In this article, I analyze Charles Crittenden’s account of fictional objects in his Unreality: The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects (1991). I argue that Crittenden’s sketchy ontology of fictional objects does not support his weak eliminativism. Going along the lines of Amie Thomasson (1999), I stress that the problem of fictional objects is a strictly ontological problem, which requires an ontological solution. A solution to the problem of fictional objects (or ficta) that accommodates “practice” (ordinary language and literary practices) is of (...) course to be praised, but not when it is foregrounded at the expense of “ontology.” I argue for Roman Ingarden as a champion of ontology and practice, whose way of dealing with ficta fares better than Crittenden’s on both the ontological and practical sides. In short, ficta should be approached as something over and above mere grammaticalia (grammatical objects) namely as “purely intentional” objects that are formally incomplete, and which readers complete by resorting to practices of language and literary criticism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss monastic paideia in the context of providing shelter for ASD individuals in the High Middle Ages. Firstly, we will canvas the historical and conceptual shift from Ancient Greek paideitic ideas to their Christian counterparts. Then, by drawing on the recent literature in the history of medicine that traces the signs and symptoms of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in Hildegard of Bingen, a German abbess in the 12th century, we will turn to her (...) invented language Lingua Ignota as a source of both her diagnosis and a manner of dealing with her disability. This, in turn, could be further advanced by identifying monasteries as therapeutic loci for neuroatypical individuals who had trouble finding their place within the arid and somewhat monochromatic medieval society. (shrink)

There is a good chance that “each critic becomes a Pygmalion” (as Leo Curran put it) when they bring the work of art to life in their narcissistic (and almost amorous) attention, unfolding its meaning so that they should be able to write their own interpretation. The starting point of the present text is the perfection of sculptural forms, and the author discusses “traditional” aesthetic concepts: the beautiful and the sublime along with the difference and interplay of the two qualities, (...) bearing in mind their variations and relations. The framework is provided by the occurrence of these two in the discourses on the self and taste in the eighteenth-century while the focus is on subjective criticism concerning the beautiful versus the sublime in the artistic and sensual experience of statues. Within the given framework, the author is planning to force Edmund Burke, stiffened by the experience of the sublime, and Winckelmann, softened by the sight of the Greek statues, into a dialogue on individual taste. (shrink)

This essay explores Jacques Lacan’s theory of desire as functioning according to the logic of tragedy and compares it with Alenka Zupančič’s concept of love as comedy, demonstrating however that the latter remains too caught up in the Lacanian worldview to truly capture the active side of love. The essay argues that Zupančič’s interpretation of Lacan can be reinterpreted again through the lenses of “messianic psychoanalysis” – psychoanalysis “slightly adjusted” – standing not on the side of the tragic acceptance of (...) fate, but of the promise of “more life.” Drawing from the reflections of Agata Bielik-Robson, Eric Santner and Jonathan Lear, this essay intends to demonstrate that Zupančič’s comedy of love can be reconciled with the more relational notion of love as a psychoanalytical counterpart of messianic Exodus. An example of such a liberating combination of eros and wit can be found in Freud’s interpretation of Wilhelm Jensen’s Gradiva. (shrink)

This paper explores two primary propositions: a) philosophical mediation is a vital component of cultural diplomacy, historically evolving from a practice based on cultural sensitivity, critical analysis, and public discourse; b) in the realm of diplomacy, philosophical mediation delineates the principles of cultural “adaptability,” addressing local social dynamics and epistemologies where the art of negotiation is applied. This approach does not seek to dismantle or expose prejudices, ideological and religious beliefs, pseudo-historical anticipations, and political narratives. Instead, philosophical mediation strives for (...) a delicate equilibrium; supporting tolerance of accepted traditions alongside democratic and constructive criticism, and promoting enlightenment and progress. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between common sense and taste in the history of aesthetic thought. “Common sense” guarantees the communication of tastes through different modalities. It can either facilitate agreement among individuals, fostering mutual understanding and envisaging a universal aesthetic community, or provoke disagreement. In the former scenario, common sense is literally common to everyone, while in the latter case, it implies diversity and dissensus. By associating the concept of taste with judgement and the sensible (Arendt and Rancière), we (...) scrutinize some contemporary political interpretations of Kantian aesthetics. Through this analysis, we illustrate that common sense is intertwined with certain metaphysical assumptions that not only hinder its claims of universality but also introduce structural paradoxes within the system of aesthetic judgment. In the last section of the article, we explore these paradoxes, proposing another communicability beyond the confines of the judgment of taste or subjective limitations. (shrink)

Preview: “Taste” is among those philosophical categories that are the most difficult to fully characterize. Reflection on taste, on the experience and concept of taste, flourished in modern times. It went through its history from dynamic development in the seventeenth century and theoretical career in the eighteenth century. One gets the impression that “taste” became the central category of philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the nineteenth century, interest in taste diminished significantly. Considerations of taste were closely integrated (...) into the general philosophical attitudes of thinkers of the period. They generated disputes that form the canvas of later considerations that are already less emotional. The social transformations that we have been observing in the last few decades are forcing a renewed interest in the category of taste. At the same time, it is a colloquial category, commonly used. It is present if not in every European dictionary, then in most. In some languages it also has numerous synonyms that provide clues as to how various psycho-social states are expressed through these terms. Most often they are limited to the physiological sense of taste and are linked to cuisine, customs, recipes, and health. Taste, however, cannot just be confined to physiology – although the importance of the social functioning of taste understood in this way cannot be denied. (shrink)

Preview: /Review: Emmanuel Faye, Arendt et Heidegger: Extermination nazie et destruction de la pensée, (Albin Michel, 2016), 560 pages./ The appearance of Martin Heidegger’s Black Notebooks (1932-38) in 2014 has posed profound questions to philosophers and political theorists. For a long time, in ways that the Black Notebooks have definitively undermined, Heidegger’s National Socialism was widely considered as limited to 1933-34. His larger thought, at least after a proposed turning or kehre in the mid-1930s, was presented as insulated from, or (...) even critical of, Nazism and antisemitism. The work of Emmanuel Faye (led by Martin Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy), has been at the forefront of scholarship which has taken seriously the many questions raised by the ongoing publication of Heidegger’s Nazi-era materials, since the 1990s. On one hand, can great philosophy be implicated in forms of openly ethnonationalist, even exterminist political movements, or does it necessarily involve normative commitments which abhor anything like Nazism? On the other hand, how should we understand a political movement like National Socialism, including its ideological dimensions, such that it could appeal to a thinker of the magnitude of the one-time Fuhrer-Rektor of Freiburg University? Finally, what does publication of Heidegger’s Nazi texts and positions, culminating in the Black Notebooks, say about its limitations, political dimensions, and the postwar reception history of Heidegger in the liberal nations. (shrink)