If we want to talk about the philosophy of religion with an Islamic approach, we must clarify what are its differences and similarities with the conventional philosophy of religion in the West. For this purpose, in this paper, the meaning of comparative philosophy and its obstacles, possibilities, necessities, and benefits will first be investigated. After that, it will be shown what considerations should be taken into account in order to have a comparative philosophy. Then, we will show how to have (...) a philosophy of religion with an Islamic approach and what differences and similarities this type of philosophy of religion has with the Western philosophy of religion. Following that, some hermeneutic considerations for this philosophical comparison will be mentioned, and afterward, it will be shown how the Christian background of Western philosophy of religion has affected it. Finally, we will review some of the main subjects of the philosophy of religion if it is to be rationally evaluated with the foundations of Islamic thought to show what differences it has with the conventional Western philosophy of religion. (shrink)

A longstanding problem confronting Christian theology and its doctrine of incarnation is the apparent contradiction that it faces. For example, to be divine, in the relevant sense, is to have the limitlessness of God. To be human, in the relevant sense, is to have the limitations of humans. The incarnation (in the person of Jesus per Christian doctrine) is to be both divine and human. Many theologians and sympathetic philosophers have attempted to ‘consistentize’ (i.e., make consistent) incarnation. Timothy Pawl has (...) been one of the latest to do so. In this paper, I concisely note a dilemma for Pawl’s approach. (shrink)

John Lemos defends an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will that is a variant of event-causal libertarian views. Many argue that these views are susceptible to the luck problem: an agent’s directly free choices are too luck infected for the agent to be morally responsible for them. The weightings model supposedly escapes this problem largely because in this model an agent’s reasons for choices do not come with pre-established values. Rather, an agent performs intentional acts of weighting that contribute (...) to the value she assigns to her reasons. Decisions that are consequences of weightings are, thus, under the agent’s control and not subject to luck. In a recent paper, I argued that despite its weighting component, Lemos’s model succumbs to the luck problem. Lemos rejoins that my criticisms are based on misunderstandings and confusions. I deflect the charge of misperception and explain why the weightings model remains susceptible to the luck problem. (shrink)

In this article, we inquire into the concept of meaning in pedagogy through Heidegger’s philosophy. Since metaphysical systems reduce the Being of humans, due to the dominance of subjectivist and worldlessness views, they tend to suffer from the crisis of nihilism, which has made its way into various ontological sciences, especially pedagogy. In this article, we tackle the elements that culminated in such meaninglessness in pedagogy in terms of dualism, worldlessness, absence of existentials, and finally the posteriority of Eros and (...) Pathos to Logos. Now, since the philosophies of Nietzsche and Heidegger extensively deal with the issue of meaning, and in particular, Heidegger in Being and Time grapples with the concept of the meaning of Being by analyzing existentials, here we decided to discuss meaning by drawing on the existentials of understanding and attunement, and from this perspective, we look for a way out of the crisis of nihilism in pedagogy. Discussion of the meaning of being-in-the-world and the prior precedence of Eros over cognition and Logos is also helpful for overcoming the crisisof nihilism in pedagogy. That is, if pathos, eros, and the existentials of understanding and attunement are taken seriously in pedagogy, then pedagogical meaninglessness might be resisted by appealing to worldlessness and subjectivism. In fact, the revolution that sparked in Heidegger’s philosophy, in which pathos was deemed prior to logos and the question of meaning was rendered possible by turning to existentials, opened the way for a pedagogy based on existentials. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers of religion have predominantly focused on understanding the nature of faith, yet there has been a lack of attention towards a particular type of faith that we can call inquiry-based faith. This paper aims to address this gap by exploring some challenges associated with inquiry-based faith. I argue, in particular, that while this is a widespread kind of faith, we face a dilemma in showing how it is possible and plausible. On the one hand, faith that P requires (...) acceptance of P, and on the other, if someone is inquiring into whether P is the case, she must not already accept that P is the case. Borrowing a conceptual framework from recent literature on inquiry, I propose a solution to this dilemma by appealing to parts of the story of Abraham in the Quran. I suggest, specifically, that one can have faith that a partial answer to a question is the case, and at the same time, seek further inquiry into the question for a more complete answer. As such, I support the idea that inquiry-based faith is a possible and plausible option for both faithful people and inquirers. (shrink)

This article provides a brief background of how Comparative Theology is understood today, to point out features of how it is practiced that are responsive to issues peculiar to contemporary Catholicism, and to suggest how a version of CT might be developed that is more consistent with Islamic traditions of thought on related issues. In order to accomplish this last goal, a brief introduction to the traditional “Islamic sciences” is provided. It will be suggested that an Islamic Comparative Theology (ICT) (...) can be understood as a multidisciplinary field that draws on several Islamic sciences, as well as research in religious studies. I argue in favor of a blurring of the distinction between Comparative Religion and Comparative Theology, and point out that relevant discussions are to be found across a variety of traditional Islamic sciences, but that it would be advantageous to collect these discussions together and to augment them with information gleaned from both secular and Islamic approaches to the teachings of Muslim thinkers about theological issues, broadly understood, in comparison with what is found in non-Islamic traditions in such a manner to enrich our own understandings of the issues and those with whom we engage in dialogue. (shrink)

In recent work, I defend an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. (Lemos, 2018, Ch. 5; 2021; 2023, Ch. 6). On this view, basic free-willed actions are understood as the result of causally indeterminate deliberative processes in which the agent assigns evaluative weight to the reasons for the different choice options under consideration. In basic free-willed actions, the assignment of weights is causally undetermined, and the choices are typically the causal consequence of these assignments of weights in which the (...) choice option that is more highly valued is the choice option selected. In a recent article, Ishtiyaque Haji (2022) criticizes my view, arguing that it: (a) does not resolve worries about luck and (b) does not make coherent sense of the freedom of the weightings involved in free choices. I argue that his criticisms are based on misunderstandings of my position. (shrink)

Many people in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic monotheistic traditions testify to their experience of being commanded by God to do something or to be a certain way. Is this kind of testimony from experience credible in some cases, and, if so, on what ground? The main thesis of this article is that it is credible in some cases and a suitable ground is available in the morally purifying experience of the human conscience. The article looks to the Hebrew Bible, the (...) New Testament, and the Qur’an for relevant testimony to the importance of righteous divine commanding experienced by humans. The relevant commands are not abstract or merely theoretical but grounded in human moral experience and potentially motivating for righteous action. The article doubts that God would be God if there were no divine commanding given directly to receptive people in their moral experience. It contends that God would not be a morally righteous guide of the divine kind needed for the worthiness of worship by humans in the absence of God’s commanding people directly in their experience. (shrink)

We point out how some Christian-Muslim comparative philosophies of religion may be enhanced with certain translations or interpretations of Christianity: a modalist view of the trinity and a high Christology. While perhaps of only limited significance, we argue in more detail that a comparison of two leading philosophers, one Islamic, the other Christian, can bring to light a shared philosophy of innate ideas or nativism, grounding moral and theological views of goodness and the divine.

Moral expressivism suggests that 1) moral sentences lack truth conditions and 2) our purpose in asserting moral sentences is to express non-cognitive attitudes such as desires, approval, or disapproval. Moral expressivism meets a fundamental challenge, known as the Frege-Geach problem. Sentences that express moral judgments can form part of semantically complex sentences. “P” (a moral sentence) contradicts “~P”, and “Q” follows logically, by modus ponens, from (1) “P” and (2) “if P, then Q”. Geach argued that noncognitivists are committed to (...) denying that moral predicates mean the same thing in embedded contexts as they do in unembedded sentences (atomic sentences). If “P” does not mean the same as the antecedent of (2), the argument would be invalid. The problem is that the above-mentioned argument is obviously valid. Blackburn has argued that the complex sentence expresses a ‘higher-order’ attitude toward the attitudes expressed by the smaller sentences which make it up. If we accept the premises of a valid argument but deny its conclusion our attitudes clash in the same way that they do if we both believe that P and ~P. Blackburn's meta-attitudes approach faces several problems. Someone who endorses the premises but denies the conclusion of the valid argument commits himself to a moral inconsistency, not a logical one. In addition, uttering both ‘P’ and ‘~P’ seem to be inconsistent but expressivism cannot explain the inconsistency between these two obviously inconsistent sentences. Blackburn's strategy of inventing a new attitude, such as tolerance, is also unable to solve this problem. Introduction Moral expressivism suggests that 1) moral sentences lack truth conditions (negative claim) and 2) our purpose in asserting moral sentences is to express non-cognitive attitudes such as desires, approval, or disapproval (positive claim). Moral expressivism meets a fundamental challenge known as the Frege-Geach problem (Geach, 1960, 1965). In the following, the Frege-Geach problem and Simon Blackburn’s response to it will be examined. Blackburn has developed several different answers to the Frege-Geach Problem In this article, only the answer which appeals to the higher-order attitudes (Blackburn, 1984) will be examined, and it will be shown that this expressivist recipe can not solve the Frege-Geach problem. The Frege-Geach problem The Frege-Geach problem is the idea that moral predicate functions as a ‘logical’ one so that sentences containing this predicate enter into logical relations with other sentences. Sentences that express moral judgments can form part of semantically complex sentences. “P” (a moral sentence) contradicts “~P”, and “Q” follows logically, by modus ponens, from (1) “P” and (2) “if P, then Q”. Geach argued that noncognitivists are committed to denying that moral predicates mean the same thing in embedded contexts as they do in unembedded sentences (atomic sentences). They cannot explain that the meaning of complex sentences is in terms of the meanings of their parts. They cannot explain why modus ponens arguments are always valid. Arguments of the form of modus ponens, according to expressivism, commit a fallacy of equivocation; because it appears to imply that “P” does have different meanings in premise (1) and in the antecedent of premise (2). “P” is asserted in premise (1) and remains unasserted in premise (2). The utterance of (2) does not seem to express approval or disapproval of “P”. If “P” does not mean the same as the antecedent of (2), the argument would be invalid. The problem is that the abovementioned argument is obviously valid. Geach (Geach, 1960, p. 223) calls this point about assertion the Frege point who was the first logician who made the point in his distinction between the sense and the reference of a sentence. “A thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition” (Geach, 1965, p. 449). The higher-order attitudes Blackburn denies that any of his claims entail valid moral arguments are invalid. He employs an account of what we are doing when we use ethical sentences in terms of expressing meta-attitudes about a moral sensibility; The complex sentence expresses a ‘higher-order’ attitude toward the attitudes expressed by the smaller sentences which make it up. There are logical relationships that exist among attitudes as there are among beliefs. If we accept the premises of a valid argument but deny its conclusion, our attitudes clash in the same way they do if we both believe that P and ~P. So we can explain the logical validity of the moral argument via the attitudes one can hold without clash; anyone approving (1) “P” and (2) “if P, then Q” must hold the consequential approval of “Q”. If he does not, his attitudes clash. The inconsistency originates from the clash of attitudes (failing to do something which one has committed oneself to do). Blackburn says that such a clash would involve a “fractured sensibility which cannot itself be an object of approval” because “such a sensibility cannot fulfill the practical purposes for which we evaluate things” (Blackburn, 1984, p. 195). Logical conflict and moral conflict There is a most important problem with this strategy for Blackburn’s expressivism. The clash of attitudes can only show moral conflict and moral conflict does not necessarily lead to logical inconsistency. What needs to be explained in the moral argument is a logical inconsistency. Moreover, as Mark van Roojen (1996, pp. 21-320) has pointed out, higher-order-attitudes logic commits us to believe in logical inconsistency where there is no such inconsistency. He considers the origin of this problem to be the confusion between logical inconsistency and practical inconsistency (van Roojen, 1996, p. 332). The negation problem The other problem for Blackburn’s expressivism was originally raised by Unwin (Nicholas Unwin, 1999, 2001). This problem is known as the ‘negation problem’. As Schroeder points out (Schroeder, 2010, p. 134), the negation problem is the same as the Frege-Geach problem, which has received more attention in recent years than its conditional form, which is presented in the modus ponens argument. The most important semantic property of the negation operator in descriptive sentences is that it makes the negated sentence inconsistent with the main sentence, in the sense that for any sentence ‘P’, ‘P’ is inconsistent with ‘~P’. According to expressivism, “murdering is wrong” (P) is used to express the attitude of disapproval towards the act of murdering. But what is expressed by “murdering is not wrong” (~P)? To utter both ‘P’ and ‘~P’ seems to be inconsistent but expressivism cannot explain the inconsistency between these two obviously inconsistent sentences; because it cannot tell us which state of mind is expressed in the moral sentences like “murdering is not wrong.” To avoid the problem, Blackburn (Blackburn, 1988, p. 189) introduces a new attitude, such as tolerance, and says that “murdering is wrong” expresses disapproval of murdering, and “murdering is not wrong” expresses tolerance of murdering. “Tolerance toward P (T!p) is equivalent to not hooraying ~p, that is, not booing p.” (Blackburn, 1988, p. 189). But there is a real difference between not accepting something and actually accepting its negation (Unwin, 1999, p. 341). Conclusion According to Blackburn, We are expressing our attitudes about a moral sensibility when we use ethical sentences. The question now is whether Blackburn can explain the validity of the inference from the premises of the argument to its conclusion through this strategy. This article has shown that Blackburn’s meta-attitudes approach faces several problems. Someone who endorses the premises but denies the conclusion of the valid argument commits himself to a moral inconsistency, not a logical one. In addition, expressivism has insufficient structure to account for the various ways in which a moral sentence can be negated because it cannot tell us which state of mind is expressed in moral sentences like “murdering is not wrong.” Blackburn’s strategy of inventing a new attitude, such as tolerance, is also unable to solve this problem. (shrink)

