My goal in this project is to understand how traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) manifests—or fails to manifest—in environmental education policy issued by the Ministry of Education in Oman. I also seek to explore whether there are cultural pressures in Omani society to overlook TEK in environmental education policy. Specifically, my aim is to understand how forces of globalization interact with TEK in Oman and whether these forces are behind the tendency to unknowingly ignore TEK when designing the Environmental Education Policy. (...) Drawing on critical decolonial studies, post-Heideggerian philosophy, and environmental education pedagogy, this article investigates the Policy of Environmental Education for Sustainable Development in Oman, which is a government document issued by the Ministry of Education in 2012 as a blueprint for designing environmental education curricula in Oman. My analysis of the policy reveals that there is both a tension with and a potential for a pluriversal approach—one that embraces the coexistence and mutual enrichment of scientific knowledge and TEK in environmental education. While the focus on scientism has historically marginalized TEK, this article argues for a pluriversal framework that values multiple ways of knowing. By fostering a dialogue between these knowledge systems, environmental education can become more inclusive, holistic, and ecoculturally sustainable. I argue for honouring indigenous world-views and celebrating the manifestations of our ecological heritage by integrating TEK into a land-based pedagogy that works alongside scientific perspectives, promoting a richer understanding of the environment. (shrink)

Judith Suissa and Alice Sullivan’s 2021 paper ‘The Gender Wars, Academic Freedom and Education’ holds that activism associated with the slogan ‘trans women are women’ harms progress towards the goals of shared learning and knowledge production. They hold that shared learning and knowledge production ground the value of the university. In response, we point out that academic freedom is not absolute, and that its contribution to learning and knowledge production is only part of a host of academic goods. Given the (...) hostile environment faced by trans people in the UK, absolute academic freedom in relation to questions about sex, gender, and gender identity should not be taken for granted. The focus of this article is on the following: (1) academic freedom is not absolute and should be responsibly curtailed when it causes harm, or hinders other educational goods; (2) public perceptions of ‘gender debates’ in the UK cause harm and hinder other educational goods; (3) academic debates about sex, gender, and gender identity could contribute to this harm and hindrance and should be undertaken only with care. (shrink)

In this article, we investigate the ethical conditions of online education by extending Levinas’ concept of the ‘face’. Considering the ‘face’ of the other raises the question of what it is we see when communicating online—is it the face of the other, or something else? How does this perception constitute the other for ‘me’? Can we access the ethical dimension of experience in online communication? To describe the ‘face’ we encounter in online educational settings, we introduce the concept of ‘interface’: (...) the presentation of the other in something other than their body. We argue that in online settings, the interface becomes the entry point for ethical pedagogy. Importantly, we do not argue that online teaching is preferable to other forms of teaching. Instead, we aim at sharpening the view of the limits and possibilities of online teaching. (shrink)

This article explores two pedagogical virtues (intellectual virtues of a teacher) that arise from the insight that non-epistemic situational factors can affect students’ epistemic judgements and behaviour. First, a virtuous teacher must be sensitive enough to these factors in order to take advantage of how they boost student learning. However, while cultivating a situationally and epistemically favourable environment for learning sounds sensible, teachers should not spoil their students by making them too dependent on these beneficial external factors. The virtuous teacher (...) must also realize that these are only scaffolds; they do help students initially, but must eventually be removed to promote the students’ intellectual autonomy. This characterizes a second pedagogical virtue: the competence to facilitate students’ growth so that they become more capable in future opportunities for knowledge acquisition. (shrink)

