View year:

  1. What is ‘Western Philosophy’?Peter West & Matyáš Moravec - 2024 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 13 (2).
    Recent discussions in the history of analytic philosophy have targeted questions about the concept of ‘Analytic Philosophy’ itself. Scholars, such as Glock (2008) and Preston (2004), have argued that ‘Analytic Philosophy’ cannot plausibly be characterised in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions and that other, more pragmatic, approaches must be taken instead. In this paper, we argue that similar questions that have recently emerged about the status of ‘Western Philosophy’ can be informed by these debates in the history of analytic (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Frege’s Conceptions of Elucidation.Wim Vanrie - 2024 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 13 (1).
    I argue that discussions of Frege’s conception of elucidation have suffered from a conflation of two distinct issues: elucidation of primitive scientific terms, and elucidation of the logical categories. The former seeks to bring us to grasp the Bedeutung of terms that stand at the beginning of the chain of definitions of a scientific system. The latter cannot be understood on the model of securing agreement in Bedeutung at all. I show how existing discussions of Fregean elucidation insufficiently take this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  18
    The Habitual Horizon.Bruce Rushing - 2024 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 12 (7).
    At the end of Frank Ramsey’s “General Propositions and Causality” ([1929b] 1990), he offers an enigmatic footnote that briefly describes his philosophy of science as a “forecasting theory”. What he means by this and by a “forecast” is unclear. However, elsewhere in his unpublished notes, he uses the term sporadically. An examination of those notes reveals the skeleton of a behavioral theory of mind. Ramsey held that all actions are at root driven by the sum total of a person’s dispositions (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  60
    Bertrand Russell’s Doxastic Sentimentalism (and Neutral Monism).Ryan Hickerson - 2024 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 12 (6).
    This paper reinterprets doxastic sentimentalism and neutral monism, as these doctrines appear in Bertrand Russell’s “On Propositions” (1919) and The Analysis of Mind (1921). It argues that Russell’s theory of belief, in this particular period, posited at least seven distinct types of feeling, but only one type of entity. The paper’s principal thesis is that Russell treated believing as feelings, but it also draws the conclusions that monism and sentimentalism are logically independent of one another, and that sentimentalism and (at (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  27
    Goodman's 'About': the Ryle factor.Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum - 2024 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 12 (5):1-27.
    Nelson Goodman’s paper ‘About’ (1961) was a milestone in aboutness theory. Although it has been much discussed, an interesting fact about it has so far been completely ignored: the important debt it owes to two papers it cites by Gilbert Ryle. With Ryle’s ‘About’ (1933) it shares much more than the title – it, too, offers a three-fold account of different ways a sentence can relate to a subject matter and a separate account for fictitious objects. More importantly, although Goodman’s (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6.  51
    Quine’s Problem.Nigel Hems - 2024 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 12 (4).
    This paper offers a defence of sense-datum statements from A.J. Ayer’s perspective that represents a response to Quine’s naturalistic ontology. Starting with Quine’s “On What There Is” (1948), and the following “Symposium” of 1951, I argue that Ayer’s proposed method of establishing sense-datum statements in his “Symposium” piece, which challenges Quine’s ontology of physical objects, is not a viable alternative to Quine’s scientific naturalism. I argue that by taking a broadly intensional approach, Ayer can offer a response to Quine’s position. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  70
    Wittgenstein and Frege on Negation and Denial.Colin Johnston - 2024 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 12 (3).
    Frege maintains that there are not two distinct acts, assertion and denial; rather, denying p is one and the same as asserting not-p. Wittgenstein appears not to recognise this identity in Frege, attributing to him the contrary view that a proposition may have one of two verbs, "is true" or "is false". This paper explains Wittgenstein’s attribution as a consequence of Frege’s treatment of content as theoretically prior to the act of judgment. Where content is prior to judgment, the denial (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Frank Ramsey's Anti-Intellectualism.Soroush Marouzi - 2024 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 12 (2):1-32.
    Frank Ramsey’s philosophy, developed in the 1920s in Cambridge, was in conversation with the debates surrounding intellectualism in the early twentieth century. Ramsey made his mark on the anti-intellectualist tradition via his notion of habit. He posited that human judgments take shape through habitual processes, and he rejected the separation between the domain of reason, on one hand, and the domain of habit, on the other. Ramsey also provided the ground to explore the nature of knowledge employed in acting from (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  53
    On 'Ontology'.Sam Whitman McGrath - 2024 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 12 (1).
    This paper uses the concept of metalinguistic negotiation, drawn from contemporary philosophy of language, to develop a novel interpretation of Carnap and Quine’s debate about ontology. Like recent revisionary accounts of the debate, it argues that the widespread perception of first-order disagreement between the two is misleading, ascribing this misperception to Carnap and Quine’s divergent usage of “ontology” and its cognates. Once this difference is accounted for, their seemingly contradictory claims about the subject can be reconciled, as the two “talk (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues