This paper discusses the semiotic and metaphysical framework within which Peirce elaborated a symbolical and dynamical conception of personhood. It exhibits the centrality of Peirce’s early conception of the “unity of consistency” along with its decentering advantages. It describes how this gave rise to a metaphysics of personhood that questions the singularity of individuals. It then conducts a semiotic study of the evolutive process across which something indeterminate evolves into something determinate that increasingly personifies itself following the logic of symbolization, (...) taking into account two major types of indetermination: generality and vagueness. It then considers the kind of teleology at work within personification. It concludes that personhood so conceived is not restricted to only individual human beings, for the process of symbolization at work is not confined to a particular species-specific application. (shrink)

Whereas classical Darwinian evolution is based on the model of vertical development, per species, and related sexual selection and natural mutations, along with environmental selective pressures, epi-genetics presents a supplemental view of horizontal development as DNA is both selectively transcribed and translated by mRNA and influenced by a process of horizontal gene transfer, including genetic melding of microbes, organelles, plants, animals and other types of hominoids. Thus, a philosophy of physical culture is offered in which cancers are conceived of as (...) an extension of a horizontal physical culture in which organisms thrive via a cooperative and synergistic sense of community. However, they are also conceived of as an extreme which manifest a unique type of ontological multiplicity whereby they not only propagate para-sexually leading to vast genetic variations, but also manipulate and appropriate cells and systems of the host, constructing horizontally connected and lethal tumor sites. Is there any hope against such a formidable ontological structure? Cultivation of human metabolism via broad and healthy dietary patterns can support the horizontal microbiome, thus maintaining synchronized and unified horizontal relations between DNA, mRNA and long non-coded RNA functions. (shrink)

What motivates the voluntary suffering of training for a long-distance run – or any other difficult athletic skill? Long-term pleasure cannot adequately explain this seemingly masochistic activity. On the contrary, I argue that pleasure, or “reinforcement,” is not the only ultimate motivator of behavior. Each of the emotion systems defines its own intrinsic values, including an innate “play” system and an innate “exploratory drive” that is included in what neuropsychologist Jaak Panksepp calls the “SEEKING system” of the emotional brain. Panksepp’s (...) description of the conscious dimension of SEEKING is remarkably similar to Otto Rank’s descriptions of his “love of life” dimension of motivation, which actually conflicts with the pleasure principle. The desire for pleasure is a desire to reduce consummatory drives, which means reducing the energy level of our bodily systems. Complete reduction would be death. If there were no competing motivation in the other direction, there would be nothing to keep us alive. The SEEKING system is what does that. It motivates a higher energy level. In the case of athletic training, we do not have to “force ourselves” to this higher energy level. The SEEKING system is an innate natural drive. If we were to deliberately try to just sit on a couch indefinitely, at some point we would fail. (shrink)

Preview: /Commentary: Richard Shusterman, Ars Erotica: Sex and Somaesthetics in the Classical Arts of Love, 436 pages./ Richard Shusterman’s Ars Erotica: Sex and Somaesthetics in the Classical Arts of Love is a masterpiece in a number of respects. With its focus on erotic love and the aesthetics of lovemaking, the book is to be admired for having the audacity to broach a topic that tends to be neglected – if not repressed – in contemporary academic scholarship. But Ars Erotica is (...) far from being “simply” about sex and different arts of love. In exploring classical erotic theories and ideals in Western, Chinese, Indian, Islamic and Japanese cultures, it reveals an impressive amount of knowledge and erudition when analyzing, documenting, and contextualizing the various ars erotica in their different social, cultural, political, philosophical, and religious milieus. Moreover, although Shusterman’s guiding thread is the aesthetic dimension of classic ars erotica, the book also has an important ethical and spiritual dimension, as it compellingly demonstrates how the cultivation of physical beauty and sensual pleasures was – at least in classical ancient traditions – indissociable from a wider concern with the cultivation of one’s character and virtue, that is, with an art of living in which sexual practices and attitudes were strongly embedded and from which they ultimately derived their deep symbolic meaning and relevance. (shrink)

This paper aims to reframe disability through John Dewey’s transactional theory of culture to indicate how disability is not located in the biological organization of the individual nor in the organization of culture, but in the transactions between the two. This paper will apply Dewey’s theory of culture to disability studies and philosophy of disability and then to ADHD to make clear the benefits of a transactional model of disability.

This article is part of a larger project that explores how to channel people’s passion for popular arts into legal social justice by reconceiving law as a kind of poetry and justice as dance, and exploring different possible relationships between said legal poetry and dancing justice. I begin by rehearsing my previous new conception of social justice as organismic empowerment, and my interpretive method of dancing-with. I then apply this method to the following four “ethico-political choreographies of justice”: the choral (...) dance of souls qua winged chariot-teams, a dancingly beautiful friendship with the community, a tightrope-dance of the cool, and humans dancingly reimagined as positioned actors in fluidly moving groups. I then synthesize these analyses into “dancing justice,” defined as the dynamic equilibrium sustained by a critical mass of a community’s members comporting themselves like social dancers. (shrink)

Preview: /Commentary: Richard Shusterman, Ars Erotica: Sex and Somaesthetics in the Classical Arts of Love, 436 pages./ Somaesthetics, the field cultivated by Richard Shusterman since 1997, bore another juicy fruit for our enjoyment. This time, his interdisciplinary research – integrating the theoretical, empirical, and practical disciplines related to bodily perception, presentation, and performance – resulted in an excellent cross-cultural study of the classical arts of love developed over centuries in such traditions as the Greco-Roman, Chinese, Indian, Muslim, Medieval and European (...) Renaissance. Somaesthetic methodology provides fertile ground for such a comparative inquiry by encouraging new ways to understand the cultural dimension of human sexuality. It complements the popular 4EC perspectives applied in cognitive science which explore cognition as embodied, embedded, enactive, and expanded: emphasizing our bodily interaction with the physical and social environment. Shusterman’s analysis of the classical arts of love as aesthetically refining sexual experience gives due acknowledgement to our somatic and sensual, but also emotional and imagery engagement in the world, commonly neglected in modern philosophy. (shrink)

Preview: In Jane Campion’s recent film version of Thomas Savage’s Power of the Dog, young Peter comes across his, and his mother’s tormentor, Phil’s secret hiding place. There he discovers in a lean-to the cowboy homophobic Phil’s copies of Physical Culture. As he leafs through the magazines, he sees the famous pictures of Eugen Sandow and his fig leaf posed as the Farnese Hercules. The scene does not appear in Savage’s novel. Flash backward or forwards a few years depending on (...) whether you place Peter and Phil in 1925 or 2021 and you have Tim Curry as Dr. Frank-n-Furter belting out the invitation to guests to “take in an old Steve Reeves movie” in the introductory musical number “Sweet Transvestite” in the musical extravaganza The Rocky Horror Picture Show. (shrink)

Preview: There is an ongoing joke – often said with a sigh of despair – within various communities: those who struggle with mental health, or chronic pain, or disabilities of any sort. This joke might, in fact, be one nexus of these communities – what brings them together in irritation – and it goes like this: “Have you tried yoga?” The often-given unsolicited advice to “heal thyself” using physical movement speaks to a deeper issue at hand, one long-entrenched in our (...) mindset: physical movement is a cure for weaknesses, and one need only exercise to “get better.” There is a link between the strength and training of the body, and the cultivation of the mind – a link present from the gymnasiums in Plato’s Republic, to late nineteenth century strongmen like Eugen Sandow and Bernarr Macfadden, to “self-care” and “wellness” movements today. “Weakness is a crime! Don’t be a criminal!” went the slogan of American strongman and one of the “fathers” of the Physical Culture movement, Bernarr Macfadden. And fertile, indeed, was his influence on ideals of masculinity, femininity, the health of the nation, mental well-being, and moral aptitude. (shrink)

Preview: /Commentary: Richard Shusterman, Ars Erotica: Sex and Somaesthetics in the Classical Arts of Love, 436 pages./ I think “it is official” now. Ars Erotica will become some sort of classic. There are several reasons why. Some, just cannot stop giggling when they hear the word sex. Many will grab the book out of curiosity, and maybe some, although I do not believe that many, will even do it for camp reasons. Many of these readers have a neurotic and/or complicated (...) relationship to sexuality, and hopefully at least some of them will find the book helpful, as they reflect on themselves and their sexual lives through the text. On the other hand, I cannot imagine anyone in aesthetics or with a scholarly interest in sexuality who would not find the book helpful. Nothing comparable on the relationship of aesthetics and sexuality has been done and the book embraces the topic globally – featuring Shusterman’s vast and deep knowledge – about not just Western philosophy and culture, but also Chinese and Japanese thinking among others. (shrink)

Preview: /Commentary: Richard Shusterman, Ars Erotica: Sex and Somaesthetics in the Classical Arts of Love, 436 pages./ Richard Shusterman’s work is remarkable, among other things, for extending the range and power of the discipline of aesthetics, conceived by him as fundamental to many dimensions of human experience. Indeed, he has driven aesthetics into entirely new ranges of phenomena and strategies for research, and also perhaps returned to an ancient sense of the centrality of aesthetic concepts such as beauty to virtually (...) every human endeavor. In many ways, I think, Shusterman is fulfilling John Dewey’s vision as expressed in Art as Experience, as well as spelling out in detail the implications of his own early book Pragmatist Aesthetics, exploring the aesthetic dimensions of all sorts of human activities. Schusterman’s somaesthetics, however, takes what we might call the aesthetics, or ordinary experience, and centers it on the body in a way that Dewey could not have foreseen. The book might have been titled The Aesthetics of Sex, and as soon as he broaches the topic it strikes one that this subject has been remarkably neglected within philosophical aesthetics, or even in Western philosophy as a whole. Considered as dimensions or arenas of human experience, the aesthetic and the erotic, as Shusterman shows in replete multi-cultural detail, are bound up entirely and from the origins in many or even all cultures. (shrink)

Richard Shusterman, Ars Erotica: Sex and Somaesthetics in the Classical Arts of Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 436 pages./ Like other contributors, I would like to begin by expressing my respect and admiration for the scale and scope of Richard Shusterman’s achievement in Ars Erotica. The Preface acknowledges “the vast amount of material” involved in this project of charting “the history of erotic theory in the world’s most influential premodern cultures,” with each chapter on a different cultural tradition potentially (...) meriting its own monograph (AE, x, xi). As a scholar who has worked in depth on the work of Pierre Hadot, as well as Michel Foucault’s works on the practices of philosophy conceived as an art or craft (technê) of living in the Western tradition, my response will necessarily be more limited. It will address in detail just the first major chapter of the book – especially as I note with appreciation the piece in this symposium by Marta Faustino on the relations between the ars vivendi and ars erotica. I take some comfort in accepting these limitations from the statement of a particular debt that Shusterman proffers in his Preface to Foucault’s works in the finally-not-completed History of Sexuality series. The author notes both what he owes to Foucault on sexuality, particularly in his studies on the ancient Greeks and Romans, as well as his differences from Foucault’s work. (shrink)

Preview: In various guises and cultures, the theme of elevating, ennobling love is a recurrent topos in the premodern erotic theory my book traces. Freed from Plato’s problematic dualistic denigration of the body as prison of the soul and from the modern aesthetic prejudice of disinterestedness, Ars Erotica recaptures the valuable core of ennobling desire by showing how a new somaesthetic approach to sex could channel the power of eros to cultivate qualities of courtesy, grace, skill, self-mastery, and sensitivity to (...) the feelings of others, thus evoking a richer, more positive vision of sex education than we have today. (shrink)

In the late 1800s masculinity as understood in the United States’ urban northeast underwent a major transformation as the preceding emphasis upon decorum and civility gave way to a new ideal based on masculine health and fitness. This thesis seeks to demonstrate the significant role that Eugen Sandow, a Prussian born strongman who rose to international fame at the turn of the century, played in this masculine transformation. Sandow rose to stardom alongside theatre impresario Florenz Ziegfeld and used that stardom (...) to revolutionize American manhood. Sandow was a performer, an athlete, and marketing genius. These three distinct identities coalesced to allow Sandow the opportunity to inspire a nation. (shrink)

Preview: /Commentary: Richard Shusterman, Ars Erotica: Sex and Somaesthetics in the Classical Arts of Love, 436 pages./ Richard Shusterman is the not the first scholar in the West who introduces sex and sexuality in the Chinese tradition. Other scholars engaged in this theme include Robert van Gulik, Michel Foucault, Douglas Wile, and Fang Fu Ruan. Nevertheless, Shusterman is the first one who brings the topic from the perspective of somaesthetics and within a bigger context: the classical arts of love in (...) different cultures. It should be noted that sex or sexuality has received little attention in the history of Western philosophy, and it is still not an easy topic to address in philosophical discourse today in the face of “the somatic turn” in recent decades. In contrast, sexual representation with reference to body consciousness has always been an important part of the Chinese philosophical and religious tradition, and Daoism in particular, as remarkably presented by Shusterman in the chapter “Chinese Qi Erotics: The Beauty of Health and the Passion for Virtue”. The term “qi-erotics” coined by Shusterman reflects well the unique nature of Chinese cultural interpretations of sexual practice in terms of a lived experience that combines ars erotica with a sexological science of health. (shrink)

