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  1.  6
    What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein.Annalisa Coliva - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):198-207.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 198 - 207 The paper discusses and presents an alternative interpretation to Penelope Maddy’s reading of G.E. Moore’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategies as proposed in her book _What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy_. It connects this discussion with the methodological claims Maddy puts forward and offers an alternative to her therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s _On Certainty_.
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  2.  2
    The Plain Inquirer’s Plain Evidence Against the Global Skeptical Scenarios.Adam Leite - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):208-222.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 208 - 222 Penelope Maddy claims that we can have no evidence that we are not being globally deceived by an evil demon. However, Maddy’s Plain Inquirer holds that she has good evidence for a wide variety of claims about the world and her relation to it. She rejects the broadly Cartesian idea that she can’t be entitled to these claims, or have good evidence for them, or know them, unless she can provide (...)
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  3.  6
    Introductory Overview.Penelope Maddy - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):193-197.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 193 - 197 This piece gives an overview of my book, _What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy_.
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  4.  2
    Replies to Coliva, Leite, and Stroud.Penelope Maddy - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):231-244.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 231 - 244 Here I cast some doubt on Professor Coliva’s interpretive claim that Moore’s “Proof of an external world” is addressed to idealism, not skepticism, and explore the consequences for our understanding of the final paragraphs of the paper. In response to Professor Leite, I examine the disagreement between us on whether the global skeptical hypotheses can be refuted by ordinary evidence. Finally, after analyzing the logic of the skeptical argumentation, I attempt (...)
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  5.  34
    What is the Scandal of Philosophy?Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):141-166.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 141 - 166 The central question of this paper is: what has Kant’s Refutation of Idealism argument proven, if anything? What is the real scandal of philosophy and universal human reason? I argue that Kant’s Refutation argument can only be considered as sound if we assume that his target is what I call ‘metaphysical external-world skepticism’. What is in question is not the ‘existence’ of outside things, but their very ‘nature’, that is, the (...)
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  6.  11
    Skepticism and Perceptual Justification_, _edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini. [REVIEW]Ted Poston - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):250-255.
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  7.  5
    Hume’s Presence in the ‘Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion’_, _written by Robert J. Fogelin.Mark G. Spencer - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):245-249.
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  8.  8
    Comments on Penelope Maddy’s What Do Philosophers Do?.Barry Stroud - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):223-230.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 223 - 230 I here offer a discussion of some of Penelope Maddy’s responses to philosophical scepticism in her recent book, _What Do Philosophers Do?_ Among other things, I suggest that philosophers who take an interest in human knowledge are not primarily concerned with _whether_ anyone knows anything about the world, but rather with understanding _how_ we know the things we do in the face of the difficulties that seem naturally to arise in (...)
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  9.  27
    Skepticism and Spatial Objects.Ali Hasan - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (2):73-95.
    _ Source: _Page Count 24 I defend external world realism. I assume that the principle of inference to the best explanation is justified: roughly, a hypothesis that provides a better explanation of the total evidence is more probable than one that does not. I argue that the existence of a world of spatial objects provides a systematic explanation of the spatial contents of visual experience, and that it provides a better explanation than traditional skeptical hypotheses. This paper thus pursues the (...)
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  10.  14
    Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (2):96-130.
    _ Source: _Page Count 35 In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard’s version of non-epistemicism, hinge commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge commitments. One of the main (...)
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  11.  17
    Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (2):96-130.
    In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard’s version of non-epistemicism, hinge commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge commitments. One of the main reasons in favour of NBT (...)
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  12.  16
    Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst.John Greco - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):51-61.
    _ Source: _Page Count 11 _Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of our Believing_. By Duncan Pritchard. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016. Pp. xv + 239. ISBN 978-0-691-16723-7.
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  13.  18
    Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst.John Greco - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):51-61.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 51 - 61 _Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of our Believing_. By Duncan Pritchard. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016. Pp. xv + 239. ISBN 978-0-691-16723-7.
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  14.  2
    Academic Skepticism in Seventeenth-Century French Philosophy: The Charronian Legacy 1601–1662_, _written by José R. Maia Neto. [REVIEW]Michael W. Hickson - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):137-140.
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  15.  17
    Does Scepticism Presuppose Voluntarism?Jonathan Hill - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):31-50.
    _ Source: _Page Count 20 Philosophical scepticism is sometimes thought to presuppose doxastic voluntarism, the claim that we are able to believe or disbelieve propositions at will. This is problematic given that doxastic voluntarism itself is a controversial position. I examine two arguments for the view that scepticism presupposes voluntarism. I show that they rely on different versions of a depiction of scepticism as a conversion narrative. I argue that one version of this narrative does presuppose voluntarism, but the other (...)
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  16.  10
    Does Scepticism Presuppose Voluntarism?Jonathan Hill - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):31-50.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 31 - 50 Philosophical scepticism is sometimes thought to presuppose doxastic voluntarism, the claim that we are able to believe or disbelieve propositions at will. This is problematic given that doxastic voluntarism itself is a controversial position. I examine two arguments for the view that scepticism presupposes voluntarism. I show that they rely on different versions of a depiction of scepticism as a conversion narrative. I argue that one version of this narrative does (...)
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  17.  2
    Dialogues of Maximus and Themistius_, _written by Pierre Bayle.John Christian Laursen - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):63-65.
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  18.  17
    Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Random Demon Hypothesis.Thomas Lockhart - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):1-30.
    _ Source: _Page Count 30 According to epistemological disjunctivism I can claim to know facts about the world around me on the basis of my perceptual experience. My possession of such knowledge is incompatible with a number of familiar skeptical scenarios. So a paradigmatic epistemological disjunctivist perceptual experience should allow me to rule out such incompatible skeptical scenarios. In this paper, I consider skeptical scenarios which both cast doubt on my conviction that I can trust my purported perceptual experiences and (...)
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  19.  12
    Essays in Moral Skepticism_, _written by Richard Joyce.Jonas Olson - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):66-71.
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  20.  33
    Stroud, Hegel, Heidegger: A Transcendental Argument.Kim Davies - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 167 - 191 This paper presents an original, ambitious, truth-directed transcendental argument for the existence of an ‘external world’. It begins with a double-headed starting-point: Stroud’s own remarks on the necessary conditions of language in general, and Hegel’s critique of the “fear of error.” The paper argues that the sceptical challenge requires a particular critical concept of thought as that which may diverge from reality, and that this concept is possible only through reflection (...)
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