Acta Analytica

ISSNs: 0353-5150, 1874-6349

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  1.  2
    Fair Countable Lotteries and Reflection.Casper Storm Hansen - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):595-610.
    The main conclusion is this conditional: If the principle of reflection is a valid constraint on rational credences, then it is not rational to have a uniform credence distribution on a countable outcome space. The argument is a variation on some arguments that are already in the literature, but with crucial differences. The conditional can be used for either a modus ponens or a modus tollens; some reasons for thinking that the former is most reasonable are given.
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  2.  5
    Disagreement, Points of View, and Truth-Relativism.Antti Hautamäki - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):531-550.
    Truth-relativism is the claim that the truth of statements is dependent on the context in which they are made. In this article, truth-relativism is considered as a way to explain disagreements. Viewpoint relativism, a recent version of truth-relativism, is introduced as a useful framework to analyse how truth-relativism approaches disagreements. Viewpoint relativism is based on contextual semantics and the logic of viewpoint, which is a two-dimensional modal logic. In viewpoint relativism, the central concept is a point of view in relation (...)
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  3.  10
    A Problem in Standard Presentations of the Mere Addition Paradox.Oscar Horta & Mat Rozas - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):611-615.
    This paper argues that the Repugnant Conclusion which the Mere Addition Paradox generates is not the same as the one which a sum-aggregative view like impersonal total utilitarianism leads to, but a slightly more moderate version of it. Given a spectrum of outcomes {A, B, C, …, X, Y, Z} such that in each of them there is a population that is twice as large as the previous one and has a level of wellbeing that is just barely lower than (...)
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  4.  49
    The Putnam-Goodman-Kripke Paradox.Robert Kowalenko - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):575-594.
    The extensions of Goodman’s ‘grue’ predicate and Kripke’s ‘quus’ are constructed from the extensions of more familiar terms via a reinterpretation that permutes assignments of reference. Since this manoeuvre is at the heart of Putnam’s model-theoretic and permutation arguments against metaphysical realism, both Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction and the paradox about meaning that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein are instances of Putnam’s. Evidence cannot selectively confirm the green-hypothesis and disconfirm the grue-hypothesis, because the theory of which the green-hypothesis is a (...)
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  5.  17
    Epistemic Contradictions Do Not Threaten Classical Logic.Philipp Mayr - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):551-573.
    Epistemic contradictions are now a well-known and often discussed phenomenon among those who study epistemic modals. These contradictions are expressed by sentences like ‘It is raining and it might not be raining’ whose oddness to the common ear demands an explanation. However, it has turned out to be a rather controversial enterprise to provide such an explanation in a sufficiently precise and general manner. According to pragmatic explanations, epistemic contradictions are semantically consistent but pragmatically defective. According to semantic explanations, one (...)
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  6.  23
    Causation in Physics and in Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):471-488.
    It is widely thought that there is an important argument to be made that starts with premises taken from the science of physics and ends with the conclusion of physicalism. The standard view is that this argument takes the form of a causal argument for physicalism. Roughly, physics tells us that the physical realm is causally complete, and so minds must be physical if they are to interact with the world as we think they do. In what follows, I raise (...)
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  7.  17
    More than Just a Passing Cognitive Show: a Defence of Agentialism About Self-knowledge.Adam J. Andreotta - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):353-373.
    This paper contributes to a debate that has arisen in the recent self-knowledge literature between agentialists and empiricists. According to agentialists, in order for one to know what one believes, desires, and intends, rational agency needs to be exercised in centrally significant cases. Empiricists disagree: while they acknowledge the importance of rationality in general, they maintain that when it comes to self-knowledge, empirical justification, or warrant, is always sufficient.In what follows, I defend agentialism. I argue that if we could only (...)
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  8.  24
    Consciousness and Intentionality in Franz Brentano.Mauro Antonelli - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):301-322.
    The paper argues against the growing tendency to interpret Brentano’s conception of inner consciousness in self-representational terms. This trend has received support from the tendency to see Brentano as a forerunner of contemporary same-order theories of consciousness and from the view that Brentano models intransitive consciousness on transitive consciousness, such that a mental state is conscious insofar as it is aware of itself as an object. However, this reading fails to take into account the Brentanian concept of object, which is (...)
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  9.  4
    Contrastive Explanation, Efforts of Will, and Dual Responsibility: A Defense of Kane’s Libertarian Theory.Neil Campbell & Jamal Kadkhodapour - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):415-430.
    Neil Levy mounts two arguments against Robert Kane’s influential libertarian theory. According to the first, because Kanean self-forming actions are undetermined, there can be no contrastive explanation for why agents choose as they do rather than otherwise, in which case how they choose appears to be a matter of luck. According to the second, if one grants Kane the claim that agents are responsible for their undetermined choices in virtue of the fact that they made efforts of will to choose (...)
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  10.  15
    The Non-saying of What Should Have Been Said.Roberta Colonna Dahlman - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3).