Wainwright considers the relationship between ethics and mysticism in two possible ways: 1. The destruction of ethics in the context of mysticism; 2. Strengthening ethics through mysticism. He mentioned and analyzed the reasons in each type, and then ended each section by expressing his point of view, and finally, he reached the point of view that morality and mysticism are separate from each other; In such a way that they neither strengthen each other nor destroy each other. This article, by (...) criticizing the arguments of Professor Wainwright and enumerating and explaining the five models of the relationship between ethics and mysticism based on the perspective of Islamic mysticism, comes to the conclusion that contrary to his view, the relationship between ethics and mysticism, Those are not summarized in the two mentioned types and reducing these connections to those two types neglects many capacities involved in the discussion. With these debates, it is shown that the main arguments to prove the ineffectiveness of mysticism in forming a kind of ethics are not justified, but the arguments of the mystics in the direction that mysticism, both in the meta-ethical and in the normative stage, causes the realization of ethics, it seems sufficient. In the end, according to what has been said, we must adhere to the view that a mystical attitude is necessary for a completely ethical life (in the final stages of ethics). Introduction The most challenging issue under the topic of the “relationship between mysticism and ethics” is whether or not mysticism can provide the groundwork for the formation of ethics considering the view of the unity of existence. To study the relationship between ethics and mysticism, Wainwright has divided the relationships of ethics and mysticism into two parts and subsequently criticized them. In this article, we will evaluate Wainwright’s arguments and critiques and those of other experts while enumerating the typology of the relationships between mysticism and ethics to arrive at a more comprehensive view in this regard. The criticisms are presented with an Islamic mysticism approach. Examining the theories of the hindrance and weakening of ethics in mysticism Based on an argument in mysticism, apart from the Absolute Existence, other existents do not possess a genuine and true reality and they are phantasmal (vahmī). Thus, ethical matters and their laws are considered non-real matters and lose their real value. In response, it must be said that in mysticism, vahm refers to a faculty that can denote one meaning in the form of different images and thus, that multiplicities are vahmī means that they are the manifold images of a single reality. Based on another argument, in the unity of existence area, there is no possibility for an ‘other’ to be actualized as the object of a moral act as well as an independent moral agent. The answer is that what is negated in the Theory of the Personal Unity of Existence is the independent existence of manifold existents, not their actual being and manifestative distinctions. In short, the arguments concerning the weakening of ethics in mysticism indicate that mystical teachings focus a lot on individuality and the necessity of great emphasis on that is to weaken the place of the object of a moral act. It must be said in response that the main implication of such mystical teachings is a deep meaning and lofty goals and withdrawing from people, society, and similar things are not central in mysticism. Examining the theory of the independence of ethics and mysticism After studying and rejecting the arguments of both sides, that is, “the impossibility or weakening of ethics in the context of mysticism” and “the strengthening of ethics based on mysticism,” Wainwright concludes that they are independent of one another. The problem with his argument is that the claimed result is not produced from the aforementioned premises as well as that other main hypotheses can be raised regarding the relationship between these two sciences. Examining the theories of the strengthening or necessity of mysticism in relation to ethics Stace believes that all human beings are one in the domain of mysticism and this necessitates that the behavior of a moral agent with others is like one’s behavior with oneself and this leads to the strengthening of ethics in the context of mysticism. Wainwright raises issues against this argument and states that the characteristics of the unity of existence are not such that require oneness in the aforementioned meaning. After evaluating Wainwright’s argument, it must be said that according to Stace, the oneness of the moral agents and the object of a moral act does not refer to the oneness of the agent – while maintaining his limitations – and the other – while maintaining his limitations. Rather, it refers to the agent achieving mystical altruism in the third journey of wayfaring and in this case, Wainwright’s criticism doesn’t stand. Conclusion The most important issue raised by Wainwright regarding mysticism and ethics was that there are two main hypotheses about the relationship between ethics and mysticism and each of them leads to false logical consequences and, as a result, ethics and mysticism are two unrelated domains. However, it is clear that neither is the deduction very logical and nor are the hypotheses regarding the relationship between ethics and mysticism limited to the instances that he has claimed; rather, five types of relations can be enumerated in this regard. It is also clear that his arguments for questioning the effectiveness of mysticism in shaping ethics are not justified; rather, the arguments of the mystics in this regard seem to be sufficient. Therefore, we must commit to the view that a mystical attitude is necessary for a fully moral life. (shrink)

The relationship between reason and faith is one of the most important topics in the philosophy of religion. This issue has been investigated from several aspects. One of these aspects is the relationship between action and religious belief. John Cottingham, a contemporary analytical philosopher, emphasizes the primacy of religious practice over belief, as well as the involuntary nature of belief. In his opinion, the factor that causes people to become religious is not intellectual discussions about God but the internal aspects (...) of religion itself and the transforming power of religious practices in human life and experiences. In the present work, a critique has been made of his point of view with an explanatory-critical method. Criticisms that his point of view includes: First, the belief resulting from the course of action is only psychological certainty and such certainty is beyond the logic of verification. Secondly, knowledge of God and the practical system is a condition for entering it and precedes it. The third criticism is the problem of the plurality of religions and practical systems which causes people to mistrust reasons of the heart. The fourth criticism is that entering into a practical system is a confirmation of its benefits and anyone who does not believe this would have no reason to enter such a system. Introduction John Cottingham is a contemporary English philosopher, and one of the contemporary theorists in the field of the relationship between reason and faith. The relationship between reason and religious faith can be examined from four aspects: 1) The relationship between reason and the epistemological area of faith, 2) the relationship between reason and the practical area of faith, 3) the relationship between reason and the commitment area of faith, and 4) the relationship between reason and the area of faith. Explanation of Cottingham’s view Cottingham’s view can be presented in seven steps: -/- Criticism of the current situation in analytical philosophy; Changing the topic of discussion from the religious field to the spiritual field in order to expand the topic of discussion to non-religious spiritual fields; Comparison of spiritual practice with devotional orders in the past philosophical tradition; Understanding religion is based on practical participation in it; -/- This introduction is expressed according to Pascal’s point of view. According to Pascal, faith should be acquired in the atmosphere of a living tradition of practical religious worship, not through discussion and analysis in a seminar room. The basis of this view is that issues related to the nature and existence of God are beyond the reach of reason. -/- The role of emotions in human understanding; -/- Using Nussbaum’s point of view, Cottingham says: There are types of truth that the intellectual effort to obtain is equivalent to not reaching them. Religious truth is also a part of these truths. Because religious truths are beyond the direct understanding of humans and trying to understand them through logical analysis is moving away from them. -/- Involuntary belief; -/- Human belief, whether religious or otherwise, is not optional and there is a kind of passivity in all human perceptions. According to Cottingham, this point is shared by philosophers such as Hume and Descartes. Cottingham is also influenced by Pascal in this introduction. According to Pascal, although belief in God is not optional, there are indirect ways such as participating in religious activities to realize it, which are available to humans. The role of these ways in the formation of belief is a preliminary role and creating the ability to accept. -/- The necessity of trusting the witnesses of the heart; -/- According to Cottingham, such a thing is necessary for the human condition, and this issue exists in all fields of human knowledge, as well as in human daily life. For example, to go to work, a person must believe that when he turns the switch on the car, the car will not explode, even if such a belief is not the result of checking the car’s electrical system, you still have to trust this article or you will lose your job. Cottingham’s conclusion from the seven premises is that the factor that causes people to become religious is not intellectual discussions about God but the internal aspects of religion itself and the transformative power of religious practices in human life and experiences. Accordingly, faith in God is a product of trust and participation in a living community of faith. When the truth of religion is obtained through faith, and faith depends on a practical religious tradition, then there will be no other choice but to enter into the practical system of religion. Of course, he emphasizes that entering the life of faith does not mean abandoning the critical method in content analysis, and the previous reasons resulting from religious practice must be supplemented or regularized by subsequent intellectual reflections. According to Cottingham, worship precedes rational theory in four ways: 1) temporally; 2) heuristically; 3) psychologically; 4) morally Critical Review In the following, I will do a critical review of Cottingham’s view. His view on the priority of action over religious belief and that the understanding of religion is based on practical participation faces criticisms: First, the belief resulting from participation in religious actions is only psychological certainty and such certainty is beyond the logic of confirmation. Secondly, knowing God and the practical system is a condition for entering this system and has precedence over it. The third criticism is the problem of the plurality of religions and practical systems which causes people to mistrust reasons of the heart. The fourth criticism is that entry into a practical system is a confirmation of its benefits and anyone who does not believe this would have no reason to enter such a system. Therefore, at this stage as well, it is necessary to have a rational way to confirm the usefulness of this path. His view on Doxastic voluntarism is also under the involuntary approach of indirect belief, which is Pascal’s view. This component is also present in the opinions of Allamah Tabatabai. The difference between Cottingham and Allameh’s points of view is that Cottingham and Pascal consider rational arguments to be inefficient in the realization of belief and scientific verification, and they consider a practical commitment to be necessary for the realization of such verification, but Allameh Tabatabai considers scientific premises and rational proof to be the necessary conditions for faith. Conclusion Although the theory of the precedence of action over belief is faced with numerous criticisms, it is an undeniable matter. Paying attention to different levels of religious faith makes the value of theoretical discussions as well as paying attention to practical refinement and participation in spiritual actions be considered together. (shrink)

The problem of epistemic luck arises when a person has a true belief that is only true by luck. Before Gettier, it was believed that the element of justification would be sufficient for knowledge; but he showed that it is possible to have a justified true belief that is not an example of knowledge because of the intrusion of luck. Duncan Pritchard has examined epistemic luck in an extensive and detailed manner. He offers a modal account of luck based on (...) two elements: a possible-worlds analysis of counterfactual conditions and a significance condition for the factors that make the truth of the belief lucky. Pritchard argues for the superiority of this account to those that focus on whether the truth of the belief is “accidental” and on whether the believer has sufficient control over the belief. Epistemic luck may be “reflective” or “veritic”. Both undermine knowledge claims, although Pritchard gives the central role to veritic luck in his anti-luck epistemology, which is based on two elements: a safety principle and a condition to ensure that the cognitive faculties of the agent are not impaired. In this article, we will describe, analyze, and subsequently, evaluate the viewpoint of Pritchard. In addition to the critiques offered by others, ambiguities in his counterfactual account of luck and other components of his theory detract from his theory. (shrink)

In this paper, we attempt to explain the concept and types of “Implicit Bias” by outlining its various meanings. These biases can be indirectly identified in anyone through experimental tests. These biases have different epistemological consequences, namely skepticism. Jennifer Saul has argued that we have very compelling reasons to believe that our judgments, decisions, and evaluations of propositions and arguments are influenced by the social groups that the person making that argument or statement is a member of. Thus, she points (...) out that we make mistakes in the majority of the judgments we make on a daily basis. In light of this, we may be skeptical about the need to take practical action. We argue that Saul’s view is ambiguous in several ways: 1) Her discussion of skepticism depends on adopting a certain type of meaning for implicit bias and does not necessarily include other meanings. 2) In Saul’s view, the mind does not participate in the creation of belief and acts as a neutral machine. 3) Saul’s argument is self-defeating. 4) She has not given precise and general criteria for implicit bias effectiveness. 5) Her evaluation of traditional skepticism’s ineffectiveness in society is incorrect. Finally, 6) the degree of effectiveness varies from person to person, and the extent of its strength or weakness differs from person to person. Introduction Today, there is general agreement among researchers in the fields of social psychology and experimental psychology – and consequently, philosophy – that we have beliefs that affect our actions, evaluations, judgments, relationships, etc. These beliefs have been discussed in various fields. Implicit biases reflect our beliefs about categories such as racial groups, jobs, women, nationalities, LGBTQ community members, political and moral values, etc. Implicit biases are considered unconscious. This is the most common reading of this. In this reading, one is unaware of the biases that affect judgment, evaluation, decisions, etc. By means of some tests, the most well-known being the “implicit association test: IAT,” it is possible to prove the existence of such biases. Implicit biases are also commonly interpreted as “dissonant and unendorsed.” The person denies the existence of these biases and asserts that they do not reflect his true self. The most common readings of bias itself are: 1) bias as a bad thing and something that is normatively bad, and 2) bias as a neutral thing, that is, it is explored here why a trend is considered bad or good. Bias-related doubt According to what has been expressed about implicit biases, Jennifer Saul discusses the fact that implicit biases lead to another type of skepticism. She calls this “bias-related doubt.” For her, what we know about implicit biases indicates that there are very compelling reasons to believe that we cannot properly trust our knowledge-seeking. For example, when we make a mistake about the quality of an article, we have actually made a mistake about the quality of an argument. We evaluate that argument based on components completely unrelated to its quality. Our knowledge is influenced by the author’s social group. In fact, we accept an argument that we have not really accepted, and we reject an argument that we have not really rejected. Rather, we have accepted or rejected the social groups of the argument proponents. Moreover, implicit bias affects not only our judgment when accepting or rejecting people’s testimony but also who we consider credible. Even when we evaluate the evidence or the argument itself, we are still affected. Implicit biases not only affect how we choose who to trust they also influence us when we think we are judging something that has nothing to do with people’s credibility. In addition, evidence such as “shooter bias” indicates that implicit bias actually impacts our perception. Hence, she concludes that we require practical and collective action to ward off the threat of this type of skepticism. Unlike the traditional type of skepticism, which has no effect on our social life. According to her, stereotypes based on implicit biases can be completely dismantled only if we reconfigure our social world. This can be accomplished by creating more inclusive workplaces where women, people of color, and people with disabilities are in positions of authority. In addition, it can be done by putting men in nurturing roles. Discussion The following points can be mentioned in criticizing Saul: 1- Saul considered bias a bad thing. According to this reading, the mind plays no role in cognition and functions as a neutral machine. A point of view based on empiricists like Locke and Hume, as well as logical positivists. 2- Saul’s argument is self-defeating. If what she says about our knowledge-seeking faculties is assumed to be true, then this argument includes her own point of view and actually refers back to itself. 3- This type of skepticism is different in everyone, and its examination in everyone depends on conducting precise experimental tests; therefore, we cannot determine a general criterion for all people. It is also worthwhile to consider that the way experimental tests are performed will have a direct impact on the results obtained from them. 4- The skepticism that originates from implicit bias is different for each person in terms of its type and degree of influence. Although we could say that our judgments are influenced by implicit bias, it is impossible to say how much this effect is. 5- Whether we read implicit biases depends on our theoretical position about their meaning. A different position can bring completely different results. Saul’s skepticism does not necessarily include all implicit bias readings, and it cannot be related to all of them. 6- It is not true that traditional types of skepticism have no effect on our practical lives. If we are convinced that an evil demon dominates our minds, much of our certain knowledge will disappear and the quality of our epistemic life will be reduced. Conclusion We noticed that Saulish skepticism faces serious difficulties considering different readings of implicit bias. We also examined Saul’s view about how these biases lead to skepticism. Although Saul’s view is thoughtful and needs attention, we believe that the evidence and arguments she uses to justify her claim are not sufficient. In addition, they are not compatible with other readings. As a result, even though Saul’s view should be taken seriously, there is currently no strong evidence to support the point. (shrink)

