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  1.  3
    Nyāya’s Response to Skepticism.Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (1):72-89.
    The classical Indian school called Nyāya (literally “logic” or “right reasoning”), is arguably the leading anti-skeptical tradition within all of Indian philosophy. Defending a realist metaphysics and an epistemology of “knowledge sources” (pramāṇa), its responses to skepticism are often appropriated by other schools of thought. This paper examines its responses to skeptical arguments from dreams, from “the three times,” from justificatory regress, and over the problem of induction.
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  2. The Madhyamaka Contribution to Skepticism.Georges Dreyfus & Jay L. Garfield - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (1):4-26.
    This paper examines the work of Nāgārjuna as interpreted by later Madhyamaka tradition, including the Tibetan Buddhist Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). It situates Madhyamaka skepticism in the context of Buddhist philosophy, Indian philosophy more generally, and Western equivalents. Find it broadly akin to Pyrrhonism, it argues that Madhyamaka skepticism still differs from its Greek equivalents in fundamental methodologies. Focusing on key hermeneutical principles like the two truths and those motivating the Svātantrika/Prāsaṅgika schism (i.e., whether followers of Nāgārjuna should offer positive arguments or (...)
     
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  3.  5
    A. C. Mukerji on the Problem of Skepticism and Its Resolution in Neo-Vedānta.Jay L. Garfield - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (1):90-100.
    This paper examines the work of the unsung modern Indian Philosopher A. C. Mukerji, in his major works Self, Thought and Reality (1933) and The Nature of Self (1938). Mukerji constructs a skeptical challenge that emerges from the union of ideas drawn from early modern Europe, neo-Hegelian philosophy, and classical Buddhism and Vedānta. Mukerji’s worries about skepticism are important in part because they illustrate many of the creative tensions within the modern, synthetic period of Indian philosophy, and in part because (...)
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  4. Three Formulations of Cognitive Skepticism: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrīharṣa.Pradeep P. Gokhale - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (1):27-45.
    This paper provides a study of the three most famous skeptical thinkers of classical India, examining both their commonalities and unique differences. Adepts of the controversial debate methodology called vitaṇḍā, “negative debate,” these thinkers manage to challenge the very possibility of knowledge, while espousing (at least nominal) allegiance to distinct schools of thought. They also pass negative judgement on the possibility of certainty while appealing to rational persuasion. This paper explores these paradoxes and possible contradictions, with a culminating reflection of (...)
     
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  5.  7
    Three Skepticisms in Cārvāka Epistemology: The Problem of Induction, Purandara’s Fallibilism, and Jayarāśi’s Skepticism About Philosophy.Ethan Mills - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (1):46–71.
    The classical Indian Cārvāka (“Materialist”) tradition contains three branches with regard to the means of knowledge (pramāṇas). First, the standard Cārvākas accept a single means of knowledge, perception, supporting this view with a critique of the reliability and coherence of inference (anumāna). Second, the “more educated” Cārvākas as well as Purandara endorse a form of inference limited to empirical matters. Third, radical skeptical Cārvākas like Jayarāśi attempt to undermine all accounts or technical definitions of the means of knowledge (even perception) (...)
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  6. How Not To Know The Principle of Induction.Howard Sankey - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (3):243-254.
    In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell presents a justification of induction based on a principle he refers to as “the principle of induction”. Owing to the ambiguity of the notion of probability, the principle of induction may be interpreted in two different ways. If interpreted in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability, the principle of induction may be known a priori to be true. But it is unclear how this should give us any confidence in our use of (...)
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  7. Revisiting Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Argument in “Proof of an External World".Christopher Stratman - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    This paper argues that we should reject G. E. Moore’s anti-skeptical argument as it is presented in “Proof of an External World.” However, the reason I offer is different from traditional objections. A proper understanding of Moore’s “proof” requires paying attention to an important distinction between two forms of skepticism. I call these Ontological Skepticism and Epistemic Skepticism. The former is skepticism about the ontological status of fundamental reality, while the latter is skepticism about our empirical knowledge. Philosophers often assume (...)
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