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  1.  54
    A Defense of Temporal Well-Being.Ben Bradley - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):117-123.
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  2.  31
    Replies to Bradley, Rosati, and Visak.Ben Bramble - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):149-155.
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  3.  25
    Précis of "The Passing of Temporal Well-Being".Ben Bramble - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):113-115.
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  4.  39
    Causation and Ontic Indeterminacy.Chien-Hsing Ho - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):43-61.
    In this article, I first introduce an Indian Madhyamaka Buddhist critique of causality and discuss critically a contemporary Humean interpretation of the critique. After presenting a Chinese Madhyamaka interpretation, I resort to an ontological conception of indeterminacy, termed ontic indeterminacy, which draws on Chinese Madhyamaka thought together with Jessica Wilson’s account of metaphysical indeterminacy, to show that the conception is well equipped to unravel two puzzling issues that arise from the critique. I suggest that a world that consists of things (...)
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  5. Nominalism and Material Plenitude.Uriah Kriegel - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):89-112.
    The idea of “material plenitude” has been gaining traction in recent discussions of the metaphysics of material objects. My main goal here is to show that this idea may have important dialectical implications for the metaphysics of properties – more specifically, that it provides nominalists with new resources in their attempt to reject an ontology of universals. I will recapitulate one of the main arguments against nominalism – due to David Armstrong – and show how plenitude helps the nominalist overcome (...)
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  6.  6
    Persistence Egalitarianism.Irem Kurtsal - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):63-88.
    Modal Plenitude—the view that, for every empirically adequate modal profile, there is an object whose modal profile it is—is held to be consistent with each of endurantist and perdurantist views of persistence. Here I show that, because “endurer” and “perdurer” are two substantially different kinds of entity, compossible with each other and consistent with empirical data, Modal Plenitude actually entails a third view about persistence that I call “Persistence Egalitarianism.” In every non-empty spacetime region there are two persisting objects: one (...)
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  7.  11
    Moral Confirmation Vs. Moral Explanation: A Tale of Two Challenges.Sarah McGrath - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):1-21.
    In the first chapter of The Nature of Morality, Gilbert Harman sets out what he takes to be the “basic issue” confronting moral philosophy: whether moral principles can be “tested and confirmed in the way that scientific principles can... out in the world”. Harman argues that they can’t be. In this paper I argue that if we reject the Harmanian view that confirmation is the converse of explanation, then we can agree with the naturalist realist on the basic epistemological issue (...)
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  8.  50
    The Normative Significance of Temporal Well-Being.Connie S. Rosati - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):125-139.
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  9. How to Resist Bramble's Arguments Against Temporal Well-Being?Tatjana Visak - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):141-148.
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  10.  11
    Critical Reasoning and the Inferential Transparency Method.Benjamin Winokur - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):23-42.
    Alex Byrne (2005; 2011a; 2011b; 2018) has argued that we can gain self-knowledge of our current mental states through the use of a transparency method. A transparency method provides an extrospective rather than introspective route to self-knowledge. For example, one comes to know whether one believes P not by thinking about oneself but by considering the world-directed question of whether P is true. According to Byrne, this psychological process consists in drawing inferences from world-directed propositions to mind-directed conclusions. In this (...)
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