In a new formulation of the logical problem of evil, J. L. Schellenberg attempts to develop a new version of the logical form of the problem of evil through the logical inconsistency of the conjunction of three theistic claims with the existence of evil. Schellenberg, by appealing to three commitments of theism: Unsurpassable Greatness (UG), Ontological Independence (OI), and Prior Purity (PP), adopts two approaches the Modeling and the Motivation to demonstrate the inconsistency of the conjunction of these theistic claims (...) with the existence of evil. To pursue this aim, Schellenberg develops his argument by adding supplementary propositions to the four claims. Therefore, what is shown from the conjunction of the three theistic claims and additional propositions is that there is no evil in the world, whereas this is logically inconsistent with the existence of evil in the world. This paper through an analytical-critical approach aims to show Schellenberg’s argument is not sound. To show its falsity, this paper has focused on premise (8) as the central premise of Schellenberg’s argument. By showing its falsity, it would also be vulnerable to the free will defense. In addition to Gellman’s critique over premise (8), this paper also poses a dilemma over (8) to show Schellenberg’s argument is not sound and it cannot avoid Plantinga’s rebuttal. Introduction Among analytic philosophers, there have been various formulations of the objection to evil. These objections can be distinguished in two distinct ways: the logical problem and the evidential problem. What this paper aims to examine is the logical version of the problem of evil. The essential point of this argument is that there is an inconsistency between certain theistic claims about God and evil. The theist affirms both that: 1) An omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God exists and that, 2) Evil exists in the world. Mackie insists that these two statements are logically inconsistent with each other, and they both cannot be true. If there is inconsistency in theistic claims, then it is irrational to believe both. To show contradiction, some supplementary propositions are needed to add to the theistic claims. These supplementary propositions complete the logical reasoning to show that the theist’s claims, both that God exists and that evil exists, are inconsistent. Alvin Plantinga is well known for his attempt to rebut this inconsistency. His Free Will Defense offers a way of proving the consistency of the theistic claims. Plantinga attempts to show that it is logically possible and both claims can be true, although he need not show that they are in fact true. Plantinga’s strategy to prove consistency between any two propositions through finding a third proposition (3) that is possibly true, consistent with (1), and in conjunction with (1) implies the second proposition. Of course, (3) need not be true or known to be true; it need not even be plausible. Plantinga’s search for the third proposition begins with the idea of a possible world. Then, he concludes: (3) God would create a world of free creatures that choose to do evil. In other words, for any world God might create free creatures, it is not within God’s power to bring it about that those free creatures never choose evil. -/- L. Schellenberg has recently offered a new logical problem of evil. He claims his argument is immune to Plantinga’s Defense. What is new about the new argument is the premises from which Schellenberg intends to show a logical contradiction between evil and God. In this paper, I want to show that Schellenberg fails in his attempt to develop a new logical problem of evil. -/- Schellenberg’s argument Schellenberg aims to demonstrate a logical inconsistency among three theistic principles about God and the existence of evil — any evil. He begins his argument by introducing three claims about God which theists must regard as necessary truths. -/- Unsurpassable Greatness (UG): God is the greatest possible being. Ontological Independence (OI): No world created by God (or any part thereof) is a part of God. -/- Prior Purity (PP): Prior to creation (whether “prior” be taken logically or temporally) there is no evil in God of any kind. He argues that the conjunction of these three claims is implicitly inconsistent with a fourth, to which theists are committed: There is evil in the world. Schellenberg presents two different approaches related by some common features to develop his argument. These approaches are the “Modeling” Argument and the “Motivation” Argument. By adopting these approaches, he offers some supplementary propositions. He insists that each additional proposition is clearly identified as a necessary truth. The Modeling Argument, as the most important approach, assumes that the goodness of any world created by God would model God’s goodness. Where any good that purely resembles or reflects a pure good in God we might think of as modeling that good. Schellenberg argues that from UG and OI, it follows that prior to all creation: -/- a) All goods are already contained in God. b) For every possible good, among the good types it tokens, or instances, one is instanced by God. Thus, by assuming these two propositions, additional propositions that develop the argument to show the contradiction are as follows: -/- (1) Every possible good is greatly exceeded by a good of the same type existing in God prior to creation. (6) If every worldly good that permits or requires evil is greatly exceeded by a pure good of the same type, existing prior to creation in God, then any world with goods permitting or requiring evil is exceeded by a world modeling the corresponding pure goods in God. (8) God can ensure the existence of greater worlds and can do so limitlessly. (9) If any world with goods permitting or requiring evil is exceeded by a world modeling the corresponding pure goods in God and the existence of greater worlds can limitlessly be ensured by God, then for any world X that requires or permits evil, there is some world Y that models pure goodness in God such that God has no good reason to create X rather than Y. (11) If for any world X that requires or permits evil there is some world Y that models pure goodness in God such that God has no good reason to create X rather than Y, then God has no good reason to permit evil in the world. (13) If there is evil in the world, then God has a good reason to permit it. Schellenberg treat premises (1), (6), (8), (9), (11), and (13) as necessary truths. Objections to the argument Gellman wants to show that the new logical problem of evil is vulnerable to the Free Will Defense offered by Alvin Plantinga. He focuses on Premise (8) and assumes that in Schellenberg’s world, if people have freedom, they might have closed libertarian freedom. Closed libertarian freedom allows the person to choose between good options, without the freedom to choose evil. He argues that in this state of affairs, the person must choose between good alternatives, each of which signifies moral advance. In this way, the person’s closed libertarian freedom will be limited only in choosing to advance. However, one might think that the value of worldly good is at its most when chosen in open libertarian freedom. This paper also shows Schellenberg’s greater worlds face a dilemma that either involves self-contradictoriness, or it is inevitable to implicitly assume the alternative of evil alongside the alternative of good. Conclusion Schellenberg’s claim is that since the conjunction of those premises with necessary truths entails that there is no evil, and since there does exist evil, then at least one of the theistic commitments must be false. Since the goods of this world include ones that permit evil, on the Modeling Argument, Schellenberg concludes theists must give up at least one of the three initial theistic commitments. It seems that by applying the logic of Free Will, God cannot ensure the existence of greater worlds, and can do so limitlessly (premise 8) With Plantinga’s idea of possible worlds and his emphasis on the correct understanding of the logic of free will, the logical form of the problem of evil is vulnerable to the Free Will Defense. (shrink)

