to believe that it thought it was getting rid of. Much more enlightening for our present, Nietzsche’s philosophy can help us to think for ourselves, without locking ourselves into frameworks of thought that have become foreign to us and that can lead to the worst (...) misinterpretations. (shrink)

The contribution begins by giving an account of the Jesuits’ relationship to philosophy – a relationship nourished by Thomism but not solely dependent on it. The Jesuit perspective is concerned with maintaining a balance between, on one hand, a unified vision of knowledge and human life, and an openness to developments in the world; and on the other hand, emphasizing the link between knowledge effort and moral transformation. This approach, anchored in the Greek tradition, guided the Jesuits in their encounter (...) with Confucianism in the 17th century, leading to notable developments and particularly a “conversion” with neo-Confucianism. This interpretive framework was also applied against Marxism, involving various evaluations of the non-Thomist tradition. The remainder of this article explains how a historian of Chinese thought and comparative philosopher, Henri Bernard-Maître, developed an interpretation of Marxism as a resource meeting the expectations of Chinese youth in the 1930s. His successor, Octave Brière, adopts a more critical tone, whether describing the history of Chen Duxiu, the Communist Party, or the effects of Marxist thought with the central role of propaganda. Brière highlights the importance of characters, laws of evolution of history, practice, and the anthropological limits of the Marxist position. The last part of this article provides a counterpoint to the theoretical reflections with field reports from several missionaries present in Shanghai or in rural areas of the North. Ultimately, in the Jesuits’ engagement with Chinese Marxism, the main point of friction reveals itself to be the room left for the possibility of personal spiritual experience. (shrink)

Only through a long series of accidents do we have “The Works of Aristotle” at all—the Corpus Aristotelicum. When Aristotle died in 322 B.C., he is said to have left behind a body of 156 “published” works (“exoteric,” namely, available for public consumption). They survive only in fragments, too short and too few to give much sense of them. That his esoteric works, the Corpus Aristotelicum, have survived at all has been called “miraculous.” This paper traces how those esoteric works (...) of Aristotle were transmitted over the next eighteen hundred years. My claim is that this transmission depended upon communities that kept these works of Aristotle “in print.” Further, those communities can often only be inferred, like the description of the substantial object from what is known only by its shadow. The paper concludes with reflections on the tenuous existence of historic texts and how the digital age may further threaten transmission of knowledge from the past to communities in the future. I propose that the transmission history of Aristotle’s texts may provide signposts that guide us both in handing down knowledge to future generations as well as in finding models for promoting knowledge and for establishing communities of diversity. (shrink)

This article delves into Blaise Pascal’s religious philosophy, focusing on his use of the phrase “Scio cui credidi” (I know whom I have believed) to explore his understanding of faith. It analyzes Pascal’s “Memorial” and the “Summary of the Life of Jesus Christ”, highlighting how Christ is central to Pascal’s belief system. The discussion reveals the transformational nature of Pascal’s faith, particularly after his mystical experience on November 23, 1654. This experience is crucial in understanding his shift from a philosophical (...) to a deeply personal, Christ-centered faith. The article underscores Pascal’s journey from a scientific and philosophical perspective to an intimate, emotional resonance with Christian faith, demonstrating how his personal encounters with the divine profoundly shaped his religious perspective. (shrink)

In responding to a question posed by Professor Vincent Carraud regarding a passage in a letter by Etienne Pascal in which he mentions an author who speaks of the mysteries of Pythagorean numbers we have resumed our dossiers on number theory in Mersenne. We have pointed to texts from Mersenne’s correspondence, printed books, and unpublished theological manuscripts between 1638 and 1648 in which the mysteries of the Pythagorean numbers are mentioned with reference to the theory of perfect numbers and with (...) reference to Peter Bongo’s work, which was widespread throughout Europe and particularly in France, De numerorum mysteria (1599 ed. aucta). This has allowed us to provide some indications taken from Mersenne’s unpublished manuscripts in which he addresses the mathematical problem of perfect numbers in exegesis, according to the new dating of his unpublished theological manuscripts that we have established. (shrink)

