21 found

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  1. Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):178-196.
    Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...)
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  2.  35
    In Defence of Non-Ideal Political Deference.Matthias Brinkmann - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):264-285.
    Many philosophers have claimed that relying on the testimony of others in normative questions is in some way problematic. In this paper, I consider whether we should be troubled by deference in democratic politics. I argue that deference is less problematic in impure cases of political deference, and most non-ideal cases of political deference are impure. To establish the second point, I rely on empirical research from political psychology. I also outline two principled reasons why we should expect political deference (...)
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  3.  13
    Appraising the Epistemic Performance of Social Systems: The Case of Think Tank Evaluations.François Claveau & Andréanne Veillette - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):159-177.
    This article elaborates a conceptual framework to systematize the epistemic evaluation of social systems. This framework can be used to structure an evaluation or to characterize and assess existing ones. The article then uses the framework to assess four representative evaluations of think tanks. This meta-evaluation exemplifies how the framework can play its structuring role. It also leads us to general conclusions about the existing evaluations of think tanks. Most importantly, by focusing on the organizational level, existing evaluations miss factors (...)
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  4.  37
    The Bias Paradox: Are Standpoint Epistemologies Self-Contradictory?Tobias Engqvist - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):231-246.
    Standpoint epistemologies are based on two central theses: the situated knowledge thesis and the thesis of epistemic privilege. The bias paradox suggests that there is a tension between these two notions, in the sense that they are self-contradictory. In this paper, I aim to defend standpoint epistemologies from this challenge. This defense is based on a distinction between subjective and objective justifications. According to the former, a subject S is subjectively justified in believing a proposition P iff S's belief in (...)
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  5.  56
    Is Conspiracy Theorizing Really Epistemically Problematic?Kurtis Hagen - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):197-219.
    In an article based on a recent address to the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Keith Harris has argued that there is something epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. Although he finds “standard criticisms” of conspiracy theories wanting, he argues that there are three subtle but significant problems with conspiracy theorizing: It relies on an invalid probabilistic version of modus tollens. It involves a problematic combination of both epistemic virtues and vices. And it lacks an adequate basis for trust in its information (...)
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  6. Are There Any Epistemic Consequentialists?Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):220-230.
    Selim Berker argues that epistemic consequentialism is pervasive in epistemology and that epistemic consequentialism is structurally flawed. is incorrect, however. I distinguish between epistemic consequentialism and epistemic instrumentalism and argue that most putative consequentialists should be considered instrumentalists. I also identify the structural problem of epistemic consequentialism Berker attempts to pinpoint and show that epistemic instrumentalism does not have the consequentialist problem.
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  7.  35
    The Material Theory of Induction at the Frontiers of Science.William Peden - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):247-263.
    According to John D. Norton's Material Theory of Induction, all reasonable inductive inferences are justified in virtue of background knowledge about local uniformities in nature. These local uniformities indicate that our samples are likely to be representative of our target population in our inductions. However, a variety of critics have noted that there are many circumstances in which induction seems to be reasonable, yet such background knowledge is apparently absent. I call such an absence of circumstances ‘the frontiers of science', (...)
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  8.  24
    Williamson on Defining Knowledge.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):286-302.
    In his outstanding book Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson claims that we have inductive evidence for some negative theses concerning the prospects of defining knowledge, like this: knowing cannot be defined in accordance with a determinate traditional conjunctive scheme; defends a theory of mental states, mental concepts and the relations between the two, from which we would obtain additional, not merely inductive, evidence for this negative thesis; and presents an alternative definition of knowledge. Here I consider these issues and extract (...)
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  9.  38
    Reconsidering the Rule of Consideration: Probabilistic Knowledge and Legal Proof.Tim Smartt - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):303-318.
    In this paper, I provide an argument for rejecting Sarah Moss's recent account of legal proof. Moss's account is attractive in a number of ways. It provides a new version of a knowledge-based theory of legal proof that elegantly resolves a number of puzzles about mere statistical evidence in the law. Moreover, the account promises to have attractive implications for social and moral philosophy, in particular about the impermissibility of racial profiling and other harmful kinds of statistical generalisation. In this (...)
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  10.  21
    The Case for Modelled Democracy.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):89-110.
    The fact that most of us are ignorant on politically relevant matters presents a problem for democracy. In light of this, some have suggested that we should impose epistemic constraints on democratic participation, and specifically that the franchise be restricted along competency lines – a suggestion that in turn runs the risk of violating a long-standing condition on political legitimacy to the effect that legitimate political arrangements cannot be open to reasonable objections. The present paper therefore outlines a way to (...)
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  11.  19
    An Interactionist Approach to Cognitive Debiasing.Steven Bland - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):66-88.
    This paper examines three programmatic responses to the problem of cognitive bias: virtue epistemology, epistemic paternalism, and epistemic collectivism. Each of these programmes focuses on a single level of epistemic analysis: virtue theorists on individuals, paternalists on environments, and collectivists on groups. I argue that this is a mistake in light of the fact that cognitive biases arise from interactions between these three domains. Consequently, epistemologists should spend less time defending these programmes, and more time coordinating them. This paper offers (...)
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  12.  10
    Demystifying Humility's Paradoxes.Derick Hughes - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):1-18.