Marcuse suggested the alienation of art from society intrinsic to the aesthetic form represents and recollects an unreal world capable of indicting existing social arrangements while simultaneously providing a sensuous experience of another possible, liberated reality denied by established institutions. Drawing on and recasting part of Marcuse’s theory of art and the aesthetic dimension, the author puts forward several theses regarding art, alienation and abolition of the prison-industrial complex. First, art implies alienation; yet, because of that condition, art offers an (...) antidote to estrangement conducive to PIC abolition. Second, Marx explained why key components of capitalism engender alienation, but expounding upon his analysis reveals how incarceration and the concomitant punitive paradigm also reinforce and reproduce estrangement; art, understood as recollection, can aid in abolition of those institutions. Third, authentic justice implies unimpeded use of creative capacities denied and distorted by the PIC, but art can act as recuperation of those capacities in ways that transform our understanding and practice of justice. Fourth, art can offer a foretaste of liberation while anticipating, expressing and heightening our understanding of the possibilities for fuller freedom and PIC abolition, going against and beyond reformist reforms that have historically functioned to strengthen and expand the PIC. Finally, art augments the spirit of abolition and intimates a mode of being antithetical to imprisonment, the PIC and the alienated way of life associated with criminalization and State coercion. (shrink)

Preview: Almost twenty-five years have passed after the publication of Jacques Derrida’s 1996 seminal essay, “Faith and Knowledge: Religion at the Limits of Reason Alone,” one of the most important, but also most enigmatic post-secular texts of late modernity. Six articles in this issue are devoted directly to Derrida’s essay. The other two can also be read along them as dealing with broadly conceived post-secular issues. They all can be brought under the traditional heading of “faith and knowledge” – simultaneously (...) in recognition of Derrida’s title and in opening a wider perspective on fides et ratio today (a few decades after the famous 1994 Capri seminar on religion). Derrida participated in the seminar with his 2000 essay (Glauben und Wissen), on the same subject, along with the equally famous intervention of Jürgen Habermas. The main theme of Derrida’s take on the confrontation between fides and ratio is the analysis of the relation between modern philosophy/knowledge and modern religion/faith: a complex co-dependence which challenges Hegel’s conviction that philosophy had managed to sublate religion completely and allowed for the survival of its most valuable contents in a new rational form. Pace Martin Hägglund’s thesis, (according to which Derrida’s philosophy should be classified as “radical atheism” in the Hegelian vein), the essays in this volume present Derrida’s thinking on religion as far more ambivalent, leaning toward not so much atheism as radical iconoclasm which does not annul the idea of divinity, but rather hides it away from sight. (shrink)

Preview: In this article I will try to discuss some thoughts presented by Michał Herer in his book In Praise of Friendship. I read it a couple of times and it certainly deserves both the Barbara Skarga prize and interest among young scholars and students of philosophy. However, it left me wanting more every time I read it. In the present text I would like to discuss some aspects of the essay and suggest some possible ways in which the ideas (...) presented by Herer could be taken a little further. Although the below remarks are often critical, I do not want to write against Herer, but rather with him, following Annemarie Mol’s idea of discussion based on sisterhood rather than the conventional combative way, where the author in question is presented either as an “intellectual father,” an ally, or an enemy. (shrink)

This paper is an adventure of ideas. More specifically, it is a continuation of the adventure of ideas concerning the relations between creativity and logic at the level of being one finds in the work of Whitehead and his interpreters/inheritors. The “argument” of the paper, such as it is, is that ontological creativity may be fruitfully described by two logical functions, one exploding the movement from possibility to actuality, and the other from actuality to possibility. The paper explores both functions, (...) or “senses,” as fruitful ways of understanding ontological creativity, especially within processual thought. The two senses of creativity, the paper also argues, ought to be understood as primitive and inexorably “together.”. (shrink)

Preview: Since Nietzsche announced the death of God, thinkers who took his words seriously have been dealing with one crucial question: how to live a life stripped of any references to transcendent divinity? Are we to mourn God’s death indefinitely? Will we finally acknowledge and embrace our status of finite and contingent creatures? In her recent book titled Another Finitude Agata Bielik Robson addresses these questions. While this is certainly not the first time she has tackled such issues, this study (...) displays the kind of determination, clarity and subtlety that makes it truly exceptional. Further, Bielik-Robson’s style is compelling, precise, yet fluent; it boasts a highly affirmative tone. (shrink)

Encrypted in Derrida’s contribution to the Capri Seminar on Religion in 1994 are three retrievals: of his discussions of speech and of systems of inscription; of a concealment of splittings in the supposed continuities of traditions; and of a complicity between the operations of religion and those of a dissipation of the unities of science, Enlightenment, and knowledge, into proliferating autotelic tele-technologies. These retrievals take place between the lines of this discussion of faith, knowledge and religion, which arrives in two (...) halves, each in twenty-six sections. The first half arrives in italics, as spoken on the day, and ends by invoking Voltaire on toleration and a contrast between Christianity as Institution and Christianity as the legacy of Jesus and the Apostles. The second half, appended as a written supplement, with footnotes, is signed and dated April 26, 1995. Husserl’s epoche arrives as recurrent performance, challenging the unity of Heidegger’s Ereignis; contrasting modes for the arrival of futurity are invoked in a juxtaposition of the names: Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and Bergson, thus providing more than two sources for Derrida’s meditations on religion. (shrink)

Toward the beginning of one of her notebooks, Simone Weil interrupts a dense series of reflections on war, force and prestige to write, in parentheses: “(To think on God, to love God, is nothing else than a certain way of thinking on the world.)” In some respects, this one sentence is a crystallization of everything Weil wrote about God. The thought of God is somehow inseparable from a new mode of attention to and valuation of things “here below”; that is, (...) from “a certain way of thinking.” In the discussion that follows I reflect on how this “certain way of thinking” might be understood, in dialogue with a few exemplary moments from Derrida’s late work, Martin Hägglund’s reading of Derrida, as well as some biblical scholarship on Philippians 2: 5-11, and a number of richly suggestive comments from Weil’s notebooks. I show that the conceptual aporias that, on Derrida’s account, reliably emerge from ethical reflection are inchoately affirmed by Weil and (a certain reading of) the Philippi hymn. More than this, I will suggest that when read in this way, the latter allows for a new interrogation of the role that the experience of conceptual aporia may play in metanoia, the changing of mind. (shrink)

