The treatise of Rules for the Direction of the Mind can be traced back to the period of Descartes’ youth in which, until rule eight, he has presented some foundations of the theory of truth and error; such as the truth being founded on manifest and distinct intuition and deductive inference which is an adaptation of his analytical geometric theory. However, in rule twelve, he has vaguely addressed how the set of human faculties commits errors. Since this philosopher has also (...) given attention to the matter of errors in Principles of Philosophy and in the treatise Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences and Objections and Replies, in this article an attempt has been made to provide a comprehensive view and critique of Descartes’ theory regarding truth and error, albeit, focusing more on rule twelve of the treatise of Rules for the Direction of the Mind. According to Descartes, two things play an essential role in cognition; understanding and will. One of the differences between these two is that the scope of understanding is limited and it cannot acquire knowledge of everything; however, the scope of the will is unlimited. Now, if there were to be errors in our perception, they must either arise from understanding or will.In his treatises, Descartes has addressed the different dimensions of errors in perception and, overall, has shown the various aspects of error in the theory of cognition. The existence of pre-judgments and differences between the levels of understanding and will, that is, the infinity of the will and finiteness of understanding, are some of the matters that Descartes counts as factors of errors. It is noteworthy that while Descartes considers errors to be the result of the interference of the will in matters that the intellect does not have sufficient knowledge of, that is, clear and distinct knowledge, he considers this error to be true in the domain of judgment or assertions. The present article recounts the reasons for errors and analyzes them based on different works of Descartes, including Rules for the Direction of the Mind but also considers Descartes to be unjustified in some matters and criticizes him regarding those.One of the criticisms aimed at Descartes’ theory of truth is that he states that only manifest and distinct perception is true and what lies beyond it is error. He considers this principle to be demonstrable or innate. After studying the different aspects of this theory, the present article shows that even in the area of mathematics to which Descartes has given serious attention and, in fact, according to him, it is a mark of manifest and distinct thought, it is not acceptable to consider this an innate matter unless Descartes accepts it as an axiom of his philosophical system. The absoluteness of the will is also not a sufficient argument regarding the infiniteness of will which provides another possibility for error; however, attention to the essential property of the will which is indefectible is noteworthy. The theory of considering concepts and realities to be graded which has been studied in different parts of his views especially in proving the creator and regarding infinity is also not provable in Descartes’ philosophical system unless he considers it as an axiom. (shrink)

Throughout history, philosophy has always been accused of being abstract and unrelated to the everyday issues of human life, so some later philosophers have offered solutions to some individual problems and social problems. Some of them are called “philosophical consolations.” Of course, “consolation” in custom means to calm a sad or afflicted person, but the meaning of the term consolation in philosophy and social sciences is somewhat broader than its customary meaning, and it means to calm the person through the (...) way he looks at problems and provide a solution to the problems. Although philosophical counseling is a contemporary movement in the field of practical philosophy, b this does not mean that previous philosophers were silent about it; rather, some of them, in the form of practical wisdom discussions, have developed specific epistemological points and practical approaches to address the shortcomings of everyday life, including “financial poverty.”But among Muslim philosophers, Ibn Sina is more famous than others. While getting acquainted with Aristotle’s practical wisdom, Farabi’s additions to it and some of the opinions of the scholars of Ikhwan al-Safa, he used a new innovative style in the discussions of practical wisdom and, therefore, in the Islamic tradition, he has influenced all his later philosophers. On the other hand, in the West, Immanuel Kant attached considerable importance to practical philosophy over theoretical philosophy. To this end, Kant also paid special attention to the philosophy of ethics, and his teachings overshadowed the ideas of most late Western thinkers.Because “financial poverty” has long been considered the mother of many physical and mental problems in human societies, the present research tries to explain and compare the recommendations of Ibn Sina and Kant in the face of the mentioned problem through a descriptive-analytical method. In Ibn Sina’s words, in addition to Aristotelian teachings, there are also Enlightenment approaches influenced by religious texts, but Kant, as one of the system-building thinkers in the Enlightenment, lacks Enlightenment views and rationally focuses on customary affairs to provide a solution. Ibn Sina conducts his discussion on the basis of rational and metaphysical concepts but most of Kant’s views are based on his empirical approach to human cognition, although he finds the science of “anthropology” very slippery, at least in terms of method, and finds its results uncertain.Ibn Sina examines the ill effects of financial poverty in order to comfort the poor. Ibn Sina has considered “deprivation of sensory pleasures” as an important necessity of financial poverty and considers the way to cope with poverty to depend on the passage of sensory affairs and knowledge of extra-sensory pleasures. Trans-sensory pleasure includes sensual pleasure and intellectual pleasure, which can be achieved even without material wealth, and the perception of intellectual pleasures may erase the bitterness of poverty and its effects for human beings. But while acknowledging the many problems of financial poverty, Kant knows that there is no cure for it other than wealth, so he places great emphasis on the element of work and effort. Since he considers poverty to be the greatest cause of carnal vices, he calls the acquisition of wealth through work, since it leads to happiness, man’s duty to himself.Ibn Sina’s idea is in fact one of the methods of tolerating poverty and tolerating it, and with Ibn Sina’s solution, the maximum psychological effects of poverty are removed. But Kant does not accept the conditions for tolerating poverty for human beings. Basically, in Kant’s view, money solves most, if not all worldly problems because man can benefit from the art and expertise of others through financial means. (shrink)

The theory of conceptual metaphor claims that abstract concepts are understood by concrete and less abstract concepts. Conceptual metaphors map the conceptual structure of the source domain over the conceptual structure of the target domain. In this view, a conceptual metaphor is an intrinsic component of human thought, and the appearance of metaphors in language is only a sign of their existence in human thought.Lakoff and Johnson introduce causation as one of the important abstract concepts that are understood and described (...) by various conceptual metaphors. Causation is conceptualized both in ordinary and everyday language and in scientific and specialized texts through single cognitive mechanisms.Mulla Sadra is one of the greatest Muslim philosophers and Al-Shawahid Al-Rubūbīyyah is one of his most important philosophical books. In the framework of the conceptual metaphor theory, this study has analyzed the various terms used to describe causation in Al-Shawahid Al-Rubūbīyyah written by Mulla Sadra. The most important conceptual metaphors that are used in this book to describe causation have been extracted. Each of these metaphors emerges through the derivatives of one or more lexical roots in this book.In this study, Mulla Sadra’s use of metaphors is quantified based on statistical methods. By calculating the frequency of metaphoric usage of all the words that describe causation related to a metaphor, the frequency of that metaphor is extracted in the book.The “Causation is motion out” metaphor emerges through the derivations of «ṣ-d-r», «n-sh-’», «f-y-ḍ», «r-sh-ḥ», «j-l-w » and «ẓ-h-r» roots. The “Causation is making an impression” metaphor is revealed by the derivations of «‘- th-r» root. The “Cause is source” metaphor is related to the derivations of «b-d-’» root. The “Causation is being basis” metaphor is represented by the derivations of «q-w-m» root. The “Causation is making” metaphor includes the derivations of «j-‘-l» and «ṣ-n-‘» roots. The “Causation is transfer of possessions” metaphor is revealed by the derivations of «‘-ṭ-w», «w-h-b» and «f-y-d» roots.The frequency of metaphorical use of each of the lexical roots and related conceptual metaphors in this book is shown by numbers in parentheses.According to the statistical results, the “causation is motion out” metaphor has the highest frequency and the “causation is transfer of possessions” metaphor has the lowest frequency in the book.Statistical differences between the two metaphors can find a philosophical explanation. According to the “causation is motion out” metaphor, the cause is like a boiling and luminous fountain whose effects are considered as its manifestations and overflowing water. Such an image of causation is in great harmony with Mulla Sadra’s philosophical system. But in the “causation is transfer of possessions” metaphor, there is a clear distinction between cause and effect, and causation is considered as a kind of forced movement caused by the application of force. Such an image of causation is less compatible with Mulla Sadra’s philosophical system. (shrink)

