In Emile, Rousseau advances significant ideas about language, language learning and teaching: He posits a universal natural language that develops as the child matures; focuses on ‘private’ words invented by children, on the challenge facing children in their understanding of exceptions to general rules of the mother tongue and on recommended methods of teaching the mother tongue. The paper explores these notions, which feature at the end of Book I of Emile. It seeks to explain and interpret them as postulations (...) regarding language, language learning and teaching and, moreover, to show how they relate to Rousseau's general principles of education. (shrink)

Recent research shows that 20% of children face a form of chronic illness during childhood. The illness and its associated physical and mental challenges can affect such children's ‘being’ and influence how they develop as people. A significant aspect of a child's life that can be profoundly influenced by a chronic illness is education. This study employed a phenomenological approach to shed more light on the special education of such children. Temporality and embodiment were examined as two philosophical bases in (...) the phenomenological education of children with such chronic illnesses. Also, this educational model highlights that phenomenological understanding, and the healing connection in education, can increase the affected children's positive self-concept, directing them towards a satisfying and happy life. (shrink)

This essay explores the legacy of the four philosophers now often referred to as ‘The Wartime Quartet’: G.E.M. Anscombe, Iris Murdoch, Philippa Foot and Mary Midgley. The life and work of the four, who studied together in Oxford during the Second World War, is the subject of two recently published books, The Women Are Up to Something, by Benjamin Lipscomb, and Metaphysical Animals, by Clare Mac Cumhaill and Rachael Wiseman. The two books show us how Anscombe, Murdoch, Foot and Midgley (...) became friends united in their hostility to the logical-positivist orthodoxy of the day and its deleterious influence on Oxford moral philosophy. And we see how their friendship had a formative influence on their subsequent—highly distinguished—careers, so that it is possible to discern, if not exactly a school of thought, then various common themes, ideas and concerns, which are expressed and developed in contrasting ways. While Lipscomb represents the work of the Quartet as of largely historical significance, my paper defends what I take to be Mac Cumhaill and Wiseman's position that their legacy is very much a living one, containing insights that are not just of enduring relevance, but can transform how we see ourselves and how we do philosophy. For Mac Cumhaill and Wiseman, the key idea shared by the members of the Quartet is to place the concept of life at the centre of philosophical attention. This commitment has at least four dimensions: (i) an interest in the ordinary; (ii) a focus on virtue, goodness and human flourishing; (iii) an affirmation of our animal nature; (iv) recognition of the normative landscape that structures our lives. I try to bring out the philosophical significance of these themes in a way relevant to the philosophical elucidation of education. (shrink)

This paper studies how Emerson's ‘Self-Reliance’ offers a meaningful account of political and moral self-education in Western democracies. Emerson's moral perfectionism involves an ethical, political and democratic individualism that needs to be reconsidered. This paper explores a perfectionist interpretation of the modern forms of self-education as political and ordinary practices, first with the case of conspiracy theories, which express an individual desire for self-education but appear as the result of a lack of self-reliance and a failure of political self-education, and (...) then through the explicit claim to self-education made by activists in ecological, anti-racial or feminist organisations, which embodies the democratic need for self-reliance. These two examples reveal a new kind of efficient and ordinary political power at the edge of civic commitment. This leads us to define an alternative conception of pedagogy, in which equality in self-reliance matters. This also underlines our moral and ordinary political responsibility and challenges the traditional philosophical opposition between personal and public, subjective and universal. This paper underlines the accuracy of Stanley Cavell's interpretation of Emerson's ‘Self-Reliance’ in order to provide a perfectionist interpretation of activism. It also opens a new crossed perspective between the French and American approaches. (shrink)

In 1940, John and Morag Aitkenhead set up Kilquhanity School in rural Galloway, inspired by the writings of A.S. Neill and the practices at Summerhill School. In 1962, Aitkenhead wrote that he had swallowed ‘hook, line and sinker’ Neill's theories and that ‘but for him and his example, there could never have been this free school in Scotland’. Historians and commentators have tended to share his view, for example, describing Aitkenhead as a ‘disciple’ of Neill and Kilquhanity as an ‘approximate’ (...) of Summerhill with its weekly meeting, informality of relations between adults and children and a valuing of freedom and happiness over academic achievement.However, this article, drawing on primary research with ex-pupils and staff, uncovers significant differences of philosophy and practice between the two schools, particularly in relation to pupils’ contribution to the Kilquhanity School community through the daily practice of ‘useful work’. These differences raise questions about the positioning of Kilquhanity as simply a less well-known and less radical ‘Summerhill in Scotland’ and expose an often neglected fault line within the progressive and radical movements with which both schools are associated. (shrink)

Elizabeth Anscombe, Mary Midgley, Iris Murdoch and Philippa Foot all studied at Oxford University during the Second World War. One of their wartime tutors was Donald MacKinnon. This paper gives a broad overview of MacKinnon's philosophical outlook as it was developing at this time. Four talks from between 1938 and 1941—‘And the Son of Man That Thou Visiteth Him’ (1938), ‘What Is a Metaphysical Statement?’ (1940), ‘The Function of Philosophy in Education’ (1941) and ‘Revelation and Social Justice’ (1941)—give a foretaste (...) of the conception of moral philosophy that he later articulated in A Study of Ethical Theory (1957). We identify aspects of his philosophical outlook and unusual treatment of method that likely shaped his teaching. We trace his influence in the work of Midgley, Murdoch and Foot, all of whom studied with him from Trinity Term 1940 until their finals in 1942. In the case of Anscombe, though she was briefly his student—he taught her Plato—she and MacKinnon moved in shared intellectual circles, and there is reason to think that some of the forces that shaped MacKinnon's outlook also shaped hers. The sketch we offer is incomplete—in particular, we are not able to do justice to MacKinnon's explicitly theological writings—but we hope to achieve three things. First, to go some way towards indicating the importance of the teacher MacKinnon to understanding the work of his better-known pupils. Second, to introduce a philosopher for whom the teaching of philosophy, practical ethics and metaphysical theory were deeply entwined. Third, to reflect on the relationship between, on the one hand, a conception of the practice and significance of metaphysics and, on the other, a view on the role and nature of philosophical teaching and learning. (shrink)