This article offers a reading of Jacques Derrida’s account of “religion” and “life” in his seminal essay “Faith and Knowledge.” Applying Derrida’s aporetic structure of “X without X” to his remarks on religion and life in “Faith and Knowledge,” this article suggests that underlying Derrida’s endeavor to “think religion abstractly” is a radical re-conception not only of religion as “religion without religion” but moreover a re-imagination of life as “life without life” that breaks away from the traditional metaphysical understandings of (...) life and religion. (shrink)

The author begins by analyzing Walter Benjamin’s quarrel with George Kreis and the respective visions of culture advocated by both sides of the debate. Then, he offers a reading of a poem by Paul Celan in which the poet sides with Benjamin, but also makes his position more complex, ultimately offering a paradoxical figure of “the secret openness” or “open/public secrecy” as a remedy against the “mystery” of the Georgians. This idea can be seen as developed in Jacques Derrida’s understanding (...) of secrecy, which the author proceeds to analyze. The secrecy as a deconstructive rift in the public discourse, a split which tears it open, can be seen as opposed both to the undemocratic mystery and to the seeming openness of globalatinization. After considering the formal, political and religious aspects of secrecy, the author ends with showing how literature as such is the most powerful medium of Derridean secret. (shrink)

The text juxtaposes two different understandings of religion, the first: Hegelian, where it functions as an imaginary representation of the concept, and the second: Derridean, which confronts and radicalizes the idea of the death of God. At the center of their juxtaposition is the process of abstraction and the religious figure of the “desert” which both authors use to illustrate it. Central to Derrida’s thinking of religion, understood as a figure of relentless negativity in search of difference, a “desert” can (...) also be found in Hegel’s exploration of “unhappy consciousness,” where it is used in reference to the crusaders and serves as a metonymy of the futile imaginary association of Christ’s divinity with his actual, individual body. The text sets out to complicate what Hegel understands as the abstract nature of Christ’s body and body in general with reference to Derridean gesture of religious purification and through the analysis of Saint Thomas, a work by a baroque painter, Georges de La Tour which is analyzed as an embodiment of the complex relations between religious abstraction and image. (shrink)

Preview: Eli Kramer has provided us with the first volume of an ambitious trilogy entitled Intercultural Modes of Philosophy. His first volume, Principles to Guide Philosophical Community, sets us on a rich, detailed, and lengthy exploration of the much neglected, and at times romanticized, communal mode of Philosophy. For Kramer, philosophical community is a “mode of mutually reinforced ethical praxis in a shared cosmopolitan place”. The exploration of these communities, serves as “[a transition] to a new adventure in philosophy”, along (...) with an attempted rescue of successful philosophical community practices that, in turn, “[unify] the activity of a stable community”. Kramer’s twenty-six “principles,” derived from communal investigations, act as samples of living communities, and from histories of philosophical communities that would serve as support, or guiding images, for future communities. Looking ahead while glancing back is how this treatise remains for, and most noticeably from, an ongoing “praxis of learning”. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that a comparison of Derrida’s “Faith and Knowledge” to the texts and thought of classical rabbinic Judaism can illuminate new conceptual connections among the different elements of Derrida’s thought. Both Derrida and the rabbinic texts can be viewed as affirming a type of “holding back” and “allowing the other to be,” stances which Derrida links to “religiosity” and to “messianicity beyond all messianism.” Moreover, the rabbinic texts appear to avoid the “autoimmune” reaction that Derrida sees (...) as stemming from many sacrificial and self-sacrificial logics in which the self is problematically sacrificed in order to preserve the “unscathed” other. In addition, the rabbinic texts’ stance concerning divine authorization for war and capital punishment help to illuminate Derrida’s claim that the ostensibly “secular” wars of modern states are in fact better understood as “wars of religion.”. (shrink)

The paper aims at setting the problem of the relation between technology, and the individual within the framework of Pierre Hadot’s idea of spiritual exercises. It compares two rivaling views of technology that originated in the Weimar Republic in order to outline a problematic field for examining the present position of the individual and technology. As the approaches of Weimar philosophers call for an actualization, the conception of Michel Foucault’s technologies of the self is brought forth. In the conclusion of (...) the paper, the need for contradistinction within the very notion of technology is stressed, in an attempt to incorporate the topical issue into Hadot’s theory of philosophy as a way of life. (shrink)

Pierre Hadot’s legacy is a vision of ancient philosophy not only as a system of abstract concepts and logical procedures but as a practical philosophical methodology. A key element of this interpretation is consideration of ancient philosophical practice as a series of spiritual exercises to improve one’s own life. The present paper aims to show, more humbly, that by highlighting the aesthetic dimension of the practice of gardening we can consider it part of the set of philosophically charged spiritual exercises. (...) Gardening supports the improvement of one’s own experience of the world through the meeting of different temporal experiences. The appropriation of such different temporal nuances in stark contrast to the accelerated pace of modern life, or periods of tiresome repetition, makes it possible to question one’s own rhythm in the world. In other words, I defend the thesis that horticulture can be considered therapeutic also from a philosophical perspective. (shrink)

David Graeber wrote about debt, jobs and the negative effects of globalization. He was an American anthropologist, anarchist activist, and was an author known for his books Debt: The First 5000 Years, The Utopia of Rules and Bullshit Jobs: A Theory. A professor of anthropology at the London School of Economics, he passed away 2 September 2020, at age 59.

