24 found

Year:

  1.  23
    On Providing Evidence.Charity Anderson - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):245-260.
    Obligations to provide evidence to others arise in many contexts. This paper develops a framework within which to understand what it is to provide evidence to someone. I argue that an initially plausible connection between evidence-providing and evidence-possession fails: it is not the case that in order to count as providing evidence to someone, the intended recipient must have the evidence. I further argue that the following is possible: evidence is provided to an agent, the agent does not have the (...)
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  2.  26
    Closed-Mindedness and Dogmatism.Heather Battaly - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):261-282.
  3.  25
    Arrogance, Truth and Public Discourse.Michael Patrick Lynch - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):283-296.
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  4.  19
    New Words for Old Wrongs.Ishani Maitra - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):345-362.
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  5.  24
    Evidence, Coherence and Epistemic Akrasia.Ram Neta - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):313-328.
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  6.  66
    Real World Problems.L. A. Paul & John Quiggin - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):363-382.
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  7.  32
    Rational Stability Under Pragmatic Encroachment.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):297-312.
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  8.  33
    Interests, Evidence and Games.Brian Weatherson - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):329-344.
    Pragmatic encroachment theories have a problem with evidence. On the one hand, the arguments that knowledge is interest-relative look like they will generalise to show that evidence too is interest-relative. On the other hand, our best story of how interests affect knowledge presupposes an interest-invariant notion of evidence. -/- The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of evidence that is interest-relative, but which allows that ‘best story’ to go through with minimal changes. The core idea is that (...)
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  9. Fool Me Once: Can Indifference Vindicate Induction?Zach Barnett & Han Li - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):202-208.
    Roger White (2015) sketches an ingenious new solution to the problem of induction. He argues from the principle of indifference for the conclusion that the world is more likely to be induction- friendly than induction-unfriendly. But there is reason to be skeptical about the proposed indifference-based vindication of induction. It can be shown that, in the crucial test cases White concentrates on, the assumption of indifference renders induction no more accurate than random guessing. After discussing this result, the paper explains (...)
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  10.  38
    An Explanatory Challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism.Cameron Boult - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):141-153.
    Epistemological Disjunctivism is a view about paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. Duncan Pritchard claims that it is particularly well suited to accounting for internalist and externalist intuitions. A number of authors have disputed this claim, arguing that there are problems for Pritchard’s way with internalist intuitions. I share the worry. However, I don’t think it has been expressed as effectively as it can be. My aim in this paper is to present a new way of formulating the worry, in terms (...)
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  11.  41
    A Dilemma for the Knowledge Despite Falsehood Strategy.Christopher Buford & Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):166-182.
    One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.
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  12.  5
    C. I. Lewis and the Benacerraf Problem.Bob Fischer - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):154-165.
    Realists about modality offer an attractive semantics for modal discourse in terms of possible worlds, but standard accounts of the worlds—as properties, propositions, or causally-isolated concreta—invoke entities with which we can’t interact. If realism is true, how can we know anything about modal matters? Let's call this "the Benacerraf Problem." I suggest that C. I. Lewis has an intriguing answer to it. Given that we’re willing to disentangle some of Lewis’s insights from his phenomenalism, we can take the following line. (...)
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  13.  55
    Knowledge-How: Interrogatives and Free Relatives.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):183-201.
    It has been widely accepted since Stanley and Williamson (2001) that the only linguistically acceptable semantic treatments for sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ involve treating the wh-complement ‘how to V’ as an interrogative phrase, denoting a set of propositions. Recently a number of authors have suggested that the ‘how to V’ phrase denotes not a proposition, but an object. This view points toward a prima facie plausible non-propositional semantics for knowledge-how, which treats ‘how to V’ as (...)
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  14.  65
    A New Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem.Samuel Kampa - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):228-244.
    The Generality Problem is widely recognized to be a serious problem for reliabilist theories of justification. James R. Beebe's Statistical Solution is one of only a handful of attempted solutions that has garnered serious attention in the literature. In their recent response to Beebe, Julien Dutant and Erik J. Olsson successfully refute Beebe's Statistical Solution. This paper presents a New Statistical Solution that countenances Dutant and Olsson's objections, dodges the serious problems that trouble rival solutions, and retains the theoretical virtues (...)
