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  1.  8
    How Colour Qualia Became a Problem.Z. Adams & J. Browning - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):14-25.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have problem intuitions about consciousness, why we intuitively think that conscious experience cannot be scientifically explained. In his discussion of this problem, David Chalmers briefly considers the possibility of giving a 'genealogical' solution, according to which problem intuitions are 'accidents of cultural history' (2018, p. 33). Chalmers' response to this solution is largely dismissive. In this paper, we defend the viability of a genealogical solution. Our strategy is to focus (...)
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  2.  1
    Soft-Wired Illusionism vs. the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.A. Balmer - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):26-37.
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  3.  61
    Disillusioned.Katalin Balog - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):38-53.
    In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers draws a new framework in which to consider the mind-body problem. In addition to trying to solve the hard problem of consciousness – the problem of why and how brain processes give rise to conscious experience –, he thinks that philosophy, psychology, neuro-science and the other cognitive sciences should also pursue a solution to what he calls the “meta-problem” of consciousness – i.e., the problem of why we think there is a problem with (...)
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  4.  89
    Is the Hard Problem of Consciousness Universal?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):227-257.
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  5. Debunking Arguments for Illusionism about Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):258-281.
  6.  81
    How Can We Solve the Meta-Problem of Consciousness?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):201-226.
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  7.  4
    Attending to the Illusion of Consciousness.J. Dewhurst & K. Dolega - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):54-61.
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  8.  5
    The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.E. Diaz-Leon - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):62-73.
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  9.  6
    Editorial Introduction: More Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.F. Kammerer - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):8-13.
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  10.  16
    Two Caveats to the Meta-Problem Challenge.Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):74-81.
    I present two caveats to the meta-problem challenge to theories of consciousness. Chalmers suggests that a theory of consciousness that solves the hard problem should also inform us about the meta-problem, and vice versa. The first caveat is the view that mechanism M, the mechanism through which content becomes conscious, may be neutral with respect to the content it renders conscious. This means that there can be no systematic connection between M and conscious content. The second caveat concerns how we (...)
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  11.  3
    First-Person Interventions and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.C. Klein & A. B. Barron - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):82-90.
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  12. On Chalmers on the Meta-Problem.Haoying Liu - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):91-98.
    In this commentary on Chalmers’s work on the meta-problem of consciousness, I defend an approach to the meta-problem that Chalmers finds unpromising (i.e., what Chalmers has called the “use-mention fallacy” strategy.) The core of this strategy is the idea that thinking about consciousness requires a special mode of thought that activates phenomenal consciousness itself, which then facilitates a (mistaken) intuition that a first-person thought of consciousness and a third-person thought of a brain state cannot refer to the same thing. Chalmers (...)
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  13.  45
    Explaining the Intuition of Revelation.Michelle Liu - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):99-107.
    This commentary focuses on explaining the intuition of revelation, an issue that Chalmers (2018) raises in his paper. I first sketch how the truth of revelation provides an explanation for the intuition of revelation, and then assess a physicalist proposal to explain the intuition that appeals to Derk Pereboom’s (2011, 2016, 2019) qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis.
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  14.  2
    Ignorance and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.T. McClelland - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):108-119.
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  15.  6
    Appearance, Reality, and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Giovanni Merlo - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):120-130.
    Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires, among other things, explaining why we are so reluctant to endorse various forms of illusionism about the phenomenal. I will try to tackle this task in two steps. The first consists in clarifying how the concept of consciousness precludes the possibility of any distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'. The second consists in spelling out our reasons for recognizing the existence of something that satisfies that concept.
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  16. The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):131-142.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal powers view and my main arguments for it and—drawing in part on a similar view developed by (...)
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  17.  1
    Two Problems for Non-Inferentialist Views of the Meta-Problem.G. Peebles - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):156-165.
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  18. Illusionism Helps Realism Confront the Meta-Problem.R. C. Schriner - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):166-173.
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  19.  1
    Why Does the Brain-Mind (Consciousness) Problem Seem So Hard?J. F. Storm - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):174-189.
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  20.  3
    Headlessness without Illusions: Phenomenological Undecidability and Materialism.K. Williford - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):190-200.
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  21.  5
    Clean Language Interviewing as a Second-Person Method in the Science of Consciousness.J. Nehyba & J. Lawley - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (1-2):94-119.
    This article reports on Clean Language Interviewing (CLI), a rigorous, recently developed 'content-empty' (non-leading) approach to second-person interviewing in the science of consciousness. Also presented is a new systematic third-person method of validation that evaluates the questions and other verbal interventions by the interviewer to produce an adherence-to-method or 'cleanness' rating. A review of 19 interviews from five research studies provides a benchmark for interviewers seeking to minimize leading questions. The inter-rater reliability analysis demonstrates substantial agreement among raters with an (...)
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  22.  11
    Distributed Nervous System, Disunified Consciousness?: A Sensorimotor Integrationist Account of Octopus Consciousness.B. van Woerkum - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (1-2):149-172.
    What is it like to be an octopus, one of those eight-armed, infinitely flexible sea creatures with a nervous system distributed over head, eyes and arms? One interesting approach is to argue that octopuses, because of their distributed nervous systems, are likely to possess disunified consciousness (Carls-Diamante 2017). However, this supposed isomorphism between a “unified” nervous system and “unified” consciousness is problematic, since the term “unity” is taken as a “given” even though it is far from clear what it means. (...)
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  23.  18
    Robustness to Fundamental Uncertainty in AGI Alignment.G. G. Worley Iii - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (1-2):225-241.
    The AGI alignment problem has a bimodal distribution of outcomes with most outcomes clustering around the poles of total success and existential, catastrophic failure. Consequently, attempts to solve AGI alignment should, all else equal, prefer false negatives (ignoring research programs that would have been successful) to false positives (pursuing research programs that will unexpectedly fail). Thus, we propose adopting a policy of responding to points of philosophical and practical uncertainty associated with the alignment problem by limiting and choosing necessary assumptions (...)
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  24. Consciousness and Coincidence: Comments on Chalmers.Adam Pautz - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies (5-6):143-155.
    In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers briefly raises a problem about how the connection between consciousness and our verbal and other behavior appears “lucky”. I raise a counterexample to Chalmers’s formulation of the problem. Then I develop an alternative formulation. Finally, I consider some responses, including illusionism about consciousness.
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