Preview: /Review: Michael Webb, The Whole at Once: A Conversation on Meaning, 244 pages./ This is a book about a phenomenological challenge: to reach the depths of meaning. It relies principally on becoming aware of the self and of the core essence of wholes, be they collections of objects or sentences or ideas. But meaning is the end point constituting, according to the author, a drive more powerful even than the will to live. It lies beyond any given perspective. The (...) work is presented as a dialogue between student and master; its 244 pages actually make for a quick and relatively easy read, not burdening the reader with jargon. It intends to be a popular presentation but without skimping on issues of relevance to philosophy. (shrink)

Among the themes this article explores are the following: Can philosophy truly help us in times of crisis? What are the distinctive ways in which philosophy can be therapeutic and provide solace? What possible barriers exist to a person being able to be helped by philosophy? What is it to be genuinely open, to ideas, to life? What are the dynamics of pain and struggle in authentic searching? What is it to see yourself in such searching? What ways of teaching (...) philosophy can allow students to derive maximum sustenance from philosophy? (shrink)

Preview: 2020, the year the coronavirus pandemic spread globally, marked the twenty-fifth year since the publication of Pierre Hadot’s work Philosophy as a Way of Life. In that time, what began as the research specialization of just a few scholars has become a growing area of philosophical and metaphilosophical inquiry, bringing together researchers from around the globe. Hadot’s key ideas of spiritual exercises, and the very idea of PWL, have been applied to a host of individual thinkers from across the (...) history of philosophy: from the Hellenistic and Roman-era philosophers of direct concern to Hadot, through renaissance thinkers like Petrarch, Lipsius, Montaigne, Descartes, or Bacon, into nineteenth-century thinkers led by Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche.In more recent years, more global reflections on the “very idea” of PWL have begun to emerge, as well as dedicated journal editions. In these more recent PWL studies, some of the manifold research questions have begun to be explored, which were opened up by the studies of Pierre and Ilsetraut Hadot, as well as its reception in Michel Foucault’s later work. What implications, after all, does understanding the history of PWL, and the predominance of this metaphilosophical conception in the history of Western thought, have for how we understand the practice of philosophy today? Does recovering the alternative understandings of philosophy as a practice in history necessarily lead to a criticism of contemporary, solely academic or theoretical modes of philosophizing, or is the idea of PWL one which has only historiographical force? (shrink)

Preview: Beyond Baumgarten, the modern field of aesthetics can be seen as an attempt to go beyond the limits of older philosophies of beauty, sublimity, and taste in order to engage a much wider domain of qualities and judgments relating to our pleasurable and meaningful experiences of art and nature. The defining strategy of Hegelian aesthetics is to take the essence of aesthetics beyond the limits of nonconceptual sensuous experience and to celebrate instead the idea of art as purveying the (...) very highest spiritual truths, albeit in a somewhat sensuous form. The progressive revolutions of artistic forms and styles that define twentieth-century art similarly reflect the same play of dynamic movement in which art and aesthetics advance by challenging and overcoming the determination of established boundaries posited by prior aesthetic theory and practice. The limit-defying trend in aesthetics is evident in the continuing unsuccessful attempts by analytic philosophy to provide a satisfactory definition of art that will perfectly define its extensional limits by either providing its core essence or some formula that will select all and only those objects that are genuine works of art. Like other Wittgensteinian and pragmatist-inspired philosophers, I have criticized such compartmentalizing definitions of art, not simply for their failures to provide perfect extensional coverage of all the diverse works of art, but also for these theories’ explanatory poverty in explaining art’s meanings, purposes, functions, and values. One of the problems with traditional definitions of art is that they attempt to define something that is not a natural kind but a historically constructed field composed of rather diverse practices. These diverse practices employ a variety of different media and issue in a variety of different works of art that appear to belong to different ontological categories. (shrink)

This paper provides an explanatory rationale within a theoretical philosophical framework for the Philosophy Plays project as a call to public philosophy, conceived as a way of life and a form of communal therapy for the mind. The Philosophy Plays aim is to introduce philosophy to the general public through philosophical presentations by professional philosophers incorporating drama. Like Plato’s dialogues, the Philosophy Plays, that combine dialectic with rhetoric seek to engage their public audiences in a realistic and shared lived experience, (...) rendering philosophy a practical and meaningful applied activity for all participants, conceived as a way of life. (shrink)

This essay invites a recovery of "wildness" as a way for philosophers to respond to the present moment which includes: an ongoing global pandemic, economic uncertainty, increasing cultural division, and a crisis in higher education broadly that persistently threatens the status of philosophy programs. Drawing on the American thinkers John William Miller and John Dewey and elaborating on their own philosophical defenses of liberal education, I propose a turn to wildness and freedom in our pedagogies through active and embodied philosophical (...) pedagogy, including field philosophy. I offer two examples of courses that begin to invite wildness into the process of philosophical inquiry. The aim of this essay is to consider how wildness in teaching and learning and in doing philosophy might make philosophy stay alive. -/- . (shrink)

Nishitani and Neoplatonism both argue that overcoming the nihilism of non-being requires a confrontation with, and cultivation of, the experience of nothingness. This paper argues that the appreciation of nothingness is best realized in the practice of dialectic into dialogos, as adapted from the Socratic tradition. We argue that dialectic equips the self for the confrontation with nihilism, and is best suited to transforming the privative experience of nothingness into a superlative, collective experience of no-thingness. The practice of dialectic into (...) dialogos exapts the nature of the self as a synthesis of being and non-being, and possibility and necessity, in and through its relationship to others, and to its own otherness within self-transcendence. Dialectic into dialogos can thereby become a central philosophical practice for responding to our contemporary meaning crisis by affording a generative process of meaning-making that can lead to personal and cultural transformation and communion within the culture – renewing communitas for new communities. (shrink)

This paper starts with a detailed analysis of Jan Assmann’s qualitative distinction between cultural memory and communicative memory. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight both the strengths and the limitations of this seminal distinction, and to also reflect on what cultural theorists and contemporary artists could learn through Assmann’s distinction since artistic production also employs cultural memory formats that do not exclude cultural traditions in their materializations. In line with these considerations, this paper aims to disentangle what “tradition” (...) means to contemporary artists. Following Edward Shils and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophy of “tradition,” the paper argues that cultural tradition does not necessarily have an oppressive character and the rebellion and suspicion against it is at the heart of tradition itself. Thus, the traditional/contemporary binary can be precluded by reconsidering how “tradition” and “traditional” are conceptualized considering philosophy of tradition and artistic memory. (shrink)

The author argues that ancient Skepticism may be most suited to deal with two crises in the Age of COVID-19: both the physical or epidemiological aspects of the pandemic, and the epistemological and ethical crisis of increasing disbelief in the sciences. Following Michel Bitbol, I suggest one way to mitigate this crisis of faith may be for science to become more epistemically modest, renouncing some of its claims to describe reality as it objectively is, and adopting an “intransitive” rather than (...) a “transitive” approach to Nature. This was the attitude adopted by the Greco-Roman medical school of the Empirics, which may also be of assistance in combatting the urgent problem of Fake News. The epistemology of Skepticism and the scientific methodology of the closely related Medical Empiricism shows that an epistemically modest, non-interventionist approach to science is quite compatible with a robust and sophisticated proto-experimental scientific methodology. (shrink)