In this article, our aim is to examine the place of “reality” in Richard Rorty’s thought in view of the important and key discussion of language in the philosophy of this thinker. In other words, we know that with the occurrence of the “linguistic turn” in the middle of the twentieth century, the relationship between language and reality has become one of the central debates of philosophy, especially analytical philosophy, and has become of particular importance. Is it language that determines (...) the external reality for us? Is knowing the world outside the mind possible only through the possibilities that language gives us? And to what extent does the structure of language affect our cognitive pattern? These are only a part of the linguistic concerns that have occupied the minds of contemporary philosophers. The main concern and problem of the present article, which has been approached using a descriptive-analytical method, is to examine the relationship between language and reality in Richard Rorty’s thought and to show how he defends the linguistic structure of having reality. Rorty, following an analytical philosophy that, in addition to detailed analyses of traditional philosophical concepts, like the concepts of truth, meaning, necessity, etc. and by changing the discussion from experience to discussion from language in the direction of pragmatizing the basic principles of positivism, believes that it is trans-lingual and trans-temporal. The common denominator that Plato found in the outside world and transferred to man in the Cartesian-Kantian tradition is sought in analytic philosophy in language, and so analytic philosophers continue to pursue the traditional philosophy project of providing a trans-historical and eternal framework for the accurate representation of the world. Rorty tries to overcome this view of analytical philosophers with a Darwinist and pragmatic view of language and under the influence of philosophers such as Wittgenstein.For Darwinists, language is a tool among other tools that gives its users the ability to better and more efficiently adapt to their environment and meet their needs. For the likes of Wittgenstein and like-minded people, despite their many and sometimes profound differences, language had an important and pivotal place with its eventual and possibility feature. Influenced by thinkers such as Wittgenstein, and in the context of his Darwinist and pragmatic approach to language, Rorty attributes certain characteristics to language that can be said to influence his whole thought. Firstly, he considers language as a tool like other tools and, therefore, considers it to have no fixed nature and identity. Given that it is not possible to leave the language and on the other hand language has a poetic and metaphorical character, the function of language cannot be a representation of reality and reality can never be available to us naked and as independent of language and descriptions. Therefore, from Rorty’s point of view, reality is a linguistic and constructed matter of language that we humans have invented in cooperation with each other and in accordance with our historical-cultural situation and needs. Of course, Rorty’s point in saying that reality is made by language is by no means that we create reality arbitrarily and as we wish; rather, what is happening is that we are responding to an external stimulus, a response of various sentence types that manifests itself as linguistic reactions. (shrink)

Great naturalist philosophers like David Armstrong, David Papineau, Jeagwon Kim, and others have argued that the best arguments for naturalism are based on Physical Causal Closure. P.C that is a premise in these arguments implies that only natural/physical causes are responsible for natural events and supernatural/non-physical causes cannot have any effective role in the natural universe. By adding some reasonable rules such as Ockham’s Razor or Eleatic Principle to P.C, they have concluded that there is no non-natural cause such as (...) God.Many theists, in the face of the physical causal closure, may accept it and see the relationship between God and the natural world not as causal but as something entirely different; as existential or necessary relation. But this view seems to have problems. First, it is passive because it simply accepts the basic premise of the naturalistic view, and secondly, it seems unacceptable from a theistic point of view to reduce the relationship between God and the world to existential or necessary relation and to eliminate the possibility of causal influence on natural things.In this paper, I will claim that P.C is not only against supernatural causation but is also against human agency and mental causation. To show this, first, I will present an argument against human mental causation based on P.C, and Then I will consider four different physicalist approaches that try to save mental causation. These approaches consist of 1) anomalous monism, 2) non-reductive physicalism, 3) over-determination, and 4) reductive physicalism.The first solution is the idea that Davidson came up with to solve the problem of mental causation. By criticizing type identity and reductionism, he first re-examines the issue of mental causation in a new form. Examining the first, I will show that this approach cannot save mental causation, and, in fact, mental causation will be rejected in this view. The second approach, although it hopes to maintain both mental causation and commitment to the physical closure, this article will show that it wouldn’t succeed in doing either. Although at first glance, acceptance of over-determination may seem like a better solution, I show that this solution has fundamental problems, including the fact that in this approach mental causality becomes redundant, without which physical causes will produce the same result. But without a doubt, the main and popular solution of naturalists will be the last, that is, reductionism. Reductionism in this approach distances itself from early reductionism and seeks to establish a token identity between mental and physical states. But this moderate reductionism also faces fundamental problems such as the hard problem of consciousness, intention, and human agency, which will reject the possibility of its success. I will show, therefore, that none of these approaches can solve the problem of P.C and mental causation.By criticizing all of them, I will show that P.C has an absurd consequence and cannot be a plausible premise in the argument for naturalism. Therefore, the best argument for naturalism will fail and cannot work against God. (shrink)

The point of this paper is to compare substitution from the perspective of Levinas and the replacement sympathy as two approaches in facing the other. Sympathy, as one of the moral issues, is a way of paying attention and understanding the anxiety, worry, or need of others, which occurs consciously and with the recognition and replacement of the other. The substitution from the perspective of Levinas is also in relation to the “other” and outlines the scope of the subject’s responsibility (...) towards him. In the beginning, Levinas’ subject imperially reduces the other to himself, but in the face of the “other,” he pays attention to the irreducibility and dependence of the consistency of his nature on it. In this way, the infinite responsibility towards the “other” becomes apparent; a responsibility that is formed before any kind of consciousness and self-consciousness and in a more passive space than any passivity, and its scope extends to the substitution of the “other” and expiation of the “other.” In the shadow of this infinite responsibility, substitution is distinguished from sympathetic and empathetic replacement. Sympathy, which has been described as a virtue in many moral systems, is a form of altruism through which an actor, by entering into the worries and sufferings of others, replaces himself in a scene of their pain. This replacement is based on knowing the other and imagining his position and ultimately transforming the other into another me. Accordingly, some have introduced sympathy and benevolence as the basis of morality and by emphasizing the essential role of compassion in human moral life, an argument is made on compassion as a pillar of morality.. Levinas also speaks of substitution in several places in his work, which is defined as a replacement in sympathy in relation to another. In other words, replacement in sympathy is the product of the relation between the actor and the other, and substitution in Levinas is based on subjectivity, which is itself based on the relation between the subject and the “other.” This paper wants to provide a comparative analysis of the subject’s substitution in Levinas with the concept of replacement on sympathy.Of course, although the concept of “other” in Levinas’s thought is different from the other in sympathy, the relationship between ‘replacement’ and ‘substitution’ in the two can be examined; for although in Levinas’s view the position of the “other” is defined beyond the essence of the subject and in sympathy after the stage of essence, substitution in Levinas can be proposed in terms of rank later than the stage of essence.‘Substituting the other’ in Levinas, unlike “replacing the other” in sympathy, while excluding cognition, changes from another level of understanding the other to the position of expiation of the other, and such a change is justified by the explanation of subjectivity.No independent research has been done on the relationship between the replacement in sympathy and substitution with the “other” in Levinas, and no analysis has been provided in this regard. This paper, in order to analyze the relation of replacement as one of the principles of sympathy and substitution proposed in Levinas, first defines sympathy and examines the other’s place in it, and then in order to achieve the concept of substitution in Levinas’s thought, examines concepts such as subject, saying, said and responsibility from his point of view. (shrink)

