In the face of forced migrants’ urgent needs and ongoing human rights violations endured within and across borders, scholars note the ‘dual imperative’ (Jacobsen and Landau 2003) of documenting these realities while also responding through humanitarian advocacy and/or political activism. This article documents one such experience, that is, an action research process that began with the first author’s accompaniment of Central American asylum-seeking mothers and children in Boston and included witnessing to and documenting these mothers’ narratives in a context of (...) systemic injustice, while contributing to the creation of a humanitarian grassroots network. The latter supported migrants’ needs while advocating for their right to asylum. Reflecting on these experiences, we explore how research that creates knowledge while acting in the world, demands what we herein describe as feminist activist scholarship grounded in dialogic relationality and compassionate care. The latter moves beyond empathetically feeling for or documenting the suffering of others, towards mutual accompaniment to engage in concrete actions to alleviate that suffering. The dialogic relationships of care in which scholars accompany and act with those at the margins have the potential to transform conventional, post-positivist knowledge production strategies from distancing or objectifying processes towards mutual accompaniment and activist scholarship. (shrink)

In recent decades, the boundaries of democratic polities have been increasingly contested in the field of democratic theory. The theoretical discussion has focused on the philosophical norms that should demarcate the boundaries of democratic constituencies. This article defends and explores an alternative approach that, instead of focusing solely on theoretical norms, theorizes democratic processes of boundary-making. This alternative approach addresses the multiplicity of intertwined boundaries bounding demos and agents capable of transforming and democratizing these multiple boundaries. I characterize a category (...) of agents who democratize symbolic everyday boundaries as transboundary associations. The democratization of the symbolic boundaries of everyday interactions is a necessary condition for the democratization of formal boundary-making, since in democratic orders and societies, institutions cannot simply impose boundaries on people. Transboundary associations produce sites for incipient democratic politics that transcend current institutional and symbolic boundaries, producing possibilities for reciprocal boundary-making. (shrink)

I assess the force of a justification for post-conflict amnesties that is aimed at overcoming the most common objection to their conferral: that they entail retributive injustice. According to this justification, retributivists ought to consider amnesties to be justified because they are analogous to plea bargains, and because retributivists need not consider plea bargains to be unacceptable. I argue with reference to the 2001 Timor-Leste immunity scheme that amnesties conditional upon perpetrators’ not only admitting guilt and confessing but also making (...) reparations may count as plea bargains. I show that plea bargains providing sentence discounts in return for guilty pleas, allowing offenders who accept these bargains to be punished in the absence of trials, and plea bargains offering leniency in punishment in exchange for offenders pleading guilty and providing testimony or other incriminating evidence against superiors or accomplices, may be consonant with versions of retributivism that allow less than the full measure of an offender’s deserved punishment to be exacted where necessary to maximise or expand deserved punishment overall. I argue that amnesties that are also plea bargains may be considered justified by plea bargain-defending retributivists. So too may amnesties conferred in exchange for perpetrators’ admitting guilt and providing incriminating testimony or other evidence against their superiors and accomplices, some of which count as plea bargains, since they too could in some cases maximise or expand deserved punishment. (shrink)

African ethicists have so far not agreed on a single, precise, secular and comprehensive basic norm, an Afro-Grundnorm, which captures the core values of Ubuntu sub-Saharan African cosmopolitanism. This article constructs and proffers the ‘double-dignity’ Grundnorm that partly shares with Western stoic cosmopolitans the view that our common human ontological capacity for autonomy identifies us as members of the human species. This capacity grants our first dignity, inherent dignity. Inherent dignity only grants our universal basic (security and subsistence) rights. Our (...) duties to care of each other derive from the second dignity, acquired dignity. Acquired dignity itself derives from our second ontological capacity, our capacity for communion. Unlike inherent dignity, acquired dignity is neither universal nor automatically present in us. It is earned when we commune with others in fostering harmony as we earn ‘full personhood’. Since fostering harmony starts with nurturing communal identities and solidarities, Ubuntu entails efficiency-model moderate cosmopolitanism which permits prioritizing serving our immediate associates or compatriots not because of their special moral worthiness but because we more efficiently serve humanity at large when we do so. (shrink)

