Year:

  1.  4
    Gorgias’ Περὶ Τοῦ Μὴ Ὄντος and Its Relation to Skepticism.Richard Bett - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):187-208.
    The paper examines whether Gorgias’ On What Is Not should be considered an instance of skepticism. It begins with an analysis of the work as reported by the two sources, Sextus Empiricus and the anonymous author of On Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias. It is then argued that the Pyrrhonian skeptics did not regard On What Is Not as skeptical. Nonetheless, it is possible to read the work as offering counter-arguments to Parmenides, with a view to inducing suspension of judgment in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  10
    Are There Mathematical Hinges?Annalisa Coliva - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):346-366.
    In this paper I argue that, contrary to what several prominent scholars of On Certainty have claimed, Wittgenstein did not maintain that simple mathematical propositions like “2 × 2 = 4” or “12 × 12 = 144,” much like G. E. Moore’s truisms, could be examples of hinge propositions. In particular, given his overall conception of mathematics, it was impossible for him to single out these simpler mathematical propositions from the rest of mathematical statements, to reserve only to them a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  9
    Knowledge and Truth in the Greatest Difficulty Argument: Parmenides 133b4–134b5.Gail Fine - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):209-234.
    One of Plato’s central tenets is that we can know forms. In Parmenides 133b4–134b5, Plato presents an argument whose sceptical conclusion is that we can’t know forms. Although he indicates that the argument doesn’t succeed, he also says it’s difficult to explain how it fails. Commentators have suggested a variety of flaws. I argue that the argument can be defended against some, though not all, of the alleged flaws. But I also argue that Plato hints at a crucial distinction that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?Bryan Frances - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):325-345.
    Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophers are aware that they are not God’s gift to philosophy, since they admit their ability to track truth in philosophy is not extraordinary compared to that of other philosophers. In this paper I argue that in many real-life cases, such beliefs in controversial (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  20
    Skepticism and Inquiry.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):304-324.
    In this paper, I am interested in skepticism’s downstream effects on further inquiry. To account for these downstream effects, we need to distinguish the reasons for doubting whether p, one’s other background beliefs bearing on the prospects that further inquiry would improve one’s epistemic position on p, and the value one assigns to determining whether p. I advance two claims regarding skepticism’s downstream effects on inquiry. First, it is characteristic of “radical” forms of skepticism that is sufficient to undermine the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  5
    Isabelle de Charrière and Skepticism in the Literary Life.John Christian Laursen - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):256-267.
    This article explores some senses in which Isabelle de Charrière may be understood as a skeptic in her personal life and in her literary life, although the two cannot really be separated since she lived the literary life. She called herself a skeptic a number of times, and also showed some knowledge of the Academic or Socratic and especially of the Pyrrhonian traditions of skepticism in her novels and extensive correspondence. This Dutch-Swiss writer provides an example of what it might (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  27
    Editors’ Note.Diego Machuca & Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):185-186.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  7
    Scepticism and Self-Detachment.Casey Perin - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):235-255.
    This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic faces a dilemma: either he is more detached from himself than the non-Sceptic or he is vulnerable to a non-standard version of the apraxia objection.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  18
    Moral Realism and the Argument From Skepticism.Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):283-303.
    A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focuses on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlying concern is that if moral truths have the nature that realists believe, it is hard to see how we could know what they are. This objection may be called the “argument from skepticism” against moral realism. Realists have primarily responded to this argument by presenting accounts of how we could acquire knowledge of moral truths that are consistent with realist assumptions about their nature. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  10
    On Religious Skepticism.J. L. Schellenberg - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):268-282.
    I seek to promote a fuller understanding of religious skepticism by defending five theses. These concern, respectively: its breadth, discussed in relation to theism on the one hand and naturalism on the other; why it should be distinguished from a general metaphysical skepticism; how it is supported by the consequences of recent cultural evolution, which at the same time enable new and stronger arguments for atheism; the relations it bears to non-doxastic religious faith; and, finally, its curious capacity in certain (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Kevin McCain and Ted Poston’s Best Explanations.Frank Cabrera - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (2):1-10.