This article examines the philosophical and theological nuances in the works of Étienne Pascal and Étienne Noël, focusing on their interpretations of Saint Augustine and Jean Duvergier de Hauranne. It explores the concept of antithesis (ἀντίθεσις) in both rhetorical and philosophical contexts, drawing upon Platonic and Aristotelian texts. The article highlights the use of antithesis in Augustine’s explanation of evil and its integration into the universal order, connecting this to 17th-century French thought, especially in relation to Blaise Pascal’s ideas on (...) rhetoric. A critical analysis of Étienne Pascal’s letter to Father Noël is presented, emphasizing his understanding of rhetorical figures, notably metaphor and antithesis, and their theological implications. The discussion extends to Saint-Cyran’s interpretation of Augustine, particularly concerning ecclesiastical guidance and priesthood preparation. The article concludes by underscoring the complex interplay between language, thought, and faith in these historical contexts. (shrink)

Among those enthused by Pascal’s pithy remark that “the heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing” are phenomenological value-theorists. What makes Pascal particularly attractive to these phenomenologists is the suggestion that the heart has reasons, and reasons of its own, which resonates with the quasi-cognitive function that they ascribe to feeling. Feelings apprehend values, which are genuine objects that display an essential order and a rank distinct from the objects of reason. In this paper, I introduce and evaluate (...) Pascal’s reception in phenomenological axiology. I begin by reviewing the philosophical position that for the phenomenological value-theorists corresponds to the Pascalian notion of the order of the heart (I). I then turn to Pascal and explore the notion of the order of the heart, especially in relation to the order of reason, in his thought (II). Finally, I evaluate the legitimacy of the attribution of the phenomenological position to Pascal, arguing that, while there is not a perfect correspondence, there is an affinity that warrants the phenomenologists’ allusions to Pascal (III). (shrink)

Pascal places man at the heart of fundamental “contraries”: “Nature has put us so well in the middle that if we change one side of the scale, we also change the other (…). This makes me believe that there are springs in our head, which are so arranged that whoever touches one also touches the opposite”. The “middle” «which has fallen to us in share» can only be understood through the “divine milieu” and the role of a Mediator: this is (...) how the path of a consent “from ourselves to ourselves” is drawn for man. themselves», peace with God, the joy of salvation, the discovery of the truthfulness of the Gospel, the hope of a new life... It is nothing less than a consent to reality, to the end of a difficult crossing, often obscure and noisy open to a silence which is that of the tested, paradoxical Presence “of a God who hides himself”. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of divine revelation as presented by Blaise Pascal, examining the fundamental dichotomy between the hidden and revealed aspects of God. Beginning with the premise of human existence as inherently obscure and lost in the universe without apparent reason, the study delves into Pascal’s inquiry into the origins of human existence and the role of God as both a part of and apart from this primordial darkness. Pascal’s reflections on the incomprehensibility of man before that of (...) God highlight a foundational obscurity, setting the stage for a deeper investigation into the nature of divine revelation. The article contrasts Pascal’s perspective with traditional theological and philosophical views, particularly in relation to the manifest nature of God as commonly interpreted through natural phenomena. It further delves into Pascal’s interpretation of scriptural passages, notably Isaiah 45:15, emphasizing the notion of Deus Absconditus (Hidden God) and its critical role in understanding the paradoxical nature of divine revelation. The article examines how Pascal perceives God’s manifestation through various historical and mystical dimensions, including nature, the Incarnation, and the Eucharist, each revealing God while simultaneously concealing Him. (shrink)

Against the “universal consent of the people” and “the crowd of philosophers”, Pascal proves the existence of the void, thus re-establishing the truth where only the force and falsity of opinions had prevailed. Nature “has no repugnance for the void”, it “makes no effort to avoid it” but “admits it without difficulty or resistance”. Pascal defines the void as neither matter nor nothingness. Can this definition be found in Philosophy, in the Anthropology of the Pensées? We would like to show (...) the importance of the notion of the capacity of empty nature, which is decisive when it comes to describing the condition of man, troubled by a desire for truth and happiness that he cannot satisfy. Nature is thus, for him, what is “most contrary” to him, depriving him of what is rightfully his. The void has a cardinal function in Physics, but also in Philosophy. (shrink)

