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  1. Diairesis_ and _Koinonia_ in _Sophist 253d1-E3.Colin C. Smith - 2020 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (1):1-20.
    Here I interpret a central passage in Plato's Sophist by focusing on understudied elements that provide insight into the fit of the dialogue's parts and the Sophist-Statesman diptych as a whole. I argue that the Eleatic Stranger's account of what the dialectician "adequately views" at Sophist 253d1-e3 involves both division and the communion of ontological kinds, not just one or the other as has been typically argued. I also consider other key passages and the turn throughout the dialogue from imagistic (...)
     
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  2. The Suicidal Philosopher: Plato's Socrates.Anna B. Christensen - 2020 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 37 (4):309-330.
    Since the Phaedo characterizes Socrates’s death as a punishment by Athens, many scholars argue that he could neither have been responsible for nor have intended his death, so that his death was not suicide. This is no mere semantic quibble: the question turns on issues of responsible and intentional action. I argue that the dialogues portray Socrates as committing suicide. To do so, I use a Platonic account of responsibility and intention to show how Athens and Socrates were jointly responsible (...)
     
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  3. Self-Deception, Emotions, and Imagination in Nietzsche.Emma Syea - 2020 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 37 (3):241-261.
    Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality includes several cases of agents who are, prima facie, self-deceived. Recent work has linked these cases to deflationary accounts on the one hand and intentionalist Sartrean accounts on the other. But neither is fully satisfactory. I suggest a new account that gives a central role to focused daydreaming and imagination, especially as related to affective content that threatens to destabilize self-deception. This approach, not neatly categorizable, builds upon both deflationary and intentionalist accounts, emphasizing links (...)
     
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  4.  8
    Cynics as Rational Animals.Michael-John Turp - 2020 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 37 (3):203-222.
    The Cynic exhortation to live according to nature is far from transparent. I defend a traditional interpretation: to live in accordance with nature is to live in accordance with human nature, which is to live as a rational animal. After discussing methodological concerns, I consider the theriophilic proposal that the ideal Cynic lives like an animal. I marshal evidence against this view and in favor of the alternative of Cynics as rational animals. Finally, I anticipate and address the concern that (...)
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  5. On Some Leibnizian Arguments for the Principle of Sufficient Reason.Stephen Harrop - 2020 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 37 (2):143-162.
    Leibniz often refers to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) as something like a first principle. In some texts, however, he attempts to give positive arguments in its favor. I examine two such arguments, and find them wanting. The first argument has two defects. First, it is question-begging; and second, when the question-begging step is excised, the principle one can in fact derive is highly counter-intuitive. The second argument is valid, but has the defect of only reaching a nearly trivial (...)
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  6.  16
    Peter of Palude and the Fiery Furnace.Zita Toth - 2020 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 37 (2):121-142.
    According to most medieval thinkers, whenever something causally acts on another thing, God also acts with it. Durand of St.-Pourçain, an early fourteenth-century Dominican philosopher, disagrees. This paper is about a fourteenth-century objection to Durand’s view, which I will call the Fiery Furnace Objection, as formulated by Durand’s contemporary, Peter of Palude. Although Peter of Palude is not usu- ally regarded as a particularly original thinker, this paper calls attention to one of his more interesting controversies with his fellow friar, (...)
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  7.  26
    C. I. Lewis Was a Foundationalist After All.Griffin Klemick - 2020 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 37 (1):77-99.
    While C. I. Lewis was traditionally interpreted as an epistemological foundationalist throughout his major works, virtually every recent treatment of Lewis's epistemology dissents. But the traditional interpretation is correct: Lewis believed that apprehensions of "the given" are certain independently of support from, and constitute the ultimate warrant for, objective empirical beliefs. This interpretation proves surprisingly capable of accommodating apparently contrary textual evidence. The non-foundationalist reading, by contrast, simply cannot explain Lewis's explicit opposition to coherentism and his insistence that only apprehensions (...)
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  8. A Problem in Du Châtelet's Metaphysical Foundations of Physics.Matias Kimi Slavov - 2020 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 37 (1):61-76.
    To provide metaphysical grounds for the physics of her time, Du Châtelet argued for the notion of an active force. This was different from the impressed force in Newton’s second law. The former force was a property of a body, whereas the latter was an external cause. I shall study this discrepancy and argue that the interactive concept of force in Newton’s third law is consistent with Du Châtelet’s standards for an intelligible physics. Consequently, the interaction entailed by the law (...)
     
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  9.  23
    On Wittgenstein’s Notion of a Surveyable Representation: The Case of Psychoanalysis.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2020 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (37):391–410.
    I demonstrate that analogies, both explicit and implicit, between Wittgenstein’s discussion of rituals, aesthetics, and psychoanalysis (and, indeed, his own philosophical methodology) suggest that he entertained the idea that Freud’s psychoanalytic project, when understood correctly—that is, as a descriptive project rather than an explanatory-hypothetical one—provides a “surveyable representation” (übersichtliche Darstellung) of certain psychological facts (as opposed to psychological concepts). The consequences of this account are that it offers an explanation of Wittgenstein’s admiration for and self-perceived affinity to Freud, as well (...)
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