Prompted by the centenary of the founding of Summerhill, in my contribution to this JOPE Suite on Democratic Education, I briefly explore both the admiring reciprocity and the subsidiary but significant differences of praxis between A.S. Neill and Alex Bloom, two remarkable pioneers of education in and for participatory democracy as a way of life. Because A.S. Neill's work is internationally renowned and Alex Bloom's has yet to re-establish the worldwide recognition it had in his own lifetime, my emphasis is (...) on the contribution of Alex Bloom, in large part because he is amongst the most radical pioneers of democratic education the UK state sector has ever known. To a significant degree, the aspirations and actualities of Bloom's work rebutted Neill's insistence that pioneers within the state sector of education could not innovate in ways that would significantly challenge the status quo. Indeed, Alex Bloom extended participatory democratic educational aspirations in ways which Neill did not. Most importantly, these not only entailed a commitment to community engagement, they did so in conditions of abject poverty and profound psychological trauma following the ravages of the Second World War London Blitz with its attendant evacuation and subsequent return to the ruins of their former homes.In the first section, I take as my starting point Alex Bloom's strongly supportive review of A.S. Neill's book The Problem Family and Neill's visit to Bloom's school in the East End of London, some five years later. Foregrounding the dialectic of practice and aspiration, I touch on some of the key issues that emerged for both Neill and Bloom at that time.Challenging Neill's later affirmation that the only significant freedom one can introduce into a state school is ‘a free attitude on the teacher's part, his or her being on the side of the child’ and his reported view that Bloom and others might be able to experiment in methods of teaching or ways of organising the timetable, ‘but not in methods of living’, the second section explores the nature and interrelationship of six key strands woven into the fabric of Alex Bloom's truly remarkable work that exemplified the grounded possibility and vibrant actuality of participatory democracy as a way of living and learning together that prefigures a more just, creative and caring form of human engagement.Locating the foundation of Alex Bloom's praxis within the 20th-century personalist philosophical tradition and its Adlerian psychological counterpart, the brief concluding section draws in particular on the work of John Macmurray who argues, as did Bloom in his own writing and his daily praxis, that ‘The first priority in education—if by education we mean learning to be human—is learning to live in personal relation to other people. Let us call it learning to live in community’. (shrink)

To speak of democracy is often to speak less of a fact than of a hope. In his introduction to Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville admitted that ‘… in America I saw more than America; I sought the image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character, its prejudices and its passions, in order to learn what we have to fear or to hope from its progress’. De Tocqueville recognised that democracy's success would rely on its constant promotion, the (...) affirmation and revaluation of its terms and conditions, such that it sustains the investedness of its (voluntary) participants. This paper considers the work of Stanley Cavell as inheriting the tone of de Tocqueville's romantic will to democracy, particularly in the discovery of its analogous image in ‘remarriage comedy’. I look first at the ways in which popular pictures of (in this case, American) democracy on film sustain an expression of hope for a better set of relations amongst equal and consenting participants, an expression that is identified as romantic in nature. By contrast, I will also discuss how representations of democracy's reality on screen—pictures that sit outside comfortable generic expectations, and reveal those moments in which interest in democratic participation or values has ebbed or is dormant—have as much to tell us about democracy's character as more idealist expressions of what it might be or become. (shrink)

In the past few years, we have seen emerging new work that brings into focus the role of historical change and its moral implications in Iris Murdoch's philosophy. This paper strengthens this reading of her work and investigates the implications of this aspect of Murdoch's thinking for education in general and for moral education in particular. It resituates the Platonic imagery of the individual's ascent towards the true and the good in a framework where our conceptions of the true and (...) the good are in a process of historical reconfiguration. (shrink)

In the past few years, we have seen emerging new work that brings into focus the role of historical change and its moral implications in Iris Murdoch's philosophy. This paper strengthens this reading of her work and investigates the implications of this aspect of Murdoch's thinking for education in general and for moral education in particular. It resituates the Platonic imagery of the individual's ascent towards the true and the good in a framework where our conceptions of the true and (...) the good are in a process of historical reconfiguration. (shrink)

This article explores the context for the accompanying suite of papers on creating and sustaining democratic spaces in education. Prompted by the centenary of Summerhill, the internationally famous democratic school founded in Suffolk, England, in 1921, by A.S. Neill, this collection of papers explores and broadens out the central questions at the heart of experiments in democratic education. We suggest that, at a time of distrust in and questioning of the central institutions of democratic government, and in the wake of (...) challenges to the mainstream system of state schooling, these questions are more relevant than ever. We argue that detailed attention to the everyday practice of creating democratic spaces in a variety of educational and social contexts can highlight the myriad ways in which educators, students, families and communities can keep democratic values and principles alive, thereby enriching our discussions about the meaning and value of democratic education. (shrink)

In recent years, a new scholarly gaze has been cast on four women‒Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch‒who have come to be known as the ‘Wartime Quartet’. During the postwar period, when women were still scarce in the discipline, these four flourished as philosophers. New details about their wartime education give us materials to reflect on what enabled them to develop their unique philosophical voices. Their work dispels widespread philosophical dogmas, especially scientistic interpretations of naturalism that exclude (...) value from the fabric of reality. Through their attention to the details of ordinary life, they avoid flattening the complexities of moral learning, especially where this involves navigating intergenerational differences. The articles in this Suite look to the Wartime Quartet's writings and learning conditions to show that, far from being of purely historical interest, they shed fresh light on the aims and challenges of moral education and offer a critical perspective on current pedagogical practices‒particularly in the teaching of philosophy. (shrink)