The paper offers an interpretation of the thesis developed by Fichte in the Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre following “the philosophy one chooses depends on the man one is” as a deepening of symbolic practices and dispositions that philosophy shares with ordinary consciousness. To support this interpretation, the paper describes how Fichte defines individual character formation and how it relates to a historical determinate is presented through a quick excursion in the Nicolaischrift of 1801 (§2). Through a critical and synthetic (...) view of the process of initiation into philosophy, the paper shows how the choice of philosophy is a choice for philosophy (§ 3) and invests a certain “skill” that is produced in the pre-philosophical dimension (§ 4). Through discussion of the Fichtian concepts of “instinct of reason” and “new sensory,” how the choice for philosophy, interpretable as the production of a new habitus, the fichtean doctrine of Science realizes itself fully as ‘critique’ (§ 5). (shrink)

This article provides a critical reexamination of Blaise Pascal’s fragment on the “eternal silence of infinite spaces”, challenging the conventional objections, notably those by Paul Valéry. It presents an analytical journey through the philosophical and existential dimensions of Pascal’s text, exploring the unique interplay between human solitude and cosmic silence. The discussion navigates the intricate relationship between individual perception and the overarching sense of existential dread evoked by the universe’s vastness. This exploration is enriched by contrasting Pascal’s insights with broader (...) philosophical contexts, including references to Kierkegaard and the concept of the ‘music of the spheres’. Ultimately, the paper offers a nuanced interpretation of Pascal’s work, emphasizing its enduring relevance in understanding the human condition within the unfathomable expanse of the universe. (shrink)

In this work, I attempt to outline a critical history of Jansenism and its reception, especially in Pascal. In particular, in the first part, I will outline the interpretive lines that led to the formation of Jansenist thought and its main ideas, concerning the interpretation of predestination. In the second part, I will turn my attention to Jansenism as conceived in Port-Royal, with particular regard to Pascal’s interpretation and use of Jansen’s ideas, especially in relation to the complex dialectical relationship (...) that Pascal’s Jansenism entertains with the sciences. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to describe and analyse the presence of Pascal’s thought in the work of the Spanish writer José Jiménez Lozano (1930-2020). In fact, it could be considered that this writer is almost a kind of Pascal come alive, especially in terms of understanding and experiencing Christianity, since, for both Pascal and Jiménez Lozano, the orientation of the human soul towards God is not only a part of the essence of man but also is his most (...) definitory anthropological constituent. (shrink)

Although Pascal is a thinker of the figure of Christ, he seems to neglect the other Persons of the Trinity, in particular the Holy Spirit. This article examines the place Pascal gives to the third Person of the Trinity. It shows that, for Pascal, the Holy Spirit plays an important role in the conversion of man, insofar as he spreads in his heart the grace of Christ sent by the Father. Finally, this study comes to a difficult fragment of Pascal’s (...) in which he asks whether all Holy Scripture is dictated by the Holy Spirit, in order to propose a new reading. (shrink)

The doctrine of the three orders which distinguishes and hierarchizes flesh, spirit and charity is obviously one of the major themes of Pascal’s thought. But it appears that Pascal meditates as much on the disorder – and dis-order – induced by sin and the corruption of our nature as on the hierarchy and the heterogeneity of these three kinds of reality. In the world he describes, in fact, not only is everything overturned – the lowest order, that of the flesh, (...) now dominating the other two – but also everything is confused – pleasure, for example, obtaining the credence that normally belongs to science, and the flesh invading the order of the spirit through custom and imagination. To maintain then, as several commentators do, that no interference between the orders is possible, so that tyranny can only exist in the state of desire, is in our view to adopt a more Stoic than Pascalian point of view. For to deny disorder is also, according to Pascal, to deny sin by projecting into the second nature the memory of the first. (shrink)

