The aim of this paper is to analyze some rising issues that indexicality places to Husserl’s phenomenological semantics. We will conduct the discussion availing ourselves of the husserlian formulation of the problem and his attempt to solution, and of approaches to the problem from analytic philosophy and linguistics. In particular, in order to understand what essentially characterize indexicality and make it a puzzling problem, we will examine two of its fundamental features, that is the relationships it maintains with context and (...) perspective. We will try to sound out their compatibility with Husserl’s analysis and to highlight some internal difficulties in the phenomenological approach to the topic. (shrink)

This paper investigates the concept of étendue intelligible, as used by Malebranche to frame a metaphysical theory on top of the concept of space, a new perspective on ideas and a solution to Cartesian issues about the nature of thought and its relationships with extension. In particular, attention is paid to the reasons why the étendue intelligible is, for Malebrance, the joining link between the human mind and God. Such a connection is emphasized not only for its metaphysical meaning but (...) also for the intrinsic relevance of a topological view of ideas. (shrink)

Recent studies demonstrated that 15-month-olds selectively respond to others’ beliefs. According to an epistemic mentalist interpretation, this attests that 15-month-olds possess a rudimentary capacity to attribute beliefs. Weaker interpretations suggest instead that infants are only sensitive to others’ beliefs because they can detect their proximal correlates. These two opposed interpretations often appeal to principled objections. In contrast, I argue that the dispute can be brought back to its empirical basis if we clearly explain what it means having ‘tacit’ or ‘implicit’ (...) knowledge of a theory. I introduce a definition of tacit knowledge based on the notion of structural similarity, and I discuss some crucial experiments that may be conducted to assess the validity of the epistemic mentalist interpretation. (shrink)

Memories and notes on the teaching of Cesare Vasoli and on the main lines of his studies of philosophy and history of culture.

This paper faces the problem of the guilt’s ambivalence, torn between responsibility and temptation, self-affirmation and strangeness to himself. Following Kierkegaard’s and Ricoeur’s thinking, we try to sound out this indissoluble polarity by means of analysis of adamitic myth, in which the sinner conscience rationally confesses to itself this terrible experience, the perception of being sinner, wicked, and of being at the same time deceived, victim of a pre-existent and irresistible evil.

In philosophy of mind, the arguments about phenomenal experience are related to ontological points of view in which the alternatives are physicalist monism and dualism. Both involve problems and the choice is difficult in order to describe the experience into scientific knowledge. I accost Carnap and Vasubandhu philosophies to show an epistemic position, that involves an ontological deconstruction, from the phenomenal experience starting point. In this view, the way to address the psico-physical problem changes: it is not concerned any problem (...) about a dualism of substances. Experience and evidence are two points of convergence, and lead to the question of subjectivity: the consciousness it is not an object however it keeps its relevance. (shrink)

Can epistemology be naturalized? The question has more than one sense. There are many forms of both the naturalistic stance and its denial in relation to different topics and by means of different strategies. Only some of them are instantiated in the existing literature. After a taxonomy of the range of possible forms of naturalism and anti-naturalism, the paper suggests an emergentist view which shifts the issue from psychology to cosmology.

In Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, contradiction is characterized as sense, that is to say it’s an expression, and not a nonsensical formulation. This fact is shown by Husserl’s characterization of noetic sense, which can be entirely found within the intentional essence of the act: this means that comprehensibility is what is required for a formulation to be noetically sensical, even if it’s somehow morphologically ‘incomplete’ or if it doesn’t admit any possible fulfilment.

This paper examines ‘technology’ and ‘nihilism’ referring to three different philosophers: Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Martin Heidegger. In fact Horkheimer, Adorno and Heidegger had underlined a strong connection between ‘technology’ and ‘nihilism’ because of which man and world are reduced to superficial things. By analyzing their formulation of present society, it is also possible to underline their common intention to begin a new way of thinking about man and world.

This paper aims to focus on the Weberian concept of Weltbild, considered as one of the most important analytic instruments of his sociology. I will argue that Weltbilder have a mainly cognitive function, with a direct practical effect: they are framing devices, that allow men to orient themselves in the world. In this sense, the Weberian concept of Weltbild differs from the notion of Ideology. I will base my argument on two different elements: the peculiar theoretical status of World-images and (...) their relationship with material factors. Unlike ideologies, in fact, Weltbilder do not deal with the distinction true-false: they are conceivable as cultural constructions, the relationship with whom can only take the form of belief. Secondly, they are not simply functional products of material interests: in Weberian analysis, ideal and material factors have a mutual influence, that is not deducible by a rule. (shrink)

The present work is focused on a specific question: is time permanent or not in Kant’s first Critique? I tried to find out my answer on the papers written by authors from Anglo-American tradition, who don’t seem so interested in this topic. Indeed, the former problem was to find remarks about it. Then I highlighted two different points of view: ones think that time is permanent. They tried to warrant this, using especially what Kant says about it in the second (...) edition section dedicated to first Analogy. Others think that time flows, in particular when it’s considered as medi- ate external sense. Finally, I tried to explain why, on my point of view, it’s possible to find in Kant this two contrary position and how it is possible to get out from this situation. (shrink)