34 found

Year:

  1.  7
    RECkoning with the Stakes in Overcoming Representation-Hungry Problem Domains.Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):517-532.
    The paper reviews the current state of play around anti-representationalist attempts at countering Clark and Toribio’s representation-hunger thesis. It introduces a distinction between different approaches to Chemero’s Radical embodied cognition thesis in the form of, on the one hand, those pushing a hard line and, on the other, those who are more relaxed about their anti-representationalist commitments. In terms of overcoming Clark and Toribio’s thesis, hardliners seek to avoid any mentioning of mental content in the activity they purport to explain. (...)
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  2.  19
    The Fundamentality of Fundamental Powers.Joaquim Giannotti - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):589-613.
    Dispositional essentialism is the view that all or many fundamental properties are essentially dispositional, or powers. The literature on the dispositional essence of powers is abundant. In contrast, the question of how to understand the fundamentality of fundamental powers has received scarce interest. Therefore, the fundamentality of powers stands in need of clarification. There are four main conceptions of the fundamental, namely as that which is metaphysically independent; or belonging to a minimally complete basis; or perfectly natural; or metaphysically primitive. (...)
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  3.  8
    Two Norms of Intention: A Vindication of Williamson’s Knowledge-Action Analogy.Frank Hofmann - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):1-10.
    According to an important analogy between knowledge and action, as proposed by Timothy Williamson, intention aims at action just as belief aims at knowledge. This paper investigates the analogy and discusses three difficulties that it has to face. The key is to distinguish between two different norms of intention and to see that the knowledge-action analogy is concerned with one of them only, namely, the realization norm: one ought to intentionally act if one intends to act in a certain way. (...)
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  4.  3
    A Coherentist Justification of Epistemic Principles and Its Merits.Byeong D. Lee - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):533-551.
    The problem of epistemic circularity involved in justifying fundamental epistemic principles is one of the fundamental problems of epistemology. One important way out of this problem is a Sellarsian social practice theory of justification, according to which we are justified in accepting an epistemic principle if we can answer all objections raised against it in our social practice of demanding justification and responding to such demands. The main goal of this paper is to show that this social practice theory can (...)
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  5.  29
    Epistemic Reasons Are Not Normative Reasons for Belief.Samuel Montplaisir - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):573-587.
    In this paper, I argue against the view that epistemic reasons are normative reasons for belief. I begin by responding to some of the most widespread arguments in favor of the normativity of epistemic reasons before advancing two arguments against this thesis. The first is supported by an analysis of what it means to “have” some evidence for p. The second is supported by the claim that beliefs, if they are to be considered as states, cannot have epistemic reasons as (...)
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  6.  7
    On the Content of Information Systems Ontologies.Timothy Tambassi - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):615-621.
    Despite the fact that information systems ontologies [ISOs] support the mutual understanding between human beings and software applications, human beings and software applications do not understand ISOs' contents in the same way. The same applies to ontological integration. This paper attempts to account for such discrepancies by emphasizing that while human being can have access to entities represented in ISOs, software applications cannot.
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  7.  7
    What We Can Learn From Literary Authors.Alberto Voltolini - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):479-499.
    That we can learn something from literature, as cognitivists claim, seems to be a commonplace. However, when one considers matters more deeply, it turns out to be a problematic claim. In this paper, by focusing on general revelatory facts about the world and the human spirit, I hold that the cognitivist claim can be vindicated if one takes it as follows. We do not learn such facts from literature, if by “literature” one means the truth-conditional contents that one may ascribe (...)
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  8.  7
    Cognitive Focus.Julie Wulfemeyer - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):553-561.
    Philosophers of mind and language who advance causal theories face a sort of conjunction problem. When we say that the thing had in mind or the thing referred to is a matter of what causally impacted the thinker or speaker, we must somehow narrow down the long conjunction of items in a causal chain, all of which contributed to the having in mind, but only one of which becomes the object of thought or the linguistic referent. Here, I sketch a (...)
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  9.  19
    Re-defending Feline Liberty: a Response to Fischer.Cheryl Abbate - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):451-463.
    In response to my defense of house-based, free-roaming cats, Bob Fischer : 463–468, 2020) argues that cat guardians have a duty to permanently confine their felines to the indoors. His main argument is that house-based cats cause an all-things-considered harm to the animals they kill and that this harm is not outweighed by the harm cats endure as a consequence of feline imprisonment. He moreover claims that while we can justify the restriction of feline liberty because cats are not “full (...)
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  10.  10
    There is Still a Problem of Consistent Incompatibility: a Response to Coren.Peter Baumann - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):475-477.
    This article responds to Daniel Coren’s very insightful critical discussion of Baumann. It clarifies and defends the view that there is a problem of mutually consistent but necessarily incompatible desires. Distinguishing explicitly between semantic and syntactic consistency, one can show that the problem remains under each interpretation of “consistent.”.
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  11.  14
    The Prejudice of Freedom: An Application of Kripke’s Notion of a Prejudice to Our Understanding of Free Will.James Cain - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):323-339.
    This essay reframes salient issues in discussions of free will using conceptual apparatus developed in the works of Saul Kripke, with particular attention paid to his little-discussed technical notion of a prejudice. I begin by focusing on how various forms of modality underlie alternate forms of compatibilism and discuss why it is important to avoid conflating these forms of compatibilism. The concept of a prejudice is then introduced. We consider the semantic role of prejudices, in particular conditions in which prejudices (...)
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  12.  10
    Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality.Claire Field - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):423-441.
    I argue for the unexceptionality of evidence about what rationality requires. Specifically, I argue that, as for other topics, one’s total evidence can sometimes support false beliefs about this. Despite being prima facie innocuous, a number of philosophers have recently denied this. Some have argued that the facts about what rationality requires are highly dependent on the agent’s situation and change depending on what that situation is like. 2019). Others have argued that a particular subset of normative truths, those concerning (...)
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  13.  14
    What Does It Take to Know that You Know?Noah Gordon - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):443-449.
    In some recent work,, 213–217, 2015, Logos and Episteme, 7, 83–94, 2016) John N.Williams defends a new objection to the defeasibility theory of knowledge. But the objection is of wider interest, since Williams also suggests that this style of objection may undermine other theories of knowledge. I distinguish two versions of Williams’ objection. I then show that the first version relies on false conceptual principles, and the second relies on a specific and dubious conception of the goal of the analysis (...)
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  14.  3
    Correction to: On the Lewisian Principle of Recombination and Quidditism.Karol Lenart - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):373-373.
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  15.  28
    A New Argument for the Rationality of Perception.Neil Mehta - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):393-408.
    In this paper, I offer a new argument for the perceptual rationality thesis: the claim that perceptual experiences themselves can be rational or irrational. In her book The Rationality of Perception, Susanna Siegel has offered several intertwined arguments for this same thesis, and, as you will see, one of Siegel’s arguments is what inspires my own. However, I will suggest that the new argument is significantly better-supported than Siegel’s original argument.
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  16.  18
    Spatial Relations Are External.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):341-355.
    The thesis I wish to argue for in this article is that spatial relations such as occupying and being 1 km distant from are external. In the “Section 1” section, I shall introduce the distinction between external and internal relations and some other basic concepts in the ontology of relations. Afterwards, in the subsequent sections, I shall deal with different theories of space: substantivalism and relationism ; the spatial property theory ; super-substantivalism and super-relationism ; and spatial essentialism. I shall (...)
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  17.  17
    Monism, Spacetime, and Aristotelian Substances.Carlo Rossi - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):375-392.
    Schaffer offers us in the last section of “On What Grounds What” an applied illustration of his allegedly Aristotelian metaontological position. According to this illustration, Schaffer’s metaontological position, supplemented with a few Aristotelian theses about substance and grounding, would converge in a view remarkably similar to his priority monism, the view that there is one single fundamental substance. In this paper, I will argue against Schaffer’s suggestion that priority monism represents a viable development of Aristotelian metaphysics. In particular, I will (...)
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  18.  6
    A Dynamical Perspective on the Generality Problem.Andreas Stephens, Trond A. Tjøstheim, Maximilian K. Roszko & Erik J. Olsson - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):409-422.
