The same subjectivity that makes the world appear belongs, as an integral part, to that which it makes appear, so that there is no alternative between the phenomenological involvement of the world by subjectivity and the ontological involvement of subjectivity by the world. These are the two faces, already abstract, of a fundamental and original situation, in other words, a primitive fact or an archifact. We have thus transported the correlation to the terrain of the world in the form of (...) a double position of the subject, which I have further formulated metaphorically through the distinction between being before and being within. So, what does it mean to belong to the world, or rather, what are the senses of belonging implied by the fundamental situation we have just described? (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between French phenomenology of art and metaphysics. More specifically, it highlights four points. Firstly, French phenomenological aesthetics is characterized by a certain ignorance of the renewal of artistic questioning initiated by Anglo-Saxon aesthetics. Secondly, French phenomenology of art is a metaphysics of art, which considers that works of art contain an ontological (cosmophanic or theophanic) revelation. Thirdly, French phenomenology of art is part of the “theological turn of French phenomenology”. Authors tend towards theology or “cosmotheology”. (...) Fourthly, French phenomenology of art, which is a metaphysics of the sensible, possesses the theoretical means to think philosophically about conceptual art. (shrink)

The recent liberation of phenomenology’s “metaphysical” word seems to us to present a twofold risk: on the one hand, that of leading us to lose in intension what they will have made us gain in extension - what exactly does the term “metaphysical” mean here, and can we even hope to provide an exact definition? On the other hand, it would convert our former reservations, which may indeed have been excessive, into a temerity that would ultimately be no less so. (...) The aim we have set ourselves here must therefore be modest: to attempt to avert this twofold risk by first equipping ourselves with a clear and unambiguous concept of what is or could legitimately be understood by the term “phenomenological metaphysics; to show then how and why phenomenology, rightly or wrongly, but without really realizing what was preventing it from doing so, has never really managed to do so; to indicate finally the question that a “phenomenological metaphysics” conforming to its concept would have to ask, and to which it would have to commit itself to answer. (shrink)

Starting again from Descartes' philosophy, our intention in this article is not to leave phenomenology, but to return to it in order to shed new light on how it encounters metaphysics and revives it. It is a question of inscribing French phenomenology in another history of metaphysics, one that is underground and unofficial and which lives, in truth, from that very thing that completes the other or which the other completes. Initially, we will focus on Jean-Luc Marion's reading of Descartes (...) from the paradigm offered by Heidegger. Secondly, we would like to replay the confrontation between Descartes and Pascal. Only in the third stage, then, will we be able to return to how metaphysics, most often assumed as such from its Cartesian configuration, has worked under the surface of the phenomenology its French representatives received from Husserl and Heidegger. Levinas can often serve as an exemplary figure. (shrink)

In this article, I intend to show, first of all, that the metaphysical neutrality of the Logical Investigations leads to untenable consequences and even threatens the coherence of Husserl's project. In truth, Husserl's distinction between phenomenology and metaphysics and its corollary, the pure and simple exclusion of metaphysical problems - such as that of the reality of the so-called external world - from the field of nascent phenomenology, make it impossible to give a satisfactory form to a problem as central (...) to this new discipline as that of perception. However, my final word will not be on the indis-soluble link between the problems that phenomenology poses for itself and those that Husserl would like to be able to "purify" it from the outset. However permeable the boundaries between these two general directions of research may be, phenomenology and metaphysics are not equivalent. Phenomenology can even be said to contribute to formulating and solving certain metaphysical problems, starting with the idealism/realism antithesis. It is to this contribution that I will devote the second part of these reflections. (shrink)

In this article, I intend to show, first of all, that the metaphysical neutrality of the Logical Investigations leads to untenable consequences and even threatens the coherence of Husserl's project. In truth, Husserl's distinction between phenomenology and metaphysics and its corollary, the pure and simple exclusion of metaphysical problems - such as that of the reality of the so-called external world - from the field of nascent phenomenology, make it impossible to give a satisfactory form to a problem as central (...) to this new discipline as that of perception. However, my final word will not be on the indissoluble link between the problems that phenomenology poses for itself and those that Husserl would like to be able to “purify” it from the outset. However permeable the boundaries between these two general research directions may be, phenomenology and metaphysics are not equivalent. Phenomenology can even be said to contribute to formulating and solving certain metaphysical problems, starting with the idealism/realism antithesis. It is to this contribution that I will devote the second part of these reflections. (shrink)

According to Husserl, the mathematization of the lifeworld involves reducing it, as object of knowledge, to what is measurable, as well as excluding other forms of knowledge of it. This has important implications in relation to the modern conception of rationality, and, significantly, of practical rationality. More precisely, it issues in an impoverishment of the notion of reason. This article examines the idea that the process of commodification associated with the consolidation and expansion of capitalism has motivated another aspect of (...) the mathematization of nature to which Husserl alludes: the mathematization of value. Born from capitalist economy and from practical attitudes, this mathematization of value is a tendency to reduce all value to use value. In such context, this article offers a phenomenological reflection on the crisis of modern rationality, especially in relation to the difficulty to undertake collective actions that follow logics that are different from that of the accumulation of capital, based on the examination of this other aspect of the mathematization of the lifeworld. (shrink)

In this article I present the phenomenological tradition as a new grounding for human rights as universal rights. The hypothesis defended is to conciliate Husserl’s phenomenological method and Reinach’s a priori law in order to offer a new grounding to human rights. In order to combine Husserl and Reinach’s ideas, I propose to expand the comprehension of a priori. It would be present as eidos of each object and I name it as material a priori; it also be present in (...) the eidetic relations and I name it as formal a priori. Yet the object would have an essence, a necessary content, a material a priori, and necessary states of affairs, necessary relations and connections, a formal a priori. Reinach, in The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law, describes eidetic relations, such as, the relation between promise, claim and obligation. I propose three eidetic universalities to ground law, these are what I will call human rights. I also face a few difficulties presented by DuBois and De Vecchi derived from the amoral approach of a priori laws. Then, I highlight the difference between this proposition and Albert’s. Finally, I defend the proposition that a priori laws are beyond natural and positive laws. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the guidelines of a phenomenology of the social world in the wake of Alfred Schutz and José Ortega y Gasset. While the latter was not, for a long time, acknowledge as a phenomenologist, the former is a well-known critique of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity and of the possibility of grounding a community of transcendental Egos. Both, however, remained faithful to some basic phenomenological tenets, namely, that individual subjectivity has a relational character, the circumstances in which (...) men live are a part of their life, and life is characterized by its openness to the world. On this basis, they both carried out a phenomenological description of social existence, stressing its two main assumptions: 1) there are things that must be taken for granted; 2) habitualities, typical constructions, and systems of relevance are the primary ways of dealing with social events and other fellow citizens. In different ways, they both showed that the traditional objections opposed to phenomenology regarding its capacity to address mundane human existence stemmed from a misunderstanding of its basic tenets and intentions. (shrink)

This article focuses on possible convergences between phenomenology and anthropology and underlines their contributions to the analysis of a specific topic. In its reconstructive dimension it departs from Edmund Husserl’s positions in the letter he addressed to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl in 1935, in particular on the relationship between humanity and the surrounding word (Umwelt) and on the opposition between historical societies and primitive ahistorical societies. After having noted some critical points emerging from Husserl’s considerations, this text retraces some of its repercussions (...) on the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Derrida, whose diverging interpretations open up different ways of examining the relationship between the respective phenomenological and anthropological perspectives. Finally, with the aim of rethinking the contributions of these two fields to address the problem of the co-participation and the differentiations between the archaic and the current in descripted social structures by Lévy-Bruhl, this text turns to the specific temporality of totemic presentifications, which should become phenomenologically more detailed. (shrink)

According to Gerda Walther, a community arises only if positive feelings, which she calls inner unification, eliminate hostilities among people. There are two objections to this claim, which one can develop from Aron Gurwitsch’s critical examination of Walther’s account. The present paper aims to respond to those objections and, through this, to clarify her account of community. To this end, the author deals with Walther’s brief remark on a “pathological” form of community and her accounts of inner unification. Considering those (...) two factors, the author further shows that Walther’s idea is more plausible than it initially may appear. Contrary to what Gurwitsch seems to think, her account of communities allows for conflict and even certain types of hostility within a community. (shrink)