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  1.  3
    Swinburne’s Hyper-Cartesian Dualism.John Cottingham - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):23-31.
    This paper maintains that Swinburne’s argument that the body is not essential to who I am is vulnerable to a similar objection to that put forward by Arnauld against Descartes: how do I know that my self-identification furnishes a complete and adequate account of the essential “me,” sufficient to show I could really continue to exist even were the body to be destroyed? The paper goes on to criticize Swinburne’s “hyper-Cartesian” position, that we are simply “souls who control bodies,” and (...)
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  2.  10
    Swinburne’s Are We Bodies or Souls?William Hasker - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):67-82.
    Richard Swinburne’s Are We Bodies or Souls? presents a sustained case for a view concerning the nature of persons that can be classified as a form of either Cartesian dualism or emergent dualism. This paper comments on two important arguments developed in the book and concludes by considering the problem of the origin of souls.
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  3.  2
    Descartes, Kant, and Swinburne on Human Soul.Stanisław Judycki - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):45-56.
    This paper addresses two issues in Richard Swinburne’s book Are We Bodies or Souls? I interpret Swinburne’s modal argument as an example of a priori synthetic knowledge. Swinburne’s thesis that every person possesses “thisness” is compared with Kant’s distinction between the empirical character and the intelligible character.
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  4.  12
    The Dualist Project and the Remote-Control Objection.Eric T. Olson - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):89-101.
    Substance dualism says that all thinking beings are immaterial. This sits awkwardly with the fact that thinking requires an intact brain. Many dualists say that bodily activity is causally necessary for thinking. But if a material thing can cause thinking, why can’t it think? No argument for dualism, however convincing, answers this question, leaving dualists with more to explain than their opponents.
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  5.  4
    The Revival of Substance Dualism.Howard Robinson - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):33-43.
    I argue in this essay that Richard Swinburne’s revised version of Descartes’ argument in chapter 5 of his Are We Bodies or Souls? does not quite get him to the conclusion that he requires, but that a modified version of his treatment of personal identity will do the trick. I will also look critically at his argument against epiphenomenalism, where, once again, I share his conclusion but have reservations about the argument.
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  6. No Work for a Theory of Personal Identity.John Schwenkler - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):57-65.
    A main element in Richard Swinburne’s (2019) argument for substance dualism concerns the conditions of a person’s continued existence over time. In this commentary I aim to question two things: first, whether the kind of imaginary cases that Swinburne relies on to make his case should be accorded the kind of weight he supposes; and second, whether philosophers should be concerned to give any substantial theory, of the sort that dualism and its competitors are apparently meant to provide, to explain (...)
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  7.  6
    Not Just a Terminological Difference: Cartesian Substance Dualism Vs Thomistic Hylomorphism.Jeremy W. Skrzypek - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):103-117.
    In Are We Bodies or Souls? Richard Swinburne presents an updated formulation and defense of his dualist theory of the human person. On this theory, human persons are compound substances, composed of both bodies and souls. The soul is the only essential component of the human person, however, and so each of us could, in principle, continue to exist without our bodies, composed of nothing more than our souls. As Swinburne himself points out, his theory of the human person shares (...)
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  8.  7
    Swinburne on Physicalism and Personal Identity.Paul Snowdon - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):11-21.
    In chapter 2 Swinburne rejects physicalism for two reason. The first is that it is committed to entailments that do not exist. It is suggested that this reason is questionable both because there is no persuasive reason to deny there are such entailments, and also no reason to think that physicalism has such entailments. The second reason is that the mental involves privileged access by the subject and physical features do not allow privileged access. It is proposed that the physical (...)
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  9.  8
    Response to Essays on Are We Bodies or Souls?Richard Swinburne - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):119-138.
    This paper consists of my responses to the comments by nine commentators on my book Are we Bodies or Souls? It makes twelve separate points, each one relevant to the comments of one or more of the commentators, as follows: I defend my understanding of “knowing the essence” of an object as knowing a set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for an object to be that object; I claim that there cannot be thoughts without a thinker; I argue that (...)
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  10.  12
    Summary of Are We Bodies or Souls?Richard Swinburne - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):7-10.
    This book is about the nature of human beings, defending a version of substance dualism, similar to that of Descartes, that each of us living on earth consists of two distinct substances—body and soul. Bodies keep us alive and by enabling us to interact with each other and the world they make our lives greatly worth living; but our soul is the one essential part of each of us.
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  11.  6
    Are We Embodied Souls?Charles Taliaferro - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):83-87.
    It is argued that Swinburne should stress the functional unity of soul and body under most healthy conditions. Too often, critics of substance dualism charge dualists with promoting a problematic bifurcation between soul and body. Swinburne’s work is defended against objections from Thomas Nagel. It is argued that Swinburne’s appeal to the first-person point of view is sound.
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