Education, which is as old as humanity, has existed in various personal forms in non-western societies, where an osmotic exchange of wisdom, values and life skills within families, tribes and communities was instrumental in the formation and continuation of diverse wisdom traditions all over the world. A personal system of education, called Gurukula (Sanskrit guru, teacher; kula, family) education, thrived in pre-colonial South Asia for centuries before it was replaced by colonial education. This article discusses the philosophy and science behind (...) Gurukula education, where education was a personal process involving an osmotic exchange of essences between teacher and taught, giving wide scope for the celebration of the natural diversity and variability of human behaviour and personality leading to an education that provides equal opportunity in the real sense—as an equal fit between individuals and their environment(s), giving rise to a practical democracy. (shrink)

This paper describes and analyses the experience of the participants of an undergraduate reading group on ‘The Wartime Quartet’. In the first section, I explain the set-up of the reading group. In the second section, I discuss what the participants shared and the trends we noticed in our experiences as women and marginalised genders studying undergraduate philosophy In the third section, I explain why the philosophy of the Quartet was itself vital to our development and how it enabled us to (...) begin critically engaging with the material presented in our courses. My fourth section introduces a phenomenon I call disassociated disagreement (DD) and uses testimonies from former members of the reading group to illustrate why this phenomenon is central to understanding the confusion that sometimes presents in students of philosophy. I then discuss a strategy for combating DD and illustrate how students’ seeming confusion can provide a pathway to unique and insightful philosophical perspectives. I conclude by situating my discussion within the broader framework of research into women's representation in philosophy and close by arguing that the concept of DD can be a potent tool for encouraging more philosophy undergraduates who belong to marginalised groups to pursue further study. (shrink)

Through a series of conversations, Fintan McCutcheon and Joanna Haynes explore McCutcheon's reflections on school leadership in the contexts of the Educate Together movement (in the Republic of Ireland) and, specifically, in his aspiration to build an optimally democratic school in Balbriggan. Much of the academic and professional literature on school leadership depicts the role of school leaders as expressing a strong vision for the school, with charismatic communication and strategic skills, and putting explicit emphasis on high educational standards. On (...) the ground, the school leader is required to maintain executive governance standards, is accountable to a range of hierarchies and audiences and is in a custodian role to traditions of school culture and human resource relationships. Taken together, these academic, professional and contractual obligations can corral the school leader into practice of limited scope, obstructed by protocol, risk-averse and curtailed in creativity and, in relation to developing a democratic school, lacking in the necessary room for innovation. The conversation focuses on the rough ground of incident and messiness, identified through critical moments of school life when the aspirations to be democratic, to lead democratically, to teach democracy and to create a sustaining democratic school culture are lived-out. Through this dialogue, the conversants observe a practice of school leadership grounded in practical reason. The dialogue touches on and threads congruence between the on-the-ground risk-taking, rule-breaking, action orientation, nuanced dialogue, passionate engagement and deep reflection that characterise day-to-day school leadership practice. It concludes with ideas concerning the dynamics of forms of democracy that can prevail. (shrink)

This article is an exploration of a democratic school where the author spent several years researching and engaging with teachers and students while investigating the practice of Philosophy for/with Children (P4C) within Irish Educate Together schools. I offer an account of how teachers in these contexts seek to reconcile and harmonise their P4C practice with their own educational and democratic outlooks. These perspectives were uncovered through a ‘lived enquiry’ study involving deep immersion in the day-to-day life of a school as (...) a researcher and P4C practitioner. Teachers seeking to reconcile their practice with their views in this context resulted in the children in their classrooms learning through democratic processes, where democracy is not merely prescribed, but instead becomes a way of life. By drawing upon excerpts of teacher interview data from my doctoral studies, I suggest that there is a ‘rough ground’ of practice where diverse and unique perspectives can be revealed when lived, deeply immersive and sensitive approaches are taken towards practitioners and their communities. The intertwining of Educate Together and P4C philosophies of education is explored, with particular emphasis on the notion of child-centredness, dialogue and philosophical enquiry with children. Expanding on the democratic educational ideas of Biesta and Fielding, I argue that there is a deeply contextual and philosophically compelling connection between teachers engaging in P4C, the atmosphere or environment in which dialogue with children can occur and a different understanding of democracy through education that may result. (shrink)

This is a brief introduction to the second part of a suite of papers on the theme ‘Political Education for Human Transformation’. Sceptical of the familiar and somewhat narrow frameworks for citizenship education, this East-West collaboration looks again at the very idea, and the possible means, of education for democracy. It examines the principle of an equality of voices as crucial to mature democratic citizenship, expanding on this through the idea of the ‘education of one's experience’. This is a matter (...) not of introspection but rather of turning attention outward—towards the language we use, the way others are treated, works of art and popular culture—in order to be more critically awake and to experience more fully how the world comes to light. We introduce papers by Alexis Gibbs and Léa Boman, which respectively consider the reflections of de Tocqueville on democracy in the United States and Emerson's essay ‘Self-Reliance’. Together, these essays contribute to an understanding of the manner in which we are always already implicated in structures of power. They offer a redefinition of political subjectivity. (shrink)

Character education in schools in England is flourishing. I give many examples of the enthusiasm for it as well as drawing attention to the UK government's new ambivalence towards it. Character education seems largely impervious to the many criticisms to which it has been subjected. I touch on these only briefly as my focus is on a criticism that has received little coverage. This is because the virtues on offer are unstable. They are best understood as sites on which we (...) contest our understanding of what it is to be a good person rather than reach conclusive answers. There is support for this argument in Aristotle, notwithstanding its many oddities and those of some modern uses of his conception of the virtues. The proliferation of the virtues in the practice and theory of education today is, I suggest, a sign of weakness and not of strength, while the very instability of the virtues demands that they be continually discussed and debated. This places them at the heart of any vision of education worth having. (shrink)

