In twentieth-century France, the word “metaphysics” had connotations of closed systems which claimed certainty for themselves. As a result, few dared to engage in metaphysical speculation. Ricœur, however, rejected this prevalent definition because he believed it came from Heidegger’s procrustean reading of the history of philosophy. While agreeing that certainty and closure were neither desirable nor possible, Ricœur did make metaphysical claims. Following Jaspers’s revival of pre-modern apophatic metaphysics for which transcendence cannot be comprehended, Ricœur, in his early work, argued (...) for “critical realism” against neo-Kantian idealism, “original affirmation” against Sartrean negativity, and the “metaphysical choice” of human freedom’s consent to the unchosen features of reality. (shrink)

Cet article reformule et approfondit la distinction de Ricœur entre douleur et souffrance dans les termes de la philosophie de l’esprit contemporaine pour qu’elle puisse ultérieurement y être discutée dans le débat existant sur la douleur. Douleur et souffrance sont distinguées, par leurs dimensions évaluatives respectives, donc en termes d’intentionnalité, ainsi que par leurs fonctions, à partir de la façon dont Ricœur caractérise les effets propres de la souffrance sur l’activité mentale et la conduite. Notre lecture suggère que la douleur (...) évalue le caractère dommageable d’un état corporel ou d’une situation, tandis que la souffrance évalue le caractère à première vue injustifiable du mal subi. La première a une fonction pratique, nous motiver à nous préserver de ce qui nous porte atteinte, tandis que la seconde a une fonction épistémique, nous motiver à nous interroger sur l’imputation morale du mal subi et sur les raisons qui pourraient le justifier. (shrink)

Contextualizing Ricœur’s lecture “Suffering is Not Pain” alongside his other peripheral works on the matter uncovers a “practical philosophy,” that could provide new perspectives for clinicians faced with suffering. The analysis unfolds in four stages. First, it examines Ricœur’s interest in dialoguing with psychiatry to nourish his philosophical work. Second, it highlights Ricœur’s contributions as a third party to help psychiatrists overcome some major issues at that time. Third, it contextualizes the topic of suffering within the prevailing medical views at (...) that time, and their corresponding issues in clinical practice. Finally, it delineates three principles for an applied ethics of suffering; namely, the need to dissociate suffering from any moral justification, approaching the therapeutic relationship as an alliance, and a minimal recognition that patients endure despite the damages suffering inflict on the self-other axis, to preserve their dignity. (shrink)

In 1992, Ricœur delivered his lecture, "Suffering is Not Pain," at a psychiatry colloquium, addressing clinicians eager to explore this profound human experience, which is notably absent from the traditional psychiatric corpus. Ricœur examined the semiology of suffering through three moments: the specific relationship between oneself and the other, the characterization of a diminution in the power to act, and, finally, a hermeneutic reflection on suffering as an enigma that has something to teach—both at the level of self-reflection on one’s (...) own existence and in the context of relationships with others. It thus appears that suffering can open the way to a hermeneutic of the symbols of human existence, whose meaningful manifestations can also be clinical. However, this text does not belong to Ricœur’s systematic work. To understand its significance this annotated translation accompanied by its explanatory introduction, allows for a detailed reading that considers the intertextual references and the meanings implied by Ricœur’s expressions. By integrating clinical and philosophical language, this translation acknowledges the importance of multi- and interdisciplinary approaches to the study of suffering. (shrink)

Dans la pensée de Paul Ricœur, la souffrance est principalement abordée sous son aspect existentiel et phénoménologique, comme l’illustre le texte de la conférence « La souffrance n’est pas la douleur », présentée devant un public de psychiatres. Dans ce numéro thématique, nous proposons la toute première traduction anglaise de ce texte. Les contributions des différents auteurs examinent la définition de la souffrance chez Ricœur ainsi que le dialogue qu’il établit entre l’approche philosophique et l’approche clinique. En retraçant la généalogie (...) de la souffrance dans l’œuvre systématique de Ricœur, cette introduction met en lumière les inflexions conceptuelles issues des changements méthodologiques, marqués notamment par une transition de la phénoménologie eidétique à une phénoménologie herméneutique aux implications ontologiques, ainsi que la pluralité de ses motivations et intérêts (psychanalytiques, théologiques). La souffrance, négativité de l’existence, bien qu’exposée au risque d’un affect solipsiste, déploie une sémiologie propre, dans une ouverture à l’autre, que Ricœur explore dans « La souffrance n’est pas la douleur ». (shrink)

