Animals and Business Ethics is an edited book that applies business ethical theory to nonhuman animals. It explores the ethics of commodifying animals in a business context, how stakeholder and social contract theories relate to animals, how business can be regulated to improve conditions for animals, how to create more humane jobs for humans and animals, and the linkages between human and animal well-being, in the context of human workers and consumers who interact with animals in business. Business ethics literature (...) has underrepresented animals, although this is beginning to change. This book is an introduction to how business ethics theory can be applied, through a range of theoretical chapters and case studies. Animals and Business Ethics is a valuable contribution to the literature, which opens space for additional research. (shrink)

In this article, I will be looking at the person and works of Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673), an aristocrat and author whose philosophical texts and poetry defended the rational capacity of nonhuman animals. Generally, society in 17th-century England did not consider nonhuman animals to have any intelligence or emotional capacity and treated them accordingly. In her works, Cavendish sheds a light on these commonly accepted views, providing arguments against them and indicating their inconsistencies.

International policy frameworks can influence values and ideals by promoting a common conception of societal good, a domain overlapping with the traditional concerns of religion. Animal welfare has begun to receive attention in the UN environmental and sustainable development policy. This article explores the potential for Hindu religious communities and organizations to contribute to the creation and implementation of policy on animal welfare and the environment. The article centers on a discussion of the UN Environment Assembly's March 2022 resolution on (...) the Animal Welfare—Environment—Sustainable Development Nexus and the traditional Hindu concepts of līlā (divine play), ahiṃsā (harmlessness), and sevā (service). (shrink)

This article explores the potential ways in which artificial intelligence (AI) can support veganism, a lifestyle that aims to promote the protection of animals and also avoids the consumption of animal products for environmental and health reasons. The first part of the article discusses the technical requirements for utilizing AI technologies in the mentioned field. The second part provides an overview of potential use cases, including facilitating consumer change with the help of AI, technologically augmenting undercover investigations in factory farms, (...) raising the efficiency of nongovernment organizations promoting plant-based lifestyles, and so forth. The article acknowledges that the deployment of AI should not happen in a “solutionist” manner, meaning to always consider nontechnical means for achieving desired outcomes. However, it is important for organizations promoting veganism to realize the potential of modern data-driven tools and to merge and share their data to reach common goals. (shrink)

This article presents a cross-contextual examination of St. Augustine's views concerning nonhuman animals. It aligns seemingly disparate conclusions of previous studies by considering both material and metaphorical nonhuman animals across Augustine's writings and by integrating the role he assigns to them into his broader metaphysical framework. While Augustine is found to assign instrumental value to all aspects of material creation, nonhuman animals are shown to carry a particularly complex significance due to their proximity to humans in his hierarchical account of (...) creation. (shrink)

Richard Wagner's animal ethics is an underresearched issue within Wagner scholarship. In this article, I aim to fill this gap. In particular, I will demonstrate that, by drawing on Schopenhauer's philosophy, Wagner indicated a path to elaborate an animal ethics. First, I will reconstruct Schopenhauer's animal ethics, showing how it was deeply imbued with tenets of Brahmanism and Buddhism. Second, I will deal with Wagner's animal ethics, illustrating its indebtedness to Schopenhauer.

Animal ethicists have worried that hoping for the success of the animal rights movement is epistemically irrational because it contradicts our best evidence and practically irrational because it makes animal rights advocates complacent. Against these worries, this article defends the claim that animal rights advocates can rationally hope for the success of their movement despite grim prospects. To this end, the article draws on Philip Pettit's (2004) account of hope to articulate the novel notion of “careful substantial hope.” Hope in (...) this sense is a cognitive strategy of thinking as if movement success is likely because the right strategies and tactics will be employed. The article concludes with suggestions for how philosophers can encourage this kind of hope. (shrink)

This article examines the antivivisectionist writings of British novelist and philosopher John Cowper Powys (1872–1963) during the 1930s and 1940s. Powys's opposition to the widespread practice of animal experimentation, both in his fiction and his contributions to activist newspapers, has been noted by critics to have prefigured the modern animal rights movement. On the surface, his writings on the subject display an unnuanced and impassioned outrage, yet on closer inspection, they form a logical piece of Powys's idiosyncratic worldview and to (...) some extent reflect the arguments of “new age” antivivisection campaigns of his time. (shrink)

In this article, I will argue that ethical veganism can be understood as a form of quietism, as a quiet retreat from a world burdened by human moral failings and animal suffering. I will also show how this retreat, although quiet in nature, is both a legitimate and valuable form of genuine resistance to animal oppression. Positing ethical veganism as a form of sociopolitical resistance to animal exploitation is not new, but thinking of it as a quietist retreat and a (...) legitimate and valuable form of quiet resistance is a different matter. (shrink)

