The Allegory of the Cave (Pl. Resp. 514a1–520e2) is often analyzed in terms of metaphysical, epistemological, political, and psychic hierarchies that are clarified and reinforced by philosophical education. But the Allegory also contains an important historical allusion to the silver mining that took place in classical Attica. Examining the Cave in light of the enslaved miners around Lavrio leads us to reconsider the philosophical ‘liberation’ (λύσιν … τῶν δεσμῶν, 515c4) at the Allegory’s heart in the context of Athenian slavery and (...) Plato’s thoughts on the practice. Elsewhere in his work Plato generally uses servile metaphors in two ways: to depict ‘bad’ internal psychic subjection and ‘good’ submission to logos as manifested in various entities. This historical dimension of the Allegory works to undermine the ostensible naturalness of the slave/citizen distinction and suggest that philosophical education has the potential to ‘free’ the former and ‘subjugate’ the latter. The implication that these juridical categories are, to an extent, arbitrary and mutable reveals important differences between Plato’s views and those of his classical peers, and it adds to the dialogue’s protreptic dimension for its readers then and now. (shrink)

Plato in the Laws proposes a simulation of nearly ideal conditions regarding the experts’ persuasion and observes that even in these circumstances some citizens will not agree with the epistemic authorities. In this paper, such situations are labelled as exhibiting persistent dissent. Plato maintains that persistent dissenters lack the virtue of sōphrosynē, but its meaning is notoriously difficult to decipher. This paper offers to examine the role of sōphrosynē in tackling persistent dissent in light of Plato’s reflections on civic participation. (...) This angle will not only uncover the epistemic aspect of sōphrosynē that lays the groundwork for persuasion, but it will also give a less optimistic assessment of the civic theory of the Laws, whilst simultaneously widening our own understanding of the range of disagreements between the experts and the non-experts and the difficulties in removing them. (shrink)

This paper argues that Aristotle’s account of friendship can be applied equally to cases of friendship in association and personal friendship. It argues that both types of friendship are similar insofar as both are primarily concerned with the common good that serves as the basis of the friendship. This notion of the common good is what allows Aristotle to draw a connection between personal relationships, the more circumscribed associations, and the political association. This focus on the common good allows one (...) to look to the political association to inform one’s understanding of both friendship and justice in both the smaller associations and in personal relationships. (shrink)

We reply to the objections raised in Polis 40 (2023) by Ryan Balot and Manuel Knoll to our original paper ‘Recognition and Redistribution in Aristotle’s Account of Stasis’, published in Polis 39 (2022). We argue that Knoll is correct in arguing that Aristotle distinguishes between democratic views of distributive justice and his own, but wrong to argue that this wholly resolves a tension in Aristotle’s exposition between views of democratic justice as, in one sense, based on equality ‘according to worth’ (...) and in another based on arithmetic equality. Balot, we contend, misconstrues our original argument when he represents us as claiming that, according to Aristotle, the injustice which leads agents to engage in stasis exists entirely in their own minds. We did not and do not hold that view and therefore (pace Balot) are in no way committed to any of its alleged implications. Balot’s misunderstanding on that point entails a wholesale misrepresentation of our original argument. (shrink)

Although Tacitus began his writing career during the Principate at the end of the first century CE, the dominant approach to thinking about political life was still guided by Republicanism, a constellation of concepts from the mid-first century BCE Roman Republic. Republicanism held that there was only one type of monarchy and that it necessarily precluded libertas. Tacitus, who was living under different iterations of monopolistic power in the Principate, questions this tenet by examining various Germanic tribes. The Germania explores (...) different types of monarchical arrangements, showing that monarchy is not a one-size-fits-all form and that there are significant political differences among the Germanic monarchies, some of which preserve libertas. In this examination, he highlights the inapplicability of Republicanism to a system as dynamic as the Principate. (shrink)

In Oedipus at Colonus Sophocles shows that neither individual reason nor piety are singularly sufficient for either individual happiness or the common good. Human understanding is dependent on a decentering of the individual, such that the reason of the wider community, including that of the gods, can augment the limitations of individual perspective. Sophocles shows not only the dependence of faith and reason on one another, but the degree to which both are dependent on reciprocal good will within a community.

