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  1.  23
    A Functionalist Account of Human Uniqueness.Anthony Bolos - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (3):326-344.
    I challenge the assumption that human uniqueness, of the sort motivated by the doctrine of the imago Dei, is incompatible with contemporary views in evolutionary biology. I first develop the functionalist account of the image of God and then argue that image bearing is a contingently imposed function. Humans, chosen by God to bear his image, are unique in that they alone possess an ideal range of image bearing capacities. This ideal range, in the end, makes humans well-suited for the (...)
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  2.  7
    Common Worship.Joshua Cockayne & David Efird - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (3):299-325.
    People of faith, particularly in the Judeo-Christian tradition, worship corporately at least as often, if not more so, than they do individually. Why do they do this? There are, of course, many reasons, some having to do with personal preference and others having to do with the theology of worship. But, in this paper, we explore one reason, a philosophical reason, which, despite recent work on the philosophy of liturgy, has gone underappreciated. In particular, we argue that corporate worship enables (...)
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  3.  4
    Love as a Middle Way Between Dogmatism and Hyper-Rationalism in Ethics.Kyla Ebels-Duggan - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (3):279-298.
    In the Groundwork Kant dismisses theistic principles, along with all other competitors to his Categorical Imperative, claiming that they are heteronomous. By contrast, he asserts, the fundamental moral principle must be a principle of autonomy. I argue that the best case for this Kantian conclusion conflates our access to the reasons for our commitments with an ability to state these reasons such that they could figure in an argument. This conflation, in turn, results from a certain Kantian conception of inclination, (...)
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  4.  6
    Can a Latin Trinity Be Social? A Response to Scott M. Williams.William Hasker - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (3):356-366.
    Scott Williams’s Latin Social model of the Trinity holds that the trinitarian persons have between them a single set of divine mental powers and a single set of divine mental acts. He claims, nevertheless, that on his view the persons are able to use indexical pronouns such as “I.” This claim is examined and is found to be mistaken.
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  5.  43
    How To Be a Skeptical Theist and a Commonsense Epistemologist.Perry Hendricks - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (3):345-355.
    Trent Dougherty has argued that commonsense epistemology and skeptical theism are incompatible. In this paper, I explicate Dougherty’s argument, and show that (at least) one popular form of skeptical theism is compatible with commonsense epistemology.
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  6.  1
    Paradise Understood: New Philosophical Essays About Heaven, Edited by T. Ryan Byerly and Eric J. Silverman.Dolores G. Morris - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (3):379-385.
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  7.  4
    Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil, by Guillaume Bignon.Kevin Timpe - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (3):373-379.
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  8.  13
    Reply to Eleanor Helms on Faith Versus Reason in Kierkegaard.Merold Westphal - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (3):367-372.
    Two reasons are given for speaking of “reason” even where Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, Climacus, speaks of “understanding.” First, we are dealing with a significant contribution to a centuries-old discussion of an issue that goes by the name of “faith and reason.” Second, whereas Kant and Hegel sharply distinguish mere understanding from reason, no such distinction is at work in Kierkegaard’s text. At issue is the quite different distinction of unaided human reason and divine revelation. It is not just any notion of (...)
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  9.  6
    Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes From the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen, Edited by John A. Keller. [REVIEW]Michael J. Almeida - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (2):264-271.
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  10.  6
    Resurrection and Moral Imagination, by Sarah Bachelard.James G. Hanink - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (2):257-261.
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  11.  2
    The God Relationship: The Ethics for Inquiry About the Divine, by Paul K. Moser.Jill Hernandez - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (2):272-276.
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  12.  13
    The Paradox of the End Without End.David Vander Laan - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (2):157-172.
    In much of Christian thought humans are taken to have an ultimate end, understood as the highest attainable good. Christians also anticipate “the life everlasting.” Together these ideas generate a paradox. If the end can be reached in a finite amount of time, some longer-lasting state will be better still, so the purported end is not the highest good after all. But if the end is to possess some good forever, then it will never be reached. So it seems an (...)
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  13.  12
    Presentism, Atemporality, and Time’s Way.Brian Leftow - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (2):173-194.
    After defining presentism, I consider four arguments that presentism and divine atemporality are incompatible. I identify an assumption common to the four, ask what reason there is to consider it true, and argue against it.
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  14.  6
    Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, by Michael Gorman.Anna Marmodoro - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (2):261-264.
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  15.  9
    Faith Through the Dark of Night.Daniel J. McKaughan - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (2):195-218.
    Faith plays a valuable role in sustaining relationships through various kinds of challenges, including through evidentially unfavorable circumstances and periods of significant doubt. But if, as is widely assumed, both faith in God and faith that God exists require belief that God exists, and if one’s beliefs are properly responsive to one’s evidence, the capacity for faith to persevere amidst significant and well-grounded doubt will be fairly limited. Taking Mother Teresa as an exemplar of Christian faith and exploring the close (...)
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  16.  6
    Religious Diversity.Hamid Vahid - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (2):219-236.
    Philosophical responses to religious diversity range from outright rejection of divine reality to claims of religious pluralism. In this paper, I challenge those responses that take the problem of religious diversity to be merely an instance of the general problem of disagreement. To do so, I will take, as my starting point, William Alston’s treatment of the problems that religious diversity seems to pose for the rationality of theistic beliefs. My main aim is to highlight the cognitive penetrability of religious (...)
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  17.  4
    The Good and the Good Book: Revelation as a Guide to Life, by Samuel Fleischacker.C. R. Dodsworth - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):142-147.
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  18.  71
    Resolving Religious Disagreements.Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):56-83.
    Resolving religious disagreements is difficult, for beliefs about religion tend to come with strong biases against other views and the people who hold them. Evidence can help, but there is no agreed-upon policy for weighting it, and moreover bias affects the content of our evidence itself. Another complicating factor is that some biases are reliable and others unreliable. What we need is an evidence-weighting policy geared toward negotiating the effects of bias. I consider three evidence-weighting policies in the philosophy of (...)
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  19.  26
    Taking Pascal’s Wager: Faith, Evidence, and the Abundant Life, by Michael Rota. [REVIEW]Trent Dougherty - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):147-153.
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  20.  2
    Fine-Tuning the Multiverse.Thomas Metcalf - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):3-32.
    I present and defend an “indexical” version of the Fine-Tuning Argument. I begin by outlining the dialectic between the Fine-Tuning Argument, the Multiverse Objection, and the This-Universe Reply. Next, I sketch an indexical fine-tuning argument and defend it from two new objections. Then, I show that such an argument is immune to the Multiverse Objection. I explain how a further augmentation to the argument allows it to avoid an objection I call the “Indifference Objection.” I conclude that my indexical version (...)
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  21.  14
    Cognitive Science of Religion, Atheism, and Theism.Myron A. Penner - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):105-131.
    Some claim that cognitive science of religion either completely “explains religion away,” or at the very least calls the epistemic status of religious belief into question. Others claim that religious beliefs are the cognitive outputs of systems that seem highly reliable in other contexts, and thus CSR provides positive epistemic support for religious belief. I argue that CSR does not provide evidence for atheism, but if one is an atheist, CSR lends “intellectual aid and comfort,” CSR does not provide evidence (...)
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  22. Does God Have the Moral Standing to Blame?Patrick Todd - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):33-55.
    In this paper, I introduce a problem to the philosophy of religion – the problem of divine moral standing – and explain how this problem is distinct from (albeit related to) the more familiar problem of evil (with which it is often conflated). In short, the problem is this: in virtue of how God would be (or, on some given conception, is) “involved in” our actions, how is it that God has the moral standing to blame us for performing those (...)
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