This text is the translation of the first of two sessions of a lecture course given by Derrida at the Sorbonne in 1961–62. It was clearly intended as an introduction or survey of the concept or notion of ‘world’ from the Greek kosmos and the Latin mundus to the Christian sense of a fallen world, the Kantian ‘idea’ of world, and the Heideggerian rethinking of the very question of world in ‘On the Essence of Ground’.

This paper investigates the intersection of architecture, philosophy, and sexual difference in Plato’s notion of khōra as it appears in the Timaeus. By engaging first with Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of Plato’s khōra, the paper shows how the interplay between architecture and philosophy not only reflects but also perpetuates patriarchal structures. Khōra, sometimes solely described as a passive receptacle, stages a complex relationship with femininity that challenges traditional notions of space and identity. Drawing on the works of feminist theorists such as (...) Julia Kristeva and Fanny Söderbäck, the paper examines how khōra serves as a foundational moment in the construction of sexual difference within philosophical discourse. Ultimately, this exploration calls for a reimagining of khōra as a site of resistance and transformation—one that, while existing before the architect-demiurge created the universe, nonetheless conditions his work. (shrink)

If the word ‘devastated’ feels most appropriate when thinking of the passing of a beloved one, it also undergirds, through the waste of its desert, two essential notions of Western philosophy and literature: chaos and khōra. Looking at our world twenty years after Derrida’s passing, and at how for more than five decades he thought and wrote on the notion of world, this essay examines the radicality of Derrida’s deconstruction for our past and future conceptions of a world, of ourselves, (...) and of each and any threshold between these terms. (shrink)

Paul de Man’s interpretation of Proust’s metafigural argument is fundamentally correct. Both critics of this interpretation and some of de Man’s defenders have misunderstood how metaphor functions in Proust’s reminiscence of summer, which uses resemblance to evoke reconciliatory totalities. Proust’s passage contains classical metaphors—not synecdoches that merely resemble metaphors. But de Man’s attempts to justify his interpretation are unpersuasive. Indeed, they are so unpersuasive that they become allegorical: though he claims that there is an undoing of metaphor by metonymy in (...) Proust’s text, de Man’s own text relies on metaphor. Detractors like John Guillory are wrong about Proustian metaphor, but they discern some of the genuinely aberrant features of de Man’s discourse. Allegories of Reading allegorically subverts claims made for de Man’s rigour, which is a dead metaphor susceptible to the kind of rhetorical reading he performs on Proust. (shrink)

The essay begins by recalling the words of Homer that to live is to behold the light of the sun. For it is the ‘elementals’ of sky, sun, and light that give all things to mortal beings, including time itself, beginning with the daily alternation between day and night. But contemporary commercial and scientific projects threaten to change all this. Whether it be through the launching of tens of thousands of communication satellites to fill the night sky or the creation (...) of a sulfuric blanket in the atmosphere to block the sun’s rays to combat global warming, what is threatened is our very relationship to the sun and to light. The essay thus argues that what is today needed is a new ‘politics of light’, one that would guard the clarity of the sky. Needed as well is a philosophy that attends to things beyond the human life-world, to the elementals of sun, sky, and light, but also to the invisibility at the heart of light itself. Appealing to some of the most recent scientific discoveries regarding the hyper-giganticness of the cosmos, the essay concludes that philosophy must attend to ‘phenomena’ whose nature is precisely to remain concealed, phenomena such as black holes, dark matter, and dark energy that are today thought to comprise an astonishing 95% of the matter and energy of the universe. Turned in this direction, the essay concludes, philosophy can perhaps reawaken the wonder that is at its very origin. (shrink)

This essay engages with the question of how to open a sense of the world that would be capable of de-totalizing the world’s totalization. It discusses the works of Jean-Luc Nancy on the end of the sense of the world today and on the way this end and the void it exposes existence to are already an open sense, the open sense of existence existing—transitively—every single existence. The void of sense demands the distinction between sense and signification or meanings, proposing (...) sense as the praxis of transitive existence. It opens an open sense of the open itself by reconsidering the difference between world and cosmos and by showing the urgency of thinking today an acosmic cosmology or a acosmology that would correspond to this praxis of transitive existence. (shrink)

When we undertake the project of a phenomenology of pain, and even a deconstruction of the experience of pain, we discover that pain is not merely something that is felt by a subject, but rather pain—and chronic pain, especially—causes the subject to live in a new world. This essay is an investigation of that world. Moving from questions of mind/body dualism to whether or not pains are subjective representations of some material-physical state of the body, a philosophical and physiological analysis (...) of pain is undertaken in an attempt to show how a world of pain emerges and then functions once established. Along the way, issues concerning the measurement of pain, the value of pain, the mystery of the phantom limb in pain, the use of placebos to treat pain, and the question of whether or not pain is necessarily a private experience are taken up, ultimately leading to the conclusion that an established world of pain can usher in a collapse of the distinction between subjects and their pain such that chronic pain sufferers might meaningfully be said to become their pain. (shrink)

René Descartes plays a small but pivotal role in Jacques Derrida’s 1961–62 course, ‘The Notion of World’. In contrast, one finds the world everywhere in Descartes’ own texts, from the Discourse on Method to The World. A more extensive discussion of Descartes’ world is found in Derrida’s 1981/82 seminar, Language and the Discourse on Method, which takes up Descartes’ travels throughout the world, a spacing before Cartesian extension, and the tension between universal reason, shared by the whole world, and the (...) necessity of writing philosophy in one language rather than others. (shrink)

This essay considers the spectacle of slavery that is death, and death only which continually persists as slavery-to-segregation-to-neosegregation or otherwise understood as a system of white-over-black. By observing the motionless movement of death perfecting itself (neither as life nor as historical time, progress, the human, or development), I argue that law makes death sovereign. The essay pursues this line of inquiry by considering a. capitalism as a system of spectacular relationships, a system of legal relationships, that places death atop everything (...) and as a faith expressed in the gospel of legal method and its false promise of perpetual progress. And b. law as a structure analogous to the unconscious since it exists outside of time. In placing these two concerns together, it considers a sort of magical thinking of law—a make-believe realm in which rules appear to somehow govern themselves and an ‘us’ that seemingly masks over and absolves the system of white-over-black. Such banishment, whereby the system of white-over-black banished from the realm of the spectacle, is by that act repatriated to and given sovereignty over the world of the real, the world of historical time. (shrink)

This essay explores various meanings of the word crisis (krisis): in philosophy, law, and psychoanalysis; but also in relation to truth, law, judgement, and thinking. In various axioms—on truth and negation; and on being and reproduction—the essay asks why blackness is often excluded from crisis theory. I then go on to explore the unintended consequences and complications of this exclusion in respective works by Donald Winnicott (on tolerance and contraception), and then only through what is deemed to be neither an (...) object nor a relation, neither a negation nor a phantasy. In the wake of these lacunae I conclude: blackness is an example of an unthought, and that this n’est pas cannot be thought, or determined, as krisis. (shrink)

This essay surveys Henry David Thoreau’s extensive commentary on slavery and freedom in the 1840s and 50s, tracking the ways he toggles between the literal (i.e., the institutions of racial chattel and capital’s value-form resisted by civil disobedience and reconfigured by civil war) and the figurative (i.e., the existential and spiritual slavery evaded by the individual and collective attainment of ‘real values’), and how his natural philosophy at once illuminates and obscures the true stakes of his abolitionism and that of (...) his fellow Transcendentalists. It notes that there is much to be said for and much yet to be done on the burgeoning intersectional critique of Transcendentalism, one that highlights both its strengths and limitations—or, at times, its outright problems—regarding race, nation, class, gender, sexuality et al. So too for the literature celebrating Thoreau ‘as much for his politics as his aesthetics,’ avowing how his ‘reform writings and lectures alone have earned him the reputation of being a social activist who didn’t rest on high-minded principles.’ The focus here is adjacent and complementary: to consider the prospects of a Black Transcendentalism that is coeval with and prior to Thoreau's articulation of the principles of ‘Elevation’ and ‘Emancipation.’ Beyond that, it speculates about something like the blackness of Thoreau’s own evolving relation to the political-intellectual movement of Transcendentalism itself. (shrink)

Labour, for capitalist critique, is not just slavery analogised; it is slavery materialised and expanded. Across the Marxist terrain, class struggle is presupposed by the struggle not to be a slave: the struggle of ‘the worker’ combats a slavery simultaneously more complex, because it is more mediated, and implicitly more emancipatory, because it materialises what has been called ‘objective possibility’. In this article, I track symptoms of the sublation of slavery by labour in the telling of ‘new labour history’ and (...) counter with ‘objective impossibility’ as a more open and efficacious diagnostic for the slave’s political position. Though the sentences of United States labour history are alive with promises of solidarity, the field also remains an unstable landmine of antagonism, death, failure, limit. I argue that this labour history, despite its gestures towards the problem ‘race’, is grammatically caught in a web of desires that Sylvia Wynter names ‘the hegemony of the labour conceptual frame (i.e., the frame of the struggle against capitalism)’. The labour conceptual frame is hegemonic because the relation between race and class already presupposes a latent Marxist orientation to subjects, objects, consciousness, and history that renders perfect the slave’s objective impossibility and culminates, at the nexus of race and class, in an uncritical conversion of labour’s objective possibility into pure, unmediated possibility. This article tracks how the black worker remains stubbornly impossible throughout this theoretical convergence, bending the apparatus of labour history, the purchase of Marxist theory, and the salience of class-first politics through the excess of blackness to labour. (shrink)

This article explores the comparison between Derrida and Zhuangzi and their approaches to the question of metaphor and analogy, examining the deconstruction of essentialist and culturalist forms of philosophical comparativism. The author contends that the notion of ‘Western metaphysics’ relies on an implicit comparison between the West and its others, shaped not only by philosophical factors but also by historical, sociological and strategic considerations, as exemplified in Aristotle’s exclusion and subjection of metaphor. Derrida’s approach in ‘White Mythology’, with its ‘internal (...) reading’ and ‘quasi-transcendental’ perspective, challenges the unity and identity of the conventional representation of philosophy as a Western achievement. However, the article also advocates for an ‘external’ and ‘quasi-empiricist’ viewpoint that recognises the erratic character of comparisons, resisting the appropriation of philosophical differences into general categories such as ‘Western’ or ‘Chinese philosophy’. (shrink)

This article argues that rhetorical theory will never dominate a quasi-originary and ontolgising rhetoricity that nonetheless calls for it. This rhetoricity is not simply a game played ‘in the world’, to borrow Derrida's phrasing; it is—like writing, like metaphoricity, like the ‘yes-yes’ or (en)gage—one more name for ‘the game of the world’. To get some traction on this undeclinable yet unmasterable rhetoricity, we’ll examine what Derrida calls ‘a danger of rhetoricism’ in de Man's work, a tendency to overestimate the authority (...) of the linguistic, the verbal, the discursive. The goal is not so much to substantiate Derrida's suspicions about de Man's ‘rhetoricism’ as it is to get on the tail of a rhetorical force that is irreducible to it, an ineluctable affectability or responsivity that is bound up in the very structure of sur-vival. (shrink)

How and why, historian of science Lily Kay asks, did the ‘biological problem of DNA-based protein synthesis’ come to be represented ‘as an information code and a writing technology?’ What sort of metaphor was ‘code’ for these bio-geneticists? One whose run-away expansion, Derrida noted in Of Grammatology (1967), urgently required philosophical justification. Yet, 60 years later, there is still fundamental disagreement about its meaning and epistemic status. If the metaphor lacks ontological purchase, what accounts for its effectiveness? If, on the (...) other hand, scriptural metaphors get at the common root of culture and biology, what do we now mean by ‘code’? In this article, I trace several influential accounts of the metaphor’s effectiveness—making explicit the opposing notions of ‘code’ that animate them—and argue that each is too limited. Greater attention to the metaphoricity of ‘code’ yields a more philosophically productive and critical account of the metaphor of code. (shrink)

This article stages a critical-philosophical encounter between Derridean deconstruction and Peircean biosemiotic theory focussing on the role and status of metaphor within each. It argues that the biosemiotic understanding of metaphor as a structuring principle informing the sign-activity of living organisms and processes offers an alternative understanding of a generalised metaphoricity of life as such and an account of what might be called biological text, textuality or even, biosemiotic intertextuality. The article argues that biological textuality obeys a logic of semiotic (...) immanence that is distinct from the logic of différance and of the quasi-transcendental as thought by Derrida. On this basis it elaborates the way in which metaphor in biosemiotic theory, and also the generalised biological metaphoricity informing the text of life, function as radically non-representational, inferential, and hermeneutic operators which model the semiotic processes of life and thereby enable an epistemologically weak or, in a certain sense, non-philosophical realism. (shrink)

This article undertakes a deconstructive reading of astrobiology’s search for extraterrestrial life. Taking its lead from Derrida’s ‘White Mythology’, it explores ‘metaphor in the text of astrobiology’—and includes within the astrobiological ‘text’ not only scientific publications and work on astrobiology in the philosophy of science, but also ‘life detection technologies’. I situate astrobiology in the tradition of a metaphysical analogy that goes back through the enlightenment and early modern astronomy to the ancient Atomists’ notion of the ‘plurality of worlds’. This (...) analogy, which constitutes an identification of life with being and therefore serves as the conceptual basis for the notion that life must exist on other worlds, experiences a mutation in the middle of the twentieth century when molecular biology refigures life in terms of a scriptural metaphor as text. The result is an aporia whose logic Derrida formalised in ‘White Mythology’. (shrink)

This article explains how Derrida’s notion of an originary or generalised metaphoricity can be understood in terms of the analyses presented in Voice and Phenomenon (1967) in response to Eugen Fink’s question of a ‘transcendental logos’ and of the paradoxical ontological status of phenomenological language. Tracing Fink’s impact on Derrida, as well as the key differences between them, the article shows that underlying Derrida’s reappropriation of the phenomenological concept of ‘life’ is an expansion of indicative relations—which in Husserl typify the (...) function of signs within intersubjective communication and modes of judgement characterised by the non-presence of the intended object—to a general feature of the ‘living present’. While for Fink the indicative or metaphorical nature of the transcendental concept of ‘life’ does not threaten the founding unity it serves to name, for Derrida it is this very unity which is undermined by the proliferation of indication at the core of temporal experience. (shrink)

In his recently published 1975–76 seminar on Life Death (§3), Jacques Derrida offers a severe critique of French epistemologists and philosophers of life. On Derrida’s view, they do not seem to be concerned with the question of the metaphoricity of metaphor but, rather, by taking the epistemological cut between (inadequate) metaphors and (adequate) concepts for granted, they explain the scientific process as a movement of critical rectification of metaphors by concepts. Moreover, they do not engage with Nietzsche seriously. Here I (...) build on this last point to examine the project of accounting for the very condition of the scientific process that Derrida puts forward in ‘White Mythology’ (1971) and Life Death. My reading hypothesis is that this project rests on Derrida’s original interpretation of Nietzsche’s Darwinian-type genesis of thinking, according to which selective reproduction consists in the metaphoricity of metaphor. (shrink)