View year:

  1. Forgiveness and Moral Luck.Daniel Telech - 2024 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 14:227-251.
    Proceeding from the assumptions that forgiveness is at least sometimes elective and that it changes the normative relations between victims and wrongdoers, this paper argues that our practices of forgiveness are subject to an overlooked form of moral luck, forgiveness-luck. Forgiveness-luck is introduced via reflection on ‘differential forgiveness’, wherein of two equally culpable and remorseful agents, one is forgiven and the other not, and both justifiably so. In being forgiven—at least if forgiveness is normatively significant— one undergoes a positive alteration (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Explanatory Pluralism in Normative Ethics.Pekka Väyrynen - 2024 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 14:138-161.
    Some theorists of normative explanation argue that we can make sense of debates between first-order moral theories such as consequentialism and its rivals only if we understand their explanations of why the right acts are right and the wrong acts are wrong as generative (e.g. grounding) explanations. Others argue that the standard form of normative explanation is, instead, some kind of unification. Neither sort of explanatory monism can account for all the explanations of particular moral facts that moral theorists seek (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues