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  1.  63
    Forgiveness and the Multiple Functions of Anger.Antony G. Aumann & Zac Cogley - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):44-71.
    This paper defends an account of forgiveness that is sensitive to recent work on anger. Like others, we claim anger involves an appraisal, namely that someone has done something wrong. But, we add, anger has two further functions. First, anger communicates to the wrongdoer that her act has been appraised as wrong and demands she feel guilty. This function enables us to explain why apologies make it reasonable to forgo anger and forgive. Second, anger sanctions the wrongdoer for what she (...)
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  2.  3
    Emotional Cognitivism Without Representationalism.Dave Beisecker - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):113-122.
    In _Knowing Emotions_, Rick Anthony Furtak seeks an account that does justice to both the cognitive and corporeal dimensions of our emotional lives. Concerning the latter dimension, he holds that emotions serve to represent axiological features of the world. Against such a representationalist picture, I shall suggest an alternative way to understand how our emotions gear in with the rest of our cognitive states.
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  3.  4
    Emotional Knowledge and the Emotional A Priori.Ronald de Sousa - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):106-112.
    In the following comments, I will raise no major objection to Furtak’s main line of argument. My questions are essentially requests for clarification. They focus on three key expressions: first, the “unified” character of emotional agitation and intentionality; second, the unique “mode of cognition” claimed for emotions; and third, the “emotional a priori.”.
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  4.  6
    Is Contempt Redeemable?Ronald de Sousa - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):23-43.
    In this essay, I will focus on the two main objections that have been adduced against the moral acceptability of contempt: the fact that it embraces a whole person and not merely some deed or aspect of a person’s character, and the way that when addressed to a person in this way, it amounts to a denial of the very personhood of its target.
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  5.  4
    Envy's Non-Innocent Victims.Iskra Fileva - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):1-22.
    Envy has often been seen as a vice and the envied as its victims. I suggest that this plausible view has an important limitation: the envied sometimes actively try to provoke envy. They may, thus, be non-innocent victims. Having argued for this thesis, I draw some practical implications.
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  6.  5
    Knowing Emotions: Replies to de Sousa, Beisecker, and Gallegos.Rick A. Furtak - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):135-145.
    Beginning with de Sousa's question about how my position is related to that of "enactive" theorists, I spell out my emphasis on the unity of affective experience, and say more about my conception of the emotional "a priori." In response to Beisecker, I elaborate by way of a literary example on how a significant fact can exist without yet having 'registered' in one's emotional awareness, and on the basis of this I reject the claim that emotions constitute significance. Finally, prompted (...)
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  7.  3
    Précis: Knowing Emotions.Rick A. Furtak - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):98-105.
    Summary of Knowing Emotions: Truthfulness and Recognition in Affective Experience.
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  8.  6
    What Are Emotions For?Francisco Gallegos - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):123-134.
    What would it mean for an emotion to successfully “recognize” something about an object toward which it is directed? Although the notion of "emotional recognition" is central to Rick Furtak’s _Knowing Emotions_, the text does not provide an account of this concept that enables us to assess the extent to which a given emotional response is recognitive. This article draws from the text to articulate a novel account of emotional recognition. According to this account, emotional recognition can be assessed not (...)
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  9.  10
    Editorial: Introducing the Journal of Philosophy of Emotion.Cecilea Mun - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):i-iv.
    Editorial introducing the Journal of Philosophy of Emotion, and the contents of its inaugural issue.
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  10.  10
    Emotions, Reasons, and Norms.Evan Simpson - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):72-97.
    A tension between acting morally and acting rationally is apparent in analyses of moral emotions that ascribe an inherent subjectivity to ethical thinking, leading thence to irresolvable differences between rational agents. This paper offers an account of emotional worthiness that shows how, even if moral reasons fall short of philosophical criteria of rationality, we can still accord reasonableness to them and recognize that the deliberative weight of social norms is sufficient to address the moral limitations of strategic rationality.
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