In a world described or experienced as unfair, what can philosophical practitioners propose in order to help individuals and communities strive for a meaningful life? One answer, empirically informed by the author’s practice as philosophical counselor in therapeutic, self-care and organizational contexts, is five principles for the cultivation of philosophical health, namely mental heroism, deep orientation, critical creativity, deep listening, and the “Creal”. In the light of Hadot’s rediscovery of philosophy as a way of life and in dialogue with his (...) reading of ancient philosophy, it is asserted that the embodied and socially embedded mind can, through these five principles or modalities, be prepared to maintain a pragmatic elevation of view and creative resilience in everyday events, especially in critical situations. This meta-analytic and meta-dialectic practice of philosophical health, termed “crealectics,” presupposes that we are of the same creative cosmological flesh, and therefore we are bound to comprehend and care for each other philosophically. (shrink)

This paper examines philosophy as a way of life in a time of crisis by focusing on Buddhism, envisioned as a path exercising the faculty of “mindfulness.” From this standpoint of “Buddhist philosophy as mindful exercise,” and following the Kyōto School’s inspiration of engaging a dialogue with Western traditions, including modern psychology and medicine, the paper reflects upon the role of philosophy during this critical period. In response to the contemporary fragmentation of knowledge, it conceives creatively a set of core (...) principles in the form of maxims – to be examined and adapted by each potentially interested individual – as tools to retain vital information, organize reflection, and reorient one’s attention and destiny. Structured according to the Buddhist categories of view, meditation, and conduct, this collection of maxims serves to articulate the organic movement that goes back and forth between the distinctions made in philosophical discourse and the unity of lived philosophy. (shrink)

Preview: “America does not think much of its philosophers,” Douglas Anderson writes in his introduction to Philosophy Americana. “We do not teach philosophy in our high schools. A majority in America have no idea what philosophy is about or why it might be interesting, if not important.” Perhaps that lack of appreciation for philosophy is coeval with its beginnings when the ancient Athenians put Socrates to death. Anderson’s lament is clearly present from the supposed birth of Western philosophy, and vividly (...) so in 1486 in Italian humanist Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s discourse known as The Dignity of Man, where he states, “The whole of philosophy is occasion for contempt and contumely, rather than honor and glory. The deadly and monstrous persuasion has invaded practically all minds, that philosophy ought not to be studied at all or by very few people; as though it were a thing of little worth to have before our eyes and at our fingertips....Thus,” Pico said six centuries ago, “we have reached a point, it is painful to recognize, where the only persons accounted wise are those who can reduce the pursuit of wisdom to a profitable traffic.” So it seems today in America and so it has apparently been and will ever be. Nevertheless, Anderson hopes to open a discussion about how philosophy does and does not manifest itself in American culture, how its practitioners remain “invisible,” and largely misunderstood “in rural, laboring, underclassed, and unschooled settings.” It is not his intention, at least in this book, to take up the issue of race in a discipline as overwhelmingly white as Western philosophy. Yet this has been for me, a black American philosopher, a lifelong meditation, which I will attempt to address in this essay. (shrink)

Preview: At times, the COVID-19 Pandemic has spent words of their value. We academic philosophers have written many articles in relation to it, and plenty of social media posts, as well as other discourse on it. It all seems effete to stop the flames we have kindled that led to this global tragedy. Our civilizational unsustainability and instability have borne down on us the last year and a half, and at times it seems to reveal a dire fall. There is (...) a sense of failing to avoid a pandemic-onium all too visible and nearing as we descend to the depths. Like the Devil’s palace, this place is also of our own creation. Whether this zeitgeist is but the Calvinist vision of perennial despair reappearing its fantastical face or indeed a portent of the times to come, we cannot but at time see through the eyes of the rebel fallen angel, with smoldering sorrow and anger for our world, if not heaven, well lost. It becomes hard in such moments to have any hope that one’s own work at self and communal cultivation is anywhere near enough. It sometimes feels as if all we can do is fiddle as Rome burns. Are we participating in our own downfall? Even if not in the confines of academic philosophy, and doing broad based cultivation work in philosophy as a way of life, how can one not but feel helpless and wrathful about our own situation, for the countless dead by government inaction to the virus, corporate greed and entitlement to protect vaccine formulas, hubristic populace quests for superior conspiratorial knowledge, growing authoritarianism, unchecked white supremacist fascism, and biological devastation caused by an unsustainable late-capitalistic, hyper abstracted, global economy? Those feelings seem righteously luciferian. However, our global wisdom traditions, with nuance, challenge us against mere smoldering anger, or at least not without guidance. To go further, our PWL wisdom traditions have long exhorted us to strive for ataraxia, and even to amor fati, especially at the worst of times. (shrink)

Preview: /Review: Jennifer A. Herdt, Forming Humanity: Redeeming the German Bildung Tradition, 312 pages./ Jennifer A. Herdt’s book Forming Humanity: Redeeming the German Bildung Tradition traces the post-Kantian secularization of Bildung from its roots in Pietism through its development into the human autocracy of Herder and Goethe, to the reconciliation and expression of the concept in Hegel. In the journey through the history of Bildung, Herdt specifically focuses on the role of Christianity in human formation, the tension between human formation (...) and divine formation, and the failures of Kunstreligion to achieve the formation of humanity. Reforming Humanity is a meticulously researched foray into the history of a question that has haunted humans since it emerged as the Greek paideia: How do we form humanity? For any scholars of the German philosophical or theological tradition, or any scholars of the aesthetic purpose of education, Herdt’s book is a vital library addition. (shrink)

The paper presents an interpretation of Platonism, the seeds of which can be found in the writings of Gödel and Wittgenstein. Although it is widely accepted that Wittgenstein is an anti-Platonist the author points to some striking affinities between Gödel’s and Wittgenstein’s accounts of mathematical concepts and the role of feeling and intuition in mathematics. A version of Platonism emerging from these considerations combines realism with respect to concepts with a view of concepts as accessible to feeling and able to (...) guide our behavior through feeling. (shrink)

Philosophy nurtures its actuality from questions, or a call that comes from and leads to a lived risk. This paper embraces that risk in directly responding to nine of the fifteen questions in the Call for Papers for the issue, Philosophy as a Way of Life in a Time of Crisis. Attentive to the idea of PWL, I listened for each question’s latent placement from seasoned historical thinkers. From that, I assigned the order of the questions. Each question served as (...) a bright opening between the latticework of the authors and issues I revisited. I felt transformed and happy under this pergola. Philosophy as a way of life flourishes in such exchanges, and by what ferries from who writes, nurtured in the gardens from whom we write for. Here, too, there are paths to a genre-in-possible-community. May these paths lead us to “everything so that virtue and phronesis are made life-participating.”. (shrink)

Is the Stoic sage a possible or desirable ideal for contemporary men and women, as we enter into difficult times? Is he, as Seneca presents him, the very best person for a crisis? In order to examine these questions, Part 1 begins from what Irene Liu calls the “standard” modern conceptions of the sage as either a kind of epistemically perfect, omniscient agent, or else someone in possession of a specific arsenal of theoretical knowledge, especially concerning the physical world. We (...) contest this contentious conception of the sage for being inconsistent with the Stoic conceptions of wisdom, the technai and knowledge which can be gleaned from the doxographic sources. In Part 2, we suggest that the wisdom of the Stoic sage reflects the Stoics’ “dispositional” conception of knowledge, their substantive conception of reason, and their sense of philosophy as above all an “exercise” or askêsis of a craft or technê for living. It is embodied in an ongoing exercise of examining one’s impressions for consistency with what one already knows, looking back to the natural prolêpseis with which all people are equipped. In Part 3, we show how only this account of the wisdom of the sage, at the epistemic level, enables us to understand how, in the non-doxographic texts led by Seneca’s De Constantia Sapientiae, the sage is celebrated above all for his ethical characteristics, and his ability to bear up in a crisis. Concluding reflections return to our framing concern, as to whether philosophy as a way of life, and the ancient ideal of the sage, can speak to us today not only as scholars, but as individuals called upon to live in difficult times. We suggest that they can and should remain sources of orientation, contestation, and inspiration. (shrink)

Preview: /Review: Steven Collins, Wisdom as a Way of Life: Theravāda Buddhism Reimagined, 304 pages./ Steven Collins was in the process of finalizing his manuscript and final academic work on Buddhism when he passed away unexpectedly at the age of sixty-six in February 2018. Although unfinished, the manuscript was in circulation among his colleagues and was near to completion. The final published version suffers hardly at all except for a somewhat abrupt end that one imagines would have seen a few (...) more pages added to put a bow on a capstone project to a life of excellent research and truly entertaining composition. (shrink)

Why awaken the soul to justice if the only result can be to increase awareness of the futility of aspiring to justice in the world? Zwicky documents challenges to the belief that teaching philosophy will result in a fairer polity and suggests that perception of being’s integrity sustains pursuit of philosophy as a way of life.

Popular culture is a vital part of the philosophy of culture. Immersion in the world of popular culture provides an immanent understanding, and after all, some of what is merely popular culture today will be the high culture of tomorrow. The genre of science fiction is one of the more important and durable forms of cultural and social criticism. Science fiction narratives guide our imaginations into the relation between the might-be and the might-have-been. The central idea of this paper is (...) that possibilities have an existence that is intelligible to us, independent of and indifferent to actualities, and involving a distinction between “constellated possibilities” which form a pattern dependent upon one’s perspective in some actual standpoint, and “clustered” possibilities, which actually exist entangled and inseparable from one another, as possibilities. Science fiction writers intuitively know that if one introduces a variation into the present in order to trace a plausible alternative storyline from that standpoint, certain other variations will have to accompany the chosen variation in order to maintain the unity of the plot. I use Rod Serling, the creator of the legendary series The Twilight Zone, as an example in this paper. Hence, science fiction writers do work with clusters as well as constellations of possibilities, and they experience the clusters with a stronger feeling of necessity. I call that feeling Wirkungsschicksal, of “effective destining.” I will develop this distinction and that stronger feeling of necessity into a method for the philosophy of culture. (shrink)

This paper’s aim is to provide a new interpretation of Martha C. Nussbaum’s and Richard Rorty’s views on the ethical role of literature. I pursue this aim in a threefold manner. First of all, I shortly discuss and provide a critique of previous comparisons by other authors. Afterwards, based on the presented critique of other comparisons, I present concise summaries of their respective views. Finally, I propose a double context for interpreting and assessing their views together. The main claim of (...) the paper is the following: despite several differences in their philosophical underpinnings, Nussbaum’s and Rorty’s views on literature can be interpreted together using the context of John Rawls and Jacques Rancière. This interpretation consists of showing how uncovering a shared Rawlsian characteristic of Nussbaum’s and Rorty’s views paves a way for explaining how literature actually does ethical work, using some concepts of Rancière. Such a contextual reading allows for both a more thorough understanding of their respective projects and assessing their shared shortcomings. (shrink)

This essay focuses on political implications of Derrida’s messianicité as a form of Marrano messianism: a universal vision of community “out of joints” which, despite its disjointedness and inner separation, nonetheless addresses itself as “we”. By referring to the generalized “Marrano experience” – the fate of those Sephardic Jews who were forced to convert to Christianity and, in consequence, became neither Jewish nor Christian – Derrida takes the Marrano as his paradigmatic political figure of a “rogue” who escapes every identity (...) politics. In Derrida’s project of “living together”, the Marrano stands for the non-participatory remnant of otherness which is not just the other of this or that particular tradition, but becomes a bearer of a new universalism, based not on the abstract notion of human nature but on the non-identity, a distance-from-identity or what Yirmijahu Yovel calls the “non-integral identity.”. (shrink)

Preview: The status of philosophy of culture seems to be notoriously unclear. Since its birth as a methodologically self-aware discipline, it constantly provokes controversies and questions concerning its nature, scope, and objective field of cognitive interests. Is it to be conceived – as it was intended by Wilhelm Dilthey – as a kind of philosophical foundation for Geisteswissenschaften and even more specifically for Kulturwissenschaften – in which case it would play a parallel role to philosophy of science in its relation (...) to natural sciences? Or is it to be understood as a kind of inter-discipline or trans-discipline whose task is to provide a synoptic view on the world we live in and try to understand? Or perhaps one should see it as a particular meta-philosophical orientation – understood rather in terms of a specific approach or a form of sensitivity than as a discipline which would be fully determined with regard to its methodology and objective field of cognitive interests? Or, as some scholars quite convincingly suggest, should be seen first and foremost as a way of life oriented around human intellectual and spiritual growth? Or still as something else? Furthermore, even if we assume a common agreement with regard to its nature and status among other philosophical disciplines as well as its relation to humanities and natural sciences – it does not mean that it will be followed by a similar agreement with regard to its most adequate methodological approach. Should it be: descriptive, archeological, critical, procesual, teleological, normative? Perhaps a synthesis comprising all of them? Or still something different? (shrink)