Amidst the lingering prominence of idealist and rationalist traditions in the philosophy of education, the notion of living, sentient body (or soma) seems to have received scant attention by educational philosophers hitherto. These traditions—whose strong influence can be traced back to such philosophers as Plato, Descartes, Leibniz and Wolff—elevate and privilege the import of reasoning and mind over the body, rendering the latter ancillary and even distorting to the pursuit of knowledge and truth. Drawing on the idea of somaestehtic philosophy (...) initially proposed by Richard Shusterman, this article first discusses this philosophical outlook and then expands it by foregrounding the notion of the libidinal body—that is, the potentiality of the performative dimension of the soma in constructing and reconstructing knowledge. It argues that the soma itself is, in fact, the site of desire for knowledge production and reproduction. To buttress this argument, the article provides evidence from Borneo's Dayaknese communities as one of the instances of the somatic society where the practices of the libidinal body for the community's education are most conspicuous. The article ends with some thoughts on the possible research directions the philosophy of education ought to take to push the field forward in its pursuit for virtue and the good life. (shrink)

From the first co-operative trust school at Reddish Vale in Manchester in 2006, the following decade would witness a remarkable growth of ‘co-operative schools’ in England, which at one point numbered over 850. This paper outlines the key development of democratic education by the co-operative schools network. It explains the approach to democracy and explores the way values were put into practice. At the heart of co-operativism lay a tension between engaging with technical everyday reforms and utopian transformative visions of (...) an educational future. A new arena of debate and practice was established with considerable importance for our understanding of democratic education within the mainstream. (shrink)

Assessment is a necessary task in all areas of education, but there is no agreement on how to assess the impacts of different approaches to sex education, both on an individual level and on a population level over time. The history of mid-20th Century Family Life Education in the United States illuminates some of the obstacles that have made assessing sex education programmes so difficult: control groups, access to large numbers of research subjects and the means to verify self-reporting are (...) elusive. These persistent challenges have to do with the nature of the subject, which is, in contrast to most subjects, not supposed to be practised at school. Standards of reliability, validity and classroom authenticity, therefore, apply partially at best. We argue that some approaches to sex education are valuable whether or not they are assessable, and that some things that are assessable may not be valuable in the way they are thought to be. (shrink)

I offer an account of sexual ethics, and thus of an education in sexual morality, that tries to make some sense of how a view of consent as central to those ethics might be combined with an education in certain virtues. I do so by exploring what some see as the shortcomings of a standard of consent, namely, how it can deal with instances of prima facie bad sex. I consider and reject various attempts to show that consensuality is sufficient (...) for morally good sex. I then show how a needed supplement to the standard of consent can appeal to a broader view of why consent matters. This in turn connects to those personal and interpersonal virtues that the 2019 Department of Education guidance on relationships and sex education suggests should be taught. Finally, I provide an account of why more than consensuality is needed in the case of sex. In short, I insist on the critical importance of consent but supplement the standard of consent by an appeal to why consent matters and does so especially in the case of sex. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Forming and sustaining healthy relationships of any kind requires empathy, thought, communication and effort, all of which are learned skills. Many of these skills can and should be learned in a variety of places, including and especially in schools. One of the most appropriate venues for teaching interpersonal relationship skills in school is through ‘sex ed’ classes. I argue that student-centred, anti-racist, culturally affirming and appropriate, inclusive, egalitarian and relationship-based learning environments are necessary for sex education that benefits all students. (...) The principles of hip-hop-based pedagogies, including Christopher Emdin's Reality Pedagogy, Bettina Love's Abolitionist Pedagogy and Rawls and Robinson's Youth Culture Pedagogy can serve as a useful theoretical framework around which to build sex education curriculum and policy. School-based sex education (SBSE) based on these principles may prove extremely beneficial not only to all students and their individual sense of identity and sexual autonomy but also to the general welfare of the public in the long run. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

The relationship between sexuality education and religion is often framed antagonistically, especially when it comes to tensions between the teaching of sexuality education and the priorities of some religious communities. In this paper, we argue that this antagonism can be structured as much by the prevalent forms of engagement that display it (dialogue and debate), as it is by the antagonism between contrasting ethical systems. While we acknowledge the importance of debate and dialogue in the public sphere, we contend that (...) appeals to these discursive forms in schools and classrooms can limit possibilities for rethinking engagements across sexuality education and religion. This is because of the tendency within certain manifestations of dialogue (for example, dialogical models connected to liberal political projects) to err on the side of predictability, rationality and abstraction. To address some of these limits, we draw on the recent turn to conversation in educational thinking. We think through the significance of conversation in offering a mode of engagement for students, teachers and school communities that is conditioned by the dispossession of the self and is attuned to the unpredictable, affective and contextual landscapes of shared encounters. We conclude with some thoughts on the practical implications of conversation for rethinking the role of the sexuality education teacher, practices of parental consultation and processes of policy enactment in schools. (shrink)

Legislating comprehensive sex education curricula has long been believed to be essential to aligning education about sex, sexuality and human relationships with the values of equality, inclusivity and autonomy. Defences of the need for ‘good’ sex education in public schools are contingent upon arguments about whose experiences ought to guide us in determining what sufficient alignment with such values might look like. The aim of this paper is to explore the assumptions underlying one prevailing norm in such defences: what I (...) call parental deference or the practice of heeding to the rights of parents in debates about sex education. The question at the heart of this paper is, then, who in our communities does this deference exclude? I begin with a brief consideration of the appeal of parental deference within theories of education in general, and sex education in particular, before problematising its normalisation through a consideration of the exclusions such deference creates. In the process, I aim to explore the limits of parental deference for addressing the intersection of sexuality, sex, gender and race with violence in curricula and argue instead that one way of mitigating the consequences of these limits is to take seriously what I call sex education's community problem: If schools are to serve communities, why are so many community members’ experiences excluded? (shrink)

