Year:

  1. Fatalism and Future Contingents.Giacomo Andreoletti - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):1-14.
    In this paper I address issues related to the problem of future contingents and the metaphysical doctrine of fatalism. Two classical responses to the problem of future contingents are the third truth value view and the all-false view. According to the former, future contingents take a third truth value which goes beyond truth and falsity. According to the latter, they are all false. I here illustrate and discuss two ways to respectively argue for those two views. Both ways are similar (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  67
    Method in the Service of Progress.John Bengson, Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer‐Landau - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):179-205.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  14
    Presentism and Modal Realism.Michael De - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):259-282.
    David Lewis sells modal realism as a package that includes an eternalist view of time. There is, of course, nothing that ties together the thesis that modality should be analyzed in terms of "concrete" possibilia with the view that non-present things exist. In this paper I develop a theory I call \emph{modal realist presentism} that is a combination of modal realism and presentism, and argue that is has compelling answers to some of the main objections to presentism, including the arguments (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Characterising Theories of Time and Modality.Daniel Deasy - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):283-305.
    Recently, some authors – call them Reformists – have argued that the traditional Presentism-Eternalism and Actualism-Possibilism debates in the metaphysics of time and modality respectively are unclear or insubstantial, and should therefore give way to the newer Temporaryism-Permanentism and Contingentism- Necessitism debates. In ‘On characterising the presentism/eternalism and actualism/possibilism debates’ (2016, Analytic Philosophy 57: 110-140), Ross Cameron defends the Conservative position that the traditional debates are both substantial and distinct from the Temporaryism-Permanentism and Contingentism- Necessitism debates. In this paper I (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  89
    On the Global Ambitions of Phenomenal Conservatism.Declan Smithies - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):206-244.
    What is the role of phenomenal consciousness in grounding epistemic justification? This paper explores the prospects for a global version of phenomenal conservatism inspired by the work of Michael Huemer, according to which all epistemic justification is grounded in phenomenal seemings. I’m interested in this view because of its global ambitions: it seeks to explain all epistemic justification in terms of a single epistemic principle, which says that you have epistemic justification to believe whatever seems to you strongly enough on (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  19
    Against the Middle Ground: Why Russellian Monism is Unstable.Brian Cutter - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (2):109-129.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  76
    Exiting The Consequentialist Circle: Two Senses of Bringing It About.Paul Edward Hurley - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (2):130-163.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  21
    Rampant Non‐Factualism: A Metaphysical Framework and its Treatment of Vagueness.Alexander Jackson - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (2):79-108.
    Rampant non-factualism is the view that all non-fundamental matters are non-factual, in a sense inspired by Kit Fine (2001). The first half of this paper argues that if we take non-factualism seriously for any matters, such as morality, then we should take rampant non-factualism seriously. The second half of the paper argues that rampant non-factualism makes possible an attractive theory of vagueness. We can give non-factualist accounts of non-fundamental matters that nicely characterize the vagueness they manifest (if any). I suggest (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  19
    On the Study of Imaginative Resistance.Andrea Sauchelli - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (2):164-178.
    I argue that the current methodology employed to study imaginative resistance should not be used to draw general conclusions about the influence of genre on episodes of imaginative resistance caused by complex works of art. One of the main problems is that the mini stories upon which the current methodology relies are inadequate—mostly because they are artless and ‘flat’. Mini stories cannot generate imaginative experiences structurally similar to the experiences elicited by complex and interesting works of fictional art.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  19
    Essentially Practical Questions.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):1-26.
  11.  39
    Naive Action Explanationism.Anton Ford - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):67-77.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action.Declan Smithies & Jeremy Weiss - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):27-54.
    What is the role of affective experience in explaining how our desires provide us with reasons for action? When we desire that p, we are thereby disposed to feel attracted to the prospect that p, or to feel averse to the prospect that not-p. In this paper, we argue that affective experiences – including feelings of attraction and aversion – provide us with reasons for action in virtue of their phenomenal character. Moreover, we argue that desires provide us with reasons (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  30
    Beware of Safety.Christian Piller - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy:01-29.
    Safety, as discussed in contemporary epistemology, is a feature of true beliefs. Safe beliefs, when formed by the same method, remain true in close-by possible worlds. I argue that our beliefs being safely true serves no recognisable epistemic interest and, thus, that this notion of safety should play no role in epistemology. Epistemologists have been misled by failing to distinguish between a feature of beliefs — being safely true — and a feature of believers, namely being safe from error. The (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues