The idea that the soul has a guardian daemon was a common topic among Platonists, informed by different readings of Plato, especially Symp. 202e and Resp. 620e. In his philosophically dense interpretation, Plotinus describes the daemon as the ‘pole of attraction’ or the erotic disposition that keeps the core of one’s personality directed towards the Good. In this way, the daemon promotes the soul’s ascent to higher levels of reality through a transition from unconsciousness into consciousness that, across different incarnations, (...) will eventually flow into the disembodied self. In order to unpack this view, this article brings together Enn. III.4 and III.5 with Enn. VI.7, where Plotinus discusses the difference between soul (ψυχή) and the expressed principle (λόγος) belonging to soul. This difference if fundamental to fully understand the role of the guardian daemon in the soul’s πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή. (shrink)

This study intends to show that the usually given meaning of the teleological dualism τὸ οὗ/τὸ ᾧ of Aristotle’s De anima, understood as “an aim or goal” and “the beneficiary”, does not come from Aristotle, but from a controversial interpretation of the ancient commentators. It originates on the attempt of certain Peripatetics to appropriate the Stoic distinction between “happiness” and “the happy subject” designated as the σκοπός and the τέλος of moral action. After this historical accuracy, we will propose a (...) different reading of the Aristotelian distinction according to the context of De anima as designating the tendency in the individual towards its preservation and use. (shrink)

Against the Epicureans who conceive the gods as indifferent to make them inaccessible to anger, the Stoics assert that the god is incapable of anger due to his very benevolence. However, doesn’t the Stoic god’s concern for man threaten his impassivity and expose him to feel anger and passions? In this paper, I address, in a theological context, the classic ethical problem of the compatibility between the integrity of the individual and his concern for others. Several hypotheses are examined. Is (...) divine benevolence merely a disposition to do good to human beings, devoid of any affection for them? If it is a feeling, is it an aspiration to the very exercise of the virtue of benevolence, rather than to the good of mankind in itself? Or could it be understood, in the context of the cosmic οἰκείωσις, as the god’s care for his own parts? Finally, should not we distinguish, in god’s philanthropy, between the φιλία he feels for the wise men and the ἔρως he feels for everyone else? (shrink)

Galen’s elemental mixture of fire, air, water and earth (and of the corresponding primary qualities, hot, cold, dry and wet) is primarily a physical process, in which primary elements mix and give rise to all compounded physical bodies, inanimate and animate. As such, the concrete, physical process of mixture is an essential basis for a thorough understanding of Galen’s physical system. In this article I pursued a twofold aim. First, I showed Galen’s syncretic approach while expounding his theory of mixture (...) (insofar as he attributes that theory equally to ‘Hippocrates’, Aristotle and the Stoics) and illustrated the reasons behind this approach. Second, and more importantly, I addressed Galen’s epistemological position concerning mixture’s constituents and answered the question of whether, according to Galen, are the qualities alone, conceived more Aristotelico as conceptually distinct from the body itself, to mix or if Galen viewed mixture, as the Stoics did, as a coextension of bodies. As we argue, Galen assigns the epistemological status of πιθανόν to the Aristotelian and Peripatetic doctrines. This indicates that, to a certain extent, he joins this historical debate and is more closely aligned with Aristotle and the Peripatetics than with the Stoics. By resorting to what is πιθανόν Galen obtains two results: (1) does not expose himself to accusations of dogmatism but, at the same time and in his method, enters the ongoing controversy about qualities and bodies without taking a definitive position, and (2) he preserves his syncretic theoretical structure which finds its linchpin in the defence of a medical-cum-philosophical continuism. (shrink)

Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories contains the most extended testimony about the Stoic conception of acting (ποιεῖν) and undergoing (πάσχειν). Simplicius ascribed to the Stoics the idea that acting and undergoing are to be reduced to the movement. To this opinion Simplicius opposed the Aristotelian view according to which acting and undergoing are two different categories. In this paper I intend to outline the original Stoic position comparing the reportage of Simplicius with other Stoic sources. Later, I will deal with (...) Boethus’ defense of the distinction between the categories of acting and undergoing. I will argue that Boethus directly reacted against the Stoic opinion reformulating it in Aristotelian language. (shrink)

Aristotle’s use of the term ‘eironeia’ in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) appears to be inconsistent: first, he attributes the attitude termed ‘eironeia’ to the great-souled man (megalopsychos), who is defined by his virtuousness, then he classifies ‘eironeia’ as one of the two vices which are central to his account of the virtue of truthfulness. Modern attempts to explain and to solve the “riddle of the great-souled eiron” have not been satisfying. This paper argues that the riddle results from Aristotle trying (...) to reconcile aristocratic values with democratic reality. In the process, some insight will be gained on the concept of the megalopsychos in general, on Aristotle’s notion of the virtue of truthfulness and on his depiction of Socrates. Finally, it is argued that Aristotle’s use of the notion of ‘eironeia’ in the NE bears some resemblance to the use of the notion of ‘irony’ in modern political theory. (shrink)

Even if Plato never claimed to be a ‘historian of philosophy’, there are in his dialogues many references to previous philosophers. Apart from his works on the Sophists, which do not claim to faithfully expose the ‘philosophy’ of their authors, we find in Plato’s dialogues comments and sometimes quotations from the Presocratics, from Thales to Philolaos. In some cases, Plato adds the name of the quoted philosopher, but sometimes he leaves to the reader the task of finding out who the (...) commented or quoted author is. This is the case with Melissos in a passage of the Sophist (244b), where his name is not quoted, but an anonymous monistic philosopher expounds a literal quotation of the philosopher: ἓν μόνον ἔστιν (fr. B 8.1 DK). (shrink)

In his own De anima, Alexander of Aphrodisias famously identifies the “active” (poietikon) intellect with the prime mover in Metaphysics Λ. However, Alexander’s claim raises an issue: why would this divine intellect come in the middle of a study of soul in general and of human intellection in particular? As Paul Moraux asks in his pioneering work on Alexander’s conception of the intellect, is the active intellect a “useless addition”? In this paper, I try to answer this question by challenging (...) a solution according to which the active intellect would intervene directly with the material intellect to trigger its ordinary working. I argue that the active intellect acts as a final cause, both for human intellect and for its ordinary objects of thought. The active intellect is twice “cause of the intellection”, i.e. cause of the actualization of human thought: once (i) when it offers thought occasions for thinking through objects, and again (ii) when it actualizes mediately the human intellect itself in its development. This reading agrees with Alexander’s usual position about the prime mover’s causality. It accounts for the multiplicity of expressions with which Alexander describes the causality of the active intellect in his De anima. It also explains why the development of human intellect has been described without direct reference to active intellect, since substances do not aim directly at the First cause, but their aiming at it is mediated by their desire for their own good. (shrink)

The existence of common points between Alexander of Aphrodise and Bardaisan the Syrian has been pointed out on various occasions. However, this question has not been explored in depth. The article proposes to analyse the cosmological ideas of Alexander and Bardaisan. Because both authors are known for their anti-determinist and anti-astrological polemics, it is preferable to place this comparison in the context of the astrological interpretation of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. The article discusses the Aristotelianism of Bardaisan, who may be the (...) first representative of the reception of this doctrine in Syriac. (shrink)

It is now a widespread opinion among interpreters that Aristotle’s History of Animals is not a mere collection of empirical data but has its own theoretical framework; however, there is still disagreement as to exactly what this framework is. To address the problem, the article analyzes in detail the diairetic schemes of HA I 1, attempting to overturn the common opinion that this chapter is a mere expository introduction to the study of animals’ differences. On the contrary, it will be (...) shown that in this chapter Aristotle not only applies the method of ‘multiple division’ theorized in Parts of Animals I 2–4, but also uses dividing criteria that are informed by his causal theory and his hylomorphist ontology. This analysis will therefore lead to the more controversial conclusion that HA is not an ‘early’ work by Aristotle but a mature treatise with its own specific theoretical aim: the aitiological explanation of the anatomical, eco-physiological and ethological differences among animals. (shrink)

Chapter 20 of Plotinus’ treatise VI, 2 [43] has received particular attention because it seems to deal with the Intellect. However, the connection of this chapter with chapter 19 is problematic insofar as the latter deals with the ways in which species are generated by the first genera. Our aim will be to show that chapter 20 can only be understood in the light of the notion of genus. More precisely, Plotinus’ aim in this chapter is to demonstrate the priority (...) of the genus over its species by means of the theory of double activity. In order to demonstrate this point, the notion of Intellect is introduced by Plotinus as a model (παράδειγμα) to conceive this priority. We will study successively these two chapters to justify this point, insisting on the link between them as well as on the reinterpretation of some key Aristotelian concepts. This study also shows that the use of the comparison with science allows Plotinus to justify the primacy of the intelligible totalities that are the Soul and the Intellect as well as the generation of their respective parts, the particular souls and the particular intellects. (shrink)

We present here the first translation into a modern language of the anonymous commentary on the second book of the Nicomachean Ethics. It is an evidence of the style of exegetical work that was being done in the Peripatetic schools during the 2nd–3rd century AD, and a testimony to a particular version of 2nd century Aristotelianism. Even if the comment is not continuous, one gets the impression of listening to a good lecturer illustrating Aristotle’s text. He paraphrases it at times, (...) makes comparisons with other passages of the corpus, illustrates the structure and the logic of the discourse, and shows the difference between Aristotle’s positions and those of other schools. In the most theoretically interesting parts of the commentary the anonymous discusses aporiai, and opposes Aristotle’s ethical theories to other schools, especially to the Stoics. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a new reading of Plato’s precosmos (Ti. 52d2–53c3). More specifically, I shall argue that the precosmos is populated by bodies deriving from random complexes of properties, and that this is the effect of the Receptacle’s full precosmic participation in the Paradigm. This will turn out to be consistent with a robust notion of ‘precosmic generation’ and will reveal why Plato may have sought to refer to this otherwise puzzling scenario: representing the precosmos (...) in this way allows Plato to effectively justify why the Demiurge is responsible only for the goodness and perfection of the universe, and why it is properly the best possible cause. (shrink)

At Prior Analytics II 22.68a16–21, Aristotle argues that if A is predicated of all B and C and nothing else, and B is predicated of all C, then A and B convert. In justifying his argument, however, he appears to claim that B is not predicated of all A. This claim has long been a cause of puzzlement to commentators. A widespread view is that the kind of conversion discussed in the passage at issue should be explained in both extensional (...) and intensional terms. After providing some textual evidence that Aristotle only apparently claims that B is not predicated of all A, I give a purely extensional account of Aristotle’s argument. This account is plausible, conservative and simpler than any of the intensional accounts that have been proposed so far. (shrink)