Kant’s general taxonomy of duties includes substantial claims that normatively and theoretically differentiates it from other moral theories. Basing his moral theory on a conception of Right, he also made a general classification of several duties with their corresponding moral worth. The general aim of this study is to identify the basic principles and criteria that determine Kant’s classification of duties. Another aim is to trace some implications and effects of Kant’s conception of duties in the contemporary discussion of social (...) and economic rights. We argue that the normative basis of the argument against social and economic rights is very similar to that of the principles Kant uses in his classification of duties. However, from the responsibility of the state, Kant imposes legitimate obligations over individuals, albeit indirectly. (shrink)

The subject that God knows the particulars in a universal way has become one of the main philosophical problems that especially medieval Islamic thinkers focused upon and interpreted after Ghazali’s critiques. The essence of the problem is that particulars change constantly and are perceived ; the knowledge of particulars involves knowledge of changes in the particulars. If we try to know it, our knowledge will change for the knowledge depends on its subject. Besides, the universals are in the intellect and (...) apprehended by it, and never change. Then, how can the human intellect understand the particulars? If knowledge of the particulars changes the intellect while they are apprehended, why doesn’t same knowledge change God? Or if God knows particulars in a universal way, then how does He distinguish the particulars from each other? Some thinkers, such as Marmura and Leaman, added to this questions the new ones to critisize it again in the last century. We don’t hold most of their critiques, and discuss all of the questions above mentioned according to the philosophers’ passages; but we also critisize the philosophers in different ways in the conclusion. (shrink)

La conception leibnizienne de “la caractéristique universelle”, qui est un des projets d’établir une langue idéale, dans l’histoire de la philosophie, constitue le sujet de cet article. Dans ce cadre, premièrement, nous avons tenté d’expliquer le contexte historique du projet leibnizien d’une langue idéale. Ensuite, nous avons essayé de préciser l’axe de ses travaux orientés à cette visée. Finalement, nous avons cherché à évaluer son projet en question sous le rapport de ses concepts “la connaissance symbolique” et “la pensée aveugle” (...) [cogitatio caeca]. (shrink)

This article examines the contrasting discourse that appears concerning the concept of ‘fear’ between Qadi ‘Abd al-Jabbar, who attaches importance to reason and rational thought in religion, and Kierkegaard, who regards religion as a transcendent value and observes a paradoxical relation between reason and faith. ‘Abd al-Jabbar argues that religion is the totality of reasonable, objective and universal divine injunctions and sees the religious truth within the boundaries of reason. Kierkegaard, by contrast, claims that religion is the totality of divine (...) commands and is faith and submission that stems from the divine will. He also thought that the theological truth is beyond the boundaries of reason where thinking ends. (shrink)

In this article my main aim is to illuminate the development of conception of phenomenon in a general perspectivethe. For this aim I referred to the Platonian demarcation between forms and sensory world. I tried to show that there is a similarity between Platonian dualism and Deacartes dualism if we read Plato following Descartes. But we know that such a distinction between two kind of entities has kept busy a lot of philosophers in history of philosophers. Accepted that the submission (...) of conception of phenomenon to philosophy has achieved by Plato, the real term meaning has been gained during the period of Kant. Also in the contemprary philosophy Brentano and Husserl has dealt with this conception to a certain extent. (shrink)

The present study explores the ontological, phenomenological and existentialist interpretations of the concept of existence in the philosophy of two leading existentialist philosophers, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. Concepts play an important role in the emergence and development of each and every philosophical trend. In this context, it should be emphasised that, as with all other existentialist thinkers, this concept has been important for the philosophy of the mentioned thinkers. Although the philosophies of the two are totally separated there is (...) a strong similarity in their evaluation of the concept and their understanding of existentialism. Even that the philosophical relationship between the two mainly rests on this. Therefore, we have tried to posit important questions concerning the concept of existence and provide different answers. While human essence is in his existence for Heidegger, for Sartre existence comes before essence. For Sartre who conceptually talks about this concept this issue has to be elaborated. However, existence is not abstract for Heidegger. It is the condition of being human in a foreign and anxious place. According to him the most peculiar characteristics of existence are objectivity, inexpressibility, and inexplicability. However, for Sartre existence occurs through actions. (shrink)

This article focuses on Heidegger’s importance from the point of political thought. Although Heidegger is not a political philosopher, his thoughts have very important consequences in terms of political philosophy. Firstly, Heidegger’s evaluations about Western thought can help to understand the problems of modern political life and philosophical thought systems. On the other hand, Heidegger’s conception of Being, truth and human being presents some clues to understand what Heidegger thinks about a good political community. According to Heidegger modern political society (...) is a mass society. This society includes a totalitarian order. Contrary to the modern political society, Heidegger’s understanding of a good political community refers to such a form of social life which allows different styles of life to live together. (shrink)

According to Ibn Rushd miracles are principles that prove religion. Religions are principles that prove virtues. However, as mind cannot establish a connection between miracle and prophecy, emotional miracle is a violation of the laws of nature and cannot be used to prove prophecy. However, an action such as revelation which belongs to prophecy can be considered as a miracle. As the illiterate prophet brought a knowledge including so much information, the only miracle of Hz. Muhammed is the revelation, Koran. (...) Ibn Rushd examines miracle in means of causality and order in the universe. In the mean time, he tries to respond to the criticism of Gazzali aimed at the philosophers and criticizes the theologian. In this article, the miracle understanding of Ibn Rushd will be examined under revelation, prophecy, natural order and causality principles and his general ideas and methodology in order to find answers to the possible questions. (shrink)

In this article, I discussed how Ibn Sína defined “the converse ” and how later logicians conributed to his definations. For Ibn SínÀ have got two definations in the different works: KitÀb al-ShifÀ: al-ÚıyÀs versus al-IshÀrÀt which hold the record of “falsehood ” in the converse. This record didn’t exited in former logicians’ works : for example Aritotle and al-FÀrÀbí. But some later logicians accepted the defination of KitÀb al-ShifÀ: al-ÚıyÀs and the others accepted al-IshÀrÀt’s defination. However commentators of al-IshÀrÀt- (...) Ùÿsí and Semerúandí- didn’t accepted the record of falsehood in the converse. According to them, this record was entered by scribes . On the other hand Ibn SínÀ used only terms of categorical proposition, not hypothetical propositions’ terms. Later logicians offers more general terms icluding both categorical proposition and hypothetical proposition. (shrink)

Ein Aufsatz Fichtes im Philosophischen Journal von 1798 “Über den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung” trug ihm den Vorwurf des Atheismus ein, und Fichte musste demzufolge 1799 Universitaet Jena verlassen. Fichte bezeichnet sich nicht als ein Atheist. Seine ganze Philosophie dreht sich um den Begriff des Gottes. Es ist ganz klar, dass Fichte nicht Atheist war. Aber er war auch nicht einverstanden mit der Gottauffsaaung des Christentums. In diesem Zusammenhang stellt sich die Frage, ob Fichte ein Theist oder (...) ein Deist ist. Unsere Meinung nach war Fichte höchst wahrscheinlich ein Deist aber auf keinen Fall ein Atheist. (shrink)

This article attempts to criticize Ontological perfectionism, which underlines our epoch with the aid of Heidegger’s interpretation of tragic experience of being. As a modest warning to our shallow approaches to the things, I suggest that we urgently go back to tragic experience of being to overcome to our epochal dangers.