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  15.  15
    Why Not All Evidence is Scientific Evidence.Carlos Santana - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):209-227.
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  16.  22
    Self-Regulation and Knowledge How.Elzinga Benjamin - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):119-140.
    In the 1940s, Gilbert Ryle argued for anti-intellectualism about know how. More recently, new intellectualists have challenged the canonical status of Ryle's arguments, and in the ensuing debate Ryleans appear to be on their back foot. However, contributors on both sides of the debate tend to ignore or misconstrue Ryle's own positive account of know how. In this paper, I develop two aspects of Ryle's positive account that have been overlooked. For Ryle, S knows how to Φ iff (1) S (...)
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  17.  66
    Conciliationism and Moral Spinelessness.James Fritz - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):101-118.
    This paper presents a challenge to conciliationist views of disagreement. I argue that conciliationists cannot satisfactorily explain why we need not revise our beliefs in response to certain moral disagreements. Conciliationists can attempt to meet this challenge in one of two ways. First, they can individuate disputes narrowly. This allows them to argue that we have dispute-independent reason to distrust our opponents’ moral judgment. This approach threatens to license objectionable dogmatism. It also inappropriately gives deep epistemic significance to superficial questions (...)
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  18.  16
    Accessibilism Defined.Michael Hatcher - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):1-23.
    Accessibilism is a version of epistemic internalism on which justification is determined by what is accessible to the subject. I argue that misunderstandings of accessibilism have hinged on a failure to appreciate an ambiguity in the phrase ‘what is accessible to the subject’. I first show that this phrase may either refer to the very things accessible to the subject, or instead to the facts about which things are accessible to her. I then discuss Ralph Wedgwood’s (2002: 350-352) argument that (...)
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  19. How to Insult and Compliment a Testifier.Finlay Malcolm - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):50-64.
    Do we insult, offend or slight a speaker when we refuse her testimony? Do we compliment, commend or extol a speaker when we accept her testimony? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is “yes”, but only in some instances, since these respective insults and compliments track the reasons a hearer has for rejecting or accepting testimony. When disbelieving a speaker, a hearer may insult her because she judges the speaker to be either incompetent as a knower (...)
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  20. Independence and New Ways to Remain Steadfast in the Face of Disagreement.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):65-79.
    An important principle in the epistemology of disagreement is Independence, which states, “In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s expressed belief about P, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own belief about P, I should do so in a way that doesn’t rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief about P” (Christensen 2011, 1-2). I present a series of new counterexamples to both Independence and also a revised, more widely applicable, version of it. I then (...)
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  21. A Higher-Order Approach to Disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.
    While many philosophers have agreed that evidence of disagreement is a kind of higher-order evidence, this has not yet resulted in formally precise higher-order approaches to the problem of disagreement. In this paper, we outline a simple formal framework for determining the epistemic significance of a body of higher-order evidence, and use this framework to motivate a novel interpretation of the popular “equal weight view” of peer disagreement—we call it the Variably Equal Weight View (VEW). We show that VEW differs (...)
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  22.  26
    Folk Attributions of Understanding: Is There a Role for Epistemic Luck?Daniel A. Wilkenfeld, Dillon Plunkett & Tania Lombrozo - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):24-49.
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  23. Faith and Epistemology.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2018 - Episteme:1-20.
    I offer an epistemic framework for theorising about faith. I suggest that epistemic faith is a disposition to believe or infer according to particular methods, despite a kind of tendency to perceive an epistemic shortcoming in that method. Faith is unjustified, and issues into unjustified beliefs, when the apparent epistemic shortcomings are actual; it is justified when the epistemic worries are unfounded. -/- Virtuous faith is central to a great deal of epistemology. A rational agent will manifest faith in their (...)
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  24.  12
    Intraspecies Impermissivism.Scott Stapleford - 2018 - Episteme:1-17.
    The Uniqueness thesis says that any body of evidence E uniquely determines which doxastic attitude is rationally permissible regarding some proposition P. Permissivists deny Uniqueness. They are charged with arbitrarily favouring one doxastic attitude out of the set of attitudes they regard as rationally permissible. Simpson (Episteme, 2017) claims that an appeal to differences in cognitive abilities can remove the arbitrariness. I argue that it can't. Impermissivists face a challenge of their own: The problem of fine distinctions. I suggest that (...)
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