In this paper I contrast different versions of Greek rhetoric that in the late Hellenistic period were exported to Rome by both rhetoricians and philosophers, and show how with regard to Roman law these versions differed in aim and in application. With regard to the application in law, I argue that in Rome’s unique practice of resolving disputes between citizens – i.e. done with the help of specialists – the Stoic conception of rhetoric as the longer, explanatory version of dialectic, (...) aiming at what is correct and true, was useful in conveying the correct answer to non-specialists, the judge included, whereas the Academics’, and more specifically Philo of Larissa’s, conception of rhetoric, aiming at what is verisimilar, is above all useful in the public realm, that is in political and forensic speeches. (shrink)

Aristotle follows the Socrates of Plato's Gorgias in contrasting rhetoric with teaching. For him, premises of arguments must in rhetoric be reputable ( endoxa), but in teaching be archai of the relevant science. And teaching requires recognition of the speaker's authority, rhetoric does not. Like Socrates, he thinks teaching but not rhetoric requires knowledge of your subject. Unlike Socrates, Aristotle does not for this reason reject rhetoric as dangerous, but accepts it as useful for public and interpersonal deliberation.

Reader of Plato's dialogues realize that while Socrates in the Gorgias criticizes rhetoric in strong terms he nevertheless proves to be a brilliant rhetorician. One wonders why Plato's Socrates sometimes combines persuasive as well as argumentative elements in his philosophical conversations. This paper argues that Socrates uses persuasive elements, when he addresses interlocutors who might be talented but often have difficulties to trust rational arguments and might hesitate to accept them and to act accordingly, even if they agree that the (...) arguments seem to them coherent and plausible. Socrates uses traditional persuasive elements, but transforms them into a pedagogical tool for philosophy. (shrink)

This paper argues that despite prima facie impressions, the first Stoics (the 3rd c. bc) put forward a conception of rhetoric of similar if not of equal importance as that of Plato and Aristotle, who represent two landmarks in the earliest development of what we may call ‘philosophical rhetoric’. The paper shows that the Stoics built upon their predecessors’ ideas, and that once we see this continuity, common features in Plato’s, Aristotle’s and the Stoics’ conception of rhetoric come to the (...) fore. For all of them argumentation, logical or dialectical, is at the core of philosophical rhetoric. The paper also addresses passages in Plutarch which accuse the Stoics of contradiction in their approach to rhetoric. (shrink)

This paper draws a taxonomy of the use of rhetorical genres in teaching and writings by the Platonists of Late Antiquity (from Iamblichus at the turn of the third/fourth century ad to the Platonists of Athens and Alexandria in the fifth and sixth centuries). It is a rich gamut of genres, including encomia of heroes (biographies), of sciences (protreptics), of gods (theologies), mirrors of princes. It also examines some rhetorical argumentative techniques. The question of the difference between good and bad (...) rhetoric is discussed. While being critical of rhetors who cater to popular opinions and bases desires, the Platonists of Late Antiquity found room for a ‘true’ rhetoric, in the service of philosophy, inspired by knowledge and seeking the good. (shrink)

Plotinus’ Enneads display a strategy of persuasion that can be called a philosophical rhetoric in more than just a general sense. It takes its lead from Plato’s definition of rhetoric as psychagogy and is, at least to some extent, theorized in Ennead V 3.6. Plotinus starts from the fact that logical necessity does not always entail inner assent, which he explains with the fallen state of the embodied soul – the addressee of all philosophical speech – and the influence of (...) the senses. To heal the discrepancy of necessity and persuasion, which on the level of pure Intellect does not exist, philosophy must persuade the soul to ascend to the Intelligible, where it has its true roots. To achieve this goal, Plotinus combines two modes of philosophical speech: the ‘necessity mode’, which considers intelligible Being in itself and from its proper principles, and the ‘persuasive mode’, which teaches soul to view itself as a part and offspring of the intelligible world. Some examples, mainly from Ennead V.3, show how this combination works in practice and how it can be transferred to the Neoplatonic One, which, being ineffable, is strictly speaking unaccessible to speech and rhetoric. (shrink)

Prime matter plays an indispensable role in Aristotle’s philosophy, enabling him to avoid the pitfalls of both naïve Platonism and nominalism. Prime matter is best thought of as a kind of infinitely divisible and atomless bare particularity, grounding the distinctness of distinct members of the same species. Such bare particularity is needed in symmetrical situations, like a world consisting of indistinguishable Max Black spheres. Bare particularity is especially important in modern physics, given the homogeneity and isotropy of space. With the (...) importance of fields in classical, relativistic, and quantum physics, we have good reason to prefer something like Aristotle’s continuous, infinitely divisible matter over indivisible particles. Mass and energy in relativistic physics also points in the direction of prime matter as the enduring substrate of these quantities. Recent work on Aristotelian interpretations of quantum mechanics, further underscores the contemporary relevance of prime matter. (shrink)