    The utterance “I am humble” is thought to be paradoxical because a speaker implies that they know they are virtuous or reveals an aim to impress others – a decidedly non-humble aim. Such worries lead to the seemingly absurd conclusion that a humble person cannot properly assert that they are humble. In this paper, I reconstruct and evaluate three purported paradoxes of humility concerning its self-attribution, knowledge and belief about our own virtue, and humility's value. I argue that humility is (...)
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  13.  25
    Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology.Matthew Brandon Lee & Paul Silva - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):111-129.
    A Lockean metaphysics of belief that understands outright belief as a determinable with degrees of confidence as determinates is supposed to effect a unification of traditional coarse-grained epistemology of belief with fine-grained epistemology of confidence. But determination of belief by confidence would not by itself yield the result that norms for confidence carry over to norms for outright belief unless belief and high confidence are token identical. We argue that this token-identity thesis is incompatible with the neglected phenomenon of “mistuned (...)
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  14. William James on Risk, Efficacy, and Evidentialism.P. D. Magnus - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):146-158.
    William James’ argument against William Clifford in The Will to Believe is often understood in terms of doxastic efficacy, the power of belief to influence an outcome. Although that is one strand of James’ argument, there is another which is driven by ampliative risk. The second strand of James’ argument, when applied to scientific cases, is tantamount to what is now called the Argument from Inductive Risk. Either strand of James’ argument is sufficient to rebut Clifford's strong evidentialism and show (...)
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  15.  19
    Polycentric Limited Epistocracy: Political Expertise and the Wiki-Model.Aylon Manor - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):1-20.
    Democracy has recently been criticized by several philosophers on grounds of poor epistemic performance. The proposed alternative – epistocracy – faces criticism for failing to uphold and express the core democratic values of civic equality and individual autonomy. In response, proposals have been offered that try to achieve epistocratic performance while retaining democratic inclusion. This paper raises two problems for such proposals, relating to the selection of experts and the incentive-compatibility of the system. Given these failures, I sketch what I (...)
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  16.  15
    Agent Reliabilism and Inferential Knowledge From Gettiered Belief.K. Merrick Olivier - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):130-145.
    Epistemologists have generally accepted that competently deduced, known conclusions must issue from known premises, as the principle of Counter-Closure demands; however, some have recently challenged the notion, arguing that knowledge may be inferred from non-knowledge. In this paper, I focus on the yet unexamined topic of inferential knowledge from Gettiered belief with regard to Greco's virtue-epistemic framework, which he refers to as ‘agent reliabilism’. I argue that agent reliabilism allows for instances of Counter-Closure violation. In presenting my argument, I construct (...)
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  17. Against Intuitive Horribleness.Joel Michael Reynolds - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1).
    Testimony by disabled people concerning the relationship between their experiences and overall well-being has long been an object of social scientific and humanistic study. Often discussed in terms of “the disability paradox,” these studies contrast the intuitive horribleness of certain impaired states against the testimonial evidence suggesting that people in such states do not in fact experience their lives as horrible. Explanations for why such testimonial evidence is suspect range from claims about adaptive preferences to issues of qualitative research methodology. (...)
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  18.  2
    Prime Cuts and the Method of Recombination.David-Hillel Ruben - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):21-30.
    Whether some condition is equivalent to a conjunction of some conditions has been a major issue in analytic philosophy. Examples include: knowledge, acting freely, causation, and justice. Philosophers have striven to offer analyses of these, and other concepts, by showing them equivalent to such a conjunction. Timothy Williamson offers a number of arguments for the idea that knowledge is ‘prime’, hence not equivalent to or composed by some such conjunction. I focus on one of his arguments: the requirement that such (...)
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  19. Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology.Paul Silva Jr & Matthew Brandon Lee - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):111-129.
    Can there be knowledge and rational belief in the absence of a rational degree of confidence? Yes, and cases of "mistuned knowledge" demonstrate this. In this paper we leverage this normative possibility in support of advancing our understanding of the metaphysical relation between belief and credence. It is generally assumed that a Lockean metaphysics of belief that reduces outright belief to degrees of confidence would immediately effect a unification of coarse-grained epistemology of belief with fine-grained epistemology of confidence. Scott Sturgeon (...)
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  20. Demarginalizing Standpoint Epistemology.Briana Toole - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):47-65.
    Standpoint epistemology, the view that social identity is relevant to knowledge-acquisition, has been consigned to the margins of mainstream philosophy. In part, this is because the principles of standpoint epistemology are taken to be in opposition to those which guide traditional epistemology. One goal of this paper is to tease out the characterization of traditional epistemology that is at odds with standpoint epistemology. The characterization of traditional epistemology that I put forth is one which endorses the thesis of intellectualism, the (...)
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  21.  30
    A Probabilistic Approach to Epistemic Safety From the Perspective of Ascribers.Yingjin Xu - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):31-46.
    “Epistemic safety” refers to an epistemic status in which the subject acquires true beliefs without involving epistemic luck. There is a tradition of cashing out safety-defining modality in terms of possible world semantics, and even Julian Dutant's and Martin Smith's normalcy-based notions of safety also take this semantics as a significant component of them. However, such an approach has to largely depend on epistemologists’ ad hoc intuitions on how to individuate possible worlds and how to pick out “close” worlds. In (...)
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