    According to Grice’s analysis, conversational implicatures are carried by the saying of what is said. In this paper, it is argued that, whenever a speaker implicates a content by flouting one or several maxims, her implicature is not only carried by the act of saying what is said and the way of saying it, but also by the act of non-saying what should have been said according to what would have been normal to say in that particular context. Implicatures that (...)
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  11.  14
    Markosian’s Sideways Music and Aesthetic Value Gluts.Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):431-439.
    In “Sideways Music”, Ned Markosian presents the aesthetic value variance of sideways music as a case against what the Spacetime Thesis—the thesis that time is one of four similar dimensions that make up spacetime. Critics have already raised worries about the premises of his argument. In this paper, I focus on Markosian’s assumed aesthetic realism. I argue that there is a version of aesthetic realism—a version that admits aesthetic value gluts—that is consistent with both the Spacetime Thesis and the aesthetic (...)
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  12.  14
    Knowledge as Objectively Justified Belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):397-414.
    According to Lehrer’s defeasibility account of knowledge, we can understand knowledge as undefeated justified true belief. But this account faces many serious problems. One important problem is that from one’s subjective point of view, one can hardly bridge the gap between one’s personal justification and objective truth. Another important problem is that this account can hardly accommodate the externalist intuition that the epistemic status of a belief is not entirely determined by factors that are internal to the subject’s perspective. The (...)
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  13.  16
    Illusionism: an Argument for Its Incoherence.Alen Lipuš & Janez Bregant - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):341-352.
    In his recent paper on the meta-problem of consciousness, Chalmers :6–66, 2018) claims that illusionism is one of the best reductionist theories available and that it is not incoherent, even if it is implausible and empirically false. Our paper argues against this: strong illusionism is poorly established. The first part presents the reasoning leading to strong illusionism; i.e., it describes the initial conditions and relations among them for its establishment. The second part of the paper argues that strong illusionism is (...)
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  14.  33
    Knowing Falsely: the Non-factive Project.Adam Michael Bricker - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):263-282.
    Quite likely the most sacrosanct principle in epistemology, it is near-universally accepted that knowledge is factive: knowing that p entails p. Recently, however, Bricker, Buckwalter, and Turri have all argued that we can and often do know approximations that are strictly speaking false. My goal with this paper is to advance this nascent non-factive project in two key ways. First, I provide a critical review of these recent arguments against the factivity of knowledge, allowing us to observe that elements of (...)
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  15.  12
    Anti-Luminous Mental States: Logical, Psychological and Epistemic Problems.Óscar L. González-Castán - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):283-300.
    In this paper I shall argue that Tim Williamson’s argument for the anti-luminosity of many mental states faces difficult logical, psychological and epistemological problems. From a logical point of view, his argument is correct. However, the contrary argument that says that the anti-luminosity thesis does not necessarily follow from it is also correct. This opens a sceptical scenario. Hence, if Williamson wants to convince us that we should rationally prefer his argument rather than the other, he needs to add considerations (...)
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  16.  10
    Manifestation and Unrestricted Dispositional Monism.Vassilis Livanios - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):179-196.
    Most metaphysicians agree that powers can exist without being manifested. The main goal of this paper is to show that adherents of an unrestricted version of Dispositional Monism cannot provide a plausible metaphysical account of the difference between a situation in which a power-instance is not manifested and a situation in which a manifestation of that power-instance actually occurs unless they undermine their own view. To this end, two kinds of manifestation-relation are introduced and it is argued that dispositional monists (...)
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  17.  46
    Frege’s Puzzle and Act-Based Propositions.Nikhil Mahant - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2).
    I argue that the act-based accounts of propositions, like the one defended by Soames, cannot be used to address Frege’s Puzzle without also giving up the Millian view of names. I begin by identifying two puzzles—both of which have been called Frege’s puzzle—and discuss the act-based theorist’s solution to the first puzzle. I then raise an objection against the solution and argue that it cannot be overcome unless a concession is made. Making the concession, however, would make it impossible for (...)
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  18.  25
    Naïve Realism with Many Fundamental Kinds.Neil Mehta - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):197-218.
    Naïve realism is a theory of perception with great explanatory ambitions. It has been influentially argued that, in order to realize these explanatory ambitions, the naïve realist should say that any perception belongs to just one fundamental kind. I think, however, that adopting this commitment does not particularly help the naïve realist to realize her explanatory ambitions, and so is not warranted. This result is significant because once this commitment about fundamental kinds is relinquished, we see that it is possible (...)
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  19.  47
    Necessitism, Contingentism, and Lewisian Modal Realism.Cristina Nencha - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):227-247.
    Necessitism is the controversial thesis that necessarily everything is necessarily something, namely that everything, everywhere, necessarily exists. What is controversial about necessitism is that, at its core, it claims that things could not have failed to exist, while we have a pre-theoretical intuition that not everything necessarily exists. Contingentism, in accordance with common sense, denies necessitism: it claims that some things could have failed to exist. Timothy Williamson is a necessitist and claims that David Lewis is a necessitist too. The (...)
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  20.  14
    Lowe Vs Lewis Vs Lowe on Temporary Intrinsics.Dean Rickles - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):173-177.
    We find that E. J. Lowe’s resolution to David Lewis’s problem of temporary intrinsics is wrong, but not quite for the reasons adduced by Lewis himself. Our discussion hinges on a connection between state-independent properties and intrinsic properties.
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  21.  28
    Can We Have Physical Understanding of Mathematical Facts?Gabriel Tȃrziu - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):135-158.
    A lot of philosophical energy has been devoted recently in trying to determine if mathematics can contribute to our understanding of physical phenomena. Not many philosophers are interested, though, if the converse makes sense, i.e., if our cognitive interaction (scientific or otherwise) with the physical world can be helpful (in an explanatory or non-explanatory way) in our efforts to make sense of mathematical facts. My aim in this paper is to try to fill this important lacuna in the recent literature. (...)
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  22.  13
    Properties, Concepts and Empirical Identity.Nicholas Unwin - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):159-171.
    Properties and concepts are similar kinds of thing in so far as they are both typically understood to be whatever it is that predicates stand for. However, they are generally supposed to have different identity criteria: for example, heat is the same property as molecular kinetic energy, whereas the concept of heat is different from the concept of molecular kinetic energy. This paper examines whether this discrepancy is really defensible, and concludes that matters are more complex than is generally thought. (...)
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  23.  17
    Collective Epistemic Luck.Moisés Barba & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):99-119.
    A platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic (...)
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  24.  23
    A Kierkegaardian Anti-Luck Epistemology.Tim Black - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):85-97.
    We can address the issue of epistemic luck, the possibility that the world interferes with the activity of believing so as to keep that activity from achieving its aim, by rethinking the aim of that activity. So, if we give up truth, for example, as the aim of belief, and if we embrace a different aim—the aim of believing as my ideal self would have me believe—we can eliminate the possibility of luck and leave the world no room to interfere (...)
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  25.  12
    Is Fallible Knowledge Attributable?E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):73-83.
    Here are two prima facie plausible theses about propositional knowledge: a belief could still constitute knowledge even if the belief is justified in a way that’s compatible with its being either false or accidentally true; each instance of knowledge is related to its subject in a way similar to that in which each intentional action is related to its agent. Baron Reed develops and defends a novel argument for the incompatibility of and. In this paper, I clarify and critically assess (...)
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  26.  20
    Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge.Mylan Engel - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):33-56.
    In this article, I develop and defend a version of reliabilism – internal reasons reliabilism – that resolves the paradox of epistemic luck, solves the Gettier problem by ruling out veritic luck, is immune to the generality problem, resolves the internalism/externalism controversy, and preserves epistemic closure.
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  27.  11
    Skill, Luck, and Epistemic Probability.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):25-31.
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  28.  29
    Rationality, Success, and Luck.Ram Neta - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):57-71.
    Rationality, whatever exactly it demands of us, promotes success, whatever exactly that is. Some philosophers interpret that slogan as something that can provide them with a way of reductively explaining the demands of rationality by appeal to some independently intelligible notion of success: being rational, they might say, is just having whatever property it is that promotes success. Other philosophers may interpret the same slogan as something that can provide them with a way of reductively explaining the notion of success (...)
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  29.  44
    Varieties of Epistemic Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):9-23.
    My interest is in how shifting from an anti-luck epistemology to an anti-risk epistemology can enable us to make sense of some important epistemic phenomena. After rehearsing the more general arguments for preferring anti-risk epistemology over its anti-luck cousin, I argue that a further advantage of this transition lies in how it puts us in a better position to understand certain trade-offs with regard to epistemic risk. In particular, there can be ways of forming beliefs that are epistemically low risk (...)
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  30.  8
    Correction to: Epistemic Luck and Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):7-8.
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  31. Epistemic Luck and Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):1-6.
    This is an editorial introduction to a special issue of Acta Analytica on epistemic luck.
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  32.  95
    Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):121-134.
    This paper critically explores Timothy Williamson’s view of evidence, and it does so in light of the problem of epistemic luck. Williamson’s view of evidence is, of course, a crucially important aspect of his novel and influential “knowledge-first” epistemological project. Notoriously, one crucial thesis of this project is that one’s evidence is equivalent to what one knows. This has come to be known as the E = K thesis. This paper specifically addresses Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology and the E = K (...)
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  33.  33
    Relationism and the Problem of Order.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2022 - Acta Analytica:1-29.
    Relationism holds that objects entirely depend on relations or that they must be eliminated in favour of the latter. In this article, I raise a problem for relationism. I argue that relationism cannot account for the order in which non-symmetrical relations apply to their relata. In Section 1, I introduce some concepts in the ontology of relations and define relationism. In Section 2, I present the Problem of Order for non-symmetrical relations, after distinguishing it from the Problem of Differential Application. (...)
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