What are the main conditions that any theory of human rights should satisfy to guide action? If agents must take action for a fairer world as human rights discourse suggests, this is a crucial question to reflect upon. In this paper, I make a proposal. I argue that any theory of (moral) human rights that guides action on the basis of correlative duties must satisfy three key conditions. The first condition is focused on the specification of act-types, the second concerns (...) the distribution of correlative duties, and the third is focused on the resolution of (resolvable) conflicts of human rights. I show that this proposal has substantive implications because it implies to reject, challenge and, in some cases, resist ideas that are commonly accepted in the literature on human rights. (shrink)

The ‘Other’ can be near to us, or far from us. We are in-relation with both. Given that, we explore whether, from a moral philosophical perspective, the ‘near-other’ is in tension with the ‘far-other’. We argue that we find our relationship with the near-other through a transcendent metaphysical empathy derived from the noumenon, which is manifest in the phenomenon as compassion and justice. We then argue that perceived differences in the phenomenon mean that we do not reliably transfer this empathy (...) for the near-other, to the far-other. Further, empathic and constructive dialogue is made more difficult because of our proclivity to actively engage in ‘othering’ those not-like-us. Properly, moral decision-making is positioned in a space cognizant of the other. Near-otherness makes consensus in the decision-making process easier, while far-otherness makes consensus more difficult. In our post-modern, multicultural and multifaith era, we need to be alert to the other’s perspective, to find a way to have a meaningful dialogue and thus achieve consensus in our moral decision-making. (shrink)

Special sections are planned for forthcoming issues 20:1, 20:2 and 20:3 Issue 20:1 – submissions due 15 January, 2024Issue 20:2 – submissions due 15 MayIssue 20:3 – submissions due 15 SeptemberFor...

Human rights instruments exist to respond to serious dangers that human beings routinely face, what Henry Shue terms ‘standard threats.’ According to Shue’s influential account of the structure of a moral right, these threats are ‘the targets of the social guarantees for the enjoyment of … a right.’ They are ‘common, or ordinary, and serious but remediable.’ Yet for individuals who struggle daily against serious, remediable threats that are common to their peer group, but do not routinely threaten mainstream society, (...) this oversight has enormous implications for their security, subsistence, freedom, and dignity. This paper examines the three elements of Shue’s standard threat. It concludes by making the case that if we are to deploy this element of the structure of moral rights to justify social guarantees of protection, and to craft them in a way that takes proper account of human diversity, then we must ask: Standard for whom? (shrink)

This article uses what Patti Tamara Lenard refers to as the cosmopolitan problem of motivation to discuss the roles of loyalty in two philosophical accounts of global solidarity. Avery Kolers’ Kantian, deontological approach to solidarity as reason-based deference is contrasted with Richard Rorty's controversial, anti-Kantian description of solidarity as ethnocentric inclusivity generated through sentimental education. This article offers critical reflections on the work of these two influential thinkers and combines elements of their theories to contribute a limited but useful response (...) to Lenard's concerns regarding loyalty and the motivation of global solidarity. (shrink)

Participatory action research (PAR) is a form of community-driven qualitative research which aims to collaboratively take action to improve participants’ lives. This is generally achieved through cognitive, reflexive learning cycles, whereby people ultimately enhance their wellbeing. This approach builds on two assumptions: (1) participants are able to reflect on and prioritize difficulties they face; (2) collective impetus and action are progressively achieved, ultimately leading to increased wellbeing. This article complicates these assumptions by analyzing a two-year PAR project with mothers of (...) disabled children from a South African urban settlement. Participant observation notes, interviews, and a group discussion served as primary data. We found that mothers’ severe psychological stress and the strong intersectionality of their daily challenges hampered participation. Consequently, mothers considered the project ‘inactionable’. Yet, many women quickly started expressing important individual and collective wellbeing transformations. To understand these ‘unlikely’ transformations, a feminist relational account, in particular, that of relational wellbeing, proves essential. We reflect on the consequences of these findings for the dominant PAR methodology and operationalization, and propose to sensitize future PAR with marginalized women by employing relational wellbeing as an overarching ontological awareness. (shrink)

What are the main conditions that any theory of human rights should satisfy to guide action? If agents must take action for a fairer world as human rights discourse suggests, this is a crucial question to reflect upon. In this paper, I make a proposal. I argue that any theory of (moral) human rights that guides action on the basis of correlative duties must satisfy three key conditions. The first condition is focused on the specification of act-types, the second concerns (...) the distribution of correlative duties, and the third is focused on the resolution of (resolvable) conflicts of human rights. I show that this proposal has substantive implications because it implies to reject, challenge and, in some cases, resist ideas that are commonly accepted in the literature on human rights. (shrink)