Despite the many interpretive disputes regarding John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of education, there is wide agreement that Mill saw education as the most necessary and significant means of promoting human happiness. I challenge this view by claiming that Mill belongs to a broad philosophical trend of his time that rejected the conception of human nature that stands at the foundation of the modern ideal of happiness according to which human freedom is expressed in the autonomous pursuit of self-satisfaction. Instead, he (...) embraced an understanding of humans as unique beings whose freedom is expressed in the development of original characters. I argue that the change in Mill’s perception of truth that occurred during his mental crisis led him to understand these processes as open—they are not subject to any static or universal purpose since freedom is understood as the ability of individuals to alter their purposes according to the internal changes they experience. My claim regarding the negation of happiness in Mill’s thought provides an answer to the question, largely neglected in the literature, of why, unlike many thinkers associated with the tradition to which he belonged, he chose not to elucidate the operative steps necessary to promote happiness in a book dedicated to education. I conclude by claiming that his use of the utilitarian lexicon is not accidental and does not reveal internal contradictions, but is a tactical move intended to enable the optimal conditions for creating significant change in people. (shrink)

This article explores Biesta’s recent revisiting of his iconic and at times contested notion of education as subjectification. First, I look at how Biesta presents his notion by attending to his answers to the criticisms it has faced concerning elusiveness, oversimplification, and self-centredness. Then, going beyond the declarative level, I explore a concrete example of education as subjectification from Biesta’s 2022 book, World-Centred Education. Analysing the example of Homer Lane and Jason, I examine the ambivalence between Biesta’s explicit statements on (...) subjectification as a form of spontaneous and noncoercive teaching aimed at cultivating freedom and the more complex picture that emerges from a close reading of the original story. From this analysis, I find important conceptual limitations to education as subjectification: it could conceal part of the institutional context of education and the teacher’s active role, and also reduce freedom to an individualistic concept. I thus conclude by suggesting that the language of subjectification should always be engaged with critically—but never in isolation—and with a stereoscopic optic in mind. (shrink)

Drawing on Courtney Jung’s structural theory of obligation, this article proposes a novel interpretation of the relationship between liberal democratic justice and identity politics. This interpretation, in turn, justifies an anti-racist curriculum in the context of liberal democratic education. According to Jung’s theory, the liberal state has an obligation to improve the status of oppressed identity groups in society in so far as the state itself has participated in the formation of their identities through historical and continuing structural injustices. Based (...) on this theory, the article argues that anti-racist education should be understood as receiving its justification not from the recognition of particularistic identities as such, but from the state’s obligation to compensate for the structural injustices, which have contributed to the formation of the identities in question, and which are incompatible with liberal democratic justice. Furthermore, the article elaborates on a form of anti-racist curriculum broadly compatible with the liberal democratic aim of fostering political and personal autonomy of students. (shrink)

This article explores the role that can be played by philosophy education in Ethiopia as a means to develop a shared meaning that is able to go beyond the ethnic polarization that is currently haunting the nation. It shows that through the introduction of a philosophy education that fosters a culture of critical reflection, dialogue, and reflection on the nature of human existence, human values, and a moral fabric that is able to bestow a sense of a common purpose on (...) the lives of individuals, one can develop a shared conception of meaning in the Ethiopian context. This reflective exercise, made possible by philosophy education, can lead into the bridging of ethnic divisions and a process of intercultural understanding that is able to introduce commonly shared normative systems. In a nation like Ethiopia that is being plagued by ethnic divisions rooted in the system of ethnic federalism, philosophy education can provide a foundation for social cohesion and ethical deliberation that leads into the creation of an inclusive society grounded on the development of a shared sense of identity. (shrink)

This article explores an educational philosophy centred around the notion of ‘dwelling’. Building on the analysis of Heidegger, Roth, Dewey, Emerson, and Haraway, the article reflects on how ‘dwelling’ foregrounds a certain quality of engagement with the present as the focal point of educational theory and practice. To this end, it considers how the concept of ‘dwelling’ can contribute to the development of present-oriented theoretical perspectives in education. In particular, the article seeks to explore the potential of ‘dwelling’ to offer (...) a non-individualistic notion of ‘being present’ in the context of education, with special emphasis on the question of how ‘being present’ might be understood in community with others who are fundamentally different from us. Additionally, drawing from Roth’s example of a science education oriented towards ‘rooting’, and Murdoch’s thinking around ‘unselfing’ through aesthetic experience, the article contemplates how ‘dwelling’ might be cultivated in and through education. (shrink)