Ethical and theological concern for nonhuman animals has been a primary characteristic of the neo-Vaiṣṇava movement of Assam, India. This concern is reflected in its strict prohibition of blood sacrifice or any kind of cruelty toward animals. At the same time, theologically, this faith puts all living beings, human and nonhuman, on an equal ontological footing and urges its followers to see God in all creatures. The present article looks at some of these concerns/considerations of this faith for nonhuman animals (...) and, at the same time, also takes into account neo-Vaiṣṇavism's historical backdrop and a few of its inner contradictions. (shrink)

One of the issues with introducing animal rights law is whether the problem is quantitative or qualitative, whether it can be achieved by working within existing legal paradigms or whether it requires a new set of paradigms. The answer is fundamental: a quantitative problem can be solved by applying more of the same solutions, while a qualitative problem requires completely different solutions. The qualitative camp can be represented by, say, Professor Gary Francione, demanding not only rights for animals but that (...) they have personhood and are no longer considered “property.” The quantitative approach can be finely represented by Professor David Favre, who has argued for many years that we can make progress by developing existing legal principles to give some rights to some animals, and he does so eloquently in his new book. He is clear in his view that progress is, and can continue to be, made with a series of steps, as he puts it, “climbing the slippery slope toward personhood” (p. viii).His case is supported by looking backward—progress made in establishing the rules governing humans in their relationships with animals—as well as forward to developments that will support continuing improvement in the lives of animals, not least the potential for technology (for example, through cell- and plant-based meat). At the same time, he also rightly rejects the concepts of animal welfare and animal rights being at odds, let alone either of them being a panacea for better lives for animals.One aspect of animal law that Favre believes does need to change is that of property status. As he says, the status of animals as personal property is “critical to the future of animal law” (p. 25). In general, the solutions have been largely binary—that animals simply cannot be property for them to have meaningful rights or that animals can be property and still have rights. The former makes intuitive good sense (and is consistent with the objectives of the human abolitionist movements) but would have enormous effects on economic activity throughout the world. The latter is appealing because it does not change the current paradigm, so can be developed more easily.Favre's premise is that we are moving toward rights for animals, so we need to find a way of integrating animals into the current legal system rather than having to destroy and reconstruct the legal system. His ingenious solution is to propose a fourth category of property, alongside real, personal, and intellectual property: “living property.”Within this category, he envisages using the common law concept of the trust to provide equitable “self-ownership,” where an animal has equitable “ownership” while a human retains legal “ownership.” He then connects this concept to adaptations in other aspects of law that start to recognize the selfhood of animals, creating a platform onto which broader and deeper rights for animals can develop, such as the status of “animalhood” (p. 72) and the corresponding legal right of consideration before decisions are made by the state affecting an animal's fundamental interests (such as continuing to be alive). By putting animals in a separate class—rather than uncomfortably leaving them in personal property—he creates a possible route for animal rights that seems less paradigm-busting than removing them from being property altogether.Drawing on evidence from criminal law, tort law, equity (trusts), property law, and family law, he shows how in many places—with a focus on states in the United States—existing laws are being adapted (“green shoots” p. 81) to recognize that animals are more than personal property, in ways that cannot be explained simply through the growth of regulations. For example, family law is starting to recognize that in the division of matrimonial assets, companion animals cannot be treated simply like any other personal property such as a table or a car based on who paid for them. Because animals are “living property,” the courts should take account of other aspects, such as who cared for the animals and who looked after them. Similarly, the concept of extending trust law so that an animal can be the beneficiary of a trust—in the same way as a human can be but inanimate personal property cannot—shows that the law can understand that companion animals can play a large emotional role in our lives (as well as we in theirs), such that we want to ensure proper care for them after we die.The book raises important issues. First, it is intentionally about domestic animals, with their close links with humans, so the potential for laws to engage is much easier than with, say, farmed animals. The danger with solutions that focus on domestic or charismatic animals (e.g., dogs, chimpanzees, elephants) is that the arguments may be pertinent essentially only to those species and therefore hard to apply to animals of less charismatic species, say in a factory farm (but who are present in much greater numbers and generally badly treated in comparison). He “leaves for another day” (p. 32) the discussion about other animals. Hopefully that day will come, as it would be interesting to see how Favre could extend his concept to animals for whom the public has less affection and less appreciation of their capacities (and for whom the prospect of death is much more real and imminent).Secondly, public support for these ideas about living property may simply not be present. If there is not a sufficient groundswell of support for changing the status of animals, then whether one proposes changing it to not-property or “self-owned” property doesn't matter (if someone doesn't like needles, it doesn't matter whether the needle you propose to use is big or small). This may be too pessimistic, of course (people can be helped to overcome a fear of needles, and one way to start is with small needles). Perhaps the law should start with small changes to recognize at least a few animals—their sentience, their capacities for pleasure and pain, their emotions and preferences, their potential for autonomy—and build public support from there.There is also the underlying and more radical point about whether these ideas—the trust for a beloved companion set up by the human, the divorce settlement that doesn't just give the companion to the party who paid for them—are actually bringing about changes for animals as such or are simply adapting laws to help humans, recognizing human needs, and do not actually change the status of animals. The ends are still humans, and the means are still animals.This is not intended to paint a bleak picture: The more bluntand uncompromising part of the animal rights movement that has been focused on the qualitative problem has hardly been successful at getting animal rights laws passed anywhere in the world, so everything that moves us closer to a better, richer, more thoughtful view of animals will help. Favre's approach has ingenuity, shows good sense, and has the potential to bring about real animal rights. The themes and cases in this book that show how courts and legislatures are becoming more aware of the sentience of at least some animals, as well as proposing a middle path in the debate about animals as property, are important in the journey toward recognition of animal rights. Even more important, they may actually work. (shrink)