Reference to persons with personal pronouns raises the issue of the primary referent and its nature. “I” does not refer to a property or cluster of properties. This contrasts with our identifying grasp of persons. A person is a radical singularity and thus stands in contrast to a kind or sortal term. The individuation of persons is not adequately grasped by “definite descriptions” or “eidetic singularities.” In spite of the seeming possibility of persons being wholly identical in terms of properties, (...) in other words, “doubles,” the core referent of reference to persons is not to what is individuated merely by mere numerical differences or spatial-temporal, and essential-eidetic determinations. Rather we have to do with a “non-sortal unique essence.” What “I” refers to is a self-individuating substance. This raises questions for the proper referent of “love.” What is it that love intends or loves if persons are basically radical singularities. What does one love and why does one love if whom one loves is most essentially non-sortal? The question of the ontological status of persons requires integrating the status of being transcendental I’s, and thus being non-temporal, non-spatial, non-sortal, simple substances and thus not homogenous with the experienced world. (shrink)

This work argues that an opportunity is being missed by the philosophical tradition, especially within philosophy of culture: an opportunity not just to philosophize “about” culture, but to embody culture and put it into practice. It argues that philosophy itself is a powerful form of culture – one that needs to be better understood and more explicitly practiced. To highlight this blind spot, the work introduces a distinction between “philosophy of culture,” and “cultural philosophy.” Cultural philosophy should be better explored (...) by the discipline for two reasons: a clearer understanding of cultural philosophy would benefit all practitioners of philosophy; also, a philosopher of culture who engages cultural philosophy will be a more effective philosopher of culture. The goal of the project is to highlight the possibility of (and value in) a “cultural philosophy,” and to serve as something of a prolegomenon toward further work in that area. (shrink)

Preview: It has been my observation that Poland is unique for having a philosophy of culture tradition that has theoretical depth and insight into the origins and role of philosophy, popular breadth throughout Polish philosophy in a variety of departments, institutes and programs, and for its cultural relevancy. Yet, this tradition is largely unknown in philosophy/philosophy of culture circles in the English-speaking world.

This article puts forth Modern Socratic Dialogue as a pedagogical tool for cultivating an American Bildung. Beginning with Michael Hogue’s work on “resilient democracy,” an associational ethos that is vulnerable and based on our lived uncertainty. To further establish this American Bildung, I investigate what it means to be American. Drawing from the works of Michael Walzer and Gloria Anzaldúa, I establish that “American” means unfinished, pluralistic, and embraces ambiguity. The question of how to cultivate this pluralistic, ambiguous, and vulnerable (...) Bildung is framed by the freedom and social bonds of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s theory of Bildung. For an American Bildung to flourish, freedom and social bonds can be presented and practiced in the form of Modern Socratic Dialogue – “truths” are created by the community of interlocutors, and problems and solutions are based on the experiences of the participants. (shrink)

Preview: /Review: Piotr Schollenberger, Jednostkowość i wydarzenie. Studia z estetyki Lyotarda, 283 pages./ Piotr Schollenberger’s book entitled Jednostkowość i wydarzenie. Studia z estetyki Lyotarda is a thorough and extensive – nearly 300-page – philosophical analysis of a number of topics selected from the vast, polyphonic and complex body of Jean-François Lyotard’s philosophy. It ought to be noted that Schollenberger does not focus his analysis on themes that prevail in the existing interpretations of the philosophy of Lyotard.

The paper offers a glimpse at the diversity of what is labelled Philosophy of Culture, and then brings out some important issues concerning culture. The first section expounds etho-analysis as a way of doing philosophy of culture, introducing the notions of solicitator, sensance and ethos. It also gives an idea of how its program has been conducted with respect to love or truth. Etho-analysis describes the ideal part of culture, interpreting it as revealed by concrete practice. The second section discusses (...) whether and how far etho-analysis embraces the cause of truth and validates the scholastic tradition which has provided tools for it. Etho-analysis claims to formulate true descriptions. It understands meaning as unfolding its complication thanks to traditional tools, and recognizes the ethical significance of the community of science. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to discuss the idea of dialogue with nature. Even though the idea of dialogue with animals, plants – even objects of inanimate nature – is well known, it has usually been treated as an expression of a naive or folk view. Yet, it has recently gained in importance as an idea that is used to describe an ecological approach to natural environment and tends to be treated as a foundation for an ecological culture. A (...) noteworthy contribution to the reconsideration of the concept of human-nature dialogue has also been given by a number of contemporary philosophers who have offered an environmental reinterpretation of phenomenology and hermeneutics based on, among other things, Martin Buber’s concept of the I-You relationship. The paper will focus on two aspects of the concept of dialogue, namely on its epistemological and ethical implications. Following Erazim Kohák’s theory, which will be presented as a key figure of a particular manner of speaking about nature, one that leads to ecological personalism. (shrink)

Max Scheler seems to present two distinct approaches to philosophy of culture. In the early period of his Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik and “Ordo Amoris,” he describes cultures as being defined by their distinct order of value preferencings. In his later period of his “Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens,” however, Scheler explains the dynamics of culture in terms of the interaction of what he calls “real” and “ideal sociological factors,” rooted in various drives and spirit, respectively. (...) These approaches are fully compatible and complementary, the former describing culture’s vertical structure and the latter, its horizontal structure. Together these two approaches offer a comprehensive philosophy of culture, deserving greater attention. (shrink)

In this paper I revisit the debate concerning the distinction, which is sometimes made between “analytic” and “continental” philosophy. I look at the historical context in which the distinction came to prominence in the twentieth century, the reasons why it subsequently declined in popularity, and eventually had begun to be undermined. I argue that the distinction possesses intuitive content, which the recent attempts at exposing it as conceptually flawed fail to account for. I suggest that the intuitive content of the (...) distinction provides us with resources to usefully define two different ways philosophical reflection has been approached during the course of the twentieth century. I conclude by suggesting that we can bring these two ways of approaching philosophy into focus by appealing to the idea of philosophical temperament. (shrink)