This paper studies the distinction between the essence of the soul and its powers in Thomas Aquinas as it develops from a theological to a psychological claim. A reconstruction of this development will show that the distinction is initially foreign to Aristotle’s philosophical psychology and leads Aquinas to break away from Aristotle’s conception of form. Ultimately, the distinction is postulated for its theoretical benefit, as it allows Aquinas to explain how the intellect can be a non-bodily power of a bodily (...) form – something other authors of the Aristotelian tradition can difficultly account for. (shrink)

Recent research has established that in his De secundis intentionibus, Hervaeus Natalis reacted to views of the modist thinker Radulphus Brito. Historians have noted several points of disagreement between Hervaeus and Radulphus, but I maintain more precision is needed. I argue that the core of the dispute is found in two points: first, a disagreement on what to call 'intention'; second, a disagreement regarding the process through which things lead to the formation of our universal concepts (genera, species, etc.). I (...) argue that this second point shows a profound shift regarding the root of universal concepts. (shrink)

Arguing for a cognition theory that radically rejects the passivity Aristotle attributes to the soul with regard to material things, Olivi has to assume that the soul is always on the alert, that is, that its attention to the body never disappears, even in deep sleep. This is for him the only way to explain why an intense sensation wakes us up without acting on the soul. He thus exposes himself to possible criticism from Aristotelians: his hypothesis is counter-intuitive and (...) seems to be contradicted by our experiencing eclipses of our awareness. I propose a defense of Olivi based on a ‘retort’, showing that Aristotelians must themselves postulate either, like Albert the Great, that the agent intellect is constantly in act, or, like Thomas Aquinas, that it exercises a continual surveillance of phantasms, even when we are not conscious of it. So they cannot deny Olivi the right to hypothesize a permanent attention of the soul. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of esse iudicatum in Peter Auriol. For Auriol, esse iudicatum is a property that objects acquire when they are correlated with an act of iudicium. Iudicium is the production of an object in the mind, and so esse iudicatum is the property of being produced as such an object. I will show that Auriol’s theory is at the confluence of two distinct streams of thought. It emerges, first, from a long philosophical tradition running from Aristotle (...) to Thomas Aquinas through Averroes. Indeed, the notion of iudicium is derived from that of κρίσις, which refers to an active mode of cognition, and Auriol himself refers to Averroes when he develops his theory of iudicium. In addition, Auriol combines this material with Christian theological sources – more precisely, with discussions about the production of the divine Word, which is understood as a “saying”, dicere, of which iu-dicium is an echo. (shrink)