Animals in Brazil: Economic, Legal and Ethical Perspectives presents a broad overview of the complicated role of animals in Brazilian society. Its four substantive chapters survey the landscape of animal agriculture, animal protection laws, recent animal jurisprudence, and the underlying cultural factors that have shaped the Brazilian people's relationship with and treatment of animals. Despite the book's title, there is no chapter addressing economics. However, it represents the first book in English addressing the plight of animals in Brazil and makes (...) a marked contribution to animal ethics in Latin America. At its best, it is very good, and overall, the volume is a worthwhile addition to the bookshelf of anyone interested in Brazilian animal law.The introduction by the book's editor, Carlos Naconecy, does exactly what an introduction should do: it succinctly describes the content of the chapters to follow. My quibble is that while Naconecy has excellent English and expresses himself well, the essay badly needed the editorial scrutiny of a native English speaker. The succeeding chapters each begin with an abstract, a simple but useful aid to any scholar who might not be interested in all of the issues the book covers.Chapter 1, “Food Animals in Brazil: Five Decades of Transformation,” ably describes Brazil's progression from a primarily subsistence-based agrarian culture to its full-scale embrace of industrial agriculture with all of its incumbent horrors. In just 50 years, Brazil has gone from a net importer to the world's second-largest exporter.The story of the country's transition to confinement, meat-based agriculture is all too familiar. It wrought havoc on community and family ties and overwrote traditional dietary practices, leading to widespread obesity, disease, and nutrient deficiencies. It also made indifference toward agricultural animals a new national norm. The level of cruelty that is both legal and common in Brazilian industrial agriculture would strain credulity if it weren't so similar to those of so many other countries. Indeed, the authors’ discussion of the systemic animal mistreatment, devastating environmental consequences, and accompanying cultural erosion in Brazil could easily have been cut and pasted into a chapter surveying the last 50 years in the United States.The second chapter is the strongest in the collection. “The Legal Protection of Animals in Brazil: An Overview” summarizes the country's animal-legal framework and situates it within the context of Brazil's constitutional prohibition against animal cruelty. The authors explain why the constitution offers little practical protection. Under the prevailing view, only those acts undertaken for the purpose of causing needless suffering constitute cruelty. Since much animal cruelty is ostensibly done for other reasons (food, science, etc.), the cruelty prohibition does not reach the majority of offenses.The authors next construct a syllogistic argument that the current legal classification of animals as “things” rather than beings who are the subjects of rights is logically and ethically flawed. Since cruelty involves suffering, and objects cannot suffer, and since animals suffer (otherwise animal cruelty laws would be pointless), then animals must be subjects of the law. Phrased differently, animals must be rights-holders. This leads into a compelling argument that the constitution not only supports but requires such an interpretation.“Cases and Debates in the Brazilian Animal Rights Arena” does exactly what its title suggests. It looks at recent animal-related judicial developments and situates them within a broader cultural and legal context. For example, the Supreme Court recently held that the Vaquejada, a rodeo-like event involving chasing and tackling terrified cows, was unconstitutional.Immediately following the decision, the legislature amended the constitution to classify the Vaquejada as an important cultural activity and thus protected under a different constitutional provision. The courts are currently considering whether that constitutional amendment is itself unconstitutional. We are further told about movements against foie gras and vivisection and about recent developments regarding custody disputes over domestic animal companions.The final chapter, “Factors That Influence the Brazilian Ethos Regarding Animals” is a broad discussion of the ways Brazilian history and culture have impacted attitudes toward animals. It is argued that because Brazil was the last Western country to eliminate slavery, Brazilians are more prone to treat animals like property and that the Brazilian temperament makes them more likely to be passionate than pragmatic. We also learn that a cultural reluctance to protest against social wrongs enables Brazilians to remain silent in the face of animal injustice and that the country's Catholic tradition instilled the idea that only people were made in the image of God and that animals therefore matter less. These observations strike me as overbroad and problematic. For example, millions of Brazilians have spent much of the past decade protesting government corruption, and the country has an impassioned animal advocacy movement. Furthermore, it is not clear that Brazilians necessarily treat animals differently than people from other countries with very different histories.Overall, Animals in Brazil begins the work of new scholarship in English on animals in the Brazilian context. The fact that some chapters are more informative and useful than others is an inevitable by-product of an edited volume and should not deter those interested in Brazilian animal law from reading it. The excellence of the first two chapters alone makes the book worthwhile. (shrink)