This investigation examines the question of whether the similar theories of the origins of monarchy encountered in certain early Greek and Indian literary sources should be taken as evidence of cross-cultural diffusion of political ideas. The paper argues against the alternative explanation, according to which the similarity in form in the Greek and Indian versions of the kingship theory is rooted in similar social processes, by exposing how the earliest extant Greek version of the theory seems to build on a (...) prototype most closely mirrored in one early Indian source. (shrink)

In the Statesman and Phaedrus Plato addresses the problem inherent to law of how a general rule can be applied appropriately to particular circumstances. Previous scholarship has shown the connection between these dialogues’ critiques of written law and writing, a similarity this paper argues extends to the comparison of writing to a pharmakon (‘drug’) in both dialogues. Furthermore, close textual analysis shows that the Stranger’s discussion of measure in the Statesman parallels Socrates’ concept of ‘logographic necessity’ in the Phaedrus according (...) to which the parts of a perfect writing cohere like limbs within an organism. Logographic necessity and measure raise the possibility of overcoming the weakness of writing and written law respectively. Ultimately, the Laws recapitulates these issues to reveal an insuperable gap between legal and philosophic writing. Envisioning the ideal of perfect law is, however, necessary to see how law falls short of what philosophy as Platonic dialogue achieves. (shrink)

This article argues that Cicero laid down his imperium in Brundisium in September 47 after Caesar had, in a meeting between the two men, granted Cicero permission to retain his imperium and title of imperator for as long as Cicero wished to do so. Instead of accepting Caesar’s offer, Cicero instead immediately repudiated it, laid down his imperium in the city of Brundisium, and went immediately to Tusculum to begin a second period of political retirement. Caesar’s offer and his return (...) to Italy in the autumn of 47 gave Cicero an excuse to consider expired the SCU of 7 January 49 and, by immediately renouncing his imperium, perform, under the cover of his now-fulfilled obligation to the Pompeians, a calculated personal statement of political independence. (shrink)

Scholars generally agree that, according to Aristotle, factionalizers are motivated by a sense of injustice (the ‘first cause’) to redress imbalances in wealth and honor (the ‘second cause’). Recent discussions, however, have offered a misleading interpretation of Aristotle’s third cause, which he identifies as the origin of the factionalizers’ sense of injustice. It involves, most importantly, greed, hubris, and other factors such as fear and ‘disproportionate growth’. In conversation with a recent publication in Polis, this article restores the third cause (...) to its proper place in Aristotle’s account. Abusive power holders, driven by greed, hubris, and overreaching, oppress their fellow citizens – following in the tradition of Homer’s Agamemnon, Hesiod’s basileis, and Solon’s aristocrats. These power holders prompt a sense of anger, indignation, and injustice in their fellow citizens, who ultimately form factions and take action on their own behalf. (shrink)

At the beginning of Book 9 of the Politeia (571cd), Platon suggests that all people bear in themselves unlawful desires like the desire to have sex with their own mother or with any other human, god, or beast, the desire to murder anyone, or the desire to eat anything. Modern scholars take it for granted that by the desire to eat anything, Platon means cannibalism. This view is based on the fact that Platon discusses unlawful desires in connection with the (...) tyrannical man and that the tyrant is, elsewhere in the Politeia, twice connected with anthropophagy (at 8.565d–566a and 10.619c). This paper challenges this communis opinio and argues that we have no reason to assume that at Politeia 9.571d Platon claims that every one of us has the hidden desire to consume human flesh. Also, the alleged cannibalism of the Platonic tyrant is questioned. A close reading of the passages 8.565d–566a and 10.619c reveals that in the depiction of the tyrant Platon makes use of mythological motifs and literary topoi but never literally claims that the tyrant has cannibalistic desires. (shrink)

This short article is a response to Douglas Cairns, Mirko Canevaro, and Kleanthis Mantzouranis, who in Polis 39 (2022) explicitly criticize both of my previous interpretations of Aristotle’s view of democratic justice and of the relation of proportional and numerical equality. Against Cairns et al., I argue that there is no tension or contradiction between Aristotle’s statements on these two kinds of equality and on democratic justice. The paper suggests a new reading of Aristotle’s texts that strictly distinguishes between Aristotle’s (...) own views and his references to ‘respected opinions’ (endoxa). It concludes that Aristotle consistently identifies democratic justice with ‘numerical’ or ‘arithmetic’ equality and not with proportional equality, which he usually identifies with equality ‘according to worth or merit’ (kat’ axian). (shrink)