Medieval interpretations of hylomorphism, in which substances are conceived as metaphysical composites of prime matter and substantial form, are receiving attention in contemporary philosophy. It has even been suggested that a recovery of Aquinas's conception of prime matter as a ‘pure potentiality’, lacking any actuality apart from substantial form, may be expedient in hylomorphic interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we consider a recent hylomorphic interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the theory of Cosmic Hylomorphism, which does not explicitly invoke (...) any notion of prime matter in its original formulation. We argue that prime matter does in fact play a role in constituting and individuating particles in this theory. However, we demonstrate that the notion of prime matter which features in the extended version of Cosmic Hylomorphism that we propose here is distinct from Aquinas's conception of prime matter, inasmuch as it has discrete metaphysical parts. (shrink)

The traditional concept of prime matter – a purely potential substratum that persists through substantial change and serves to constitute the generated substance – has played a dwindling part in Aristotelian scholarship over the centuries. In medieval interpretations of Aristotle, prime matter was thought to play these two roles in all substantial changes, not only in changes at the level of the four elements. In more recent centuries, traditional prime matter was relegated only to the context of substantial changes between (...) the four elements. And in the last few decades of Aristotelian scholarship, it has become common either to downplay or even to eliminate prime matter’s role in elemental changes too. I will support the traditional concept of prime matter by showing that it aligns Aristotle’s view of elemental change with one of the central constraints on matter imposed in his Physics to a degree that cannot be achieved on the non-traditional interpretations: the need for matter to be in potentiality in a way that avoids the two problematic extremes of mere persistence, on the one hand, and destruction, on the other. This point will be supported by Aristotle’s rejection of both monism and pluralism in On Generation and Corruption. Second, I will argue that Aristotle calls for precisely the same kind of potentiality in a very different context: his critique of Anaxagoras’s view of matter in the Generation of Animals. Here the very same problematic extremes of mere persistence and destruction that plague the alternate views to traditional prime matter also plague the dominant views on the matter for animal generation. Especially since Aristotle takes living things to be paradigmatic substances, these comparisons suggest that the apparent idiosyncrasies of elemental transformation which have motivated interpreters to depart from traditional prime matter may not be so idiosyncratic after all. And if that is so, it may be that the problem lies not so much with traditional prime matter as with our assumptions about how persistence and constitution work in substantial change according to Aristotle. In the end, this line of argument opens the door to three new potential interpretations of the matter for substantial generation in Aristotle, interpretations which align with his concept of potentiality and – to varying degrees – with traditional prime matter as well. (shrink)

Scholastic hylomorphism conceives prime matter and substantial form as metaphysical parts of every physical substance. During the early modern period, both hylomorphic constituents faced significant criticism as scientists and philosophers sought to replace Aristotelianism with physical explanations for the workings of the universe. This paper focuses specifically on prime matter and delves into the arguments put forth by four 16th-century scholastic philosophers – Toledo, Fonseca, Góis, and Suárez – in their attempts to establish the existence of prime matter. Firstly, I (...) analyse a set of arguments rooted in substantial change, which emphasize the crucial role of a persistent, common substrate in the processes of generation and corruption. Secondly, I explore a set of ex-nihilo arguments and, thirdly, I examine a series of demonstrations based on the interplay between accidental and substantial change. Although these three sets of arguments converge on the necessity of a common substrate for substantial change to occur, they fall short of demonstrating that this substrate is both prime and shared by all natural entities. Fourthly, I turn to a set of arguments centred on the impossibility of infinite regress, designed to complement those related to natural change, and I assess additional arguments that do not primarily focus on substantial change. Lastly, I draw my conclusions on these argumentative strategies to demonstrate the existence of prime matter. (shrink)

Medieval interpretations of hylomorphism, in which substances are conceived as metaphysical composites of prime matter and substantial form, are receiving attention in contemporary philosophy. It has even been suggested that a recovery of Aquinas's conception of prime matter as a ‘pure potentiality’, lacking any actuality apart from substantial form, may be expedient in hylomorphic interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we consider a recent hylomorphic interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the theory of Cosmic Hylomorphism, which does not explicitly invoke (...) any notion of prime matter in its original formulation. We argue that prime matter does in fact play a role in constituting and individuating particles in this theory. However, we demonstrate that the notion of prime matter which features in the extended version of Cosmic Hylomorphism that we propose here is distinct from Aquinas's conception of prime matter, inasmuch as it has discrete metaphysical parts. (shrink)