If we have libertarian free will, then it is plausible to believe that the occurrences of certain physical events have irreducible and ineliminable mental explanations. According to a strong version of naturalism, everything in the physical world is in principle explicable in nonmental terms. Therefore, the truth of naturalism implies that libertarian choices cannot explain the occurrences of any physical events. In this paper, I example a methodological argument for the truth of naturalism and conclude that the argument fails. I (...) then consider additional concerns raised against the reality of libertarian freedom. First, I examine the claim that if a physical event E is not causally determined to occur by another physical event, then there is no way to account for the difference between E’s occurring randomly and E’s being causally determined to occur by a mental event. Second, I consider the assertion that the affirmation of libertarianism is a mind-of-the-gaps version of the God-of-the-gaps objection to a divine explanation of a physical event. Third, I take up the question of whether the inability of libertarians to pinpoint precisely where the initial physical effects of libertarian choices occur is a good reason for rejecting libertarianism. Fourth, I examine the claim that belief in the existence of the soul or immaterial mind is the result of an explanatory hypothesis to account for how libertarian free choices can causally produce physical effects. Fifth, I look at the traditional objection to substance dualism from the impossibility of causal interaction between a soul and its body. (shrink)

The principle of alternate possibilities says that you are morally praiseworthy or blameworthy for something you do only if you could have done otherwise. Frankfurt examples are putative counterexamples to PAP. These examples feature a failsafe mechanism that ensures that some agent cannot refrain from doing what she does without intervening in how she conducts herself, thereby supposedly sustaining the upshot that she is responsible for her behavior despite not being able to do otherwise. I introduce a Frankfurt example in (...) which the agent who could not have done otherwise is God. Paying attention to the freedom requirements of moral obligation, the example is commissioned, first, to assess whether various statesof affairs that are unavoidable for God can be obligatory for God and for whichGod can be praiseworthy. The example is, next, used to unearth problems with conventional Frankfurt examples that feature human agents. I argue that conceptual connections between responsibility and obligation cast suspicion on these examples. Pertinent lessons that the divine Frankfurt example helps to reveal motivate the view that divine foreknowledge and determinism, assuming that both preclude freedom to do otherwise, may well imperil obligation and responsibility. (shrink)

An argument is presented, based on a common-sense interpretation of an everyday experience, for emergent dualism as the best available account of the origin of the human mind/soul. Emergent dualism is superior to subjective idealism in that it honors the common-sense conviction that the things we encounter have a real, physical existence, separate from our mental perceptions of them. It is superior to materialism in that it allows for our mental states to have real, physical effects, distinct from the effects (...) of the physical states that accompany the mental states. It is also superior to materialism in allowing for a real, unified self that is not merely a collection of physical particles. These features allow emergent dualism to provide a foundation for libertarian free will; belief in such free will is another deliverance of common sense that cannot readily be reconciled with materialism. Emergent dualism is superior to standard varieties of dualism in giving a plausible account of the minds of non-human animals. Perhaps surprisingly, emer­gent dualism is superior both to traditional dualism and to standard varieties of materialism in combining readily with theories of biological evolution, in which natural selection promotes both the physical and mental development of complex organisms. (shrink)

The relation of causal necessity with free will has been a source of great debate in the history of philosophy and theology. However, in recent years, it has also been discussed in the science of Usul al-Fiqh. After explaining the compatibility of causal necessity with free will, Ākhūnd Khurāsānī speaks of the ’shattering of his pen.’ Two interpretations have been given for this statement. Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī considers the theory of compatibility that Khurāsānī presented as being correct. However, he interprets the (...) ’shattering of the pen’ to be a reference to another matter, i.e., the problem of the recompense of an agent in the case where causal necessity is accepted. His explanation of the aforementioned compatibility and the permissibility of the recompense of sinners has been evaluated in this article. On the contrary, Muḥaqqiq Na’ini considers the ’shattering of the pen’ to be a reference to the problem of the conflict between causal necessity and free will. He says that aside from the popular preliminaries of free will, such as knowledge and intention, there is a need for something that he calls ’talab’-a noetic action that stems from the governance of the soul. He considers this talab to fall outside the scope of causal necessity. This paper seeks to examine the views of these two illustrious students of Ākhūnd Khurāsānī so that the various Usuli dimensions of this discussion can be clarified. (shrink)

For a half - century, I have been developing a view of free will that is incompatible with determinism and, in the process, attempting to answer the Intelligibility Question about such a free will: Can one make sense of an incompatibilist or libertarian free will without reducing it to mere chance, or mystery, and can such a free will be reconciled with modern views of the cosmos and human beings? In this paper, I discuss recent refinements to my earlier writings (...) on such a view, refinements developed in recent years in response to the large critical literature on my views in the past several decades. My view has usually been designated an event-causal view of libertarian free will and distinguished from non-causal and agent-causal libertarian views. But I was never happy with this designation of my view as “event-causal” and did not use it myself in earlier writings. In this paper, I explain why I now reject it altogether. I have come to believe that to avoid numerous misunderstandings in current debates about free will, we must distinguish four different kinds of libertarian theories, not merely three: in addition to non-causal, agent-causal, and event-causal theories, we need to add a fourth kind, which might be called an agent-causal/event-causal theory. My view has always been of this fourth kind. It represents what I call in the title of this paper the “fourth way forward” for making sense of an incompatibilist free will. (shrink)

Whether we are free agents or not and to what extent depends on factors such as the necessary conditions for free will and our definition of human agency and identity. The present article, apart from possible alternatives and the causality of the agent regarding his actions, addresses the element of inclination as a necessary condition for free will. Therefore, an analysis of these conditions determines that even though in some circumstances the range of alternatives the agent can choose is very (...) limited or the agent chooses an action without having the inclination to choose it; however, this does not make the agent forced; rather, free will has levels and every individual possesses a certain extent of it in different conditions. Just the fact that the ultimate choice is made by the agent himself and has voluntarily performed the act himself ultimately is sufficient for being free. As a result, even though the influence of external factors on human actions cannot be disregarded; however, because the action is ultimately not outside his control, accordingly, there is neither such a thing as a compelled agent and nor are our actions left to luck. The character of the agent that is voluntarily formed through our actions plays a determinant role in our choices and actions due to the epistemic and motivational components they possess. (shrink)

Divine freedom is reviewed with respect to three important themes: fate, revisions in divine decisions, and divine obligations. A study of the first theme yields the conclusion that God is free because He has absolute power and authority. In addition, God is free in relation to human beings in the sense that He can do what they do not expect. This theme is found under the heading of decree and measure, qaḍāʾ and qadar. Theologians have also grappled with the problem (...) that the divine decrees appear to change, and on the tablet containing the divine decrees, there can be changes and erasures. This leads to the second topic, badāʾ, the apparent revision of divine decisions, which the theologians treat as abrogations of commands. God can be understood to foster a relationship with us in which He will appear to us as free to respond to our changing conditions, especially prayer and repentance. Finally, the obligations God sets for Himself and reveals to us through scripture are considered. This indicates a kind of divine freedom that only has meaning in the loving relationship between God and His servants that is cultivated through divine revelation. It is then suggested that these various dimensions of divine freedom can best be understood through complementing philosophical and scriptural approaches to the issues and that the understanding of this kind of synthetic hermeneutics can be deepened through comparative theology. (shrink)

This article articulates and defends an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. It begins by defining the conception of free will at issue and then goes on to present versions of the luck objection which is often made against theories of LFW. It is argued that the sort of indeterministic weightings model of LFW which has been defended in the recent literature by Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe and John Lemos has the resources to answer such luck objections while (...) possessing virtues which some other libertarian views lack. According to the indeterministic weightings model of LFW, in making undetermined free-willed choices between two courses of action, A or B, the reasons for choosing each option don’t come with pre-established evaluative weights. During the process of deliberation, the agent assigns weight in an undetermined way to the reasons for each option and this typically leads to the choice of the option that has been assigned a greater value. In the paper, it is not only argued that this theory can resolve worries about luck but also that the view has virtues which certain other libertarian views lack, as such the view is contrasted with the modest libertarian models of LFW from Daniel Dennett and Alfred Mele as well as Robert Kane’s view. (shrink)

My objective in this article is to question whether the problem of free will can, within our current conceptual system, be framed coherently. It is already widely recognized that a mental faculty, the will, needed to initiate action, no longer fits with current thought. However, we can still ask whether human decisions and actions are determined by something other than the agent. So the important question is whether we still have a cogent concept of determinism. The two prevalent alternatives are (...) a closed set of deterministic laws of nature, and a simple distillation of the principle of sufficient reason: all events must have a cause. I first provide examples showing that philosophical concepts come and go as categorial frameworks change. The modern concept of deterministic laws of nature was developed during the latter half of the modern period and is now being called seriously into question. G. W. Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason could only be justified in theological terms, which most contemporary Western scholars reject. I end with an inadequate account of a dawning worldview based on complex adaptive systems theory, in which most human actions are best described in terms of non-necessitating propensities. (shrink)

The division of knowledge into “notion” and “assertion” is one of the foundational discussions. Knowledge, in its general sense, is divided into knowledge-by-presence and acquired knowledge. Acquired is either notional that is not judgment or notional accompanied by judgment. The former is “notion” while the latter is “assertion.” The two problems of this division are as follows: 1) “failure to comply with the criteria of rational division” which includes the instances of “unity of the divider and divided” and “lack of (...) contrast between the types; 2) “the contrast of two categories in one quiddity.” Thinkers have replied to the first problem by considering the different validities in division, that is, the divider is unconditioned, notion is negativity conditioned, and assertion conditioned to something. In response to the second problem, they have said that judgment is necessary to assertion and is tantamount to the differentia, and the companionship of notion and judgment is mental. Apart from asserting the composition of assertion and explaining its parts, Fakhr Razi believes in the logical requisites of composition as well. According to him, assertion is the collection of notions of object and predicate and copula and judgment. Its problem is the acquirement of assertion from definition dues to the self-evidence of judgment; or it is from both definition and argument due to the acquiredness of judgment. As it were, the acceptance of the acquirement of judgment is incompatible with Fakhr Razi’s foundation in considering notions self-evidence. Another problem is the incompatibility with the unity and simplicity of knowledge. In his view, we cannot eliminate the first problem by considering the different validities in the divisions and divider because firstly, the type of these conditions is mentally-posited and they cannot be the differentia for real matters. Secondly, these validations explain the manner of presence of the divider in the divisions and their relationship to each other and is not specific to notion and assertion. Similarly, using judgment as the diffrentia of assertion cannot be a reply to the second problem because no differentia has been mentioned to conceive a part of assertion to make it acquired and distinct. Moreover, because Fakhr Razi’s basis has a problem in the composition of assertion, answers and requisites based on it will also be problematic. Therefore, his view does not appear to be successful in solving the problems. In the explanation of the views of the philosophers, Nasir al-Din Tusi considers assertion to be judgment. “Meaning” is the divider of notion and assertion. Notion is really knowledge and assertion is knowledge of it reverts to notion. In reality, assertion is judgment and judgment has two aspects: 1) it is an action of the soul; 2) conceptualization of this action of the soul by the soul. According to the second aspect, judgment is one of the instances of notion. The main point in this view is to consider notion as the basis; however, limiting knowledge to notions results in the denial of the share of argument in the two parts of logic. As it were, the division of knowledge into two parts makes the division figurative and indulgent. However, if one seeks the different in the philosophical and logical aspects in Khwaja Nasir’s view, then from a philosophical perspective, assertion is judgment and reverts to notion and this results in the exclusiveness of knowledge to notions. Therefore, there are essentially no divisions for knowledge. However, the concept of notion and assertion is one of the issues of logic. From this perspective, knowledge is figuratively divided and since it is in the beginning of logic and is in the position of education, such a matter is allowed. Therefore, by defining “meaning” as a divider, Khwaja could answer the first part of the first problem. As it were, considering assertion to be the same as judgment is both its second part and also the second problem which is an existential and ontological discussion would essentially not be applicable. (shrink)