Scholars often turn to Livy’s famous digression on Aulus Cossus and the spolia opima (4.17–20) to shed light on his larger political inclinations. These readings generally regard Livy as either an Augustan (or at least a patriotic Roman) or an apolitical skeptic. Yet neither view, I argue, fully explains the Cossus affair. What is needed is an interpretation that recognizes the political nature of the Cossus digression and its skepticism toward Augustus. Attending to Livy’s rhetorical strategy in the digression allows (...) us to see it as an instance of oblique criticism of Augustus and his control over Roman life. The explanatory power of this reading extends to episodes from the life of Romulus as well. I argue Livy uses these stories to make a theoretical argument about the nature of despotism, namely, that it seeks to control narratives of the past just as much as it aims for political domination. (shrink)

In the proposed law-code in De legibus there is a law that votes are to be known by the best citizens (the optimates) but free to the common people (the plebs) (3.10). This law, Cicero claims, grants ‘the appearance of liberty’ (libertatis species), preserves the authority (auctoritas) of the optimates, and promotes harmony between the classes (3.39). The law and the precise meaning of libertatis species remain opaque even with the lengthy commentary (3.33–39), and much scholarly debate and discussion has (...) arisen as a result – most of it very critical of Cicero’s proposal and the arguments supporting it. This paper offers a fresh analysis of the voting law that is more charitable to Cicero. It unpacks the full details of the voting system that is developed in De legibus and sheds new light on developments in Cicero’s thinking about the best state. (shrink)

The following paper offers a study on how contestation over the meaning of language forged the political ideology present in the second of the Epistulae ad Caesarem. ‘Ideology’ being a notoriously malleable concept, Michael Freeden’s theoretical approach is used to focus what it means, how it is manifested in the sources, and how it can be located and analysed. The political thought of the Late Republic is studied by examining the vocabulary contained in one of the disputed letters that Sallust (...) addressed to Julius Caesar. Taking libertas as a case study of an ‘essentially contested concept’, the relation between language, meaning and ideology is dissected, outlining the morphological configuration that underlies the second Epistula. It is argued that the resulting array of political arguments is one iteration of what has been called popularis ideology. (shrink)

The meaning of the word tyrannos in Greek tragedy is much debated. Some have assumed that the word is always a neutral term signifying ‘ruler’ alone. Others argue for competing ideologies regarding tyranny: the result of an evolution in thinking on autocracy. This article challenges both of these assumptions. The negative meaning of tyrannos is always latent in tragedy, even where the word is used objectively and not as a term of abuse. Tyrannos does not simply indicate a powerful individual (...) but implies absolute power, fortune and wealth. This absolute power leads to ruin and tyrannical vice. Tyrannos signifies not a bad or illegitimate ruler, but rather one with the potential to develop such characteristics. It is the tyrant who evolves, whereas Greek conceptions of tyranny remain largely unchanged from at least the time of Aeschylus to that of Aristotle. (shrink)

This paper argues that Cicero’s critique of Epicureanism in De finibus is motivated by a concern about its degrading effect on the moral sensibility of Rome’s best men. In place of earlier objections to Epicureanism, which centered on its inability to explain or recommend the virtuous conduct of Roman maiores, De finibus focuses on its inability to do so properly and, more prospectively, to assist boni in the work of maintaining the dignity and respectability of Roman civic life. Responding to (...) optimates like Cassius who claimed that Epicureanism was compatible with Roman politics because it treats virtue as being necessary for pleasure, Cicero holds that instrumentalizing virtue in this way is actually a grave corruption of it. Not only do Epicureans debase politics by reducing it to considerations of utility alone: they also introduce deeper forms of civic confusion by distorting and abusing the very idea of honorableness. (shrink)

This essay examines two articles by Rex Stem about Cicero and Cato: ‘The First Eloquent Stoic and Cato the Younger’ and ‘Cicero as Orator and Political Philosopher: The Value of the Pro Murena for Ciceronian Political Thought’. It places these articles in dialogue and draws upon them to present an overarching argument about Cicero’s critique of Cato’s Stoicism. It also assesses their respective defenses of Roman republicanism, offering counterarguments to Cicero’s critique of Cato and underlining the ways in which the (...) two men were allies. (shrink)