Our 2021 article in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice argued that mutuality, defined as ‘loving attention’ towards a sexual partner, should be a moral standard for ethical sex. We specified that this loving attention should occur in the form of attempting to know what could be knowable about the other person and taking a ‘thick’ view of the other in their particular social and psychological contexts. We contrasted this orientation with the comparatively ‘thin’ view of people from a rights-based ethical (...) perspective that claimed that individuals would have fulfilled their moral duty by acquiring free and informed consent from a partner. Michael Hand and Michael Reiss have responded to the article, and here we respond to their critiques. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss rape myths and mythologies, their negative effects on rape and sexual assault complainants, and how they prejudicially construct women qua women. The backdrop for the analysis is the Belfast Rugby Rape Trial, which took place in 2018. Four men, two of whom were well-known rugby players, were acquitted of rape and sexual assault in a nine-week criminal trial that dominated local, national and international attention. The acquittal resulted in ‘I Believe Her’ rallies and protests across (...) Northern Ireland. Of concern were the deeply sexist and misogynistic text exchanges among the acquitted about the complainant and women more generally. One month after the trial, the Criminal Justice Board of Northern Ireland commissioned an independent review of the arrangements to deliver justice in cases of serious sexual offences. The Gillen Review proposed 16 key recommendations, among them measures to dispel rape myths and the role that Relationship and Sex Education in schools could play in combatting these myths. I will explore these issues using Miranda Fricker's construction of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is little appreciation of the profound impact that routine testimonial injustice—where the credibility of a speaker is deflated or undermined on account of her social identity—can have on the wellbeing of speakers and how it ramifies with other forms of injustice. To illustrate, I draw on neurological explanations to show why attributions of sexual consent are unjustly sustained in cases of rape and sexual assault. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Responses to the pernicious influences of mainstream pornography on its viewers fall into two main sorts: regulation and education. Pornography has long been a core topic in analytic feminist philosophy, but it has largely focused on issues around regulation, in particular with trying to undermine arguments against regulation on the grounds that pornography should count as protected speech. Here I instead look at some ways that philosophy can contribute to an education-based approach, in particular to what has been called an (...) ‘education to address pornography's influence’. I first argue that philosophical considerations can help to motivate this kind of overall approach to countering pornography's influence, but the main contribution of the paper is to contend that such considerations can also contribute to shaping the kind of content and messaging that such an education should have. I discuss two related issues, focusing on pornographic films. The first concerns the status of pornographic films as fiction; it is misleading and unhelpful to tell teenagers and young adults that pornography is ‘just fiction’, as is sometimes proposed, but it is not clear what more effective and accurate message might be offered instead. The second concerns the ways that pornographic films often present the people (and in particular the women) who perform in them as ideals or archetypes when it comes to what kinds of sexual acts people typically choose and enjoy, which I argue is a neglected form of objectification. I briefly evaluate some suggestive examples of proposed messaging, targeted at teens and young adults. (shrink)

This article examines Lamb, Gable & de Ruyter's critique of consent as the standard by which one can determine if a sexual encounter is ethical in their ‘Mutuality in sexual relationships: a standard of ethical sex?’. Their examination of this issue is to be welcomed for a number of reasons, including growing criticism of ‘consent’ as the gold standard in medical and social science research ethics. The focus of this article is specifically on school sex education (principally, for 11–16-year-olds). Contrary (...) to Lamb et al., I argue that it is difficult to maintain that ‘The standard of mutuality should be taught in all schools and the government should indeed demand or support this, even with checks to see if children have learned this standard, at least in attitudes about sexual behavior’ for three reasons. First, while there are good arguments in favour of school children being introduced to the ideal of mutuality, it seems too high a bar to require children to ‘have learned’—a phrase that can be taken to mean to ‘have come to accept’ rather than merely to ‘understand’—this; consent is a more appropriate requirement and is itself a sufficiently rich term that it merits analysis by students, aided by their teachers. Second, my judgement as a sex educator is that sex education is more effective when students are given the opportunity to explore what is good and what is right, rather than simply being told. Third, if we have to adopt a single principle, there is much to be said for ‘respect for others’ to trump both ‘consent’ and ‘mutuality’. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

In September 2020, relationships and sex education (RSE) became compulsory in all English secondary schools, and relationships education became compulsory in all English primary schools, marking a significant step forward in the fight to establish children's rights. Although the new RSE regime will help to ensure that many English schools provide pupils with a far more comprehensive RSE curriculum than ever before, the statutory guidance underpinning it includes a number of caveats that mean, although the subject is compulsory, not all (...) children will receive the same content. Arguably, along with the right to withdraw (which is often exercised on religious grounds), the most insidious of these ‘carve-outs’ allows faith schools to teach RSE according to their ‘distinctive religious character’. This exemption has been used to defend the use of religious RSE resources that critics maintain are misogynistic, homophobic and often draw heavily on pseudoscience, as well as to justify leaving certain topics (such as same-sex relationships or trans rights) out of classroom discussion altogether. Drawing on empirically informed normative case studies and recent reforms to the curriculum in Wales, I argue that faith-based carve-outs to RSE policy imperil children's access to a distinct package of educational goods. Using a recent framework for educational decision-making based on these goods developed by Brighouse et al. I go on to conclude that such policies are politically and morally unjustifiable (at least if one agrees that the relevant package of goods is desirable). I further maintain that, even when considered from the perspective of human rights law—which is often given as a pragmatic reason to allow more permissive policies with respect to teaching topics that may impinge upon parents’ deeply held convictions—there are no necessary grounds for governments to legislate for the subject to be circumscribed by the religious beliefs of parents or the faith ethos of the schools children attend. (shrink)