In Paul Ricœur's thought, suffering is primarily addressed from an existential and phenomenological perspective, as illustrated in the text of the lecture "Suffering is not Pain," delivered to an audience of psychiatrists. In this thematic issue, we present the very first English translation of this text. The contributions of the various authors explore Ricœur's definition of suffering as well as the dialogue he establishes between the philosophical and clinical approaches. By tracing the genealogy of suffering in Ricœur's systematic work, this (...) introduction highlights the conceptual shifts resulting from methodological changes, notably the transition from eidetic phenomenology to a hermeneutic phenomenology with ontological implications, along with the plurality of his motivations and interests (psychoanalytic, theological). Suffering, as the negativity of existence, while exposed to the risk of a solipsistic affect, nonetheless unfolds a unique semiology, in an openness to the other, which Ricœur inquires in "Suffering is not Pain.". (shrink)

In this contribution, I focus on three key questions that arise when engaging with Ricœur’s lecture, “Suffering is Not Pain.” The first is the methodological issue concerning the philosopher’s role, particularly in taxonomizing. I will examine mental taxonomy, as well as taxonomy more broadly, before turning to pain and suffering more specifically. I then move to Ricœur’s characterization and contrast of suffering and pain throughout the lecture. Following this, I expand on Ricœur’s definition of suffering as a diminution of the (...) power to act by incorporating my own account of suffering as a significant disruption to agency. I explore how this expanded view can contribute to a deeper investigation of Ricœur’s agentive hypothesis of suffering within each of his three identified “moments” of suffering, thus enhancing our understanding of the specific agentive challenge that suffering represents. (shrink)

Cet article s’efforce de relever la place originale, parfois discrète, parfois non reconnue par l’auteur lui-même, qui est dévolue à l’expérience clinique psychiatrique par Paul Ricœur dans sa conférence « La souffrance n’est pas la douleur ». En effet, celle-ci semble de prime abord nettement séparer discours médical et discours philosophique phénoménologique, qui auraient deux objets et méthodes bien distincts. Pour autant, en bien des points, pour certains décisifs, Ricœur est amené à puiser dans l’expérience clinique pour alimenter sa phénoménologie (...) de la souffrance. Il nous semble ainsi esquisser la nécessité d’une authentique philosophie clinique, attentive in fine à la place essentielle de la douleur dans toute souffrance. (shrink)

The paper explores the difference between semiology and hermeneutics of pain and suffering by focusing on narrativity and the body. First, it recapitulates some historical distinctions between explaining and understanding in the context of psychopathology. It shows how the hermeneutic method culminates in the idea of the cohesion of life, constituted through biography and narrative. The second section deals with the relationship between narrativity and selfhood in stories of suffering. The third part addresses the problem of the lived body and (...) the ante-predicative embodiment of suffering and pain, which fuse with the ambiance, coloring the lifeworld. (shrink)

This article explores the application of Paul Ricœur’s model of suffering to negative experiences (termed here “para-suffering”), such as a hint of disappointment or a slight envy, which are not named suffering in everyday language, since the term is reserved for worse experiences. The analysis of a para-suffering example shows that a para-suffering experience can unfold within several of Ricœur’s figures of suffering. The implications of what should be regarded, at the very least, as significant commonalities between para-suffering and suffering (...) are then examined: caution is necessary in using Ricœur’s definition of suffering, suffering benefits from being analyzed in comparison with para-suffering, and para-suffering deserves greater philosophical attention. Although it is neither physical pain nor suffering, it remains a crucial part of human negative experiences. (shrink)

“Discourse, Metaphysics,and Hermeneutics of the Self” deals with the connection between the hermeneutics of the self, as constituted in the ethical-anthropological framework of Oneself as Another (1990), and Ricoeur’s conception of a metaphysics of human agency as developed within this period of his work. It relates to his inquiries in the fields of ontology and metaphysics, from the lectures entitled Être, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote (1953-1954), up to “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993) published in the (...) Revue de métaphysique et de morale, via the article “Ontologie” (1972) for Encyclopaedia Universalis, the last chapter of The Rule of Metaphor (1975), and the first section of the conclusions to the third volume of Time and Narrative (1985). Ricœur aims at determining a specific kind of philosophical discourse as a common ground for the perspectives stemming from a hermeneutic phenomenology and from a more speculative ontological-metaphysical research. (shrink)

“Discourse, Metaphysics,and Hermeneutics of the Self” deals with the connection between the hermeneutics of the self, as constituted in the ethical-anthropological framework of Oneself as Another (1990), and Ricoeur’s conception of a metaphysics of human agency as developed within this period of his work. It relates to his inquiries in the fields of ontology and metaphysics, from the lectures entitled Être, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote (1953-1954), up to “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993) published in the (...) Revue de métaphysique et de morale, via the article “Ontologie” (1972) for Encyclopaedia Universalis, the last chapter of The Rule of Metaphor (1975), and the first section of the conclusions to the third volume of Time and Narrative (1985). Ricœur aims at determining a specific kind of philosophical discourse as a common ground for the perspectives stemming from a hermeneutic phenomenology and from a more speculative ontological-metaphysical research. (shrink)

When examining the relationship of Ricoeur’s philosophy to the field of ontology and metaphysics, a text entitled “Discourse, Metaphysics and Hermeneutics of the Self” may attract attention as it provides useful and meaningful insights. This text is a reworking of a better-known text, “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993), but remains different by focusing on analyses relating to an ontology and metaphysics of human action and agency, and considers the speculative structure of a hermeneutics of the self constituted since (...) Oneself as Another (1990). Originating from a conference held at the Universidade de Santiago de Compostela (Spain) in 1993 and 1995, this text was first published in 1998 in the proceedings of that conference; the present version aims at making it accessible again and improving its editorial form. (shrink)

In this article we will show the process that allowed Ricœur to apply the Aristotelian ontology of actuality and potentiality to his hermeneutics, and how this development ended up providing him with a speculative solution to the aporetics of time. We will distinguish two alternative solutions: the poetic solution, given in Time and Narrative and the speculative one, developed in Memory, History, Forgetting. Despite the importance of the existential analytic, we believe that the introduction of the Spinozian conatus was decisive (...) for Ricoeur’s change of perspective. (shrink)

Après avoir distingué la souffrance, toujours subjective, réflexive et narrative, de la douleur, toujours localisée dans le corps, Ricœur aborde la souffrance selon deux axes : d’un côté comme une altération du rapport à soi et du rapport à autrui, et de l’autre comme une diminution de la puissance d’agir. À partir de là, cette étude tentera de montrer que la souffrance est une question de pouvoir. Un être souffrant est un être vivant qui peut souffrir. Le sujet est un (...) être qui peut souffrir ses souffrances, les tolérer, les supporter. Or, souffrir, c’est éprouver une diminution de son pouvoir d’agir et de penser. C’est perdre sa puissance, jusqu’à ne plus pouvoir souffrir ou tolérer ses souffrances. (shrink)

“Discourse, Metaphysics and Hermeneutics of the Self” deals with the connection between the hermeneutics of the self, as constituted in the ethical-anthropological framework of _Oneself as Another_ (1990), and Ricoeur’s conception of a metaphysics of human agency as developed within this period of his work. It relates to his inquiries in the fields of ontology and metaphysics, from the lectures entitled _Être, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote_ (1953-1954) – translated as _Being, Essence and Substance in Plato and Aristotle_ (...) (2013) –, up to “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993) published in the _Revue de métaphysique et de morale _– translated into English as “From Metaphysics to Moral Philosophy” (1996) –, via the article “Ontologie” (1972) for _Encyclopaedia Universalis_, the last chapter of _The Rule of Metaphor_ (1975), and the first section of the conclusions to the third volume of _Time and Narrative_ (1985). Ricœur aims at determining a specific kind of philosophical discourse as a common ground for the perspectives stemming from a hermeneutic phenomenology and from a more speculative ontological-metaphysical research. (shrink)

“Discourse, Metaphysics,and Hermeneutics of the Self” deals with the connection between the hermeneutics of the self, as constituted in the ethical-anthropological framework of _Oneself as Another_ (1990), and Ricoeur’s conception of a metaphysics of human agency as developed within this period of his work. It relates to his inquiries in the fields of ontology and metaphysics, from the lectures entitled _Être, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote_ (1953-1954) – translated as _Being, Essence and Substance in Plato and Aristotle_ (2013)—, (...) up to “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993) published in the _Revue de métaphysique et de morale _– translated into English as “From Metaphysics to Moral Philosophy” (1996)—, via the article “Ontologie” (1972) for _Encyclopaedia Universalis_, the last chapter of _The Rule of Metaphor_ (1975), and the first section of the conclusions to the third volume of _Time and Narrative_ (1985). Ricœur aims at determining a specific kind of philosophical discourse as a common ground for the perspectives stemming from a hermeneutic phenomenology and from a more speculative ontological-metaphysical research. (shrink)

This paper assesses the possibility of interpreting Ricœur’s notion of representation as a form of Darstellung in the Kantian sense of exhibition (presentation). The aim is to emphasize the ontological significance of representation as Darstellung, through the consideration of the paradigmatic case of historical representations. Indeed, the necessity to adequately interpret the relationship between representation and the represented becomes more compelling when dealing with the representation of history. On the one hand, history becomes objective insofar as it is depicted in (...) historical representations, but on the other, this depiction remains the presentation of an underlying reality that demands to be spoken of. The notion of Darstellung thus helps ensure the demand of historical representations to stand for past reality, without being reduced to mere copies of a supposedly pre-given original. This allows for a transition from the epistemological reflection upon historical representations to the ontological consideration of historicity as such. (shrink)

When examining the relationship of Ricoeur’s philosophy to the field of ontology and metaphysics, a text entitled “Discourse, Metaphysics and Hermeneutics of the Self” may attract attention as it provides useful and meaningful insights. This text is a reworking of a better-known text, “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993), but remains different by focusing on analyses relating to an ontology and metaphysics of human action and agency, and considers the speculative structure of a hermeneutics of the self constituted since (...) Oneself as Another (1990). Originating from a conference held at the Universidade de Santiago de Compostela (Spain) in 1993 and 1995, this text was first published in 1998 in the proceedings of that conference; the present version aims at making it accessible again and improving its editorial form. (shrink)

When examining the relationship of Ricoeur’s philosophy to the field of ontology and metaphysics, a text entitled “Discourse, Metaphysics and Hermeneutics of the Self” may attract attention as it provides useful and meaningful insights. This text is a reworking of a better-known text, “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993), but remains different by focusing on analyses relating to an ontology and metaphysics of human action and agency, and considers the speculative structure of a hermeneutics of the self constituted since (...) Oneself as Another (1990). Originating from a conference held at the Universidade de Santiago de Compostela (Spain) in 1993 and 1995, this text was first published in 1998 in the proceedings of that conference; the present version aims at making it accessible again and improving its editorial form. (shrink)

Le Quichotte de Cervantès occupe une place singulière dans l’histoire de la traduction littéraire en langue française, au moins parce qu’il a fait l’objet d’incessantes retraductions. Mais l’ouvrage retient l’attention parce que la traduction y est thématisée pour elle-même en deux endroits. Cervantès, en jouant avec les codes du roman de chevalerie, pose le cadre général d’une réflexion théorique sur la traduction dont on cherchera ici à souligner les principales tensions constitutives. En intériorisant ses propres origines fictives et traductives, dans (...) un intermède à cheval entre les chapitres viii et ix, le Quichotte évoque à la fois l’idée d’une traduction impossible, mais aussi celle de la traduction comme une modalité particulière de lecture où s’origine la littérature moderne comme quasi-monde (Ricœur) propice aux échanges textuels. Il s’agira finalement de montrer que, ce faisant, Cervantès fait signe à la fois vers le structuralisme et la tradition herméneutique, et leur articulation problématique. (shrink)

The following article investigates the hybridity of narrative identity. It explores how idem-identity and the ipse-identity interrelate through time and otherness and illustrates the process of self’s reflexive re-cognition via others. It posits that narrative identity encompasses both private and public dimensions, requiring a co-authorship that integrates collective identities. This article argues for an ethical dimension to this identity, emphasizing the reciprocal movement between self and other. It introduces the concept of followability, which involves reconstructing narratives in a resonance relationship, (...) fostering narrative hospitality and mutual transformation. The study concludes by proposing an eschatological perspective as a horizon for followability, enhancing narrative refiguration through future-oriented imagination. (shrink)