    The generality problem is commonly considered to be a critical difficulty for reliabilism. In this paper, we present a dynamical perspective on the problem in the spirit of naturalized epistemology. According to this outlook, it is worth investigating how token belief-forming processes instantiate specific types in the biological agent’s cognitive architecture and background experience, consisting in the process of attractor-guided neural activation. While our discussion of the generality problem assigns “scientific types” to token processes, it represents a unified account in (...)
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  19. Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content.Derek Green - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):159-69.
    Mental content normativists hold that the mind’s conceptual contents are essentially normative. Many hold the view because they think that facts of the form “subject S possesses concept c” imply that S is enjoined by rules concerning the application of c in theoretical judgments. Some opponents independently raise an intuitive objection: even if there are such rules, S’s possession of the concept is not the source of the enjoinment. Hence, these rules do not support mental content normativism. Call this the (...)
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  20.  9
    Determinables in Frames.David Hommen - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):291-310.
    In this paper, I assess the ontological commitments of frame-based methods of knowledge representation. Frames decompose concepts into recursive attribute-value structures. Attributes are the general aspects by which a category or individual is described; their values are more or less specific properties that are assigned to the referential object. The question is: are these properties to be interpreted as universals or as tropes? Some trope theorists allege that an interpretation in terms of universals is incompatible with frames for individuals in (...)
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  21.  11
    Commitment, Norm-Governedness and Guidance.Alireza Kazemi - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):213-228.
    A number of philosophers have argued that there is a basic problem in the no-guidance argument against content normativism. The problem is that the argument restricts the essential normativity of intentional states to the formation of these states being guided by certain norms. But it is suggested that the essential norm-governedness of intentional states can be equally plausibly construed as the assessability of these states by norms, which does not imply complying with them. Although I concur with the problem diagnosed (...)
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  22.  35
    The Surprising Truth About Disagreement.Neil Levy - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):137-157.
    Conciliationism—the thesis that when epistemic peers discover that they disagree about a proposition, both should reduce their confidence—faces a major objection: it seems to require us to significantly reduce our confidence in our central moral and political commitments. In this paper, I develop a typology of disagreement cases and a diagnosis of the source and force of the pressure to conciliate. Building on Vavova’s work, I argue that ordinary and extreme disagreements are surprising, and for this reason, they carry information (...)
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  23.  62
    The Aporia of Future Directed Beliefs.Daniel Rönnedal - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):249-261.
    This paper discusses a new aporia, the aporia of future directed beliefs. This aporia contains three propositions: (1) It is possible that there is someone who is infallible that believes something about the future that is not historically settled, (2) it is necessary that someone is infallible if and only if it is necessary that everything she believes is true, and (3) it is necessary that all our beliefs are historically settled. Every claim in this set is intuitively plausible, and (...)
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  24.  12
    The Role of Certainty.Timm Triplett - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):171-190.
    I argue that we can achieve certainty about some empirical propositions. When someone is having a migraine and attending to it, she can be certain that she is in pain. I show that examples intended to undermine claims of certainty or to raise doubts about the reliability of introspection do not touch such cases. Traditional foundationalists have held that epistemically certain beliefs can serve as the basis for all one’s other justified beliefs. This is not so, because those beliefs that (...)
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  25.  8
    A Contrastivist Response to Gerken’s Arguments for False Positives.Giorgio Volpe - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):311-322.
    In this paper, I defend epistemological contrastivism—the view that propositional knowledge is a three-place, contrastive relation between an agent, a proposition and a contrast term—against two a priori arguments recently offered by Mikkel Gerken for the conclusion that intuitive judgements exhibiting a contrast effect on knowledge ascriptions are false positives. I show that the epistemic argument for false positives begs the question against contrastivism by assuming the independently implausible claim that knowledge of a contrastive proposition always presupposes knowledge of a (...)
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  26.  14
    A Probabilistic Framework for Formalizing Epistemic Shifts.Yingjin Xu - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):229-247.
    The term “epistemic shifts” refers to a widely recognized phenomenon that knowledge ascribers would ascribe different epistemic statuses to the same belief under different internal/external conditions. Mainstream theories explaining shifts can all be assimilated into a probabilistic framework, according to which the epistemic status of a belief P can be at least partially evaluated in terms of the strength of the link between this belief and its normal truth-maker, namely, a P-corresponding fact, and the strength of this link can be (...)
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  27.  26
    Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon Problem.John Alton Christmann - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):55-61.
    Internalists who argue against reliabilism usually construct thought experiments designed to show how reliability is not necessary or sufficient for justification. Defenders of reliabilism have responded with debunking explanations of the intuitions that people are expected to have when considering anti-reliabilist thought experiments. One defender is Jennifer Nagel, who argues that internalist counterexamples to reliabilism play off of a shift between belief-formation processes that are unconscious and those that involve self-reflection on the contents of one’s conscious states. Nagel aims to (...)
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  28.  31
    On Inadvertently Made Tables: A Brockean Theory of Concrete Artifacts.Jeffrey Goodman - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):1-9.
    There has been a lot of discussion recently regarding abstract artifacts and how such entities (e.g., fictional characters like Sherlock Holmes, and mythological planets like Vulcan), if they indeed exist, could possibly be our creations. One interesting aspect of some of these debates concerns the extent to which creative intentions play a role in the creation of artifacts generally, both abstract and concrete. I here address the creation of concrete artifacts in particular. I ultimately defend a Brock-inspired, heterodox view on (...)
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  29.  18
    Thinking Animals or Thinking Brains?David Hershenov - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):11-24.
    Animalism offers a more attractive account of the human person than the Embodied Mind Account. If people are not animals, but small proper parts of animals, then there is a threat of spatially coincident thinkers. This will likely have to be avoided at the cost of the sparsest of ontologies, one in which there are no larger entities that can become reduced to the size of the brain or cerebrum-size thinker. This will be a rather implausible ontology as such thinkers (...)
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  30.  19
    The Logic of Aspect-Perception and Perceived Resemblance.Gary Kemp - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):49-53.
    Does the relation of seeing something as another really differ from seeing the one as resembling the other? Does seeing a cloud as a camel really differ from seeing a resemblance between the cloud and a camel? It is easy to think not, but I claim that the logic of the relation B sees x as resembling y differs markedly from that of B sees x as y and thus that we have two relations, not one. Aspect-perception is nontransitive, nonsymmetric, (...)
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  31.  21
    Moral Rationalism and Moral Motivation.Justin Klocksiem - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):123-136.
    Several prominent philosophers believe that moral facts are facts about what reasons we have, and that this entails that moral judgments are necessarily and inherently motivating. According to this argument, if morality cannot move us, then it is hard to understand how it could be sensibly regarded as action-guiding or normative. That is, they endorse a traditional argument for motivational judgment internalism based on moral rationalism. This paper criticizes this argument, and argues instead that there is no necessary or conceptual (...)
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  32.  14
    Innate Mind Need Not Be Within.Riin Kõiv - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):101-121.
    It is a widely accepted thesis in the cognitive sciences and in naturalistic philosophy of mind that the contents of at least some mental representations are innate. A question that has popped up in discussions concerning innate mental representations is this. Are externalist theories of mental content applicable to the content of innate representations? Views on the matter vary and sometimes conflict. To date, there has been no comprehensive assessment of the relationship between content externalism and content innateness. The aim (...)
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  33. An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Direction in our Concept of Time.Andrew James Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):25-47.
    This paper empirically investigates one aspect of the folk concept of time by testing how the presence or absence of directedness impacts judgements about whether there is time in a world. Experiment 1 found that dynamists, showed significantly higher levels of agreement that there is time in dynamically directed worlds than in non-dynamical non-directed worlds. Comparing our results to those we describe in Latham et al., we report that while ~ 70% of dynamists say there is time in B-theory worlds, (...)
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  34.  15
    Reference-Securing Belief and Content Externalism.Huiming Ren - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):87-99.
    I argue that our physical and social environments play a role in determining the content of most of our thoughts only indirectly—by playing a role in causing, and therefore, determining the content of, our reference-securing beliefs concerning general terms, beliefs that, when true, dictate what a general term will pick out. I also show that the problem of empty natural kind terms can be solved.
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