Drawing on Rex Stem’s analysis of exempla, I explore Mercy Otis Warren and John Marshall’s narrations of the Society of the Cincinnati, and Washington’s place within it, to draw out the lessons they sought to impart. Beginning with an exploration of Cincinnatus’ exemplum in antiquity, its relationship to late 18th-century portrayals of Washington, and its invocation in the establishment of the Society of the Cincinnati, I also discuss the exemplum by a prominent critic of the Society of the Cincinnati, Aedanus (...) Burke. I then turn to Warren and Marshall’s accounts of the Cincinnati. I do so with a particular focus on how a single exemplary American – George Washington – is depicted in two different ways, exemplifying two different sets of moral teaching. I conclude by suggesting that Warren, Marshall, and Burke’s battle over the exemplum of Cincinnatus is a battle over the moral ordering of America’s future. (shrink)

This article offers a critical appraisal of approaches to ‘friendship’ (amicitia) in Cornelius Nepos’s Atticus and Cicero’s De Amicitia, as found in the scholarship of Rex Stem and Grant Nelsestuen. In light of the former’s untimely passing in 2020, it uses an exchange of personal correspondence in 2019 between these two scholars – as well as John Alexander Lobur’s 2021 book on Nepos – as a basis for sketching new approaches to the role that friendship plays in Nepos’s biographies. Friendship (...) thus turns out to be both an important aspect of Nepos’ political thought and a crucial means for advancing scholarly understanding of Nepos’ project in Atticus and his other biographies. (shrink)

In the Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli claims that writers who are afraid to condemn Caesar instead criticize Catiline. I argue that Machiavelli follows this advice by inverting it. He openly condemns Caesar and the empire he founded while signaling that he has in mind another inimical example: the Church. He signals his intention by echoing Cicero’s fourth Catilinarian oration, imitating Cicero’s image of the ruin of Rome if Catiline’s conspiracy were to succeed through his own vision of the Italy wrought (...) by wicked Roman emperors who succeeded Caesar. The reader of Machiavelli who recognizes this echo is in a position to see Machiavelli’s own Catilinarian oration against another successor of Caesar. In making my argument, I draw on Rex Stem’s treatment of the functions of exemplementarity as employed by authors of texts and as received by their readers. (shrink)

Cornelius Nepos’ Life of Atticus shows its author as living a life of deliberate withdrawal from politics. This paper compares that life to other models of political withdrawal in Greco-Roman thought and finds that it does not cohere very closely with any of them. Nepos, the paper proposes, deviates from these existing models in showing Atticus as avoiding politics not out of a desire to transcend human life, to reorder politics, or to create a substitute politics of his own, but (...) rather to live what the paper calls ‘social life.’ Atticus embraces human interdependence while rejecting the civic forms in which that interdependence was traditionally expressed in Greece and Rome. (shrink)

In Pro Murena, Cicero argues that Cato’s rigid philosophical comportment to politics reflects a mistaken understanding both of philosophy and of politics. By implication, he suggests that there is an approach to philosophy that is compatible with political leadership. Specifically, he argues that a thoroughgoing commitment to the philosophy of the Platonic Academy (i.e., Academic Philosophy) is entirely compatible with a thoroughgoing commitment to political leadership in the late Roman Republic. This essay looks at the most famous treatment of philosophical (...) leadership in the Platonic corpus, the philosopher ruler of the Republic, and asks to what extent Cicero’s depiction of politics and philosophy is consonant with that account. (shrink)

This paper examines the intricate relationship between De Senectute and the Second Philippic, arguing that De Senectute is an important lens through which to read the Second Philippic. When Cicero decided on irrevocable opposition to Antony, the moral and political theorizing about the role of senes (literally, ‘old men/elders’) in the state found in De Senectute provided a convenient and topical framework for synthesizing the invective of the Second Philippic. A close reading of De Senectute with the Second Philippic demonstrates (...) that the philosophical thinking of De Senectute informed Cicero’s political persona in the Second Philippic and establishes the Second Philippic as the intellectual successor to De Senectute. (shrink)