Contrary to what has been stated in most accounts that Hume intends to make arguments against the existence of God, he aims to attack the claim that religious propositions can be argued; not completely reject these propositions. He considers these propositions epistemologically outside of human knowledge but ontologically accepts the existence of God. With such a view, we can dismiss atheistic-agnostic interpretations and relate him to a kind of mysticism. The key to deciding whether or not Hume is a mystic (...) is to determine what criteria we have to consider someone a mystic. Two very influential components here are (1)the belief in the existence of God; (2) the belief that the existence of God is far from our usual reasoning (antirational or irrational).And the second component is enough to call someone like Wittgenstein a fideist. We claim that there is clear evidence of these components in Hume’s works; therefore, what reason do we have to remove Hume from the circle of fideism and mysticism? In this study, after an introduction to the concept and types of fideism, we show that Hume, based on his works, surpasses skepticism and manifests a special kind of fideism.While there is an emphasis on the mystery of the proposition that God exists, he combines Christian faith, in aform that is inseparable from illogical and mysterious propositions such as the incarnation of God. Thus, Hume can be called a Christian mystic. (shrink)

In the discussion of ontological pluralism, little attention has been paid to Putnam. However, he can be considered one of the leaders of this approach. The following article pursues Putnam's view on ontological pluralism,that is, pursuing the procedure that Putnam gradually moved away from metaphysical realism and eventually became an ontological pluralist. The discussion begins with Quine's ontological ideas and it is discussed how these ideas can be viewed, at least in Putnam's interpretation, as a monistic approach to ontology. Hence, (...) ontological pluralism is, in a way, a rejection of such ideas. Then, I have dealt with Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism, and of course its inherent monism. I have shown how his arguments presented in this article in opposition to metaphysical realism can be grouped into a single doctrine called semanticism. So this doctrine, and its relation to Putnam's pluralistic approach, is also discussed. To better understand Putnam's version of ontological pluralism, which I have called the Meaning-Based version, two other versions have been introduced: the Sorting Version, attributed to Aristotle, and the Language-Based Version, attributed to Carnap. Then, I listed one by one the differences between Putnam's version and the other two versions, especially Carnap's version. Finally, the basic components of the Meaning-Based version of ontological pluralism are discussed. (shrink)