The possibility of artificial intelligence is usually discussed by philosophers as a problem about artificial thought: can an artificial system think? The production of intelligence in an artificial system would, however, give rise to an intelligent artificial being: an artificial thinker. As such, there is another, less explored way of discussing the possibility of artificial intelligence: can there be an artificial thinker? This is the problem of artificial thinkers (Olson 2018). In this essay, I discuss this problem. To do so, (...) first, I present the problem of artificial thinkers and discuss how best to interpret it (section §1). Then, I discuss the three main views on the metaphysical nature of artificial thinkers: the hardware view, according to which artificial thinkers are intelligent artificial systems; the software view, according to which artificial thinkers are types or copies of programs for artificial intelligence; and finally, the CPU perspective, according to which artificial thinkers are intelligent spatial parts of artificial systems (section §2). All of these views have problems regarding their conception of the persistence conditions of artificial thinkers. Even so, I conclude, artificial thinkers are best conceived as functional artificial systems. (shrink)

Pascal founds his interpretation of the Augustinian doctrine of the corruption of human nature on a philosophy of faith inherited from Montaigne: « we are Christians in just the same way as we are Périgordians or Germans » (Essais, II, 12) : this conception of « human faith » is analysed, in turn, by means of concepts drawn from Descartes (passion) and Gassendi (imagination). He thus leads us to a very modern conception of « human faith » – without grace (...) – as being the product of education and habit, a « sentiment » like so many others. (shrink)

In Pascal’s Pensées, at the very end of the so-called “wager” fragment, we find this intriguing remark intended to win once and for all the whole conviction of the “libertine” the apologist is addressing to : “I will tell you that you will win thereby in this life”. This article endeavours to reconsider this remark seriously, as it has been somewhat neglected by the canonical commentaries on the “wager”. We begin by determining the reasons that lead the apologist to this (...) final remark, then we attempt to define its meaning and scope in Pascal’s apologetic project. Next we seek to identify the “gain in this life” that is promised to the libertine who adopts a Christian lifestyle. This leads to study how Pascal analyses joy. To conclude we propose some more general thoughts about the strategies this fragment of Les Pensées suggests to today’s Christian apologetics. (shrink)

Le Mystère de la mort de Notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ, by Jacqueline Pascal, constitutes a work of interest, in which not only the literary virtues of Blaise Pascal’s sister are reflected, but also a glimpse of her “phenomenological” capacity. After an approach to the biography of this 17th century author, an analysis of the work and its philosophical and theological scope, in connection with the writings of Blaise Pascal, is presented, as a reference to her genius and the impact of the (...) influence of Port-Royal’s thought. (shrink)

A long tradition of criticism, which has its roots in the Romantic era, admires Pascal as a dark, a tortured writer, an incomparable representative of human misery, of the anguish of existence, of the abysses that threaten us all. It is commonly understood that he is a magnificently sinister writer. This perspective, well established today in most minds, in the honest man as well as in the student or teacher, reduces Pascal’s work to a poor apologetic manoeuvre and transforms his (...) anthropology into a one-sided indictment, impressive by its very excesses, which we savour with a shudder. The present study aims: 1) to sketch a genealogy of this error of perspective, 2) to examine its dangers and measure its damage, to indicate why it is not acceptable, and 3) to propose some reflections on the place of the greatness of man in Pascalian anthropology. Three patterns of greatness can be identified in the Pensées: logical, paradoxical and phenomenological. (shrink)

Throughout the manuscript of the Pensées and in other writings, Pascal crisscrosses his research on what the art of writing achieves and entails, on the one hand, and on the way to read and interpret the Holy Scriptures, on the other hand. Reading and writing practices are critically interwoven. This article offers a synthesis on Pascal’s reflexive account of such practices. After a summary of previous findings on the subject, it examines Pascal’s approach to (a) the rules that govern scriptural (...) interpretation; (b) the techniques of persuasion; and (c) the way to ground an instituted body, an expression by which we refer to a textual corpus, a political society, or a community of believers. (shrink)