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  1.  15
    A Life Plan Principle of Voting Rights.Kim Angell - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):125-139.
    Who should have a right to participate in a polity’s decision-making? Although the answers to this ‘boundary problem’ in democratic theory remain controversial, it is widely believed that the enfranchisement of tourists and children is unacceptable. Yet, the two most prominent inclusion principles in the literature – Robert Goodin’s ‘all affected interests’-principle and the ‘all subjected to law’-principle – both enfranchise those groups. Unsurprisingly, democratic theorists have therefore offered several reasons for nonetheless exempting tourists and children from the franchise. In (...)
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  2.  18
    First-Personal Moral Testimony: A Defence.David A. Borman - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):163-179.
    Several authors have discussed and defended what is sometimes called the Asymmetry Thesis in social epistemology: that while reliance on testimony is essentially incontrovertible in epistemology, it is uniquely problematic for moral knowledge. This conclusion results, I argue, from considering the wrong sort of moral testimony: namely, ‘third-personal’ rather than ‘first-personal’ testimony. First-personal moral testimony is an inescapable part of the constitution of legitimate moral norms, and its role cannot be deflated as a form of mere information to be taken (...)
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  3.  12
    Candice Delmas: A Duty to Resist: When Disobedience Should Be Uncivil: New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. Hardcover (ISBN 9780190872199) £19.99. 312 Pp.Marta Giunta - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):269-271.
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  4.  11
    The Nature of Punishment Revisited: Reply to Wringe.Nathan Hanna - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):89-100.
    This paper continues a debate about the following claim: an agent punishes someone only if she aims to harm him. In a series of papers, Bill Wringe argues that this claim is false, I criticize his arguments, and he replies. Here, I argue that his reply fails.
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  5.  14
    Generic Moral Grounding.Julian Jonker - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):23-38.
    Moral theories often issue general principles that explain our moral judgments in terms of underlying moral considerations. But it is unclear whether the general principles have an explanatory role beyond the underlying moral considerations. In order to avoid the redundancy of their principles, two-level theories issue principles that appear to generalize beyond the considerations that ground them. In doing so, the principles appear to overgeneralize. The problem is conspicuous in the case of contractualism, which proposes that moral principles are grounded (...)
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  6.  14
    On the Limitations of Moral Exemplarism: Socio-Cultural Values and Gender.Alkis Kotsonis - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):223-235.
    In this paper, I highlight and discuss two significant limitations of Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory. Although I focus on Zagzebski’s theory, I argue that these limitations are not unique to her approach but also feature in previous versions of moral exemplarism. The first limitation I identify is inspired by MacIntyre’s understanding of the concept of virtue and stems from the realization that the emotion of admiration, through which agents identify exemplars, should not be examined in vacuo. Scholars working on moral (...)
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  7. Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts.N. G. Laskowski - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):39-51.
    Are words like ‘woman’ or ‘man’ sex terms that we use to talk about biological features of individuals? Are they gender terms that we use to talk about non-biological features e.g. social roles? Contextualists answer both questions affirmatively, arguing that these terms concern biological or non-biological features depending on context. I argue that a recent version of contextualism from Jennifer Saul that Esa Diaz-Leon develops doesn't exhibit the right kind of flexibility to capture our theoretical intuitions or moral and political (...)
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  8.  8
    Moral Deference, Moral Assertion, and Pragmatics.Max Lewis - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):5-22.
    In this paper, I offer a novel defense of moderate pessimism about moral deference, i.e., the view that we have pro tanto reason to avoid moral deference. I argue that moral deference fails to give us the epistemic credentials to satisfy plausible norms of moral assertion. I then argue that moral assertions made solely on the basis of deferential moral beliefs violate a plausible epistemic and moral norm against withholding information that one knows, has evidence, or ought to believe will (...)
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  9.  13
    The Right to Feel Comfortable: Implicit Bias and the Moral Potential of Discomfort.Ditte Marie Munch-Jurisic - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):237-250.
    An increasingly popular view in scholarly literature and public debate on implicit biases holds that there is progressive moral potential in the discomfort that liberals and egalitarians feel when they realize they harbor implicit biases. The strong voices among such discomfort advocates believe we have a moral and political duty to confront people with their biases even though we risk making them uncomfortable. Only a few voices have called attention to the aversive effects of discomfort. Such discomfort skeptics warn that, (...)
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  10.  12
    Why Epistemic Reductionism Won’T Save the Moral Error Theorist.Alex Murphy - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):53-69.
    Moral error theorists often respond to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy by adopting the Disparity Response: reject the putative parity between moral and epistemic reasons and claim that though the former are irreducibly normative, the latter aren’t. I argue such a response fails. Expanding on Das’ Australas J Philos 95:58–69, work I present a master argument against Disparity Responses: the arguments moral error theorists use to advance their conceptual claim apply in the epistemic domain also. This prohibits the error (...)
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  11.  15
    Moral Consistency Reasoning Reconsidered.Norbert Paulo - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):107-123.