This article proceeds from a consideration of what John Baldacchino calls ‘viable ignorance’, attempting to take leave from the critical and pedagogical obligations of certain elements of Barbara Johnson's ‘positive ignorance’. It considers Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-François Lyotard and the composer, Karlheinz Stockhausen's reflections on modes of experience, and the cultivation of complementary dispositions, where the knowing, egocentric subject is transformed into, or undermined as, what Nietzsche calls ‘a medium of overpowering forces’. The disposition itself is outlined through close readings of (...) key elements of Nietzsche's notebooks, Lyotard's final chapter of Libidinal Economy (1993), and Stockhausen's lecture, ‘Intuitive Music’ (1971) and developed through supplemental practice-as-research activity in sound. The intention of this paper is to explore the space of aesthetic ignorance as committedly as possible, without reverting constantly to positive ignorance. (shrink)

This paper aspires to show the often-obscured structure of alternatives in education. Alternative education is generally understood as an umbrella term for educational thought and practice for and in schools differing from an assumed ‘mainstream’, where ‘alternative’ is often taken to mean ‘better’. In many cases, ‘mainstream’ serves as an empty signifier that can be substituted by various forms of criticism. Just as progressive education is supposed to remedy all the ills of traditional education, alternative education is often positioned as (...) a safe place to retreat to, away from the mainstream. I argue that this leads to a dichotomous structure. The mainstream, however, is not an empirical reality, for example, a specific form of curriculum, differentiation of different types of schooling, or anything else. ‘Mainstream’ serves as a generic critical reference point. My argument is developed through a series of historical discussions around alternative education explored through the lens of contemporary analysis of the category. I then offer a more systematic account of the terminology in order to establish a perspective from which to assess the flaws and problems of alternative education alongside its potential virtues and benefits. (shrink)

The Oxford English Dictionary defines fulfilment as ‘satisfaction or happiness as a result of fully developing one's potential or realizing one's aspirations; self-fulfillment’. Not only has the idea of fulfilment underpinned ‘approximately twenty centuries of philosophy’ as Lefebvre notes, it plays an indispensable role in both popular and scholarly accounts of education and upbringing. Experiences of education, of upbringing and of ‘life lessons’, however, are so often not about the fulfilment of oneself, about the discovery and actualisation of one's full (...) potential. Such experiences instead involve moments of sometimes irreparable failure and loss—a matter that has not received a great deal of attention in educational research and theory. After briefly examining the way that fulfilment is favourably framed both in humanistic psychology and in neo-humanist Bildungstheorie, this paper considers some of the exceptions to the nearly ubiquitous identification of education with fulfilment: Arthur Schopenhauer's view of the irrationality of human (developmental) experience and Ludwig Wittgenstein's use of the term ‘conditioning’ (Abrichtung) in some of his accounts of learning and socialisation. We then focus on failure and loss in education through an overview of the pedagogical theory of O.F. Bollnow. Bollnow, as is gradually being recognised in English-language scholarship, saw moments of uncertainty, disorientation and above all crisis as indispensable in educational experience—for both student and teacher. In this way, we show that instead of being the pursuit of self-fulfilment, education is unavoidably a matter of difficulty, disruption and also failure. It reshapes us, and this reshaping can be seen as being as much about formation as it is about deformation. (shrink)

The Oxford English Dictionary defines fulfilment as ‘satisfaction or happiness as a result of fully developing one's potential or realizing one's aspirations; self-fulfillment’. Not only has the idea of fulfilment underpinned ‘approximately twenty centuries of philosophy’ as Lefebvre notes, it plays an indispensable role in both popular and scholarly accounts of education and upbringing. Experiences of education, of upbringing and of ‘life lessons’, however, are so often not about the fulfilment of oneself, about the discovery and actualisation of one's full (...) potential. Such experiences instead involve moments of sometimes irreparable failure and loss—a matter that has not received a great deal of attention in educational research and theory. After briefly examining the way that fulfilment is favourably framed both in humanistic psychology and in neo-humanist Bildungstheorie, this paper considers some of the exceptions to the nearly ubiquitous identification of education with fulfilment: Arthur Schopenhauer's view of the irrationality of human (developmental) experience and Ludwig Wittgenstein's use of the term ‘conditioning’ (Abrichtung) in some of his accounts of learning and socialisation. We then focus on failure and loss in education through an overview of the pedagogical theory of O.F. Bollnow. Bollnow, as is gradually being recognised in English-language scholarship, saw moments of uncertainty, disorientation and above all crisis as indispensable in educational experience—for both student and teacher. In this way, we show that instead of being the pursuit of self-fulfilment, education is unavoidably a matter of difficulty, disruption and also failure. It reshapes us, and this reshaping can be seen as being as much about formation as it is about deformation. (shrink)

The increased governmental focus on happiness since the late 1990s, and particularly since the economic crash of 2008, has been informed predominantly by a conceptualisation of happiness promoted by the field of positive psychology, and adopted and developed in fields such as behavioural economics and more recently in fields such as neuroeducation. Concepts, or traits, associated with feeling happy or satisfied with our lives, such as resilience, are now promoted across both public and private domains as a means to improve (...) our quality of life, our productivity and our attainment. The promotion of this positive psychological notion of happiness in the context of education not only presents these traits as virtues of the productive learning citizen but also effects a delegitimisation of the negative. Analysis of curricula programmes, seen alongside the shift taken towards a focus on the individual as brain, highlights the pedagogical and political implications of this. (shrink)

