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  1.  6
    Response to Comments and Criticisms.Michael Richard Ayers - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (4):600-627.
    These responses are replies to the contributions to a book symposium devoted to my book Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism (2019), held at the University of Vienna in February 2020.
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  2.  63
    Anti-Conceptualism and the Objects of Knowledge and Belief.Menno Lievers - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (4):544–560.
    Michael Ayers’s Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a New Empiricism is a rich and detailed development of two ideas. The first is that perception presents reality to us directly in a perspicuous way. We thus acquire primary knowledge of the world: “knowledge gained by being evidently, self-consciously, in direct cognitive contact with the object of the knowledge.” (Ayers 2019, 63) The second idea is that concepts are not needed in perception. In this article, the author examines Ayers’s view. The author (...)
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  3.  9
    Knowing, Knowing Perspicuously, and Knowing How One Knows.Guy Longworth - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (4).
    In Knowing and Seeing, Michael Ayers presents a view of what he calls primary knowledge according to which one who knows in that way both knows perspicuously and knows how they know. Here, I use some general considerations about seeing, knowing, and knowing how one knows in order to raise some questions about this view. More specifically, I consider some putative limits on one’s capacity to know how one knows. The main question I pursue concerns whether perspicuity should be thought (...)
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  4.  12
    The Thing Before Us. Agreement and Disagreement Between Travis and Ayers.Sofia Miguens & Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (4):584-599.
    In this article the authors identify and analyse points of agreement and disagreement between Michael Ayers and Charles Travis, starting from their views on ‘things before us’. The authors then try to spell out what separates these philosophers in matters concerning perception, knowledge and language. In spite of their both being self-professed realists, equally critical of conceptualism and representationalism, Ayers’ empiricism and Travis’ anti-empiricism lead them to different positions in these three areas. It is shown that in the case of (...)
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  5.  7
    Editors' Preface. Book Symposium on Ayers’ Knowing and Seeing.Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum & Mira Magdalena Sickinger - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (4):489–494.
    Editors' preface to the book symposium on Michael Ayers' Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism (OUP 2019).
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  6.  50
    On Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a New Empiricism[REVIEW]Mira Magdalena Sickinger - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (4):495–502.
    This is a discussion note on Michael Ayers’ Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism.
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  7.  14
    The Extended-Expert-As-Teacher (EEAT) Model: A Defense of De Cruz.Joseph Blado - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (3):412-435.
    Recently, social epistemologists have sought to establish what the governing epistemic relationship should be between novices and experts. In this paper, I argue for, and expand upon, Helen De Cruz’s expert-as-teacher model. For although this model is vulnerable to significant challenges, I propose that a specifically extended version can sufficiently overcome these challenges (call this the “extended-expert-as-teacher” model, or the “EEAT” model). First, I show the respective weaknesses of three influential models in the literature. Then, I argue the expert-as-teacher model (...)
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  8.  13
    Reasons to Be Rational.Jens Gillessen - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (3):359-394.
    In the wake of Kolodny (2005) and Raz (2005), the normativity of rationality has become the topic of an intricate debate: what normative reasons are there, if any, to be rational? This article explains what kinds of ‘reasons to be rational’ there are. It then argues that, while we often have reason to be rationally disposed, rationality is neither itself normative nor necessarily underwritten by normative reasons – at any rate not when construed as conformance with coherence requirements. Allegedly omnipresent (...)
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  9.  25
    No Justification for SMith’s Incidentally True Beliefs.Alfred Schramm - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (3):1-20.
    Edmund Gettier (1963) argued that there can be justified true belief (JTB) that is not knowledge. I question the correctness of his argument by showing that Smith of Gettier’s famous examples does not earn justification for his incidentally true beliefs, while a doxastically more conscientious person S would come to hold justified but false beliefs. So, Gettier’s (and analogous) cases do not result in justified _and_ true belief. This is due to a tension between deductive closure of justification and evidential (...)