Plato has identified Meno’s paradox as one of the most important theoretical challenges to learning. Meno’s paradox is that research and learning about what one does not know is impossible and about what one knows is useless. To solve this paradox, Plato proposed the Theory of Recollection. According to this theory, learning is the recollection of pre-existing knowledge that the human soul has forgotten in mixing with the body. Augustine does not find the Theory of Recollection convincing. Of course, the (...) relationship between Augustine’s position and Plato’s view that knowledge is a recollection is very vague. According to Augustine, learning is not simply the mere receipt of information, but the ability to recall what we already know. Contrary to the early days of his intellectual life, Augustine believes that the example of Socrates’ question and answer with a slave cannot show the correctness of the Theory of Recollection. Augustine’s reflections on the book of The Confessions also show that remembrance involves the a priori existence of the soul. But in the second half of his intellectual life, Augustine believes that divine light brings rational things to the mind and causes them to be known without the need for innate knowledge or the pre-existence of the soul in another world. Some commentators believe that the main reason for this approach is the difficulty of accepting the past life of the soul as the main component of the Theory of Recollection. But there is no consensus among them on the timing and quality of Augustine’s change of approach. According to Gilson, Augustine never categorically disproved the notion that the soul existed before the body, and never explicitly referred to where the soul existed before the body. According to Teske, in the second period of his intellectual life, Augustine retreated from the Theory of Recollection as he had put it in his earlier writings. From O’Daly’s point of view, nowhere in Augustine’s writings can one find an explicit comment on the past life of the soul. The research question is whether the subject of the pre-existence of the soul is the only way to understand Augustine’s position on the Theory of Recollection? In other words, is the only way to get closer to an optimal understanding of Augustine’s change of epistemological approach, to take another ontological position among other opinions? The research claims that the reading of Augustine’s philosophy of language and semiotics opens a new entrance to the theory of divine enlightenment as a novel solution to the Meno paradox. In fact, instead of ontologically, the focus of Augustine’s discussion is on the discussion of language and its ability to convey meaning, real teaching, and learning. According to this linguistic approach, nothing can be learned through words and questions and answers. Therefore, unlike Plato, he concludes that learning is not the same as recollection, but the understanding of knowledge and realities of the outside world is done with the help of the light of the inner teacher, God. Augustine called this thesis divine enlightenment. The purpose of this study is to analyze and explain this claim by emphasizing the treatise on Augustine’s “The Teacher”. In this treatise, he talks about the nature of language and its role in teaching and learning. In this treatise, he emphasizes that words are insufficient to transmit our thoughts and ideas to another, and therefore, the mind reaches the level of enlightenment and understanding of the world with the knowledge it has received from its inner teacher. As a result, enlightenment of the mind by God provides the best explanation for the Theory of Recollection. (shrink)

Kant, in his pre-critical works like Reflections on Anthropology and Lectures on Metaphysics, considers some aspects of images that are not followed in the Critique of Pure Reason. Instead, in the first critique, he makes us face some new aspects act of the imagination. In this research, through the analytic-descriptive method, we study the relationship between time, image, synthesis, in Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics which can give imagination an ontological aspect. Heidegger also tries to show the coherence (...) and continuity between these two periods, which are not apart from each other. Heidegger’s interpretation relies on syntheses and his references to pre-critical works show the imagination as a unifying faculty for sensibility and understanding and make new images that are related together. He shows in the first critique, that there is a correlation and continuity between the form of presentation,, and the perceptual representations,. Different images are formed on the ground of the pure image of time and have a direct relation to the synthesis. In addition to this, schema-images are not like perceptual images, but as pure future, are the basis of thought-experience, precisely cognition-intuition. The transcendental schematism is the continuous basis of both experience and thought, which is indeed the common and unknown root between sensibility and understanding of knowledge. The transcendental schematism is the pure time that becomes the basis of our knowledge. It brings together two sources, sensibility and understanding, the two branches of human cognition that perhaps share a common, but to us unknown, root. Sensibility provides the mind with intuitions it receives from the senses, whereas understanding contains the concepts necessary to process this sensory information. Both forms of knowledge are necessary for all cognition. Now cognition is quite distinct from thought in general. Although it is possible to think without sensory information, our concepts remain empty and no cognition has occurred: we have only “played with representations ”. For cognition to occur, all thought must relate, directly or indirectly, to sensibility : our concepts must be made sensibly concrete. “If cognition is to have objective reality, that is, a connection to an object,” argues Kant, “then the object must be capable of being given in some manner”. “Being given,” is what Kant means by Darstellung: the horizon of time is representations of object = x. Conceptual representations of the object = x are necessary to cognition. Pure time is a horizon of time that forms different images as images of notions of concepts. By placing the subject and subjective knowledge with Dasein, Heidegger accentuates the horizon of time and holding open the horizon as dasein to others. Dasein creates an image for now and leaves behind the images of throwing possibilities. As a result, the point of intersection of all the discourses can be expressed in such a way that the three Kantian syntheses correspond to the three aspects of time, temporality related to the forms of existence. schema-image is the pure-image-of-time of ontological determinism in the forms of existence. Dasien acts as Kant’s imagination based on images and relations that seem visually pictorial, and performs these relations and creates images. For Heidegger, therefore, imagination means performing the visual-time-relations, which is related to the pure image of time. These pictorial or visual relations refer to seeing or throwing to the form of presenting if something, like x, appears; relationships that make the image of phenomena appear as something and something else. Based on the temporal aspect, we can say the function of imagination is forming to the present, past, and future dimension of time which is corresponded to the dasein’s forms of existence. (shrink)

The reduction of the field of science to the limits of experience from the eighteenth century and the monopoly of its methods and tools in quantification and material senses, as well as the use of reason as a concept, has limited the scope of human beings; in such a way that the attainment of indulgence was increasingly considered as his goal in the material world. The purpose of this article is to provide another definition of science by considering the courts (...) of Ibn Sina’s philosophy in the fields of ontology, anthropology, epistemology, and methodology; a definition that fits the principle of human end and happiness. Comparing the components of the above-mentioned vertices in Ibn Sina’s philosophy, science finds an intensifying range from the second level to the highest level and each time in comparison to the levels of love. And happiness corresponds with this; in such a way that man becomes more in love and closer to ultimate happiness by intensifying his knowledge. Intensification science, with the permission of multiple understandings, closes the way to the monologue logic of dogmatism, and on the other hand, according to the monotheistic system in Ibn Sina’s philosophy, it never leads to unbridled relativity and skepticism arising from the new hermeneutics. According to thinkers in this field, a definition of science that is appropriate to Muslim societies should have several characteristics and these characteristics are not discussed at all in experimental science: It should: Have a divine origin. Have a longitudinal, not transverse, view of the hierarchy of existence; because neglecting the longitudinal hierarchy leads to neglecting the fit between metaphysics and physics, in which case metaphysics is either marginalized or considered ineffective on physics. Be based on discovering the truth and not just material usefulness. Its language is sometimes cryptic and symbolic and is not limited to the dictionary of mathematics and statistics. Now that we see these characteristics clearly in the ontology, anthropology, and epistemology of Muslim philosophers, including Ibn Sina, we seek to answer the following question: How can Ibn Sina, as a Muslim philosopher, deduce another meaning of science? The findings of this study are summarized as follows: Love has many levels, and each of these levels corresponds to different levels of human happiness. On the other hand, the level of human happiness is completely in line with the level of human perception. This includes multiple levels, from the lowest to the highest. That is, sensory perception - which is the lowest kind of perception - corresponds perfectly to the lowest kind of love as well as the lowest kind of happiness. This type of science is called intensification science and unlike experimental science, it does not limit and confine science only in the field of experience. Thus, the science of intensification in the school of Ibn Sina has characteristics that are appropriate to the life of Muslim societies; because in the coordinates of this science, the system of existence has a longitudinal hierarchy and in this hierarchy, transcendence is the source of beings and true happiness is achieved by reaching and maximum likeness to it by passing the levels of sense and appearance. By discussing the true happiness of human beings in the science of intensity, unlike empirical science, the absurdity of life is reduced and its meaning is increased, and it is by the promotion of this science that true happiness is achieved; something that empirical science can never do. (shrink)