The idea of “creatio ex nihilo” entered the arena of natural science with the advent of modern cosmology in the mid-twentieth century. This idea, that is, the creation of the universe out of nothing, seems to be a consequence of the widely accepted Big Bang Theory which implies the temporal finitude of the world. In order to avoid the theological and metaphysical implications of such an idea, some scenarios and scientific models have been proposed. According to one of the scenarios, (...) the creation ex nihilo of the world is a causal physical phenomenon, and, hence, can be explained scientifically by appealing to the laws of nature. In this essay, I aim to discuss and criticize this idea. To fulfill this aim, in the introduction some achievements of modern cosmology will be very briefly introduced. In the next three sections, the notions of existence and nothingness, creation,scientific explanation, and singularity will be explored. It will be shown that what philosophers mean by these notions isradically different fromthe naïve ideas of some scientists. Hence, applying these notions to physical models of the origin of the universe is completely misleading. This work concludes that no scientific explanation appealing to the laws of nature can possibly explainthe creation of the universe out of nothing. (shrink)

The nature and existence of time is a major issue in Islamic philosophy. Avicenna is a philosopher who presented various discussions of the problem in different works, trying to explain the problem of time and its relation with other things such as motion and distance (masāfat). In his major philosophical books, Remarks and Admonitions(al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt), The Book of Healing (al-Shifāʾ), and The Book of Salvation(al-Najāt), Avicenna examines and explains the nature and manner of existence of time, but he does not (...) isolate the theological consequences of his account. An account of such consequences can reveal his view of the matter. In fact, it is essential to see how definitions of time would affect views of theological problems, as it can clarify the intellectual-philosophical system of philosophers. In this article, I draw on the analytic-descriptive method to offer an accurate picture of the nature and existence of time in Avicenna’s view, and then explicate the consequences of that definition for theological problems. I argue that Avicenna’s account of time has four consequences: (1) time’s pre-eternity is evidence of God’s pre-eternity, (2) time’s post-eternity is evidence of the post-eternity of the necessary existence, (3) the relation between God and time is possible only through the existence of intermediaries, and (4) the essential incipience of time implies the eternality of God’s grace. (shrink)

Avicenna has aimed to establisha harmonized philosophical system that incorporates logic, epistemology, metaphysics, natural philosophy, and other types of knowledge. Although he has not directly written anything about the metaphysical foundations of science, we believe that there are some implications in his philosophy that could be considered astruthmakers of scientific propositions. As natural law is significantly correlated to “experiment”, we will first discuss the epistemological aspect of experiments in Avicennian philosophy. He believes that the observation of a repeated event could (...) lead us to a causal relationship due to the fact that accidental events are neither permanent nor frequent. Following that, the logical approach which corresponds to this epistemology will be introduced. As Avicenna’s logic does not directly consider such an approach, we are to derive it from apparently disconnected chapters and then formulate them. It will be indicated that Avicenna has been aware of the differences between propositions that merely refer to existent instances and ones that consider the nature of instances. The latter obviously could refer to both existent instances and hypothetical instances. Finally, we present some points in his metaphysics that could establisha metaphysical basis for propositions concerning natural law. In addition, we will indicate that Avicenna’s system is able to justify the counterfactual conditionals that relate to laws of nature. (shrink)

Theological Voluntarism is the view according to which certain moral properties or statuses have to be explained in terms of God’s commands, will, or other voluntary states of God. In his God and Moral Law, Mark Murphy criticizes theological voluntarism in general and Adams’ divine command theory of the nature of moral obligations in particular. Furthermore, he puts forward the first sketches for a theory of moral obligation that is not voluntaristic. In this paper I will first introduce Murphy’s proposed (...) theory and will show that it is implausible. Then, drawing on Adams’ views of the nature of goodness and virtue, articulated in Finite and Infinite Goods and A theory of Virtue, I will try to put forward the first sketches of a viable theory of moral obligations that does not appeal to divine commands in explaining moral obligations and explains them in terms of goodness/badness. An important feature of morality that voluntarists appeal to for motivating their view and criticizing views that explain obligations in terms of goodness is the existence of supererogatory actions, i.e., actions that are good but not required. I will focus on this feature of morality and try to show how a theory of moral obligation that explains the obligations in terms of goodness can accommodate this feature. (shrink)

This paper examines some key aspects of the formal and figurative discourse on ‘nature’ as manifested in the philosophical tradition and with reference to contemporary life. Instead of building a straightforward, self-enclosed argument for the sake of argument, it will demonstrate how someone living today may arrive at certain kinds of judgments in the light both of our collective human inheritance, of which Ḥikma is a major element, and a philosophical reasoning that penetrates into areas of life with which philosophy (...) is not directly or primarily concerned but which are of fundamental importance to all human beings. It begins by sketching a picture of the present historical moment, which many specialists consider a historical anomaly precipitated by the abrupt rise to world domination by a single geographical region. A few basic themes relating to ‘nature’, which by tradition has been approached either figurately or formally, will then be discussed. Their upshot is that for man to live ‘naturally’, he cannot reduce his own nature to that of other animals. Every being has its particular nature. Therefore, the concept of nature cannot be considered only unconditionally or as something common to all animals. Finally, this paper poses two basic questions: Why has our necessary—but equally ‘natural’—separation from the nature of other beings been allowed to go as far as it has? Are we so alone in our modern troubles that we must cast off our human inheritance and pretend to reinvent the universe at every turn? (shrink)