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  10.  74
    Constructing a Moorean ‘Open Question’ Argument: The Real Thought Move and the Real Objective.Nicholas Shackel - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (3):463-88.
    How Moore’s open question argument works, insofar as it does, remains a matter of controversy. My purpose here is to construct an open question argument based on a novel interpretation of how Moore’s argument might work. In order to sidestep exegetical questions, I do not claim here to be offering Moore’s own argument. Rather, I offer a reconstruction making use of important elements of Moore’s methodology and assumptions that could be reasonable within a Moorean viewpoint. The crucial role within the (...)
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  11.  59
    Die Begriffsanalyse im 21. Jahrhundert: Eine Verteidigung gegen zeitgenössische Einwände, written by Nicole Rathgeb.Wolfgang Barz - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (2):349-357.
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  12. Epistemic Infrastructure for a Scientific Metaphysics.Amanda Bryant - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):27-49.
    A naturalistic impulse has taken speculative analytic metaphysics in its critical sights. Importantly, the claim that it is desirable or requisite to give metaphysics scientific moorings rests on underlying epistemological assumptions or principles. If the naturalistic impulse toward metaphysics is to be well-founded and its prescriptions to have normative force, those assumptions or principles should be spelled out and justified. In short, advocates of naturalized or scientific metaphysics require epistemic infrastructure. This paper begins to supply it. The author first sketches (...)
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  13.  30
    Inductive Metaphysics: Editors' Introduction.Kristina Engelhard, Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Alexander Gebharter & Ansgar Seide - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):1-26.
    This introduction consists of two parts. In the first part, the special issue editors introduce inductive metaphysics from a historical as well as from a systematic point of view and discuss what distinguishes it from other modern approaches to metaphysics. In the second part, they give a brief summary of the individual articles in this special issue.
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  14.  83
    The Long and Winding Road.Peter Simons - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):75-89.
    Following its welcome revival in the late twentieth century, metaphysics in the analytic tradition has succumbed to decadence, with an astonishing variety of outlandish and extreme positions or “metaphysical follies” being taken seriously. This has caused an inevitable backlash among more scientifically-minded philosophers and incurred the scorn of scientists. Much of the reason for this is the blithe ignoring of empirical science by armchair metaphysicians. The roles of empirical knowledge in good, scientific metaphysics are however unclear. In virtue of its (...)
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  15.  22
    Maps, Language, and the Conceptual–Non-Conceptual Distinction.Mariela Aguilera & Federico Castellano - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98:287-315.
    To make the case for non-conceptualism, Heck draws on an apparent dichoto-my between linguistic and iconic representations. According to Heck, whereas linguistic representations have conceptual content, the content of iconic representations is non-conceptual. Based on the case of cartographic systems, the authors criticize Heck’s dichotomous distinction. They argue that maps are composed of semantically arbitrary elements that play different syntactic roles. Based on this, they claim that maps have a predicative structure and convey conceptual content. Finally, the authors argue that, (...)
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  16.  85
    Non-Uniformism and the Epistemology of Philosophically Interesting Modal Claims.Ylwa Sjölin Wirling - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98:629-656.
    Philosophers often make exotic-sounding modal claims, such as: “A timeless world is impossible”, “The laws of physics could have been different from what they are”, “There could have been an additional phenomenal colour”. Otherwise popular empiricist modal epistemologies in the contemporary literature cannot account for whatever epistemic justification we might have for making such modal claims. Those who do not, as a result of this, endorse scepticism with respect to their epistemic status typically suggest that they can be justified but (...)
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  17. Future Selves and Present Moral Philosophers.Jakob Lohmar - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98:436-445.
    Moral expertise requires a level of reliability in moral matters that is significantly higher than that of the average person. The author argues that this requirement of epistemic superiority in moral matters is sometimes fulfilled by our future selves and generally fulfilled by present moral philosophers. Our future selves are more reliable in answering moral questions than we are, when they have been prepared to answer those questions by various epistemic activities. But if our future selves are our epistemic superiors (...)
     
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