Without doubt, one of the important schools of thought in Islam is the Muʿtazilite rationalism school of thought and, in addition, one of the most challenging historical discussions also revolves around the decision of “determinism and delegation.” Based on many accounts, the theory of “delegation” meaning human independent power in performing actions has been attributed to the Muʿtazilites as one of the important Islamic sects; a theory that, according to many of the Ashʿarite and Twelver Shiite thinkers without doubt belongs (...) to them. However, nowadays, this attribution has been challenged by some researchers and, in contrast, some have risen in support of it. This article utilizes a library method and through investigation of the intellectual foundations of the Muʿtazilites in the discussion regarding the method of creation of human actions and on one hand, striving to understand their words and on the other, by relying on ancient historical records in the works of sect-researchers and rhetoric tactics in the typology of the terms “delegation and destiny ” seeks to pass judgment and give fruit to logical contributions in response to the main question of “how the link between the Muʿtazilites and delegation can be evaluated?” Based on this, citing assemblage of that which has passed to understand the relationship between the “Muʿtazilites” and “tafwīḍ,” the following can be mentioned as the main points: 1. The word qadar can mean “ikhtiyār ” and “tafwīḍ ” and is equivocal. By studying the works of the Muʿtazilites, we can see that the attribution of the qadar to them has mostly been line with the meaning of free will regarding this term. Therefore, it cannot simply be deduced from the attribution of this term that the Muʿtazilites believe in delegation because we would suffer from the fallacy of equivocality. 2. According to experts in the area of sects, and considering the different evidence in historical books, the “qadariyya” and “mufawwida” are different from the “Muʿtazilites” and for this reason they must not be considered as one group. According to some sources, these two even had disputes between themselves. For this reason, it is not right that we consider the Muʿtazilite scholars as “qadariyya and mufawwida.” 3. The philosophical system accepted by most of the Muʿtazilites is based on accepted the linear cause and effect system along with and aligned with the theory of “denial of delegation” and can be evidence of the Muʿtazilites not accepting delegation because the theory of delegation of free will results in the violation of the law of causality by a precise breach of it and this is a serious challenge for this philosophical system. 4. Shiite scholars such as Shaykh Mufid, Syed Murtada, and Shaykh Tusi who lived in the age of development of the Muʿtazilites did not only not approve of the attribution of the theory of delegation of free will to them; rather, in some instances, they considered the beliefs of the Muʿtazilites to be the same beliefs as that of the Twelver Shiites. 5. The evidence that some of the opponents of the attribution of the theory of delegation of free will to the Muʿtazilites have presented such as “denying fate and destiny by the Muʿtazilites” and “accepting the impossibility of the gathering of two powerfuls over a single object of power” are not acceptable because, firstly, the Muʿtazilites do not deny fate and destiny and believe in them and secondly, the aforementioned law is not correlated to the theory of delegation in a correct reading of it in the discussion of the creating actions. (shrink)

Human actions and behavior are formed based on their internal events. Among these behaviors, some arise specifically under the influence of one character and emotions instantly and without undergoing the stages of thought and reflection; even though they use a knowledgeable source of the category of imagination. Similarly, sometimes particular qualities affect human souls that are subject to passivity that is acquired for the benefit of beneficial and harmful affairs in some faculties. These states of the soul are called human (...) emotions; happiness and joy, grief and sorrow, fear and hope, fervor and ecstacy, and wrath and anger are all of this class. Here, the question arises as to what the position of the character and emotions is in the human existence according to Mulla Sadra? What factors are influential in creating the states and emotions of the soul? In this study, employing the descriptive-analytic method and using sources of Sadrian philosophy, we conclude that the presence of the character necessitates that when the will to act is formed, action is produced without any difficulty, thought, and contemplation. In reality, the characteristics of the soul originate from human perception and manifest their influence in actions. The repetition and exercise of this perception and the actions related to them create the grounds for the formation of a habit in human beings that gives rise to vocation and industry. There is a strong relationship between the habits of the soul and human states and actions. Similarly, there is a special relationship between inner characteristics and emotion and the human physical condition. Based on this relationship, just as behavior is influenced by characteristics, characteristics are also affected by behavior; however, this influence is indirect. It is noteworthy that the attributes and characteristics that are activated in human beings from intellection and reasoning are never themselves the cause of the suspension of thought. On the contrary, with their activity the performance of the aforementioned faculties is elevated in terms of quality and speed. When weak souls are engaged in intellection, their emotions become chaotic or when their emotions are engaged, their mind is disturbed. However, strong souls combine the attributes of perceptions and stimulations and create a balance. The noble soul is similar to the incorporeal beings in terms of instincts and nature from a wisdom and freedom perspective. In reality, the evolution and perfection of the soul from the stage of potential to the stage of actualized intellect do not create any obstacles for the form and states of the soul. The different physical states and circumstances and their effect on the vaporous soul in terms of fineness and subtlety or roughness and density of the soul results in the intensification of the potential of emergence of different and proportional states of the soul. However, Mulla Sadra does not believe that physical states and attributes have an existential affect on the soul and spirit because such a thing is impossible and is similar to the effect of something lower on the higher. Rather, specific physical conditions create the grounds and help the emergence or intensify the potential of the manifestation of a specific state of the soul and characteristic. In all these instances, those that have a direct influence on creating the state of the soul are the human perceptive faculties including sense, imagination, and reasoning, that is, first thought and conception are formed in human beings and the states and feelings of the soul emerge after that. However, he does not believe in the direct effect of the emotions on the functioning of the reason and perceptive faculties; however, he does not deny the indirect and preparatory role of the states of the soul on human reasoning and thought. In this way, this situation itself provides the grounds for the creation of new thoughts and ideas. (shrink)

All popular concepts of deity believe in divinity. In Theism, “God” has attributes such as consciousness, will, goodness, and so forth, which can be seen in humans. On the contrary, pantheists argue that: a) the person is equal to the human being; b) embodiment is a prominent feature of the human being; c) having attributes such as consciousness, will, and so forth, requires a body and equates to anthropomorphism. In other words, these attributes are inevitably associated with embodiment and the (...) resulting limitations. Thereby, the pantheistic deity is impersonal. There is a duality of the “personality” and “impersonality” of the deity. The crucial question of this article is, “what is the relationship between divinity and personality?” The relationship of embodiment to personality and the relationship of perfection to the impersonal deity, constitute the sub-questions of it. We show that there is a significant relationship between personality and divinity. In the first section, the term divinity is examined; firstly, it is assumed that, contrary to pantheism, divinity is definable. Otto’s attempting to trace the origins of the “holy” and the historical studying of pantheistic approaches confirms this assumption. Secondly, “Infinity, ” “influence, ” and “transcendence” are three critical terms in defining divinity. Pantheistic argument showed that all critiques of personality are summed up in the fact that personality is a limiting factor. That is, it is inconceivable that the transcendent, infinite, and influential deity can be a person. Therefore, in the second part, the concept of person is examined, and we conclude that: 1) there is a relation between the practical terms in person’s meaning and the terms of divinity; 2) Although the main critique of the deity’s personality is the embodiment, it is not a crucial term in defining the person. That is why Michael Levin is in contradiction when he believes that divine unity doesn’t need to be a person or conscious, it is sufficient to be perfect. The question arises as to what perfection means without consciousness, power, and will? Isn’t a human being more complete due to the pantheistic divine unity? Accordingly, an analysis of perfection without addressing personal attributes puts pantheists in an apparent contradiction. Besides, impersonality faces a severe dilemma; if they do not take the personal attributes, according to Kant, the deity is reduced to an object. Instead, there could be some responses to anthropomorphism; firstly, the basis of the Pantheistic mistake is to generalize the meaning of finite consciousness or will to an infinite being, whereas temporality is an attribute of the deity’s knowledge or will’s objects, not of the deity’s knowledge and will. Secondly, the study shows where personality is interpreted to anthropomorphism, it focuses on the late idea in Christian thought about Jesus, while the history of attributing the deity to consciousness, will, and so forth, is much older. Finally, it is indicated that the critiques of the personality are not strong enough to challenge it. So, according to the “Principle of Simplicity”, believers in the personality of the deity have a more justified view. (shrink)

The question of free will has long been considered one of the most important philosophical questions. It can be said that different and even conflicting opinions have been expressed on this issue. Allamah Jafari and John Searle are two thinkers who, in their intellectual framework, have made a significant contribution to clarifying the “free will” debate. The two thinkers agree on various issues such as the role of the ‘I’ in creating free will, the non-randomness of action, the existence of (...) a gap before activity, and so forth. They also differ on issues such as “the meaning of free will or freedom,” “the scope of freedom or free will,” and the “Divinity of ‘I’ or non-divinity of ‘I’.” Allamah Jafari, besides the rational and reasoning method, pays attention to the scientific context. Searle also has a scientific and reasoning view of the question of free will. Jafari proves free will by introducing the metaphysical self. Moreover, consciousness has a unique role in his theory. Searle, On the other hand, with the concepts of “consciousness” and dependence on the “non-empirical self,” seeks to create a hole for proving free will. Jafari’s view about freedom is that we have free will. Therefore, his approach in this regard is liberal. But Searle plays a role in explaining the issue of “free will” by proposing two hypotheses. Both philosophers believe that the substantial evidence for the existence of free will is that we always think before we act. This thinking causes a gap between the period before the action and the time of the action. According to Jafari, a gap appears in the time “before the action” and “the time of the action.” But in Searle’s view, this gap appears between “reasons for the decision,” “the decision” and “the decision and the action,” and between “the action and the continuation of that action.” A careful examination of the views of these two philosophers can open a new way for the question of “free will” and “freedom.” This is because both thinkers have also dealt with scientific issues and have considered various aspects of the phenomenon of “will” and its freedom or lack of freedom have been considered. This article, in addition to describing and clarifying the opinion of the two philosophers, is responsible for analytical, comparative, and critical points. The comparative and critical analysis of this article reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the views of these two philosophers. The idea of Jafari and John Searle is a new view on the issue of free will. Finally, it can be said that the scientific and philosophical attitude of these two philosophers can be a new way to develop other influential theories in this field. We can summarize the contents in such a way that this article includes the views of two philosophers along with analytical, critical, and comparative evaluation. The purpose of this study is to provide a new solution and further clarify the issue of free will with a descriptive-analytical method. (shrink)

In quantum theory, objects are intrinsically evolving and changing based on the Uncertainty Principle, and the particle state is described by a time-dependent wave packet such that the wave packet corresponding to even a free particle is successively evolvable; a quantum particle has an indefinite and transformative state. In the relativistic Quantum Fields Theory, instead of the concepts of particle and wave packet, a continuous object named “field” with permanent fluctuation in its ground state is considered as the original concept. (...) In Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, based on the Substantial Motion Theory, the subject of continuous evolution and change in the natural body appears as the intrinsic mobility of the natural body. In this paper, we are going to present a comparative investigation of this topic in the two areas of study mentioned. Initially, we present some necessary topics in physics including the motion of fundamental particles, the motion of quantum objects, Quantum Fields Theory, quantum vacuum, and the creation and annihilation of particles in the Quantum Fields Theory; then, we consider some necessary topics in some fields of study in philosophy about the natural body and the nature and the identity of physical bodies including the ideas and the special opinion of Mulla Sadra. Particularly and with more detail, we pay attention to the Sadrian philosophy about the evolution and intrinsic mobility of the natural body based on his famous Substantial Motion Theory. With a comparative study, and by considering Sadrian philosophy as the fundamental philosophical basis for natural sciences, particularly physics, we try to compare the intrinsic motion of natural bodies in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy with the intrinsic evolution of quantum objects in modern physics. Our research method is based on and uses standard resources including books and research papers about Mulla Sadra’s thoughts and theories and the internationally well-known books and papers on standard quantum physics and quantum fields theory. The conclusive remarks are as follows: The transformation of quantum particles or the creation and annihilation of particles in the theory of quantum fields agrees with this point that the intrinsic mobility of the natural body in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy doesn’t reason on the philosophical existence and/or loss of existence. That a quantum particle doesn’t have a constant status in two consecutive instants is in agreement with the Sadrian Substantial Motion Theory that explains ‘motion’ in the ‘bed’ of time. Finally, we should mention that although the intrinsic motion of the natural body in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is based on its completion while the creation and annihilation of particles in Quantum Fields Theory may be better compared with the emergence and extinction well known in peripatetic philosophy, by considering the background quantum vacuum field as the main basis of the so-called “particles” which is continuously in evolution and permanent fluctuation and is the basis for the creation and annihilation of particles, the comparison between the modern Quantum Fields Theory and Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is done well. (shrink)

The Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom is the most coherent form of Schelling’s attempt to describe the absolute system or the system of freedom. For the first time in the twentieth century, with Heidegger’s careful reference to his treatise on freedom and his repeated commentary in 1936 and 1941, the importance of this treatise in the history of Western thought became apparent. Heidegger focuses on Schilling’s thinking, especially with Schilling’s treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, research (...) into the formation of the system, and the question of the possibility of a system of freedom as a question of the essence of being. Schilling bases his research on the system of freedom on a correct ontological basis in order to transcend formal freedom as an independent determinant of mechanical causation and to achieve the true definition of freedom as the ability to do good and evil. And after proposing the inadequacy of formal freedom in the idealist systems before it, it introduces the real and living concept of freedom as the ability to do good and evil. Heidegger demonstrates the independence of the Schelling system in comparison with the Fichte and Hegel systems, and his innovations in response to issues such as evil, freedom, identity, and the relation of being and “is” are most evident in the metaphysical realm of the will; however, remaining within the metaphorical framework also prevents Schilling from approaching the question of the truth of existence. Schilling’s important issue is the elimination of the opposition between freedom and necessity, which, in his view, is the focus of philosophy. For this reason, the discussion of freedom is at the heart of the system in its true sense, and in his opinion, his dissertation is for the first time the design of a system based on the idea of human freedom. The possibility of a system of freedom must be created in accordance with the principle of identity, which does not ignore the meaning of the relation of theology. In Schelling’s Heideggerian interpretation of the principle of identity, the priority of ontological issues in matters of theological nature such as all theism is given more importance and the question of all theism as a question of the system to the question of “is” and how to connect the structure of beings as a whole. The purpose of this paper is to analyze Heidegger’s interpretation of the concept of the system of freedom according to Schelling with emphasis on the ontological distinction between ground and existence. This study seeks to answer these two questions: how does the design of the real concept of freedom open the way to explain the ontological foundation of the possibility of evil and the possibility of freedom in the system? Also, how does the distinction between ground and existence lead to Schelling’s main goal in resolving the conflict between system and freedom? Moreover, according to Heidegger, to what extent does this distinction arise from Schilling’s metaphysical and subject-centered thinking? (shrink)

Perfection is an anthropological issue that is inherently human in nature, but in theory, Greek philosophers played a prominent role. They pursued this more as a virtue. The main question of this research is what analysis can be provided for Al-Kindi’s view of human perfection? This research was done using a descriptive-analytic method and its most important findings are: In analyzing the Al-Kindi’s view of perfection, we can divide it into two types – philosophical perfection and moral perfection. Philosophical perfection (...) in this research means perfection in the field of theoretical reason. In his treatise on reason, he used it in four meanings, the second meaning of which refers to the reason considered in this research. Although he uses a degree of theoretical reason, we see a kind of ambiguity and weaknesses in his philosophical perfection. What we mean by moral perfection in this research is the perfection of the practical intellect, which is called virtue. He is more morally influenced by Plato than Aristotle. And according to the powers of the human soul, it divides virtues into four parts – wisdom, prudence or courage, chastity, and justice. To explain further, a human being has many virtues, and human virtues refer to the same desirable human creation which is divided into two types, one of which is in the soul and the other surrounds the human body and is one of the effects in the soul. The kind that exists in the soul is divided into three types: wisdom, chastity and the one that surrounds the human body and one of the effects of this thing in the soul is justice. When a necessity arises, one does not fear death and repels something that is against his will; chastity is eating things to train the body and maintaining it after all. Virtues have two extremes and each of these two is a departure from moderation and vice. The soul is a slowly transcending light and after separating from the body, it becomes aware of everything in the world and no secret is hidden from it. In this article, an attempt has been made to solve the problem of perfection from Al-Kindi’s point of view using a rational-descriptive method. The important point about Al-Kindi is that he was in the early stages of the translation movement and was not familiar enough with Greek works. Also, according to the available reports, not all of his works have reached us so it is difficult to judge definitively about his views on various issues, including perfection. However, from Al-Kindi’s point of view, perfection can be divided into philosophical and moral perfection but for the aforementioned reasons, both types of perfection are ambiguous and there seems to be more of an ambiguity regarding philosophical perfection in his works. (shrink)

This paper is an ‘interdisciplinary research’ on ‘ethics’ and ‘Iranian ancient culture and languages’ that describes ‘Zoroastrian Ethics’ by analyzing Avestan and Pahlavi texts such as AVESTA, Dēnkard, The Book of Arda Viraf, and Wāzagēčand ī Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān school’ and the doctrine of tashkik al-wujud in Mulla Sadra’s al-Hikma al-Muta’aliya. The consequence of the ‘relation between finite and infinite’ in ‘Zoroastrian theology, ontology, and metaphysics’ is the ‘firm belief in the reality of the individual soul, and in its capacity (...) for activity’ in ‘Zoroastrian Ethics.’So, the main idea of ‘Parsi Ethics’ is the fullest realization of the vital forces and the consequent disappearance of the opposite tendencies. The Persian genius for ‘utilitarianism’ and ‘pragmatism’ enters into the scheme of righteousness and justice. This ethics appreciates industry, self-control, and veracity in the individual life and righteousness, regularity, and social accord in the social life. The reverse of this ethics is an abstract stiffness that will not accommodate itself to life and whose irrational consequences are often inimical to life. This paper shows that so many years before a ‘linguistic turn’ and a ‘big change in the common opinion about life, industry, and innovation’ that occurred during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in northwestern Europe and caused the ‘Industrial Revolution,’ and then ‘modern economic growth,’ the main elements of ‘capitalism’ existed in ‘Zoroastrian Ethics. ’. (shrink)

So far, various approaches have been proposed to explain the progress of science. These approaches, which fall under a fourfold classification, are as follows: semantic, functional, epistemic, and noetic approaches. Each of these approaches, based on the intended purpose of science, defines progress on the same basis. The semantic approach defines progress based on the approximation to the truth, the functional approach based on problem-solving, the epistemic approach based on knowledge accumulation, and the noetic approach based on increased understanding. With (...) a stratified description of the world, Roy Bhaskar sees science as the movement toward deeper layers aimed at discovering productive mechanisms. He also explains progress based on the layering and acquisition of knowledge of the underlying layers. But because he believes in the social nature of science and considers knowledge a social product and subject to change, he acknowledges the fallibility of cognition. Hence, it is believed that moving to a new layer does not necessarily lead to the progress of science. However, it is possible that by acquiring knowledge about the new layer, our previous knowledge will be revised and corrected. In this article, while expressing the Bhaskar theory of scientific progress and explaining its contingency with respect to the fallibility of cognition, we pursue a basic goal. This goal is summarized in the review of all four approaches in order to show their lack of attention to the fallibility of cognition and its effect on explaining progress. What has been done in this article is based on two phases: explaining the contingency of the progress of science for Bhaskar and examining the four approaches to the progress of science in order to show their inattention to the fallibility of cognition. In his philosophy, referring to the two dimensions of transitive and intransitive, Roy Bhaskar considers the purpose of science to be the acquisition of knowledge about intransitive objects, and this knowledge is achieved through a social activity. Since this cognition is a social product and belongs to the transitive dimension of science, it will be fallible and subject to change. Bhaskar concludes with philosophical arguments that the world contains generative mechanisms, but that it is the task of science to discover their nature and exactly what mechanisms are at work. This requires work in two theoretical dimensions, namely the use of conceptual tools and a practical dimension, that is, the use of experimental tools. Now, as the theoretical and technical conditions under which cognition is formed and evaluated are themselves expanding and subject to change and modification, our knowledge may also be expanded or corrected. In this study, it was found that the semantic approach is unaware of the effect of fallibility on the evidence used to estimate the approximation to the truth and, consequently, progress. The functional approach ignores this effect in solving the problems posed by theories. The epistemic approach does not take into account the fallibility of evidence used to justify and validate the evidence, and finally, the noetic approach neglects the effect of the fallibility on what the explanation and prediction are based on. These have led to these approaches, which consider the satisfaction of the criteria in question necessarily leads to progress. (shrink)