    In this critical notice, I focus my attention on the chapters that deal with the explanationist response to skepticism.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  37
    Beyond Quietism: Transformative Experience in Pyrrhonism and Wittgenstein.Rico Gutschmidt - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (2):105-128.
    Pyrrhonian skepticism is usually understood as a form of quietism, since it is supposed to bring us back to where we were in our everyday lives before we got disturbed by philosophical questions. Similarly, the ‘therapeutic’ and ‘resolute’ readings of Wittgenstein claim that Wittgenstein’s ‘philosophical practice’ results in the dissolution of the corresponding philosophical problems and brings us back to our everyday life. Accordingly, Wittgenstein is often linked to Pyrrhonism and classified as a quietist. Against this reading, I will employ (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13.  15
    Common Sense, Scepticism and Deep Epistemic Disagreements.Angélique Thébert - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (2):129-155.
    Considering the persisting disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics, it seems that they are faced with a deep epistemic disagreement. Taking stock from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, one generally thinks that deep epistemic disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. Hinge epistemology, inherited from Wittgenstein, is also considered as an illuminating detour to understand common sense epistemology. But is there really a deep epistemic disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics? Could it not be considered that they share (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  17
    Debunking Arguments in Ethics, Written by Hanno Sauer.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (2):178-183.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  21
    The School of Doubt: Skepticism, History and Politics in Cicero’s, Written by Orazio Cappello.Raphael Woolf - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (2):167-171.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  63
    DeRose on Lotteries.Peter Baumann - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):44-67.
    This article discusses Keith DeRose’s treatment of the lottery problem in Chapter 5 of his recent The Appearance of Ignorance. I agree with a lot of it but also raise some critical points and questions and make some friendly proposals. I discuss different ways to set up the problem, go into the difference between knowing and ending inquiry, propose to distinguish between two different kinds of lotteries, add to the defense of the idea that one can know lottery propositions, give (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  91
    What Shifts Epistemic Standards? DeRose on Contextualism, Safety, and Sensitivity.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):21-27.
    In The Appearance of Ignorance, Keith DeRose develops a version of epistemic contextualism that combines aspects of both safety and sensitivity theories of knowledge. This paper discusses some potential problems for DeRose’s account stemming from his Rule of Sensitivity, which is meant to model upwards shifts in epistemic standards.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18.  25
    Disagreeing with a Skeptic From a Contextualist Point of View.Elke Brendel - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):28–43.
    The paper focuses on the problem of how to account for the phenomena of disagreement and retraction in disputes over skepticism in a contextualist framework. I will argue that nonindexical versions of contextualism are better suited to account for those phenomena than DeRose’s indexical form of contextualism. Furthermore, I will argue against DeRose’s “single scoreboard” semantics and against his solution of ruling that in a dispute over skepticism, both parties to the conversation are expressing something truth-valueless. At the end, I (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  16
    Précis of The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 2.Keith DeRose - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):1-3.
    The Appearance of Ignorance develops and champions contextualist solutions to the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we’ve lost the lottery. Accounting for how it is that we know that skeptical hypotheses are false and why it seems that we don’t know that they’re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  4
    Replies to Commentators.Keith DeRose - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):68-104.
    Replies are given to comments, questions, and objections to The Appearance of Ignorance. The reply to Robin McKenna focuses mainly on his questions of whether, with the skeptical argument I’m focused on, a strong enough appearance of ignorance is generated to require an account of that appearance, and whether, to the extent that we do need to account for that appearance, we might do so without contextualism by adopting a solution proposed by Ernest Sosa. The reply to Michael Blome-Tillman focuses (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. The Disappearance of Ignorance.Robin McKenna - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):4-20.
    Keith DeRose’s new book The Appearance of Ignorance is a welcome companion volume to his 2009 book The Case for Contextualism. Where latter focused on contextualism as a view in the philosophy of language, the former focuses on how contextualism contributes to our understanding of some perennial epistemological problems, with the skeptical problem being the main focus of six of the seven chapters. DeRose’s view is that a solution to the skeptical problem must do two things. First, it must explain (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues