Abstractabstract:When the writings of Nancy Kingsbury Wollstonecraft surfaced in 2019, having been almost wholly neglected by scholars since their publication in the 1820s, they invited an inevitable and tantalizing comparison with her far more famous sister-in-law, Mary Wollstonecraft, especially since Kingsbury had written an article on "The Natural Rights of Woman." Irrespective of the Wollstonecraft connection, however, Kingsbury's writing stands on its own merits as deserving of serious scholarship by historians of women in philosophy. Nevertheless, reading Kingsbury in the light (...) of her predecessor is highly instructive and helps both bring out what is distinctive about her conclusions and place her in the context of post-Wollstonecraftian thought in the nineteenth century. Kingsbury draws on a similar set of foundational principles as Wollstonecraft, which I place within the republican tradition of political philosophy—freedom, equality, virtue, the common good. Together, these make up an ideal of freedom as independence. Focusing on the issue of education, she argues that increasing women's access to education will do little to improve their intellectual development unless there is an accompanying and extensive restructuring of social and economic norms. In applying the logic of freedom as independence, Kingsbury takes further this aspect of Wollstonecraft's thought and anticipates and prefigures some of the later arguments of feminists and abolitionists writing in the same tradition, including especially Frederick Douglass. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Avicenna's Theory of Science: Logic, Metaphysics, Epistemology by Riccardo StrobinoThérèse-Anne DruartRiccardo Strobino. Avicenna's Theory of Science: Logic, Metaphysics, Epistemology. Oakland: University of California Press, 2021. Pp. xvi + 428. Hardback, $95.00.Strobino's remarkable book does not simply present Avicenna's theory of science; it also highlights the importance of demonstration not only for logic but also for metaphysics and epistemology. Hence, Strobino's work is essential to appreciate and better understand (...) Avicenna's philosophy as a whole.Strobino grounds his research on Avicenna's theory of science in his Book of Demonstration in the Shifā', which focuses on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Taking into account the lack of any translation into English or any other main modern language as well as the lack of a full medieval Latin translation (only chapter 7 of book 3 exists in a medieval Latin version) of Avicenna's text, Strobino kindly provides in appendix C (357–71) a detailed "map" of this text, useful not only to readers who cannot handle Arabic but even to those who can, as the [End Page 326] text is so rich and complex. A simple but careful look at this map confirms what Strobino makes clear and insists upon: Avicenna greatly develops, enriches, completes, and even outgrows some of Aristotle's views. The Book of Demonstration is far more than a commentary on the Posterior Analytics; it is a complete reworking of it.Strobino shows that Avicenna grounds his theory of demonstration and science on two basic notions—conception (tasawwur) and assertion (tasdīq, which some other scholars translate as "assent")—and so gives a unified approach to his theory. Scientific conceptions require better understanding of definition and description. Avicenna builds definitions and descriptions on essentialism and, therefore, grounds them in metaphysics. As for scientific assertions, in contradistinction to nonscientific ones, they must be necessary and give the cause. Therefore, Avicenna places great importance on modality and develops modal syllogisms, whereas Aristotle focused on categorical syllogisms and neglected hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms. Avicenna also elaborates a sophisticated account of modality and its metaphysical implications. Furthermore, he broadens and enriches the appreciation of causality and explanation. These developments, according to Strobino, lead Avicenna to set forth an intricate division and hierarchy of the sciences under metaphysics, which provides their ultimate principles and allows for a unified understanding of the sciences while respecting their particularities.According to Strobino, Avicenna is keen to develop a theory of science that gives a good account of science as it is practiced. Strobino carefully shows how Avicenna's theory better reflects this practice than does Aristotle's.Strobino does not simply highlight how much Avicenna distances himself from Aristotle and goes far beyond what the Posterior Analytics yields, but also shows how much Avicenna relies on points adumbrated by his predecessor al-Fārābī in his own Book of Demonstration.The way Strobino through his analysis of demonstration links Avicenna's understanding of logic, epistemology, and metaphysics underscores the coherence and unity of Avicenna's philosophy. Scholars were aware of the importance of demonstration for Avicenna in various philosophical fields, but until the release of this book, they seemed not to have fully grasped the centrality and essential role played by the Avicennian understanding and focus on demonstration.Of course, Strobino does not limit himself to an analysis of passages in the Book of Demonstration. He has an encompassing knowledge of Avicenna's texts and uses them well to flesh out and enrich what remains terse in the Book of Demonstration. He even takes into account the way one of his successors, al-Tūsī, reads him. He also shows an extensive and wide-ranging knowledge of Aristotle's texts and of Aristotelian scholarship, as well as an interest in the Greek commentators and Galen and their relevance for interpreting Avicenna.Avicenna's Theory of Science is not an easy book to read, as it is often very technical, particularly when dealing with purely logical points or issues, but reading it is rewarding if one does so slowly and meditatively. The author, in fact, illuminates difficult matters but does not waste words. From... (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Diodorus Cronus reportedly denied that there are truths about present kinēsis (change or movement) but affirmed that there are truths about past kinēsis. Although scholars have argued that Diodorus's atomism about bodies, place, and time supports his rejection of present spatial movement of simple bodies, I argue that Diodorus rejected a broader range of present changes, including qualitative and existential change. I also argue that Diodorus rejected these three sorts of change not only for simples but also for complexes. Furthermore, (...) philosophers since antiquity have claimed that denying truths about present change is incompatible with accepting truths about past change, since each past truth about change corresponds to some present truth about change. I argue that this objection can be overcome. I conclude that Diodorus's arguments against present change are both broader and more successful than is usually maintained. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:La seconda polis: Introduzione alle Leggi di Platone by Bruno CentroneRafael FerberBruno Centrone. La seconda polis: Introduzione alle Leggi di Platone. Rome: Carocci Editore, 2021. Pp. 348. Paperback, €32.30.After the death of some of the great Italian scholars who devoted a considerable part of their lifetimes to the study of Socrates and Plato, including Gabriele Giannantoni (1932–98), Margherita Isnardi Parente (1928–2008), Giovanni Reale (1931–2014), and Mario Vegetti (1937–2018), (...) a new generation of Italian scholars has moved to center stage. One outstanding member of this group is Bruno Centrone of the University of Pisa, who has been productive for decades, even more so in recent years. After editing, inter alia, the collected articles of Gabriele Giannantoni in Dialogo socratico e nascita della dialettica nella filosofia di Platone (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2005) and publishing numerous translations with commentary of Platonic dialogues, he has now also written an extensive introduction to Plato's Laws.The Laws is one of Plato's last dialogues. Its main speaker is an Athenian, in whose voice we may discover, at least in part, the voice of Plato. In his soul, according to a saying of Paul Friedländer (1882–1968), cohabited "Socrates and Solon" (Platone [Milan: Bompiano, 2004], 1127). On the one hand, Plato remains a loyal pupil of Socrates in the Laws, one who defends and refines the Socratic dicta that virtue is knowledge and that nobody does wrong willingly (see 731c1–5, 860d1). On the other hand, he lays out the laws for the imaginary city of Magnesia. Hence, Aristotle writes, "Most of the Laws consists, in fact of laws, and [Plato] has said little about the constitution. He wishes to make it more generally attainable by actual city-states, yet he gradually turns it back towards the Republic" (Politics 2, 1265a1–4). Surely, the Laws was also written for "actual city-states," and especially also "for the ears of the younger generation" and the "Guardians of the Laws in charge of education" (811d4–6, trans. Trevor Saunders [London: Penguin Books, 1970]). It is interesting to note in this context that the Athenian starts from an institutionalist view of the law as the "common dogma of a state [dogma poleôs koinon]" (644d3) before proceeding to his own conception of the law as "reason's distribution": "we should run our public and our private life, our homes and our cities, in obedience to what is immortal in us, and dignify this distribution of reason [tou nou dianomê] with the name of 'law' [nomos]" (713e8–714a2, trans. Trevor Saunders with modification).The Third Letter, whether or not it was written by Plato, tells us that Plato had been working with Dionysius on "preambles" (prooimia) (Ep. III, 316a3). In fact, in a passage in the Laws, we are told that the legislator ought to use two methods: persuasion and force (722b6). Force corresponds to the laws themselves and persuasion to the preambles to the laws (prooimia nomôn) (722d2). The Laws contains not only laws, but also prefaces to the laws, which are persuasive in a way that is similar to the discourses of the free physician addressed to his patients, with logoi "close to philosophizing" (tou philosophein engys chrômenon tois logois) (875d2). Notably, the word 'philosophy' (philosophia) does not appear in the Laws, which is not really a "pure" philosophical work and was not intended by its author to be so, with the exception of some passages in the tenth book, where the deus-mensura thesis is stated (716c) and which also contains proof of the priority of the soul (see 896a–d). The Laws represents Plato's descent into the cave.Centrone rightly draws our attention to the fact that Plato, who via Socrates in the famous digression in the Theaetetus recommends the flight from "here to there [enthenden ekeise]" [End Page 325] (176b8–c1), descends into the cave in the Laws, that is, addresses the details of legislation. But, as Centrone rightly observes, these are merely two sides of the same coin (321). In the Theaetetus, Plato, in the guise of the Platonic Socrates, recommends leaving the cave, while in the Laws, he returns... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:John Locke's Christianity by Diego LucciBenjamin HillDiego Lucci. John Locke's Christianity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. 244. Hardback, $99.99.Diego Lucci's John Locke's Christianity is a fabulous work of scholarship—meticulously researched, well argued, and judicious. It should be required reading for everyone interested in John Locke's thought.In the introduction, Lucci aligns himself with John Dunn (The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of (...) the "Two Treaties of Government" [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969]), John Colman (John Locke's Moral Philosophy [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983]), and Victor Nuovo (John Locke: The Philosopher as Christian Virtuoso [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017]), who believe that Locke was a "Christian philosopher" whose "theological concerns, interests, and ideas indeed pervade his philosophical, political, and moral thought" (5, emphasis in the original). John Locke's Christianity, however, is not a book that defends that thesis. It is much more focused and does, basically, just what its title advertises—it provides a systemic and detailed analysis of Locke's core Christian beliefs, and a very excellent one at that.The book is structured around two pillars. The first, consisting of chapters 1–3, involves a contextualized analysis of Locke's theological writings, particularly The Reasonableness of Christianity and Adversaria Theologica. This analysis is then used to reconstruct Locke's conception of the fundamentals of Christianity. The second pillar, consisting of chapters 4–6, then uses this reconstruction to explain puzzling features of Locke's engagements with personal identity, the Trinity, and religious toleration. Lucci's reconstruction of the fundamentals of Locke's Christian beliefs are novel, interesting, and compelling. Furthermore, he uncovers details that materially affect the interpretations of Locke's philosophical accounts of persons and religious toleration, so much so that many popular interpretations begin to look strained after reading Lucci's analysis. Philosophers unaccustomed to considering the theological basis of Locke's account of persons or the Christian significance of religious toleration will now need to engage with Lucci's accounts.Locke famously offered a succinct conception of Christianity: to be a Christian is to believe that Jesus was the Messiah. Lucci shows that this conception, though economical, was by no means thin. At its core was the idea of a moralist soteriology. The promise of eternal life for those who accepted Jesus as the Messiah (and who also strove to follow the law of nature) was vital to morality, in Locke's eyes, because it was only with such an inducement that depraved humans would have firm reason to try to follow the law of nature. In Locke's eyes, Christianity, and only Christianity, offered this inducement to followers of the laws of faith and the laws of nature because of the resurrection of Christ. Lucci's moralist soteriological understanding of Locke's conception of the fundamentals of Christianity differs significantly, for example, from Nuovo's presentation of it ("Locke's Christology as a Key to Understanding His Philosophy," in The Philosophy of John Locke, ed. Peter Anstey [London: Routledge, 2003], 129–53), in which Nuovo identifies Locke's Christology as "the central and organizing principle of his theology" (129).Lucci also provides an excellent answer to one of the enduring questions about Locke's Christianity: was he a Socinian or an Arminian? Against the common view that he is somewhere between the two by being a bit of both, Lucci argues that Locke was in fact neither a Socinian nor an Arminian; Locke rather maintained a unique, irenic position [End Page 331] that may have overlapped somewhat with Socianism and Arminianism but owed nothing to either. Locke's moralist soteriology, along with some of his other Christian beliefs, look like Socinian and Arminian doctrines, admits Lucci. But many of his other beliefs did not, especially, Lucci says, those concerning original sin, satisfaction, and atonement (96–105). This was because Locke's theological beliefs were formed by neither commitment nor opposition to any particular sect, but rather by his careful, plain, and simple reading of the Gospels (50). Locke had no problem with adopting the views of theologians when their positions were revealed through Scripture... (shrink)

Abstractabstract:In Morning Hours (1785), Moses Mendelssohn presents a proof for the existence of God from the grounding of possibility. Although Mendelssohn claims that this proof is original, it has not received much attention in the secondary literature. In this paper, I analyze this proof and present its historical context. I show that although it resembles Leibniz's proof from eternal truths and Kant's precritical possibility proof, it has unique characteristics that can be regarded as responses to deficiencies Mendelssohn identified in these (...) earlier proofs. I argue that by analyzing the semantics of judgments about dispositions, Mendelssohn provides a novel explanation for the basic premise shared by these proofs, namely that possibility is grounded in actuality. Additionally, this analysis simplifies the inference to a unique infinite mind grounding all possibility. Thus, the proof is worth studying both for historical reasons and for its original account of modal concepts. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:There are two ways of hearing Philo's unexpected endorsement of a version of the design hypothesis in the final part of Hume's Dialogues. We might register it in accordance with Cleanthes's descriptivist approach to religious speech, taking Philo to be reasoning with Cleanthes in Cleanthes's own way. Or we might hear Philo's words in accordance with his own expressivist account of religious speech, an account that Philo appears to have borrowed from Hobbes. I argue that Hume intended this double layering (...) of meanings, presenting us with two distinct ways we might understand Philo's closing remarks. Each possible reading reveals a distinct Humean lesson about the limitations of natural theology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Possibility and Necessity in the Time of Peter Abelard by Irene BininiWolfgang LenzenIrene Binini. Possibility and Necessity in the Time of Peter Abelard. Investigating Medieval Philosophy Series. Leiden: Brill, 2021. Pp. xii + 326. Hardback, $166.00.This book is an impressive work written by a young Italian scholar who received her PhD only five years ago in Pisa. It is divided into three parts. Part 1 gives a survey (...) of "Early 12th-Century Debates on Modal Propositions"; part 2 is devoted to "Abelard's Modal Logic"; [End Page 327] part 3 deals with the views of "Abelard on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Modalities." The author displays a profound knowledge of the relevant literature. The primary sources comprise twenty manuscripts preserved in various European libraries, plus forty-eight printed works (from Abelard to William of Sherwood). The list of secondary sources contains altogether 136 items from A (Astroh) to Z (Zagzebski), but, interestingly, it does not mention a monograph that, by its very title, claims to give an exposition of Abelard's logic, namely Maria Teresa Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli's La Logica di Abelardo (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1964).As far as I can judge (as a nonnative English-speaker), the linguistic quality of Binini's book is quite good. The explanations in the main text, including the translations from Latin sources, are easily comprehensible, and the many quotations (distributed over no less than 655 footnotes) are almost without any fault. Thus, the book rightly deserves inclusion in the prestigious series Investigating Medieval Philosophy. Yet, at least according to my taste, the book contains many redundancies. Again and again, the author first explains a certain issue at some length, then confirms the correctness of her interpretation by means of a longer (English) quotation, and finally reconfirms it by fully quoting the Latin text in the footnotes.As Binini explains in the book's concluding chapter, her aim is to present "an all-encompassing reflection on [Abelard's] works on modalities" and "a comparison between these works and the parallel reflections advanced by other masters and logicians in the early 12th century" (308). She undoubtedly achieves this goal. The comparison of Abelard's views on possibility and necessity with the views of other logicians is mainly carried out in chapters 1–3. Ancient and early medieval logicians such as, in particular, the Stoics and Boethius favored the basic idea that "something," p, is necessary if and only if p is always the case (or true). Accordingly, p is possible if and only if p is at least sometime the case. Abelard, however, was not willing to accept that each possibility has to become realized at some time. He instead offered a "nature-based characterization of possibility" that can "account for unrealized, past, counterfactual, and even unactualizable possibilities" (308). Abelard's idea is that something, x, is possibly a P if and only if the property of being P is compatible with the nature of x. Hence this view basically amounts to a de re conception of possibility that attributes modalities to things, while the temporal view attributes modal properties primarily to propositions (or states of affairs) and hence can be labeled de dicto (or de sensu).Let us now turn to Binini's twofold aim (as formulated on the back cover of her book) to present a "uniform and consistent" reassessment of Abelard's theory of modalities and of his modal logic. The former task is tackled in chapters 8–10. After summarizing, in chapter 8, Abelard's general views on "Nature and Modalities," chapter 9 is devoted to a detailed discussion of the "Many Senses of Possibility." In five consecutive sections, Binini investigates the conception of (1) possibility as "non-repugnancy with nature" (illustrated by the thesis that "any man can be a bishop" [235]); (2) unrealizable but "conceivable" possibilities (such as the existence of humans lacking the ability to laugh [240]); (3) determinate potencies (like that of an amputee who nevertheless "can walk" [248]); (4) past and counterfactual potencies (like that of a blind person who might be able to see); and (5) other puzzling de re possibilities (such as "irrational humans" [261]).The final... (shrink)

Like most, if not all, of his contemporaries, Spinoza never developed a full-fledged philosophy of mathematics. Still, his numerous remarks about mathematics attest not only to his deep interest in the subject (a point which is also confirmed by the significant presence of mathematical books in his library), but also to his quite elaborate and perhaps unique understanding of the nature of mathematics. At the very center of his thought about mathematics stands a paradox (or, at least, an apparent paradox): (...) mathematics provides Spinoza with an epistemic model. Mathematical knowledge is certain (II/138/9 and II/138/9), clear (IV/261/8), and free from teleological thinking (II/79/33), but the objects of mathematical knowledge – i.e., mathematical entities – are nothing but “auxila imaginationis [aids of the imagination],” (IV/57/16 and II/83/15), entities that are not real and merely assist the imagination in carving the world in manner that is suitable to our limited and distortive cognitive capacities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In MemoriamSteven Nadler, PresidentIt is with deep sadness that the Board of Directors of the Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc., mourn the passing of Gerald Press, who died suddenly on December 26, 2022, at the age of seventy-seven.Jerry was a longtime member of the JHP Board. He was book review editor for the Journal from 1990 to 1997, and editor from 1998 to 2003. He also served (...) terms as treasurer and vice president.Jerry received his PhD in 1974 from the University of California-San Diego, where he worked with Richard Popkin (who established the Journal in 1957). He was a professor of philosophy at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center for forty years and proud chair of the Thomas Hunter Honors Program from 2012 to 2020. A specialist in ancient Greek philosophy, Jerry was the author of Plato: A Guide for the Perplexed (2007), as well as numerous articles and reviews. He was also editor of the volumes Plato's Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations (1993); Who Speaks for Plato? Studies in Platonic Anonymity (2000); and The Continuum Guide to Plato (2012).A passionate teacher, dedicated mentor, and learned scholar, Jerry was warm, generous, and totally unpretentious. He will be greatly missed by his many students, colleagues, and friends. Our condolences go out to his family. [End Page 1]Copyright © 2023 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)

Abstractabstract:According to a common caricature, Nietzsche cuts the figure of an anti-Buddha who advocates a type of life affirmation that is the contrary of Buddhist or Schopenhauerian life negation. In this paper, I seek to demonstrate, through a rigorous study of some of his later works—most notably Beyond Good and Evil (1886), The Antichrist (1905[1888]), and Ecce Homo (1908[1888])—that Nietzsche does not at all present himself as an anti-Buddha stricto sensu, or as a figure whose teaching is diametrically opposed to (...) that of the Indian master. The late Nietzsche, more precisely, does not conceive of amor fati and nirvāṇa as opposed ethical poles—or negatives of one another. On the contrary, certain texts in Ecce Homo and The Antichrist make it clear that there are significant affinities between amor fati and nirvāṇa as Nietzsche understands it, with respect to both the relationship to the self (seeing oneself "as a fatum") and to the other (overcoming ressentiment) that it implies. This, I conclude, lends credence to Nietzsche's infamous hypothesis according to which, contrary to appearances, all ethical ideals might in fact be "insidiously consanguine, linked up, knotted with that bad thing which seems to be their contrary" (Beyond Good and Evil, §2, KSA 5:17). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:To Shape a New World: Essays on the Political Philosophy of Martin Luther King, Jr. ed. by Tommie Shelby and Brandon M. TerryErin R. PinedaTommie Shelby and Brandon M. Terry, editors. To Shape a New World: Essays on the Political Philosophy of Martin Luther King, Jr. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020. Pp. 464. Paperback, $20.00.In the summer of 2020, as cities across the globe erupted in protest (...) after the murder of George Floyd, references to Martin Luther King, Jr. abounded: while a familiar cast of politicians evoked his memory to scold riotous protestors, others issued King's rejoinder that "the riot is the language of the unheard" (King, "The Other America," 1967). Many such invocations no doubt smacked of the "ritual celebration" and "intellectual marginalization" [End Page 339] that, as Tommie Shelby and Brandon M. Terry observe, have long marked King's reception as a political thinker (2). But in another sense, the seemingly inevitable return to King points to the significant stakes of taking his thought seriously and the political danger of laying claim to interpretive mastery. Struggles over King's legacy and the terms of his thought are not just about King but form part of the discursive terrain on which struggles over the demands of racial justice and the means of transformative collective action are waged.Shelby and Terry's ambitious, illuminating volume, To Shape a New World, first published in 2018 (timed to mark the fiftieth anniversary of King's assassination) and released as paperback in 2020 (amidst the George Floyd uprisings), invites us to take King seriously in just this sense: with an acute sensitivity to the stakes and an embrace of an interpretive pluralism that refuses the certainty of a singular, definitive reading. The collection facilitates rigorous engagement with King's thought in its own time and place but also presses the question of what we ought to do with it in this current "age of impunity and mendacity," standing amid the "unraveling" edges of "American empire," as Cornel West puts it (331). In posing and answering this question across its fifteen essays, the collection seeks to do justice to King as both a political philosopher and a political activist—a religious and political thinker whose philosophies were worked out not only behind the pulpit or within the academy, but also (and perhaps primarily) in concert with others on the field of political action. Indeed, one of its primary contributions is to challenge mainstream presumptions about what counts as political philosophy—its boundaries as a genre as well as the spaces where we imagine political philosophizing to happen and the figures we position as its primary producers.The volume is organized into four sections. The first, "Traditions," is devoted to exploring some of King's diverse intellectual influences. Here, the emphasis is less on making the case for particular traditions as the essential ones, and more on exploring the use of different interpretive lenses for shedding new light on his ideas. Three essays put King in context with thinkers he directly engaged: Robert Gooding-Williams places him in conversation with W. E. B. Du Bois and Booker T. Washington to reveal the structure of King's account of dignity amid the constraints of racial injustice; Bernard Boxill shows how King's theory of civil disobedience builds on—and collectivizes—Frederick Douglass's account of comparative freedom; and Karuna Mantena explores the theory of nonviolent action that King, through figures like Benjamin Mays and Howard Thurman, adopted and adapted from Gandhi. In contrast, Paul Taylor argues that we should read King in the company of moral perfectionists Stanley Cavell and Christopher Lebron—as showing us how practices of self-criticism, self-transformation, and experimentation enable "citizens to remain dissatisfied with things as they stand" while remaining "open to the possibility that justice will require reconstructing both society and the self" (41).In the next section, contributors turn their attention to King's "Ideals"—the ethical and political imperatives that shape the ends and means of the struggle for a new world. Like Mantena, Martha Nussbaum reads King alongside Gandhi to focus on King's insistence on channeling righteous... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche's Ecce Homo and the Revaluation of All Values: Dionysian Versus Christian Values by Thomas H. BrobjerCharles P. RodgerThomas H. Brobjer. Nietzsche's Ecce Homo and the Revaluation of All Values: Dionysian Versus Christian Values. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. Pp. viii + 210. Hardback, $115.00.It is difficult to review a book so rich in consequences and seemingly sui generis. To categorize it as the work of a "lumper" or (...) "splitter," for example, would only confuse matters. Granted, Brobjer dismisses The Will to Power as the tendentious forgery of Nietzsche's sister. Methodologically, he also appears as a "moderate" splitter who provides a close textual reading and draws on the Nachlass only so far as this serves to elucidate the claims Nietzsche made in his published works. Nonetheless, Brobjer's central hypothesis might, albeit falsely, suggest that he is an old-fashioned lumper, for he holds that Mazzino Montinari was wrong to claim Nietzsche abandoned his plans for a Hauptwerk ("Nietzsches Nachlaß von 1885 bis 1888 oder Textkritik und Wille zur Macht," in Nietzsche Lesen [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1982], 92–119).Granted, Montinari admitted that after abandoning plans for The Will to Power, Nietzsche did, in the fall of 1888, entertain a new plan for a four-volume Hauptwerk titled The Revaluation of All Values. According to these plans, The Antichrist would be its first volume, followed by The Free Spirit, containing a critique of philosophy as a nihilistic movement; The Immoralist, containing a critique of morality and its dangers; and Dionysos Philosophos. Nonetheless, Montinari claimed, these plans also collapsed when, sometime after mid-November 1888, Nietzsche decided to make The Antichrist into the whole of The Revaluation of All Values. Indeed, Montinari's hypothesis was that Nietzsche finally realized, at the last minute, that the work of the past five years and what he had previously regarded as his life task was untenable and, having published everything he could salvage from his failed Hauptwerk project, "Nietzsche's collapse in Turin came when he had literally finished with everything" (12, emphasis in the original). To Brobjer, however, "this claim seems both psychologically improbable and, in regard to Nietzsche's intention to write a Hauptwerk, simply wrong" (12). Yet despite Brobjer having demonstrated in a number of articles published over the past decades that the evidence is not only too thin and ambiguous to sustain Montinari's hypothesis, but that it contradicts his timeline (92–94), scholars continue to treat Montinari's conclusions as established fact, and moreover treat all "discussions and considerations of a magnum opus … as hypothetical and old-fashioned" (12). But if so, why should the present study, wherein Brobjer advances this same thesis, not also fall on deaf ears? The answer is surprising: Ecce Homo.The Druckmanuskript shows that both the final chapter headings and the majority of the final text of Ecce Homo were established prior to mid-November, and, while Nietzsche continued to make additions and alterations to Ecce Homo up until a day before his collapse, his revisions to the completed portions of the text were only "minor" (21). Since, even according to Montinari's timeline, the vast majority of Ecce Homo was thus written at a time when Nietzsche still incontrovertibly intended that The Antichrist would constitute only the first volume of The Revaluation of All Values (47), nothing can possibly speak against examining whether Ecce Homo might retain at least traces of Nietzsche's original plans for his Hauptwerk. To the contrary, a great deal speaks for it. After all, the conventional interpretation of Ecce Homo as a "backward-looking autobiography" (5) has hardly borne fruit; read as a summary of Nietzsche's life and writings, Ecce Homo is so "elliptic, paradoxical, absurd" (48), and so contorted by excessive self-praise and praise for Thus Spoke Zarathustra, that the text is incoherent and unusable for its supposed purpose. Yet Nietzsche explicitly told his publisher that his intention was merely to tell of his life and works "in snatches" (3), and that Ecce Homo was being composed with the "intention to give this work the same form and appearance which that magnum opus [Hauptwerk] will have, to... (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino, SJ (1607–67), conceived a procedure for determining natural moral laws by voting under a veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, imagined possible people who are ignorant of their social position, personal characteristics, nation, and the historical period in which they live vote as equals. These possible people are asked to establish a moral law in pursuit of their own and collective happiness, which they are obligated by God to follow. This article discusses Pallavicino's innovative approach to natural (...) law and examines its reception in Southern Germany and (what is now) Austria. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Women Philosophers in the Long Nineteenth Century: The German Tradition ed. by Kristin Gjesdal and Dalia NassarAlison StoneKristin Gjesdal and Dalia Nassar, editors. Women Philosophers in the Long Nineteenth Century: The German Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 336. Hardback, $99.00."How plausible, [Dalia Nassar and I] kept asking, is it that women published philosophy in the early modern period and then simply ceased to think and publish (...) philosophy in the nineteenth century?" remarked Kristin Gjesdal recently (interview with Richard Marshall, 3:16am [blog], https://www.3-16am.co.uk/articles/gadamer-herder-and-the-womenphilosophers-of-the-long-nineteen-cent ury?c=end-times-series). Not plausible at all—yet this is what historians of women in philosophy often seem to have assumed, judging by the remarkably small amount of scholarship on nineteenth-century women philosophers compared with those of the early modern period or the twentieth century. Eileen O'Neill, for instance, claims that it was "not a particularly friendly century for women philosophers" (1). In fact, as Gjesdal and Nassar observe, women were "significant contributors" to the "thriving intellectual cultures in German-speaking countries" at this time (1). Gjesdal and Nassar contrast Germanic countries to France and Britain in this regard, yet I would add that