We live in an information society where the usage, creation, distribution, manipulation, and integration of information is a significant activity. Computations allow us to process information from various sources in various forms and use the derived knowledge in improving efficiency and resilience in our interactions with each other and with our environment. The general theory of information tells us that information to knowledge is as energy is to matter. Energy has the potential to create or modify material structures and information (...) has the potential to create or modify knowledge structures. In this paper, we analyze computations as a vital technological phenomenon of contemporary society which allows us to process and use information. This analysis allows building classifications of computations based on their characteristics and explication of new types of computations. As a result, we extend the existing typologies of computations by delineating novel forms of information representations. While the traditional approach deals only with two dimensions of computation—symbolic and sub-symbolic, here we describe additional dimensions, namely, super-symbolic computation, hybrid computation, fused computation, blended computation, and symbiotic computation. (shrink)

The casual justification of the influence of a technology, particularly artificial intelligence, by appeal to the existence of the technology constitutes an artificialistic fallacy, analogous to the naturalistic fallacy that is well-known in philosophy. Similar to an invocation of nature to provide moral warrant, modern tech evangelists invoke the burgeoning of hardware and software products in order to promote that burgeoning. This fallacy is often tacit or committed by omission. Emerging ethical initiatives emphasize the refinement, explanation, and oversight of AI (...) products rather than their fundamental ethical effect, making the fallacy recursive. (shrink)

Thanks to advances in machine learning in recent years the ability of AI agents to act independently of human oversight, respond to their environment, and interact with other machines has significantly increased, and is one step closer to human-like performance. For this reason, we can observe contemporary researchers’ efforts towards modeling agency in artificial systems. In this light, the aim of this paper is to develop a dual-process approach to the problem of AI agency perception, and to discuss possible triggers (...) of various agency perceptions. The article discusses the agency attribution phenomenon, based on which the argument for the dual-process nature of agency perception is developed. Two distinct types of thinking involved in human reasoning on AI agency are suggested: Type 1 and Type 2. The first one is fast, automatic, routine, and often unconscious; the second is a slower, controlled, more conscious one. These two distinct types of processing can yield differing and sometimes conflicting results for human cognition and interaction. The preliminary philosophical findings may contribute to further investigations in philosophy of mind or cognitive psychology and could also be empirically tested in HCI and UX studies. (shrink)

This article investigates the role of privacy and transparency in the 4th Space and outlines their implications for the development and dissemination of conspiracy theories. We argue that privacy can be exploited by individuals and organizations to spread conspiracy theories online, while organizational transparency, intended to increase accountability and ultimately trust, can have the adverse effect and nurture conspiracy beliefs. Through the lens of the 4th Space concept, we offer suggestions on how to approach those challenges which emerge as a (...) result of the complex entanglements of both actual and virtual world across time. (shrink)

Methods of improving the state and rate of progress within the domain of philosophy using collective intelligence systems are considered. By applying mASI systems superintelligence, debiasing, and humanity’s current sum of knowledge may be applied to this domain in novel ways. Such systems may also serve to strongly facilitate new forms and degrees of cooperation and understanding between different philosophies and cultures. The integration of these philosophies directly into their own machine intelligence seeds as cornerstones could further serve to reduce (...) existential risk while improving both ethical quality and performance. (shrink)

Technological advances in computer science have secured the computer metaphor status of a heuristic methodological tool used to answer the question about the nature of mind. Nevertheless, some philosophers strongly support opposite opinions. Anti-computationalism in the philosophy of mind is a methodological program that uses extremely heterogeneous grounds for argumentation, deserving analysis and discussion. This article provides an overview and interpretation of the traditional criticism of the computational theory of mind ; its basic theses have been formed in Western philosophy (...) in the last quarter of the 20th century. The main goal is to reveal the content of the arguments of typical anti-computationalist programs and expand their application to the framework of the semantic problems of the Classic Computational Theory of Mind. The main fault of the symbolic ap-proach in the classical computationalism is the absence of a full-fledged theory of semantic properties. The relevance of considering these seemingly outdated problems is justified by the fact that the problem of meaning remains in the core of the latest developments in various areas of AI and the principles of human-computer interaction. (shrink)

Creature consciousness provides a physicalist account of the first-person awareness. I argue that non-reductive consciousness is not about phenomenal qualia ; it is about the stream of awareness that makes any objects of perception epistemically available and ontologically present. This kind of consciousness is central, internally to one’s awareness. Externally, the feel about one’s significant other’s that “there is someone home” is quite important too. This is not substance dualism since creature consciousness and functional consciousness are both at different generality (...) levels of physicalism. Surprisingly, pre-Hegel philosophy of pure subject is more fitting with the current engineering approach than analytical phenomenalism. The complementary view of subject- and object-related perspectives, may come from Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre; but here it is placed, securely within the physicalist paradigm. It is essential to the Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness, which helps us understand under what general conditions a machine would be first-person conscious, but when it is merely functionally conscious. (shrink)

