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  1.  9
    Reinventing Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Michael Ridge - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (4).
    I offer new arguments for an unorthodox reading of J. L. Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, one on which Mackie does not think all substantive moral claims are false, but allows that a proper subset of them are true. Further, those that are true should be understood in terms of a “hybrid theory”. The proposed reading is one on which Mackie is a conceptual pruner, arguing that we should prune away error-ridden moral claims but hold onto those already free (...)
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  2.  2
    David G. Stern, Brian Rogers, and Gabriel Citron, Eds., Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1933: From the Notes of G. E. Moore. [REVIEW]Mauro Luiz Engelmann - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (3).
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  3.  3
    Russell’s Use Theory of Meaning.Nicholas Griffin - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (3).
    Russell is often accused of having a naive ‘Fido’–Fido theory of meaning of the sort Wittgenstein attacked at the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations. In this paper I argue that he never held such a theory though I concede that, prior to 1918, he said various things that might lead a very careless reader to suppose that he had. However, in The Analysis of Mind, a book which we know Wittgenstein studied closely, Russell put forward an account of understanding an (...)
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  4.  2
    Sandra Lapointe, Ed., Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century. [REVIEW]Steven Horst - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (2).
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  5.  5
    What is the Sceptical Solution?Alexander Miller - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (2).
    In chapter 3 of Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke’s Wittgenstein offers a “sceptical solution" to the sceptical paradox about meaning developed in chapter 2 (according to which there are no facts in virtue of which ascriptions of meaning such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” can be true). Although many commentators have taken the sceptical solution to be broadly analogous to non-factualist theories in other domains, such as non-cognitivism or expressivism in metaethics, the nature of the sceptical solution (...)
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  6.  66
    Gilbert Ryle and the Ethical Impetus for Know-How.Matt Dougherty - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (1):01-21.
    This paper aims to shed light on an underexplored aspect of Gilbert Ryle’s interest in the notion of “knowing-how”. It is argued that in addition to his motive of discounting a certain theory of mind, his interest in the notion also stemmed (and perhaps stemmed more deeply) from two ethical interests: one concerning his own life as a philosopher and whether the philosopher has any meaningful task, and one concerning the ancient issue of whether virtue is a kind of knowledge. (...)
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