Nothing reveals the differences between an internal (i.e., inherently pedagogical) reflection on educational processes and an external (i.e., derived from a philosophical, sociological, psychological, theological or other perspective) more clearly than the differing attitudes towards alienation. Looked at from outside a pedagogical context, alienation appears only negative, deserving nothing but contempt and rejection; examined from inside a pedagogical framework, it proves to be a conditio sine qua non, the process through which transformative education is possible. This article juxtaposes both perspectives (...) in order to defend the conviction that within educational reflections, only an inherently pedagogical, i.e., positive, understanding of alienation is persuasive, whereas other approaches by definition either are outside of pedagogical reflections or belong to a kind of metaphysical thinking that nowadays seems rather outdated. This paper forms part of a Special Issue titled ‘Beyond Virtue and Vice: Education for a Darker Age’, in which the editors invited authors to engage in exercises of ‘transvaluation’. Certain apparently settled educational concepts (from agency and fulfilment to alienation and ignorance) can be radically reinterpreted such that virtues can be seen as vices, and vices as virtues. The editors encouraged authors to employ polemics and some occasional exaggeration to revalue the educational values that are too readily accepted within contemporary educational discourses. (shrink)

Nothing reveals the differences between an internal (i.e., inherently pedagogical) reflection on educational processes and an external (i.e., derived from a philosophical, sociological, psychological, theological or other perspective) more clearly than the differing attitudes towards alienation. Looked at from outside a pedagogical context, alienation appears only negative, deserving nothing but contempt and rejection; examined from inside a pedagogical framework, it proves to be a conditio sine qua non, the process through which transformative education is possible. This article juxtaposes both perspectives (...) in order to defend the conviction that within educational reflections, only an inherently pedagogical, i.e., positive, understanding of alienation is persuasive, whereas other approaches by definition either are outside of pedagogical reflections or belong to a kind of metaphysical thinking that nowadays seems rather outdated. This paper forms part of a Special Issue titled ‘Beyond Virtue and Vice: Education for a Darker Age’, in which the editors invited authors to engage in exercises of ‘transvaluation’. Certain apparently settled educational concepts (from agency and fulfilment to alienation and ignorance) can be radically reinterpreted such that virtues can be seen as vices, and vices as virtues. The editors encouraged authors to employ polemics and some occasional exaggeration to revalue the educational values that are too readily accepted within contemporary educational discourses. (shrink)

Education is astonishingly simple. We have all been through it, whether as children or later in life—indeed, many of us are still going through it in some form or other; we all know what works; and we are all committed to realising its individual and social potential. Such a view of the matter might dispense with the need for philosophy of education altogether as the problems of education are seen as little more than puzzles to be solved. We know (or (...) think that we know) what we want to achieve, the challenge is how to do so most efficiently. If only the virtues of education were that perspicuous, that simple. If only the vices were so easily identified and expunged. It turns out that education is astonishingly complex. The following chapters aspire to re-introduce a certain complexity that abstains from an all-too-easy understanding. They seek not to offer solutions, but complications, disruptions and dissensions. The authors assume positions against the usual associations and evaluations regarding certain words and phrases—a revaluation that turns the virtues to vices and the vices to virtues. (shrink)

Education is astonishingly simple. We have all been through it, whether as children or later in life—indeed, many of us are still going through it in some form or other; we all know what works; and we are all committed to realising its individual and social potential. Such a view of the matter might dispense with the need for philosophy of education altogether as the problems of education are seen as little more than puzzles to be solved. We know (or (...) think that we know) what we want to achieve, the challenge is how to do so most efficiently. If only the virtues of education were that perspicuous, that simple. If only the vices were so easily identified and expunged. It turns out that education is astonishingly complex. The following chapters aspire to re-introduce a certain complexity that abstains from an all-too-easy understanding. They seek not to offer solutions, but complications, disruptions and dissensions. The authors assume positions against the usual associations and evaluations regarding certain words and phrases—a revaluation that turns the virtues to vices and the vices to virtues. (shrink)

The indoctrination debates have been a key feature of the philosophy of education over the past 50 years. While it is generally acknowledged that the pejorative associations of indoctrination only emerged over the last 100 years, those normative associations are widely taken to be an essential part of the concept itself as are the positive connotations of education. I explore some of the problems of assuming that the term must refer to something negative and the essentialism that this implies. The (...) attempt to ‘transvaluate’ indoctrination results in the claim that the concept is virtually indistinguishable from education. Drawing on Ivan Snook's Indoctrination and Education, I examine several candidates for indoctrination to show that the pejorative label is not a good fit. I argue that much of what is framed as indoctrination turns out to be either impossible–implausible or necessary–inevitable; the fact that there is scarcely a gap between these extremes should give us pause to wonder about this term and its relation to education: By providing a term for those influences of which we generally disapprove, does the concept of indoctrination act as a way for educationalists to uphold and protect the normative view of education (that education must aim for something intrinsically worthwhile)?Eds.: This paper forms part of a Special Issue entitled ‘Beyond Virtue and Vice: Education for a Darker Age’ in which the editors invited authors to engage in exercises of ‘transvaluation’. Certain apparently settled educational concepts (from agency and fulfilment to alienation and ignorance) can be reinterpreted and transvaluated (in a Nietzschean vein) such that virtues become vices, and vices, virtues. The editors encouraged authors to employ polemics and some occasional exaggeration to reimagine educational values that are all too readily accepted within contemporary educational discourses. (shrink)

This is a phenomenological description of existential obedience, which draws out a contrast between it and ressentiment and existential envy, and compares it with pedagogical obedience. The discussion is developed with reference especially to the work of Erich Fromm, Emerson, and Nietzsche. Eds: This paper forms part of a special issue titled ‘Beyond Virtue and Vice: Education for a Darker Age’, in which the editors invited authors to engage in exercises of ‘transvaluation’. Certain apparently settled educational concepts (from agency and (...) fulfilment to alienation and ignorance) can be reinterpreted and transvaluated (in a Nietzschean vein) such that virtues become vices, and vices, virtues. The editors encouraged authors to employ polemics and some occasional exaggeration to reimagine educational values that are all too readily accepted within contemporary educational discourses. (shrink)