Food is intimately associated with the body, and what a person chooses to consume can easily be used to craft one's identity. Food brings people together, in much the same way as culinary preferences can divide. As veganism is gaining traction around the world, this article examines its origins in religious practices, philosophy, literature, and economic trade within the Middle Ages, elucidating how contemporary decisions to abstain from animal consumption mirror medieval ones and further how similar obstacles to this lifestyle (...) exist today. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that kinship implicitly operates as a normative ethical concept in Christine Korsgaard's account of animal ethics. I begin with an examination of the key theoretical foundations of Korsgaard's account and then examine the ways kinship operates as an ethical concept in her account, arguing that the ethical obligations she discusses are fundamentally grounded in a recognition of kinship with other animals. I conclude by recognizing that there are many remaining questions about kinship and animal ethics (...) but that the concept holds significant potential for thinking about the ethical obligations that we have to nonhuman animals. (shrink)

This article puts Buddhist moral phenomenology in dialogue with ethical veganism to propose a new way of thinking about animal ethics. It first defines ethical veganism and outlines Buddhist moral phenomenology before articulating what a moral phenomenological approach to ethical veganism looks like. It then provides some examples of this approach to ethical veganism in both Tibetan and Western settings to demonstrate its viability. It concludes by thinking through some of the implications of a moral phenomenological approach to ethical veganism (...) and argues that moral phenomenology is an exemplary mode of understanding and establishing ethical veganism. (shrink)

Frances Power Cobbe led the Victorian movement against vivisection. Cobbe is often remembered for her animal welfare campaigning, but it is rarely recognized that she approached animal welfare as a moral philosopher. In this article, I examine the philosophical basis of Cobbe's antivivisectionism. I concentrate on her 1875 article “The Moral Aspects of Vivisection,” in which Cobbe first locates vivisection within the historical movement of Western civilization and the tendency for science to supersede religion and then endeavors to refute the (...) defenses of vivisection one by one. I emphasize the philosophical considerations that led Cobbe to oppose animal experimentation on a reasoned basis. (shrink)

Saving Animals, a study of three different kinds of animal sanctuaries, is the first major ethnography to describe how sanctuaries “unmake” the notion of animals as property that reduces them to “bare life.” The study relies on numerous engaging narratives about rescue animals, their mutual interactions, and their interactions with the people who care for them—narratives that illustrate how the sentience and subjectivity of animals provide a firm ground for the author's ethical considerations. An animal sanctuary is ideally an intentional (...) community of cocitizens whose pragmatic and symbolic value resides in its ability to lay the foundation for a broad challenge to all violent practices of exploitation “targeted at a range of different others.” The patient, incremental work of sanctuaries has implications not only for the future of human-animal relations but more broadly for the future of humans on the planet. The ultimate vision of sanctuaries is a world outside that mirrors the world inside, a pantopia where there will be no “others,” only “us.”. (shrink)

The Tasmanian salmon industry has become one of the state's most profitable industries to date. Though production conditions notoriously lack transparency, there is a clear dependency on the mass production of complex nonhuman animals who are kept in inappropriate conditions and subject to harmful industry practices. This article explores why the Tasmanian Environmental Protection Agency recently approved the construction of the largest salmon hatchery in Australia, despite serious environmental sustainability and welfare concerns. It considers the likely impact of the new (...) hatchery on the welfare of both the farmed nonhuman animals and the surrounding free-ranging life and advocates for industry improvements that are guided by considerations of nonhuman animal welfare and environmental sustainability. (shrink)