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  1. Why We Should Stop Talking about Generalism and Particularism: Moving the Debate on Conspiracy Theories Forward.Maarten Boudry & M. Giulia Napolitano - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (9):22-26.
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  2.  82
    Echo Chambers and Social Media: On the Possibilities of a Tax Incentive Solution.Megan Fritts - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (7):13-19.
    In “Regulating social media as a public good: Limiting epistemic segregation” (2022), Toby Handfield tackles a well-known problematic aspect of widespread social media use: the formation of ideologically monotone and insulated social networks. Handfield argues that we can take some cues from economics to reduce the extent to which echo chambers grow up around individual users. Specifically, he argues that tax incentives to encourage network heterophily may be levied at any of three different groups: individual social media users, social media (...)
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  3.  45
    Defending Wokeness: A Response to Davidson.J. Spencer Atkins - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (6):21-26.
    Lacey J. Davidson (2023) raises several insightful objections to the group partiality account of wokeness. The paper aims to move the discussion forward by either responding to or developing Davidson’s objections. My goal is not to show that the partiality account is foolproof but to think about the direction of future discussion—future critique, modification, and response. Davidson thinks that the partiality account of wokeness does not sufficiently define wokeness, as the paper sets out to do. Davidson also alleges that the (...)
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  4.  28
    Scientism and Sentiments about Progress in Science and Academic Philosophy.Moti Mizrahi - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (6):39-60.
    Mizrahi (2017a) advances an argument in support of Weak Scientism, which is the view that scientific knowledge is the best (but not the only) knowledge we have, according to which Weak Scientism follows from the premises that scientific knowledge is quantitatively and qualitatively better than non-scientific knowledge. In this paper, I develop a different argument for Weak Scientism. This latter argument for Weak Scientism proceeds from the premise that academic disciplines that make progress are superior to academic disciplines that do (...)
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  5.  70
    Group Dispositional Belief, Information Possession, and “Epistemic Explosion”: A Further Reply to Jesper Kallestrup.Avram Hiller & R. Wolfe Randall - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (5):8-16.
  6.  72
    Algorithmic Opinion Mining and the History of Philosophy: A Response to Mizrahi’s For and Against Scientism.Andreas Vrahimis - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (5):33-41.
    At the heart of Mizrahi’s project lies a sociological narrative concerning the recent history of philosophers’ negative attitudes towards scientism. Critics (e.g. de Ridder (2019), Wilson (2019) and Bryant (2020)), have detected various empirical inadequacies in Mizrahi’s methodology for discussing these attitudes. Bryant (2020) points out one of the main pertinent methodological deficiencies here, namely that the mere appearance of the word ‘scientism’ in a text does not suffice in determining whether the author feels threatened by it. Not all philosophers (...)
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  7. Open-Mindedness, Rational Confidence, and Belief Change.Katia Vavova - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (2):33–44.
    It’s intuitive to think that (a) the more sure you are of something, the harder it’ll be to change your mind about it, and (b) you can’t be open-minded about something if you’re very sure about it. If these thoughts are right, then, with minimal assumptions, it follows that you can’t be in a good position to both escape echo chambers and be rationally resistant to fake news: the former requires open-mindedness, but the latter is inimical to it. I argue (...)
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  8. Rage in America: Why Is this Happening?Steven James Bartlett - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (1):46-60.
    The extreme incidence and prevalence of rage-driven aggression and destructiveness in the United States is without parallel in any other industrialized country in the world. During 2022 alone, there were 647 mass shootings in the U.S. (in each, at least four victims were killed). Unfortunately these many killings comprise only one form of widespread rage in America. This paper seeks to answer why this is happening.
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  9.  82
    Pluralism About Group Knowledge: A Reply to Jesper Kallestrup.Avram Hiller & R. Wolfe Randall - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (1):39-45.
    Jesper Kallestrup has provided an insightful response to our paper, “Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge”. Kallestrup identifies some important issues pertaining to our non-summative, non-supervenient account of group knowledge which we did not address in our original paper. Here, we develop our view further in light of Kallestrup’s helpful reply.
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