    Many contemporary ethicists use case-based reasoning to reach consistent beliefs about ethical matters. The idea is that particular cases elicit moral intuitions, which provide defeasible reasons to believe in their content. However, most proponents of case-based moral reasoning are not very explicit about how they resolve inconsistencies and how they abstract principles from judgments about particular cases. The aim of this article is to outline a methodology—called Consistency Reasoning Casuistry—for case-based reasoning in ethics. This methodology draws on Richmond Campbell and (...)
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  12.  5
    Feeling Badly Is Not Good Enough: A Reply to Fritz and Miller.Benjamin Rossi - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):101-105.
    Kyle Fritz and Daniel Miller’s reply to my article helpfully clarifies their position and our main points of disagreement. Their view is that those who blame hypocritically lack the right to blame for a violation of some moral norm N in virtue of having an unfair disposition to blame others, but not themselves, for violations of N. This view raises two key questions. First, are there instances of hypocritical blame that do not involve an unfair differential blaming disposition? Second, if (...)
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  13.  6
    Risk-Based Sentencing and Predictive Accuracy.Jesper Ryberg - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):251-263.
    The use of risk assessment tools has come to play an increasingly important role in sentencing decisions in many jurisdictions. A key issue in the theoretical discussion of risk assessment concerns the predictive accuracy of such tools. For instance, it has been underlined that most risk assessment instruments have poor to moderate accuracy in most applications. However, the relation between, on the one hand, judgements of the predictive accuracy of a risk assessment tool and, on the other, conclusions concerning the (...)
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  14.  6
    Out of Proportion? On Surveillance and the Proportionality Requirement.Kira Vrist Rønn & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):181-199.
    In this article, we critically scrutinize the principle of proportionality when used in the context of security and government surveillance. We argue that McMahan’s distinction from just warfare between narrow proportionality and wide proportionality can generally apply to the context of surveillance. We argue that narrow proportionality applies more or less directly to cases in which the surveilled is liable and that the wide proportionality principle applies to cases characterized by ‘collateral intrusion’. We argue, however, that a more demanding criterion (...)
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  15.  7
    Anti-Immigration Backlashes as Constraints.Lorenzo Del Savio - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):201-222.
    Migration often causes what I refer to in this paper as ‘anti-immigration backlashes’ in receiving countries. Such reactions have substantial costs in terms of the undermining of national solidarity and the diffusion of political distrust. In short, anti-immigration backlashes can threaten the social and political stability of receiving countries. Do such risks constitute a reason against permissive immigration policies which are otherwise desirable? I argue that a positive answer may depend on a skeptical view based on the alleged constraints that (...)
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  16. What Is the Question to Which Anti-Natalism Is the Answer?Nicholas Smyth - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):1-17.
    The ethics of biological procreation has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Yet, as I show in this paper, much of what has come to be called procreative ethics is conducted in a strangely abstract, impersonal mode, one which stands little chance of speaking to the practical perspectives of any prospective parent. In short, the field appears to be flirting with a strange sort of practical irrelevance, wherein its verdicts are answers to questions that no-one is asking. (...)
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  17.  4
    Saba Bazargan-Forward & Samuel C. Rickless (eds.): The Ethics of War: Essays: New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Hardback (9780199376148) £59.00. 304 Pp.Isaac Anderson Wagner - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):265-267.
    This review of the book The Ethics of War: Essays provides a general description of the book and some brief commentary on several of its chapters.
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  18.  89
    How to (Dis)Solve the Gamer’s Dilemma.Erick Jose Ramirez - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (1):1-21.
    The Gamer's Dilemma challenges us to find a distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. Without such a distinction, we are forced to conclude that either both are morally acceptable or that both should be morally illicit. This paper argues that the best way to solve the dilemma is, in one sense, to dissolve it. The Gamer's Dilemma rests on a misunderstanding in the sense that it does not distinguish between the form of a simulation and its surface content. A (...)
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  19.  9
    Mary Midgley: What is Philosophy For? [REVIEW]Andrea Boudin - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-3.
    A book review of Mary Midgley’s last book ‘What is Philosophy for?’, in which Midgley frames the role, scope and limitations of philosophy as an academic discipline, and sets philosophy into relation with contemporary problems of scientific research, such as scientism and its context-blindness, mythicism in regard to the mind/matter problem and hubristic claims about the exhaustiveness of a materialistic worldview.
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  20.  57
    Love, Reasons, and Desire.Nicholas Drake - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.
    This essay defends subjectivism about reasons of love. These are the normative reasons we have to treat those we love especially well, such as the reasons we have to treat our close friends or life partners better than strangers. Subjectivism about reasons of love is the view that every reason of love a person has is correctly explained by her desires. I formulate a version of subjectivism about reasons of love and defend it against three objections that have been made (...)
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  21.  83
    Lost Without You: The Value of Falling Out of Love.Pilar Lopez-Cantero & Alfred Archer - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.
    In this paper we develop a view about the disorientation attached to the process of falling out of love and explain its prudential and moral value. We start with a brief background on theories of love and situate our argument within the views concerned with the lovers’ identities. Namely, love changes who we are. In the context of our paper, we explain this common tenet in the philosophy of love as a change in the lovers’ self-concepts through a process of (...)
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