This article examines the often overlooked yet crucial role of care work within the academic ecosystem. Challenging the dominant paradigm that prioritizes research output, the article argues for recognizing academic labour as a spectrum where teaching, research, and service hold equal value. Drawing on Rajan’s framework of ‘academic care work’, the article demonstrates the inseparable link between care and knowledge, highlighting how care work forms the foundation for knowledge production and reproduction. The analysis situates academic care workers within the complex (...) administrative landscape of higher education institutions, exploring the challenges posed by managerialism and external pressures. The article introduces the ‘Argument from Shared Paradigm’, positing that academics, through their shared experiences and values, are uniquely positioned to advocate for and safeguard care-centred practices in research and teaching. By recognizing care work’s essential contributions, this article calls for a re-evaluation of academic reward systems and a shift towards a more inclusive academic culture. (shrink)

This article argues that, as applied to education, the Capabilities Approach pioneered by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum shares a range of philosophical commitments with the work of social realist scholars on the concept of ‘powerful knowledge’. I first trace the history of the concept of powerful knowledge and present critiques put forward by social justice scholars. I then outline the Capabilities Approach, arguing it provides a response to some of these concerns. From here I develop the connection between the (...) two educational paradigms focusing on four areas of affinity. The first is the conceptual similarity between the ‘power’ of powerful knowledge and Nussbaum’s account of a capability. The second is their concern with the reduction of education to technical-instrumentalism, human capital, and other economically driven imperatives. The third is a shared focus on the link between knowledge, human agency, and freedom. The fourth, is a mutual rejection of relativism and embrace of a nuanced universalism. Ultimately, by drawing together these two conceptually rich approaches to the aims and purposes of education, I hope to open a space for theorizing about both capabilities and powerful knowledge that can resolve some of the problems in both. For powerful knowledge, the Capabilities Approach allows a more concrete explication of why access to disciplinary bodies of knowledge is of value to both individuals and society. On the side of the Capabilities Approach, engaging with the concept of powerful knowledge can help give a rationale for how educational knowledge fosters certain centrally important capabilities. (shrink)

According to some Philosophy for Children theorists, the pedagogy of the Community of Inquiry hinges upon the acceptance of a pragmatist epistemology. The underlying idea is that it is possible to participate, and to justify participation, in a community of inquiry only if some pragmatist view of truth and knowledge is true and accepted by the participants engaged in dialogue. In this article we argue that this claim is false. In this way, we want to free the pedagogy of the (...) Community of Inquiry from some epistemological assumptions that we regard as unwarranted. To support our contention, we shall highlight two distinctions that are important in order to appreciate the connection between epistemology and education: first, the distinction between the disposition of intellectual humility and the belief in fallibilism; second, the belief in the existence of Cartesian certainties and the attitude of psychological certainty. Finally, we also argue that to vindicate dialogic inquiry it is neither necessary to adopt a pragmatist theory of truth, nor is it necessary to regard warranted judgement as the primary aim of inquiry. In contrast, we argue that truth is the aim of inquiry, and so is the aim of children when they participate in a dialogic inquiry. In this way we also suggest a justification of philosophy with children that does not instrumentalize it. (shrink)

Contra the teleological paradigm of the Hero, this article argues that incorporating an ethic of the Trickster archetype may facilitate greater critical thinking and metacognition within contemporary neoliberal Education Studies learning environments in UK Higher Education. Echoing Lewis’ call for an education to stupefy, as well as Bojesen’s argument for treating Education Studies as a labour of the negative, I present the Trickster archetype as a valuable mode of educational engagement (an endeavour which itself must be done in a paradoxical (...) fashion, for the Trickster ethic cannot be neatly prescribed). In this manner, the ethos of Trickster practices is, I suggest, one of generativity and what Greene calls ‘releasing the imagination’. As opposed to fixing us to any supposed Archimedean standpoint, Trickster practices encourage us to consider radical alternative possibilities from within normative discourse through immanent critique. I argue that the Trickster ethic foregrounds contingency over apparent necessity. I also explore how the Trickster may, paradoxically, be given a concomitant atelic aspiration in association with both Perry’s linear stages of contextual reasoning and metacognition. I conclude by elucidating the ethical and practical problems that accompany attempts to instantiate a Trickster ethic, given that it threatens, and faces possible repudiation from, those with vested interest in upholding dominant mores. (shrink)

The issue of hospitality in education has become prominent in the philosophy of education, with various articles and books being published recently. This is so for a number of reasons, such as the necessity to harbour and include immigrants and refugees in our schools and education systems, the rising levels of violence being experienced by individuals in school communities, and the importance of establishing dialogical relations between teacher and students and between students. In this article, we discuss the concept of (...) hospitality by turning to Homer (eighth Century Bce) and his classic work, The Odyssey (Ὀδ”σσεια), connecting it to the issue of hospitality in education. The article is divided into two sections. In the first, we refer to two passages in Homer’s The Odyssey that are very pertinent to the issue of the issue at hand; the Phaeacian passage, which stands for a prime example of hospitality, and the Laestrygonian case, a seminal example of non-hospitality, of hostility. In the second, we conduct a philosophical inquiry into hospitality and education. (shrink)

In this article we want to rethink the educational significance of the novel from the perspective of a ‘metanovelistic’ reading of Don Quixote, often acclaimed as the ‘first modern novel’. Our point of departure is two-fold: on the one hand, there is the controversial contemporary phenomenon of de-reading, and all the educational discussions it entails; on the other hand, there is the existing tradition of literary education, which has already extensively reflected upon the (moral, epistemological, ontological) relations between novel reading, (...) education, and subjectification, but which perhaps also has exhausted its means for doing so. To problematize this double starting point in a new way, we propose to revisit the ‘origins’ of the (Western) novel and novel reading, at the dawn of modernity. Exploring the differences between the narratives of subjectification represented by the Cartesian cogito and Cervantes’ Don Quixote—which were near-contemporaries—we strongly argue for an educational–philosophical rehabilitation of the latter. In a first movement, and in dialogue with novelists Milan Kundera and Carlos Fuentes, we do so by focusing on the novel as a particular form or configuration of knowledge—one that is by nature experimental and pluralist. In a second movement, we link this to Jean Baudrillard’s famous distinction between ‘simulation’ and ‘illusion’, claiming that novel reading qua educational subjectification always involves a quixotic practice of adventurous, ‘playful’, and public negotiation between reality and its more or less illusory alternatives. (shrink)

Based on several cases, this article develops a thought inspired by the Journal of Philosophy of Education’s special issue on the Educational Value of Monuments (55.3). The article is a reflection about the locations which make statues able to be transformed materially and semiotically, and which provoke discussion about what is to be learnt by understanding the monument as a fragment and semiophore. I argue that the monument—located in a specific place which makes its contextual meaning—represents fragments, in Latin fractures (...) or cracks, as an expression of the violence inflicted on an imaginary whole. Defining and accepting a monument as a fragment allows us to understand each change that may happen to it—including removal or relocation—as an incentive to learn about the meanings of new wholes and to consciously respond to them. On the one hand, this can effectively stop mimetic pressures to reproduce aggression towards monuments. On the other, it can create a ground for shaping an ethical attitude of co-responsibility for a common world that is not exclusively human. The strictly educational sense of the proposed redefinition of the monument would be to radicalize sensitivity to its inherent feature, which is its fragmentary nature, resulting in the fragility of the heritage it co-creates in the space of commonality. In the proposed understanding of the monument, apart from the emphasis on significant fragmentation, an important role is played by the decisive abandonment of the anthropocentric perspective. In the new perspective of the common world, the monument becomes an ephemeral heritage, and its most current educational value seems to lie there. (shrink)