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  1.  12
    Ideas, Evidence, and Method: Hume’s Skepticism and Naturalism Concerning Knowledge and Causation, Written by Graciela De Pierris.Peter S. Fosl - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (4):345-356.
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  2.  16
    Disagreement, Deep Time, and Progress in Philosophy.Kirk Lougheed - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (4):285-313.
    The epistemology of disagreement examines the question of how an agent ought to respond to awareness of epistemic peer disagreement about one of her beliefs. The literature on this topic, ironically enough, represents widespread disagreement about how we should respond to disagreement. I argue for the sceptical conclusion that the existence of widespread disagreement throughout the history of philosophy, and right up until the present day indicates that philosophers are highly unreliable at arriving at the truth. If truth convergence indicates (...)
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  3.  10
    Cicero’s Skepticism and His Recovery of Political Philosophy, Written by Walter Nicgorski. [REVIEW]Harald Thorsrud - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (4):339-344.
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  4.  39
    Why Not Persuade the Skeptic? A Critique of Unambitious Epistemology.Michael Veber - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (4):314-338.
    What constitutes a solution to the problem of skepticism? It has been traditionally held that one must produce an argument that would rationally persuade skeptical philosophers that they are mistaken. But there is a trend in recent epistemology toward the idea that we can solve the problem without giving skeptics any good reason to change their minds. This is what I call unambitious epistemology. This paper is a critique of that project.
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  5.  15
    No Morality, No Self: Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism, Written by James Doyle. [REVIEW]Rachael Wiseman - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (4):357-363.
  6.  15
    The Nature and Limits of Skeptical Criticism.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3):183-205.
    Is there something wrong with the way we form beliefs about our surroundings? Most people assume not. But there is a character, the skeptic, who disagrees. What, exactly, is this skeptic claiming, and why should this concern us? We are, after all, just humans doing what humans do: forming beliefs on the basis of our faculties. In what sense could this be wrong, and how could it matter if it is? By considering the way in which the notions of vice (...)
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  7.  20
    Replies to Commentators.Keith DeRose - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3):284-320.
    Replies are given to comments, questions, and objections to The Appearance of Ignorance. The reply to Robin McKenna focuses mainly on his questions of whether, with the skeptical argument I’m focused on, a strong enough appearance of ignorance is generated to require an account of that appearance, and whether, to the extent that we do need to account for that appearance, we might do so without contextualism by adopting a solution proposed by Ernest Sosa. The reply to Michael Blome-Tillman focuses (...)
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  8.  12
    Précis of The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 2.Keith DeRose - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3):321-323.
    The Appearance of Ignorance develops and champions contextualist solutions to the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we’ve lost the lottery. Accounting for how it is that we know that skeptical hypotheses are false and why it seems that we don’t know that they’re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work. (...)
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  9.  12
    Skepticism as Vice and Virtue.Pierre Le Morvan - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3):238-260.
    I articulate and defend a conception of skepticism inspired by Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. On it, skepticism is vicious when deficient and when excessive. Virtuous skepticism lies as a mean between these two extremes.
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  10.  12
    Redrawing the Map: Medina on Epistemic Vices and Skepticism.Aidan McGlynn - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3):261-283.
    My aim in this paper is to closely examine José Medina’s account of socially-situated knowledge and ignorance in terms of epistemic virtues and vices in his 2013 book The Epistemology of Resistance. First, I’ll offer a detailed examination of the similarities and differences between Medina’s account and both standpoint epistemology and epistemologies of active ignorance. Medina presents his account as capturing and integrating the insights of both, but I will argue that, for better or worse, his account differs from familiar (...)
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  11.  7
    Introduction.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3):179-182.
    This introduction provides an overview of the content of the papers published in the special issue on epistemic vice and forms of scepticism.
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  12.  24
    Epistemic Angst, Intellectual Courage and Radical Scepticism.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3):206-222.
    The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not, as potential knowers, just passive recipients of a passing show of putatively veridical information, we also actively need to put ourselves in the way of it by learning to resist certain forms of (...)
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  13.  22
    Can an Atheist Know That He Exists? Cogito, Mathematics, and God in Descartes’s Meditations.Jan Forsman - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2):91-115.
    Descartes’s meditator thinks that if she does not know the existence of God, she cannot be fully certain of anything. This statement seems to contradict the cogito, according to which the existence of I is indubitable and therefore certain. Cannot an atheist be certain that he exists? Atheistic knowledge has been discussed almost exclusively in relation to mathematics, and the more interesting question of the atheist’s certainty of his existence has not received the attention it deserves. By examining the question (...)
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  14.  17
    Hinge Epistemology, Radical Skepticism, and Domain Specific Skepticism.Drew Johnson - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2):116-133.
    This paper explores how hinge epistemology might fruitfully be applied not only to the problem of radical skepticism, but also to certain domain specific skepticisms, and in particular, moral skepticism. The paper explains the idea of a domain specific skepticism, and how domain specific skepticisms contrast with radical skepticism. I argue that a domain specific skeptical problem can be resolved in just the same way as radical skepticism, if there are hinge commitments within that domain. I then suggest that there (...)
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  15.  32
    "Moral Skepticism: New Essays" Ed. Diego E. Machuca (Routledge 2018). [REVIEW]Neil Sinclair - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2):1-7.
  16.  12
    Moral Skepticism: New Essays, Edited by Diego E. Machuca.Neil Sinclair - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2):173-178.
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  17.  9
    Against Those in the Disciplines, Written by Sextus Empiricus.Máté Veres - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2):169-172.
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  18.  8
    Hinge Propositions, Skeptical Dogmatism, and External World Disjunctivism.Mark Walker - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2):134-167.
    Following Wittgenstein’s lead, Crispin Wright and others have argued that hinge propositions are immune from skeptical doubt. In particular, the entitlement strategy, as we shall refer to it, says that hinge propositions have a special type of justification because of their role in our cognitive lives. Two major criticisms are raised here against the entitlement strategy when used in attempts to justify belief in the external world. First, the hinge strategy is not sufficient to thwart underdetermination skepticism, since underdetermination considerations (...)
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  19.  10
    Augustine and Academic Skepticism: A Philosophical Study, Written by Blake Dutton. [REVIEW]Scott F. Aikin - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):65-68.
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  20.  3
    Review of The Brain in a Vat, Edited by S. Goldberg. [REVIEW]Cameron Boult - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):75-82.
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  21.  19
    The Brain in a Vat, Edited by Sanford C. Goldberg.Cameron Boult - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):75-82.
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  22.  22
    Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism: New Essays, Edited by Sanford C. Goldberg.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):69-74.
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  23.  48
    Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s Sceptical Paradox: A Trilemma for Davidson.Ali Hossein Khani - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):21–37.
    Davidson’s later philosophy of language has been inspired by Wittgenstein’s Investigations, but Davidson by no means sympathizes with the sceptical problem and solution Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein. Davidson criticizes the sceptical argument for relying on the rule-following conception of meaning, which is, for him, a highly problematic view. He also casts doubt on the plausibility of the sceptical solution as unjustifiably bringing in shared practices of a speech community. According to Davidson, it is rather success in mutual interpretation that explains (...)
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  24.  67
    In Defense of the Explanationist Response to Skepticism.Kevin McCain - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):38-50.
    _ Source: _Page Count 13 A promising response to the threat of external world skepticism involves arguing that our commonsense view of the world best explains the sensory experiences that we have. Since our commonsense view of the world best explains our evidence, we are justified in accepting this commonsense view of the world. Despite the plausibility of this Explanationist Response, it has recently come under attack. James Beebe has argued that only a version of the Explanationist Response that provides (...)
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  25.  22
    The Power of Appearances.Nenad Popovic - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):51-64.
    _ Source: _Page Count 14 One common problem with anti-skepticism and skepticism alike is their failure to account for our sometimes conflicting epistemic intuitions. In order to address this problem and provide a new direction for solving the skeptical puzzle, I consider a modified version of the puzzle that is based on knowledge claims about appearances and does not result in a paradox. I conclude that combining the elements of both the original and modified puzzle can potentially guide us towards (...)
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  26.  22
    Formal Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism: In Defense of Belief in the Natural World, Written by Tomoji Shogenji.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):83-89.
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  27.  17
    A Hume-Inspired Argument Against Reason.Ruth Weintraub - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (1):1-20.
    In the “diminution argument,” which Hume adduces in the Treatise section “Scepticism with Regard to Reason,” he infers from our universal fallibility that “all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.” My aim in this paper is, first, to show that on all extant interpretations of the argument, it turns out to be very weak, and, second, that there is in the vicinity a significant sceptical argument in support of (...)
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  28. Radical Scepticism and the Epistemology of Confusion.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (3):1-15.
    The lack of knowledge—as Timothy Williamson (2000) famously maintains—is ignorance. Radical sceptical arguments, at least in the tradition of Descartes, threaten universal ignorance. They do so by attempting to establish that we lack any knowledge, even if we can retain other kinds of epistemic standings, like epistemically justified belief. If understanding is a species of knowledge, then radical sceptical arguments threaten to rob us categorically of knowledge and understanding in one fell swoop by implying universal ignorance. If, however, understanding is (...)
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