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  1.  12
    Does moral anti-theodicy beg the question?Gabriel Echazú - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (2):115-130.
    Some philosophers of religion have argued that moral anti-theodicy begs the question. This paper evaluates the arguments from two such philosophers, writing a decade apart—Robert Mark Simpson, and Lauri Snellman. Simpson argues that any global argument against theodicy must allow for the possibility of there existing a plausible theodicy, and that anti-theodical arguments (the argument from insensitivity, the argument from detachment, and the argument from harmful consequences) all implicitly discount this possibility, thus ending up begging the question. Snellman argues that (...)
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  2.  5
    Future contingency, future indeterminacy, and grounding: comments on Todd.Alan R. Rhoda - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (2):209-215.
  3.  12
    Book symposium: Patrick Todd, The open future: why future contingents are all false. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. 224 pp. $80.00. [REVIEW]Daniel Rubio - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (2):217-223.
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  4. On the metaphysics of the incarnation.Joshua R. Sijuwade - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (2):153-185.
    This article aims to provide an elucidation of the doctrine of the Incarnation. A new ‘reduplication strategy’ and ‘compositional model’ is formulated through the utilisation of certain concepts and theses from contemporary metaphysics, which will enable the doctrine of the Incarnation to be explicated in a clear and consistent manner, and the oft-raised objections against it being fully dealt with.
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  5.  8
    Book Symposium: Patrick Todd, The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. 224 pp. $80.00. [REVIEW]Patrick Todd - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (2):205-207.
  6.  3
    Book symposium: Patrick Todd, The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. 224 pp. $80.00. [REVIEW]Patrick Todd - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (2):225-231.
  7.  30
    God’s necessary existence: a thomistic perspective.Åke Wahlberg - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (2):131-152.
    There are strong reasons for assuming that Thomas Aquinas conceived of God’s existence in terms of logical necessity in a broad sense. Yet this seems to stand in some tension with the fact that he excludes the possibility of a priori arguments for the existence of God. One apparently attractive way of handling this tension is to use a two-dimensional framework inspired by Saul Kripke. Against this, this article demonstrates that a Kripke-inspired framework is inapt in this context because it (...)
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  8.  23
    Descartes on intellectual joy and the intellectual love of god.Zachary Agoff - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (1):1-19.
    Descartes maintains that we can love God and that it is pleasant and morally beneficial to do so. In this essay, I examine the necessary conditions for such an intellectual love of God. I argue that the intellectual love of God is incited by a judgment that we are joined to God in reality, which is constitutive of an intellectual joy. I go on to show that the intellectual love of God is, itself, constituted by a stripping of our private (...)
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  9.  37
    Oppy on arguments and worldviews: an internal critique.Bálint Békefi - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (1):61-76.
    This paper develops an internal critique of Graham Oppy’s metaphilosophy of religion – his theories of argumentation, worldview comparison, and epistemic justification. First, it presents Oppy’s views and his main reasons in their favor. Second, it argues that Oppy is committed to two claims – that only truth-conducive reasons can justify philosophical belief and that such justification depends entirely on one’s judgments about the theoretical virtues of comprehensive worldviews – that jointly entail the unacceptable conclusion that philosophical beliefs cannot be (...)
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  10. Future contingency, future indeterminacy, and grounding: comments on Todd: Book symposium: Patrick Todd, The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. 224 pp. $80.00. [REVIEW]Alan R. Rhoda - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (1):103-109.
    Invited discussion paper on Patrick Todd's book, _The Open Future: Why Future Contingents Are All False_ (Oxford, 2021).
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  11.  72
    Simply providential: a Thomistic response to Schmid’s providential collapse argument against classical theism.Daniel Shields - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (1):77-91.
    Classical theism is often said to suffer from the problem of modal collapse: if God is necessary and simple then all of his effects (creatures) are also necessary. Many classical theists have turned to extrinsic predication in response: God’s simple and necessary act is compatible with any number of possible effects or no effects, and is only said to be an act of creating in virtue of the existence of the universe itself. Leftow and Schmid criticize this solution for leading (...)
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  12.  20
    Arguing from cognitive science of religion: is religious belief debunked? [REVIEW]Wes Skolits - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (1):111-113.
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  13.  49
    The premortalist free will defense.James Spiegel - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (1):49-59.
    As a response to the problem of evil, the free will defense proposes that evil might exist as a consequence of God’s endowing human beings with moral freedom which we have tragically misused. Standard versions of the free will defense assume that (1) our moral freedom began in this earthly existence and (2) what explains our suffering in this world must constitute an abuse rather than a right use of our moral freedom. However, there is another variation of the free (...)
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  14.  28
    Abhinavagupta, the hard problem of consciousness, and the moral grounding problem. [REVIEW]Anand Jayprakash Vaidya - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (1):93-101.
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  15. Incompatible And Incomparable Perfections: A New Argument Against Perfect Being Theism.Jashiel Resto Quiñones - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-19.
    Perfect being theism is the view that the perfect being exists and the property being-perfect is the property being-God. According to the strong analysis of perfection, a being is perfect just in case it exemplifies all perfections. On the other hand, the weak analysis of perfection claims that a being is perfect just in case it exemplifies the best possible combination of compatible perfections. Strong perfect being theism accepts the former analysis while weak perfect being theism accepts the latter. In (...)
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  16. Mystical ineffability: a nonconceptual theory.Sebastian Gäb - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-16.
    This paper discusses the nonconceptual theory of mystical ineffability which claims that mystical experiences can’t be expressed linguistically because they can’t be conceptualized. I discuss and refute two objections against it: (a) that unconceptualized experiences are impossible, and (b) that the theory is ad hoc because it provides no reason for why mystical experiences should be unconceptualizable. I argue against (a) that distinguishing different meanings of ‘object of experience’ leaves open the possibility of non-empty but objectless nonconceptual experiences. I show (...)
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