Most nominalist logicians of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries believed that we could conceive of and refer to impossible objects. The articulation of the semantics of impossibility that underlined this view is much less known than that of their fourteenth-century predecessors, and it may at first seem to conflict with that tradition’s core principle of theoretical parsimony. Here, I propose a first analysis of John Mair’s case and argue that a central part of that development concerns the theory of signification (...) itself. I will examine his views on empty reference and imaginable impossibilities in relation to John Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen, and John Dorp of Leiden, as well as an anonymous work known as the Hagenau commentary. By doing so, I intend to show that his approach to empty reference is closely connected to issues of conceptual representation. (shrink)

In this article, I show that, when denialists attempt to deny a certainty in Wittgenstein’s sense, they do not even deny anything at all because they are articulating mere nonsense. To clarify this point, I start by providing a brief introduction to Wittgenstein’s conception of “certainty,” paying particular attention not only to the distinction between seeming and genuine doubt, but also to the nonsense generated when violating a certainty. Then, I analyze why we cannot even understand denialists when they try (...) to deny certainties about the existence of the Holocaust and the sphericity of Earth. To this end, I consider the consequences of delegitimizing research procedures, regarding the case of doubt as the normal case, and formulating the denialist doubt through words whose use is incompatible with such doubt. Subsequently, I describe the main tactics used by denialists to try to substitute scientific certainties with alternative ones. Lastly, although denialism concerning certainties cannot even be refuted because it is nonsense, I propose to make deniers as well as the general public aware of such nonsense by asking questions that revolve around incongruences such as those I have previously noted concerning Holocaust denialism and the flat-Earth “theory.”. (shrink)

What makes a prediction arbitrary? This article explores the possibility that one source of arbitrariness is asserting “P iff Q” when the justifications of P and Q are, in the relevant sense, independent. It uses this idea to draw a formal distinction between non-arbitrary and arbitrary predictions, even if they are also correct. It initially illustrates with Goodman’s New Riddle. There are, by now, so many different literature-prominent variants of grue, emerose or other odd-looking predicates that, surprisingly, the criterion handles (...) them relatively straightforwardly. As the proposal is markedly distinct from existing resolution strategies centred on predicate projectability or counterfactual analysis, it sidesteps their well-known problems. The article makes the case that testing entailments for arbitrariness enjoys advantages over the currently dominant approach of directly putting conditions on when an F that is G should support “All F are G.” The article then surveys possible broader objections and offers two formal tools for identifying when and especially why a hypothesis makes good – that is, correct and non-arbitrary – predictions or not. (shrink)

Heidegger claims that “the Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being.” While he does not seem to argue for this claim (usually referred to as the “ontological difference”), there is now a very substantial literature that fills this gap. In this article, I subject this literature to philosophical scrutiny. My conclusion is that none of the extant arguments for the ontological difference is sound. Since, by contrast, we have at least two good reasons to think that Being is a (...) being, this suggests that Being is a being, after all. (shrink)

Gamification has been touted as a revolutionary technique for promoting education, fitness, work, and more, but has also been argued to harm the very areas it claims to improve. Thus, the importance of reflection on gamification in different contexts is clear; in this article, I examine gamification within games themselves. While it may be thought that gamifying a game is either impossible or trivial, articulating its possibility allows us to uncover its impacts. I first explore some definitions of gamification within (...) the literature (Section 1). After introducing the prospect that a game might be gamified despite this being either impossible or trivial on existing definitions, I then redefine gamification such that gamifying games is meaningfully possible (Section 2). I next distinguish kinds of gameplay, building on Thi Nguyen’s achievement play and striving play to defend two additional kinds: roleplay and authorial play (Section 3). Finally, I combine the preceding strands to identify a potential harm of the gamification of games: a gamified game encourages certain kinds of gameplay over others, producing play under constraints, whereas gamification as a trend across gaming culture creates an impoverished play environment by establishing game design norms that prevent players from deciding how they play, producing inhibited play (Section 4). (shrink)

This article examines the usage of zhou 周 in the Book of Mozi 墨子 and its interpretations in Classical Chinese, arguing that zhou functions as a universal quantifier when placed before verb–object constructions. We contend that the concluding statement “yi zhou er yi bu zhou” 一周而一不周 clarifies the validity of the case “shi er ran” 是而然 and the invalidity of “shi er bu ran” 是而不然 by using zhou as a summary term referring to previous discussions. Our analysis of zhou as (...) a universal quantifier and you 有 as an existential quantifier provides a foundation for employing the monotonicity reasoning approach to study mou 侔 reasoning. This insight may shed light on other reasoning patterns in Mohist logic and beyond. (shrink)

For Aristotle, human beings are deeply social creatures, a trait that contributes to the meaningfulness of our lives. In more recent philosophy, Jean-Paul Sartre similarly argued that our existence is informed by our unavoidable social relations, even as he also emphasized the quest for individual freedom. What happens when the “Other” in these relationships are artifacts, such as robots? Can robots liberate us from our existential dependence on other humans? Should they do so, in light of Aristotelian and Sartrean ethics? (...) With recent technological advancements, an increasing amount of scholarly literature has emerged about the use, meaning, and limits of innovations such as sex- or love-robots. In this article, we will first explore the relevance of Aristotle’s virtue ethics in relation to romantic love (eros) and social technologies. We will then examine Sartre’s existentialism as in some respects a continuation of Aristotelian ethics and assess its applicability to eros in our technological age. Finally, we will conduct a case study on love-robots, reviewing recent scientific studies to evaluate their ethical and social implications from the perspectives of Aristotle and Sartre. We argue that neither Aristotle nor Sartre would endorse the view of love-robots as part of our social well-being. (shrink)

As robots evolve from functional machines to potential sexual companions, they embody both utopian hopes and dystopian fears. This article explores the ethical implications of sex robots, focusing on power dynamics, objectification, and gender performance. Through Ann Cahill’s concept of derivatization, the article argues for a nuanced understanding of sexual objectification in the context of robo-erotics. While sex robots offer new possibilities for intimacy and desire, they also risk reinforcing problematic gender norms and power structures. The article introduces a queer (...) utopian framework, oscillating between hope and disgust, to examine how sex robots might subvert or perpetuate traditional scripts of sexuality. Ultimately, this work aims to situate sex robots within the broader landscape of technological advancement and its potential to reshape human sexuality. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to suggest and explain an engaging approach to three distinct types of (alleged or genuine) semantic paradoxes, the White-Horse-Not-Horse Paradox, the Ultimate-Unspeakable Paradox, and the Liar Paradox, in a unifying way that is sensitive to distinct features of them. Although the three types of semantic paradoxes address distinct types of objects, and although their seemingly paradoxical features are different (alleged or genuine), their distinct structures and contents can be understood and treated on the same (...) common ground, which is jointly conceived in people’s pretheoretic understandings of truth and of the double-reference feature of people’s basic employment of language (saying something about an object), and from the unifying vantage point of a double-reference approach. (shrink)

The text discusses under which conditions video games can philosophize by outlining a “Critique of Videogame Reason.” Section 1 introduces the idea that academic research, especially in philosophy, uncritically assumes that writing is the most effective way of expressing and communicating ideas. Section 2 (“Transcendental Aesthetic”) discusses the representational status of video games, claiming that they amplify and stimulate a sensorimotor way of “seeing.” Section 3 (“Transcendental Analytic”) argues that for a videogame knowledge and thinking to be possible, there must (...) be a “gamish” mindset in which writing and reading are not just confined to the act of putting words in lines, but also entail the design of sets of actions. Section 4 (“Transcendental Dialectic”) advocates for a medial progressivist approach revolving around an expansive view of philosophical practice, claiming that a videogame philosophy must be able to provide at least three sui generis performances: enlightening the multi-modal, sensorimotor dimension that also characterizes the most amodal, linguistic concepts; building and supporting “emersive” experiences capable of taking specific advantage of the power of immersivity; and taking part in and fostering an explicitly dialogical interchange among scholars and researchers. Section 5 (Conclusion) envisages a more liberal and inclusive future for philosophical practice. (shrink)

In response to this issue’s theme of Can robots be sensual? two propositions are discussed from a design researcher’s perspective. Four devices across two speculative projects Habitat Robots and Soil Protector Robots are presented. Speculative Realist ideas provide reasoning for design approaches to metaphorise sensed environmental data into multi-sensorial performances that the devices embody. Facilitated through the projects are philosophy of design concerns, such as asymmetrical relations, the nature of data, and language about the devices prefiguring sensorial expectations. The performative (...) behaviours of these multi-sensorial robots evoke a sense of things by removing the truthiness of data and thereby emancipating language from privilege and expertise, subverting expectations of technology, and notions of urban Nature. Through Harman’s Quadruple Object, we speculate on asymmetricality within object relations, including between the devices and the practices of design itself. Thereby, allowing ontological design implications to be reviewed – where acts of designing in turn design us; design processes are not only entwined prefiguratively, but are companion output artefacts of these technological ecology interfaces. The devices bring together and physicalise questions of contextual boundaries and politics between humans, technology, and Nature. (shrink)

This article draws on relational psychoanalysis to reinterpret Ovid’s version of Narcissus and Echo as a means to reflect on the dynamics of how subjects connect to others and themselves through listening. Attuning to a long tradition of scholarship, we understand Ovid’s tale as a rich template for contemplating the difficulties of becoming social. We underline how both protagonists take on essential roles in each other’s transformations. While acknowledging how each actor’s unique biography creates an intrapsychic vector, we highlight the (...) effect of their encounters in their mutual becoming. We illustrate how the relational space between them plays an essential role in their development as they overcome their unique difficulties in connecting to each other. Our relational-psychoanalytic analysis offers a surprising interpretation, namely, that Narcissus and Echo can ultimately overcome their isolation and connect through their transformation. This illustrates the potential of relational psychoanalysis as an interpretative tool that allows us to understand social dynamics as a product of a relational space in which intra-psychic representations encounter and transform each other, thus contributing to ongoing discussions on the concept of relational subjectivity. (shrink)

In this article, I show how two modes of predication and quantification in a modal context allow one to (a) define what it is for an individual or relation to exist, (b) define identity conditions for properties and relations conceived hyperintensionally, (c) define identity conditions for individuals and prove the necessity of identity for both individuals and relations, (d) derive the central definition of free logic as a theorem, (e) define the essential properties of abstract objects and provide a framework (...) for defining the essential properties of ordinary objects, and (f) derive a theory of truth. I also describe my indebtedness to the work of Terence Parsons and take the opportunity to advance the discussion in connection with an objection raised to the theory of essential properties. (shrink)