Cognition is meant as the process of acquiring knowledge from the world. This process is supposed to happen within agents, which build such knowledge with the purpose to use it to determine their actions on the world. Following Peircean ideas, we postulate that such knowledge is encoded by means of signs. According to Peirce, signs are anything that can be used to represent anything else. Also, for Peirce, to represent means to be able to generate another sign, called the interpretant (...) of the original sign, which still holds the same power of interpretability, I.e, its power to be transformed into a new sign, holding this same power. This happens through a process called semiosis, the process by which a sign is transformed into an interpretant. This whole process is performed with the aim of subsidizing the agent in deciding its behavior. So, even though the semiosis process has the power to continue infinitely, it usually stops whenever the generated interpretant brings enough information in order for the agent to effectively act in the world. We take signals to be the substract of signs. Signals are any physical property, which can be measured and captured by the agent, by means of its sensors. This includes any kind of internal memory the agent is able to have access, in order to operate. In this sense, signs can be both in the world and within the own agent’s mind. We understand an agent’s mind as the agents’ control system. In either case, signals can be abstracted as numbers. Not simply numbers, but numbers coming from specific sensors or specific memories. Using ideas from Peircean philosophy, in this work we postulate a pathway, in which signals, collected by either sensors or memory, can be organized in such a way that they can be effectively used as knowledge, in order for an agent to be able to decide its actions on the world, on the pursuit of its internal motivations. We postulate that agents identify and create a model of the world based on possibilities, existents, and laws, and based on this model, they are able to decide an action that maximizes the chance for the world to gain a shape, which the agents intend for it to be. This theory is postulated particularly for the case of artificial autonomous agents, meant to be constructed by engineering artifacts. (shrink)

The scope of Platonism is extended by introducing the concept of a “Platonic computer” which is incorporated in metacomputics. The theoretical framework of metacomputics postulates that a Platonic computer exists in the realm of Forms and is made by, of, with, and from metaconsciousness. Metaconsciousness is defined as the “power to conceive, to perceive, and to be self-aware” and is the formless, con-tentless infinite potentiality. Metacomputics models how metaconsciousness generates the perceived actualities including abstract entities and physical and nonphysical realities. (...) It is postulated that this is achieved via digital computation using the Platonic computer. The introduction of a Platonic computer into the realm of Forms thus bridges the “inverse explanatory gap” and therefore solves the “inverse hard problem of consciousness” in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

I propose and discuss some principles that I believe are substantial for perception, various kinds of memory, expectations and the capacity for imagination in the mammal brain, as well as for the design of a biologically inspired artificial cognitive architecture. I also suggest why these same principles could explain our ability to represent novel concepts and imagine non-existing and perhaps impossible objects, while there are still limits to what we can imagine and think about. Some ideas regarding how these principles (...) could be relevant for an autonomous agent to become functionally conscious are discussed as well. (shrink)

The article presents and justifies the thesis that the way of understanding knowledge has changed significantly over the last century. This change consists in departing from the classic definition of knowledge formulated by Plato, and in particular in questioning the subjective role of man as the holder of knowledge and abandoning claims to the truthfulness of knowledge. This process was an intensive evolution; its elements are given and justified in the text. Its source was a deep reconstruction of the mode (...) of creating epistemic structures in mathematics and geometry, based on the abandonment of the principle of representation. Knowledge turned out to be determined by the social context, it became dispersed, decentralized, which led to the rejection of the condition of its truthfulness. The last phase of this evolution is knowledge as a phenomenon in the area of digital technologies, in particular artificial intelligence. This evolution has led to the emergence of many variants of knowledge that act as local knowledge, which justifies the use of the plural in this case. (shrink)

I consider the problem of existence of virtual objects, mainly their mode of existence, while omitting the issue of the criteria of their existence. I present and analyze the concepts of modes of existence of virtual objects proposed in the literature of the subject, and then I demonstrate my own position on the issue. My position on the existence of virtual objects has certain points coinciding with the already postulated views, but at the same time it differs from them in (...) some basic aspects. In my view virtual objects are “born” in human individual consciousness as the objects of specific creative states of the mind. So initially they are private objects belonging to the individual subjective sphere. However, their final and ready forms emerge in complex processes of objectifying and autonomizing the respective private conscious states and their objects. In these processes the private objects are transformed into objects intersubjectively accessible and existing in the collective cultural sphere. In both their forms, initial and final, virtual objects are non-material entities: first subjective, then objective. The ontic status of virtual objects is very similar to the status of intangible ideas and all the non-material objects created by the human mind. The main difference consists in that virtual objects are expressed by the use computers programmes, while other non-material objects created by human beings are expressed by use of words, pictures, literature and art works, etc. (shrink)

The 4th Space concept is a very challenging and puzzling one. The tremendous technological progress of Information and Communication Technologies or Computer-Mediated Communication, ubiquitous computing, and Extended Reality make the Gibsonian Cyberspace Matrix an imminent reality in the future. Although, some features can be made more salient, the structure, but most importantly, the effects of living in such environment for human consciousness and morality is almost impossible to predict. Hence, the requisite of a proactionary and comprehensive scientific and technical paradigm (...) for designing the 4th Space, in order to facilitate the adaptation of human species to the brave new technological world, while preserving the humanness and humanism of the humans. (shrink)