This paper, while not presenting a general discussion of authority in education, attempts to uncover some of the anomalies, paradoxes and tensions in the concept. It will argue for a revaluation of authority as an educational virtue, as a form of participatory guidance that is an aid to growth. The paper intends to help provoke continued debate over our perceived educational virtues and vices. I argue that virtuous authority is authority exercised from the point of view of a larger experience (...) and a wider horizon. If teachers’ ‘pedagogical imperative’ is to bridge the gap between forms of knowledge and their pupils, then their practice will involve authority. I suggest here that such authority should be repositioned as participatory, immanent and democratic. As Dewey says, ‘The need for authority is…constant…[I]t is the need for principles that are both stable enough and flexible enough to give direction to the processes of living in its vicissitudes and uncertainties.’ In answer to this, I suggest that teachers practice their authority in order to create stable yet flexible, open and indeterminate, but not chaotic situations that combine with pupils’ experiences in such a way as to enable educational growth. Authority practised as a form of participatory guidance, to pursue this Deweyan line of argument, can be ‘an aid to freedom’ and not freedom's enemy. This paper will argue that authority, so revalued, ought to be cultivated in our educational thought and practice. Eds: This paper forms part of a Special Issue titled ‘Beyond Virtue and Vice: Education for a Darker Age’, in which the editors invited authors to engage in exercises of ‘transvaluation’. Certain apparently settled educational concepts (from agency and fulfilment to alienation and ignorance) can be reinterpreted and transvaluated (in a Nietzschean vein) such that virtues become vices, and vices, virtues. The editors encouraged authors to employ polemics and some occasional exaggeration to reimagine educational values that are all too readily accepted within contemporary educational discourses. (shrink)

This paper, while not presenting a general discussion of authority in education, attempts to uncover some of the anomalies, paradoxes and tensions in the concept. It will argue for a revaluation of authority as an educational virtue, as a form of participatory guidance that is an aid to growth. The paper intends to help provoke continued debate over our perceived educational virtues and vices. I argue that virtuous authority is authority exercised from the point of view of a larger experience (...) and a wider horizon. If teachers’ ‘pedagogical imperative’ is to bridge the gap between forms of knowledge and their pupils, then their practice will involve authority. I suggest here that such authority should be repositioned as participatory, immanent and democratic. As Dewey says, ‘The need for authority is…constant…[I]t is the need for principles that are both stable enough and flexible enough to give direction to the processes of living in its vicissitudes and uncertainties.’ In answer to this, I suggest that teachers practice their authority in order to create stable yet flexible, open and indeterminate, but not chaotic situations that combine with pupils’ experiences in such a way as to enable educational growth. Authority practised as a form of participatory guidance, to pursue this Deweyan line of argument, can be ‘an aid to freedom’ and not freedom's enemy. This paper will argue that authority, so revalued, ought to be cultivated in our educational thought and practice. Eds: This paper forms part of a Special Issue titled ‘Beyond Virtue and Vice: Education for a Darker Age’, in which the editors invited authors to engage in exercises of ‘transvaluation’. Certain apparently settled educational concepts (from agency and fulfilment to alienation and ignorance) can be reinterpreted and transvaluated (in a Nietzschean vein) such that virtues become vices, and vices, virtues. The editors encouraged authors to employ polemics and some occasional exaggeration to reimagine educational values that are all too readily accepted within contemporary educational discourses. (shrink)

Enhancing agency—or in a more colloquial term, promoting empowerment—is typically viewed as an unquestioned good. International organisations promote the empowerment of girls and other vulnerable groups around the world. Domestically, democracies rely for their legitimacy on the idea that citizens have agency; hence, civic educators aim to strengthen student ‘voice’ and their inclination to participate. This is all for good reason, as justice does depend in part on the agency of individuals and oppressed groups. But a focus on individual or (...) even collective agency has a dark side. For if people feel that they can change the world, then they also often feel that they should. This sense of responsibility to use one's agency at all times can encourage an instrumental relationship to others and make it difficult to learn receptively, particularly from people with whom we disagree, and especially in moments of crisis. (shrink)

There seem to be obvious virtues to keeping a sense of balance. In this paper, I consider some examples from ordinary life and education where the pursuit of balance would appear to be a benefit. Yet I also draw upon lines of thinking from John Stuart Mill and Adam Phillips to examine whether the apparent good sense of balance can be disturbed. I show how Mill's and Phillips’ ideas extend into a consideration of the aesthetics of balance and the idea (...) that there might be something deceptively alluring about balance. I seek to develop these lines of thinking in relation to a work of modernist literature that works to dissipate balance's beguiling allure. (shrink)

There seem to be obvious virtues to keeping a sense of balance. In this paper, I consider some examples from ordinary life and education where the pursuit of balance would appear to be a benefit. Yet I also draw upon lines of thinking from John Stuart Mill and Adam Phillips to examine whether the apparent good sense of balance can be disturbed. I show how Mill's and Phillips’ ideas extend into a consideration of the aesthetics of balance and the idea (...) that there might be something deceptively alluring about balance. I seek to develop these lines of thinking in relation to a work of modernist literature that works to dissipate balance's beguiling allure. (shrink)

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An important aspect of moral expertise is moral sensitivity, which is the ability to be sensitive to the presence of morally salient features in a context. This requires being able to see and acquire the morally relevant information, as well as organise and interpret it, so that you can undertake the related work of moral judgement, focus (or motivation) and action. As a distinct but interrelated component of ethical expertise, moral sensitivity can and must be trained and educated. However, despite (...) its importance to moral education, there has been comparatively little discussion about the role of ethical sensitivity and the ways that it can be trained within the context of Kant’s, and Kantian, ethics. This paper seeks to address this gap. While Kant does not explicitly focus in detail on moral sensitivity, by breaking sensitivity down into seven distinct aspects through drawing on the Four Component Model, we are able to identify a wealth of resources in Kant’s work from which we can con- struct an account of moral sensitivity education that draws on his underlying moral theory. (shrink)