In the first part of the article, Giuseppe Veronese’s concept of arithmetical constructivism is reconstructed from his dispersed remarks. It is pointed out that although for Veronese time is a necessary condition for the construction of natural numbers by an individual subject and the subject cognizes time in an a priori way, it is not a (proto-)intuition of the subject. This is a fundamental difference between the concept proposed by Veronese and the constructivism of Kant and Brouwer. Veronese’s justification of (...) the subject’s ability to cognize infinity, represented in his text by infinite sequences, is analyzed in the second part of the paper. The only condition for the cognition of the infinite sequence is to have a rule according to which its successive terms “follow one another.” The price of the ability to cognize the infinitive “whole” (sequence) may be the uncognizability of certain “parts” (terms of sequence). Infinite sequences, cognizable according to Veronese, are allowed as objects of mathematical research, although they do not meet the condition of constructability. (shrink)

The paper presents a formalization of Henryk Elzenberg’s system of axiology, which features the notions of value, ought, and obligation. The formalization I propose is constructed in the language of sentential modal logic. However, as Elzenberg was well aware, his system of axiology had several difficulties. To avoid them, I propose a modification of the system’s foundations and show that it preserves the formal properties of ought and obligation postulated by Elzenberg. To show this, I express in the proposed formal (...) language a certain theory of the logic of preference that I describe from the syntactical as well as the semantical point of view. (shrink)

Surveys are the most widely used research tool in experimental philosophy. In this paper, I analyze two types of criticism of the questionnaire method put forward in the literature. The first type is metaphilosophical. It asserts that the surveys used by experimental philosophers are based on a flawed and unproductive method of cases. The second type is methodological. It argues that currently used questionnaires are unfit to measure philosophically relevant phenomena. I show that these objections can be met by a) (...) improving questionnaires used in research practice and b) expanding the methodological repertoire of experimental philosophy. (shrink)

One of the essential aspects of the dispute between scientific realism and anti-realism is the question of the ontological status of unobservable objects assumed by scientific theories and models. Scientific realism claims that these objects exist in the natural world, while anti-realism denies this. The missing mass problem is a good example of an issue that requires that this question be resolved. In cosmology, this problem is solved by assuming the presence of dark matter and dark energy. The difficulty, however, (...) is that experience does not provide direct evidence for the existence of these two „substances.” In the first part of the article, the differences between scientific realism and anti-realism are discussed. In the second and third parts, the problem of the missing mass is presented (special attention is paid to the difficulties with the empirical confirmation of the existence of dark matter and dark energy). The fourth part of the article discusses the arguments of the supporters of half-realism, which is a kind of compromise between scientific realism and anti-realism. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the incompatibility of Evolutionary Epistemology of Theories (EET) with Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. The argument consists of four parts, each addressing a specific problem with EET and offering examples. Firstly, advocates of EET frequently misapply Darwin’s theory by asserting that evolution is teleological, which is at odds with Darwinism. Secondly, the “universal Darwinism” underlying EET is inconsistent with the relativism present in Darwin’s theory. Thirdly, because of the relativistic character of Darwin’s theory, philosophies that appeal to (...) it need to provide additional justification for using Darwin’s ideas outside of biology, which EET fails to do. Finally, the paper demonstrates that the Darwinocentric historiography proposed by EET underappreciates neo-Lamarckism, whose model of evolution is closer to that used in EET. (shrink)

This article aims at identifying the relevance of character research, conducted by Stepan Baley, a representative of the Ukrainian branch of the Lviv-Warsaw School. To achieve this, the author first analyzes the key points of Baley’s characterology, and then demonstrates its potential from the perspective of Twardowski’s philosophical tradition and within the ethical debate on the empirical approach to character. The author concludes that it is impossible, according to Baley, to obtain accurate and complete knowledge of character, as well as (...) it is impossible to educate a person in a certain way. (shrink)

This article discusses selected conceptions of aesthetic value formulated by representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School, including Kazimierz Twardowski, Władysław Witwicki, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Mieczysław Walfisz-Wallis, Stanisław Ossowski, Leopold Blaustein, and Tadeusz Kotarbiński.

The paper critically examines the thesis, popular in the literature, that Leopold Blaustein’s aesthetics is first and foremost a phenomenological discipline. I argue that the “phenomenological” nature of Blaustein’s philosophy follows from Brentano and Twardowski, rather than from Husserl. I therefore claim that Blaustein’s aesthetics is determined by two equally important themes: (1) a descriptive-psychological and (2) a “phenomenological” one. The article is structured as follows. The introduction situates Blaustein’s aesthetics within classical aesthetics. Section 1 reconstructs the Brentanian background of (...) Blaustein’s aesthetics. Section 2 contains a discussion of Blaustein’s assessment of Twardowski’s theory of presentations, which is followed, in Section 3, by an analysis of Blaustein’s example descriptions of aesthetic experiences. These descriptions are discussed in Section 4, which also reconstructs the main elements of Blaustein’s phenomenology of aesthetic experiences. Against this background, the question of the alleged psychologism of Blaustein’s aesthetics is addressed in Conclusions. (shrink)

Kazimierz Twardowski attributed high cognitive value to introspection because he believed it plays a fundamental role in psychology, the primary philosophical discipline. He believed that basing philosophy on inner experience would allow it to obtain universal and justified results. Internal experience consists of perceiving one’s own mental facts; it is non-sensual and selfevident. Twardowski referred to introspection in his investigations in various ways, which is presented in the article.

Late in life, Józef Maria Bocheński set out to examine the age-old preoccupation with the question “how to live as well and as long as possible?” A traditional answer has been, “live wisely.” In his Handbook of Worldly Wisdom (2020), Bocheński analyzes this answer arguing that, conceptually, living wisely is distinct from obeying moral commandments, prescribing ethical rules, and recognizing authority (e.g., piety, free submission to divine authority). He claims that ethics consists solely in what moral philosophers label as “metaethics” (...) — a theoretical discipline interested in the conceptual status of moral discourse qua discourse. However, Bocheński remains silent about a substantive ethics — that is, how a life led one way or another subscribes to some guiding value-set. As regards wisdom, therefore, the consequence of this position is that Bocheński’s account is ethically neutral. I argue that such a position entails a tension and dichotomy between, on the one hand, prudential rationality concerned with getting on in the moment — that is, wisdom — and, on the other hand, unconditional moral commandments. For his part, Bocheński does not recommend living according to wisdom’s precepts as he analyses them; his own path through life, he tells us, has been a commitment to Christian values, piety abetted by observance of moral commandments, a perspective that, I submit, is not ethically neutral: on the contrary, it entails thick, substantive value-choice. Bocheński’s avowal suggests a second dichotomy and tension, that between the worldly conduct of life, with moderate acknowledgment of moral principles, and an extra-worldly perspective (the “folly of the Cross”). Bocheński does not attempt to resolve either dichotomy, to seek a possible point of their convergence and integration, for instance by inquiring into moral psychology (i.e., the construction of self, the nature of the will, etc.). I believe that this set of views stems from conclusions Bocheński reached in advance of producing the Handbook that bear on, first, how philosophy should be conducted — as logical analysis hostile to grandiloquent speculation and synthesis (“worldviews”); and second, his utter dismissal as nefarious of anthropocentric views. Indeed, Bocheński asserts, without a blush, that almost everything “we” have come to believe about ourselves is superstition writ large. I trace what I consider to be difficulties with Bocheński’s account of wisdom — in relation to his take on morality, (meta-)ethics, and piety — to these idiosyncratic views. (shrink)

The article presents the results of several years of analytical and reconstruction efforts carried out by the author who focused on archival writings by Mieczysław Wallis, a representative of the second generation of the Lvov-Warsaw School, which were to a large extent unknown to readers. Wallis’ intellectual profile has been associated so far mostly with his writings on art criticism, aesthetics, theory, and history of art. In the light of painstaking, multistage research of the large collection of his unpublished archival (...) works, it turned out that the current perception of his intellectual preferences and academic achievements is too narrow and simplified. What is especially little known and insufficiently edited are his notes on philosophical anthropology, discussing the question of human existence and human activity in the world. They contain a unique philosophical program based on the axiological concept called psychological relationism. Its main category is the “homo creativus” approach. Wallis’ intellectual program is a valuable contribution to the achievements of the Lvov-Warsaw School and, in general, to the Polish philosophy of the 20th century. (shrink)

This article presents the main epistemological and axiological assumptions of the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS) and argues that these assumptions led to agnosticism and the conviction about the irrationality of religious beliefs, so common among the LWS members. It is shown that these assumptions were deeply rooted in the tradition of modern epistemic individualism and evidentialism. The final part of the paper discusses two contemporary modifications of the epistemology characteristic of Twardowski and his disciples. The first one, formulated by Jacek Jadacki, (...) is the conception of directival rationality; the second has been proposed by Ryszard Kleszcz and can be labeled relative rationality. Both these conceptions compromise on the LWS firm position concerning the irrationality of religious beliefs and make it possible to regard such beliefs as rational. (shrink)

Kazimierz Twardowski was renowned as an outstanding philosopher, teacher, and organizer of academic life. No less famous was his style of work, depicted in many recollections of his students. In the paper, I present three aspects of good mental work: a) stoic inspiration for Kazimierz Twardowski’s style of work, b) the place of the techniques of mental work in the program of pragmatic logic according to the views of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Tadeusz Kotarbiński, and c) selected contemporary approaches consistent with (...) the direction provided by the Lvov-Warsaw School. By exploring a new perspective in the study of good mental work by linking it to the ancient philosophy of life as well as to the most recent developments in the theory of good mental work, the paper reveals unexplored insights into the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School, demonstrating its significance, depth, and relevance to modern times. (shrink)

Tadeusz Kotarbiński never formulates explicitly the project of an intellectual ethics, but we can reconstruct his answer from his Traktat o dobrej robocie (1955; Eng. transl.: Praxiology: An introduction to the Sciences of Efficient Action, 1965) and his ethical writings. Kotarbiński does not formulate an explicit meta-ethics of values, and seems to develop a purely functionalist conception according to which there is nothing more in intellectual ethics than a conception of efficient action. However, he has a theory of practical values (...) and skills that can be applied to the aims and norms of the epistemic domain. But can he secure a genuine conception of intellectual values if these are merely immanent to “efficient work”? (shrink)

The article examines the concept of anti-irrationalism coined by the members of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The term “anti-irrationalism” comes from Ajdukiewicz, who used it to define the specificity of the School as a whole. For Ajdukiewicz, anti-irrationalism, which values cognition with intersubjective qualities, is contrasted with irrationalism. The article discusses Twardowski’s tripartite division of beliefs into rational, “irrational,” and “non-rational.” Against this background, the article explores Dąmbska’s view on irrationalism, which is divided by her into several subcategories.Finally, the author considers (...) the question of anti-irrationalism as a metaphilosophical standpoint in the context of the question of a worldview. (shrink)

Since Kazimierz Twardowski introduced the notions of “symbolomania” and “pragmatophobia,” the relationship between logic and reality was the focus of the philosophers from the Lvov-Warsaw School — inter alia two prominent logicians of the group, Stanisław Leśniewski and Jan Łukasiewicz. Bolesław Sobociński has pointed out, however, that there was a contrast between their approach to logic and reality. Despite being members of the same philosophical group and even colleagues from the same department, their philosophical views on the position of logic (...) in reality differed considerably. Yet they both agreed that reality has a certain importance for logic and that logic could be valuable for reality. The aim of this paper is to introduce their divergent positions and describe in more detail how Leśniewski and Łukasiewicz understood the relationship between logic and the real world. (shrink)

The article explores the concept of scientific philosophy as understood by members of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The author argues that according to Twardowski and his students, philosophy should be done as an exact discipline which ought to be pursued in critical and collaborative spirit. Selected views on scientific philosophy are analyzed, including ideas of Ajdukiewicz, Zawirski, and Dąmbska. It is claimed that though the conception of scientific philosophy is beset with crucial and fundamental ambiguities, it was far more important for (...) the Lvov-Warsaw School than the idea of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The Polish School of Logic flourished in the period 1920-1939. Philosophically, it was influenced by Kazimierz Twardowski, professor at the University of Lwow (now Lviv in Ukraine), who established the Lwow-Warsaw School, to which the mentioned logical group belonged. Twardowski claimed that logic is very important in every kind of human activity, professional as well as private. Hence, every argument should be clearly formulated and proceed by correct inferential rules. These postulates involved semiotics, formal logic, and methodology of science — (...) that is, logica sensu largo. This position was accepted by Twardowski’s most distinguished students, such as Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, and Tadeusz Kotarbiński, who graduated before 1914, as well as the next generation of logicians and philosophers, particularly by Alfred Tarski. Although all these people considered logic, philosophy, and science as completely neutral with respect to politics and ideology, they treated logical skills as indispensable in political activities. In philosophical specialized terminology, Polish logicians regarded logic as a weapon against irrationalism. This position was also represented by Polish logicians who did not belong to the group of Twardowski’s students. (shrink)

This article explores the question of how the members of the Lvov-Warsaw School promoted values that can be regarded as components of so-called logical culture. The author argues that these values are strictly connected with science. With references to Łukasiewicz, Czeżowski, and Kotarbiński,the article explores how values shape the logical culture and determines society as directed towards values. The article connects the meta-philosophical perspective with the philosophical one.

This paper presents the fundamental problems of metaphysics of words and reconstructs David Kaplan’s intentional metaphysics of words. I critically analyze Kaplan’s proposal and present the most important objections. I also propose some possible answers to the objections.