Cet article propose une lecture de Temps et récit II de Paul Ricœur. Ce livre qui porte sur l’idée de configuration du temps dans le récit afin d’assurer la continuité entre la préfiguration du récit et sa refiguration, et qui cherche à comprendre la spécificité du récit de fiction par rapport au récit historique, est un discours à trois dimensions : philosophie, théories du récit et œuvres majeures de la littérature. Il pose un certain nombre de problèmes théoriques qui seront (...) envisagés ici dans leur rapport au champ théorico-littéraire au cours d’une réflexion critique nourrie par la lecture du roman Mrs Dalloway de Virginia Woolf. (shrink)

The first objective of this paper is to recognize the role of emotion and feeling in Ricœur’s “little ethics” and what they can further add to it, then to explore in more detail how solicitude as a virtue, and affective disposition more broadly, can contribute to a modern ethics of technology. Ultimately, emotions help us to understand technologies and technological ways of being today; Ricœur’s “little ethics”, along with his narrative theory, provide a framework for understanding the ethically salient aspects (...) of technical practice, especially through the openness to the other demanded by solicitude, and essentially by emphasising emotion or feeling as a way of being in the world, and a mode of existence: one which is done with, if not sometimes because of, technology and technical practice. (shrink)

L’article explore l’interprétation critique que Ricœur propose de la théorie de la justice sociale de Rawls. Bien que Ricœur ait une conception dialectique de la justice (selon laquelle le « bon » englobe le « juste »), contrastant avec l’approche procédurale de Rawls (selon laquelle le juste est défini indépendamment du bon), Ricœur exprime un intérêt marqué pour les idées de Rawls. Il rapporte le projet rawlsien à l’un des moments de la dialectique du juste : le moment moral. La (...) dialectique prend sa source dans le contenu aporétique du juste et elle se manifeste, dans la vie éthique, à travers trois paradoxes : politique, juridique et socio-économique. Alors que l’approche rawlsienne bute sur ces paradoxes, il sont le ressort de l’approche ricoeurienne de la justice et en révèlent la puissance. (shrink)

En deux textes importants Paul Ricœur présente sa pensée éthique : en premier lieu, dans les études 7, 8 et 9 de Soi-même comme un autre (1990) et, onze ans après (2001), dans l’article « De la morale à l’éthique et aux éthiques » dans Le juste 2. Comme on le sait, la discussion dans Soi-même comme un autrepasse de l'éthique à la morale et à la sagesse pratique. Le présent article met l'accent sur les implications de la refonte de (...) cette relation par Ricœur dans sa présentation de 2001. Ricœur y inverse son ordre, en commençant par la morale du devoir, dont l’origine doit être pensée avant l’éthique de la vie bonne, devenue entre-temps « éthique antérieure ». Deux problèmes se posent alors : quel est le fondement du devoir et de l’obligation? Quelle est la relation entre sagesse pratique et les « éthiques postérieures », nouveau titre donné à « la sagesse pratique »? Nous incorporons enfin une donnée essentielle que Ricœur développe dans son écrit Amour et justice, en vue de compléter son plus récent panorama de l’éthique. (shrink)

La notion d’identité narrative place la possibilité de l’identité à soi (ou identité-idem) avec celle du changement. Mais a-t-on besoin d’une médiation « dialectique », comme la désigne Ricœur, entre identité et changement? Seulement si l’identité est supposée exclure le changement. Or, tel n’est pas le cas de l’identité au sens le plus fondamental du terme, l’identité numérique. La seconde difficulté tient à ce que Ricœur paraît souvent rabattre l’une sur l’autre les notions d’histoire et de narration. Nous sommes des (...) êtres historiques, cela n’est guère discutable, mais est-ce à dire que notre identité dépend de la narration que nous faisons de notre histoire? Enfin, la troisième aporie réside dans la place primordiale accordée par Ricœur à la fiction dans sa détermination de l’identité narrative. Or il n’est pas du tout évident que les personnages de fiction jouissent d’une identité véritable en un quelconque sens. Des théoriciens contemporains de la référence, tels Saul Kripke ou David Kaplan, ont au contraire insisté sur le fait que les personnages romanesques ne possédaient qu’une apparence d’identité. Comment dès lors faire de ce semblant d’identité, qui se réduit à un faisceau de caractéristiques plus ou moins stables, le modèle pour penser nos identités réelles. (shrink)