In his familiar essay in Phenomenology and the ‘Theological Turn’, Jean-François Courtine writes that the ‘cardinal experience’ of revelatory phenomena would undoubtedly be the incarnation. But in its singularity, this experience, he admits, seems to elude phenomenological thought. Against such a judgement, many Christian traditions affirm Christ's ongoing presence in diverse privileged sites, in the eucharist, saints, the Church itself, and, via Christ's own identification with ‘the least of these’ in Matthew's parable, in those who suffer. This essay considers this (...) last possibility of divine manifestation, taking up ‘the least of these’ to reconsider the relationship between finitude and the infinite in Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenogical account of revelation and saturation. While the heart of Marion's account, both in his words and according to his critics, has primarily concerned revelation's contradiction of finite experience, this essay argues that the development of Marion's own hermeneutics and his attentiveness to paradox and kenosis also reveal the confirmation of finitude at the heart of revelation. Revelation, that is, though it comes from elsewhere, is not other than finitude, but finitude otherwise, finitude's transfiguration. (shrink)

Anselm's Proslogion developed its famous argument through meditation on a single formula: ‘Now we believe that You are something than which nothing greater can be thought’. This article aims to re-enact such a meditation under changed conditions, bringing out a different sense of metaphysical dependence. That which cannot be thought without existing can now be located in (a) what really matters, (b) what is truly sincere, and (c) what is ultimately trustworthy. Once conceived as metaphysical problems, these offer a fresh (...) route into comprehending a metaphysical God who truly exists: a Christian Platonism, transvalued. The purpose of this article is introductory: to offer a route into this renewed way of thinking, rather than a comprehensive elaboration or a scholarly assessment of Anselm. (shrink)

The following article discusses Paul's conception of change regarding the resurrection body in 1 Cor 15:42‐44a. Our thesis is that Paul uses a popular Hellenistic cosmology and account of change to explain how the transformation of the body is possible. He uses seed imagery to contrast the pre‐and‐post‐resurrection bodies … the mortal and immortal bodies. Using rhetorical accommodation techniques, he resolves the Corinthian confusion regarding physical resurrection using popular Hellenistic ideas. Whereas some interpreters think that the resurrection body is terrestrial, (...) others find a rarefied extraction of matter like the Stoic material soul or a holistic transformation into a rarefied and/or celestial element fitted to a polarized heavenly environment. Our interpretation is characterized by material continuity and integrative rather than absolute polarity. Though Paul conceives of material continuity, he says nothing of rarefied bodies or their natural habitat. Jesus's resurrection and anticipated return suggest a transformation of the ‘flesh’ into a body capable of traversing both heavenly‐earthly spheres. Some think this view is incoherent, because it combines two incompatible conceptions of resurrection. Paul's solution seems to be that the resurrection body changes its properties as needed, depending on its environment. Hence, it never exemplifies incompatible properties at the same time. (shrink)

Within a broadly Thomistic frame, this paper shows how simple apophaticism in the theology of Pseudo‐Dionysius the Areopagite is the more fitting mode of knowing the triune God, beyond the use of all divine names. Specifically, we will proceed using the work of Father Bernard Lonergan, SJ on theological fittingness. After setting forth Father Lonergan's understanding of fittingness, the paper will proceed through Dionysius's cataphatic names, apophatic names, and apophatic silence. The cataphatic and apophatic names, while true, useful, and fittingly (...) said of God, will be shown to be imperfectly applied to God. As such, their fittingness pales in comparison to the simple silence of the intellect orientated towards God, despite such pure apophaticism's dissimilarity to normal human intellectual operations. (shrink)

Within a broadly Thomistic frame, this paper shows how simple apophaticism in the theology of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite is the more fitting mode of knowing the triune God, beyond the use of all divine names. Specifically, we will proceed using the work of Father Bernard Lonergan, SJ on theological fittingness. After setting forth Father Lonergan's understanding of fittingness, the paper will proceed through Dionysius's cataphatic names, apophatic names, and apophatic silence. The cataphatic and apophatic names, while true, useful, and fittingly (...) said of God, will be shown to be imperfectly applied to God. As such, their fittingness pales in comparison to the simple silence of the intellect orientated towards God, despite such pure apophaticism's dissimilarity to normal human intellectual operations. (shrink)

Desire and its cognates—longing, yearning—do a lot of hard work in modern theology, the work grounded in philosophical precedents going back at least as far as the early German Romantics. These precedents helped to inaugurate the twentieth century explorations of psychoanalysis. And so, desire re-entered theological conversation and some lessons were learnt; most evidently about bringing the body back to the soul and the spirit. Despite the impact of Nygren’s Agape and Eros thesis, the range ‘desire’ covers now in modern (...) theology admits no dualism between caritas and eros, and has actively promoted discussions that move fluidly between philosophy and theology. But a question remains that this essay can only begin to explore: what is desire? The question arises because, as theologians concerned with concepts closely allied to desiring, yearning, and longing—concepts such as grace, participation, friendship, love, and formation, for example—we employ it as if we knew what it is, and the mechanics of its operations are self-evident. But desire, this essay argues, is obscure and multiple, elusive, deceptive, and slippery. And that has theological implications. (shrink)