nineteenth-century Britain too had a vibrant print and periodical culture that created openings for women philosophers such as Harriet Martineau, Anna Jameson, Frances Power Cobbe, and many others. The broader point remains: the nineteenth century has only seemed empty of women philosophers because we have not yet investigated the women thinkers of this period or challenged the canons and narratives from which they have been excluded.Recognizing German women philosophers is particularly important because the vast majority of scholarship on the nineteenth century focuses on the German tradition. Consequently, unless we recover the work of German-speaking women, we will never change the narrative about this period. This makes the present anthology invaluable for both teaching and research. Edited by Gjesdal and Nassar, it contains new translations, nearly all by Anna Ezekiel, of texts by historical German-speaking women philosophers.Regarding teaching, many courses on post-Kantian European philosophy include no women until Beauvoir or Arendt. Such courses typically cover Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger. The editors have clearly designed this volume to enable instructors easily to bring women into such courses, by providing extracts—of suitable lengths for teaching—from women affiliated respectively with German idealism and Romanticism (Germaine de Staël, Karoline von Günderrode, and Bettina von Arnim), Marxism (Clara Zetkin, Rosa Luxemburg), Nietzscheanism (Hedwig Dohm, Lou Salomé), and phenomenology (Edith Stein, Gerda Walther). Some of these women are already well-known as political activists, as with Luxemburg and Zetkin, or under the elastic heading of "writers," as with Staël and von Arnim. But this collection presents these women's writings in a new light, showcasing their philosophical side. After all, we have learned to read Marx and Nietzsche philosophically: why not extend the same courtesy to Staël or Luxemburg?For researchers, this collection will likewise be invaluable. Post-Kantian European philosophy has been slow to respond to the wider questioning and broadening of the traditional philosophical canon. It remains sadly common for narratives of nineteenth-century German philosophy to discuss men only—a position that this book makes untenable. [End Page 336] Hopefully it will galvanize philosophers to integrate these women into the historiography of the post-Kantian tradition at last.In the introduction, the editors helpfully contextualize the selected writings, arguing that these women's exclusion from academic institutions led them to philosophize in ways that spoke to general audiences, connected with lived experience, and addressed practical and political concerns. In short, these women did a type of philosophy that was not purified but socially engaged, and can be a model for us today. Thereafter the book consists of sections on nine women philosophers, ordered chronologically. Each section begins with an editorial introduction to the philosopher and her interests, ideas, writings, and interlocutors.The writings included from Staël—whose work spans the period from the French Revolution into Romanticism—are "On Women Writers" from... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:J. G. Fichte's Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre and Related Writings, 1794–95 by J. G. FichteIsabelle Thomas-FogielJ. G. Fichte. J. G. Fichte's Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre and Related Writings, 1794–95. Edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 608. Hardback, $145.00.This edition of texts written or taught by Fichte between February 1794 and the winter of 1794–95 is a major editorial event and (...) is destined to become the indispensable working tool for all English-speaking students and researchers interested in Fichte. Daniel Breazeale, one of the greatest Fichte specialists, offers here four essential texts. First, the heart of this edition and of Fichte's philosophy, is Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre (literally "Doctrine of Science") of 1794–95. This central text has already been translated into English by Peter Heath and John Lachs under the title Science of Knowledge (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1970), but as Breazeale explains in his preface, he corrected the errors in translation and above all wished to propose a version that was "as broadly accessible as possible" (xi). This is a great challenge, given that this version of the Wissenschaftslehre (henceforth WL) is considered one of the most abstract and difficult texts in philosophy. Let us recall that the term 'WL' qualifies Fichte's entire undertaking and not just one of his works; Fichte thus professed more than fifteen versions of the WL.With this fundamental text, we are also offered a revised translation of two essays (which Breazeale had already edited in 1988): Concerning the Concept of the WL, or of So-Called 'Philosophy' (April–May 1794) and Outline of What is Distinctive of the WL with Regard to the Theoretical Power (winter 1794–95). Finally, Breazeale translates for the first time into English The Zurich WL, the lectures Fichte gave before a small committee from February 24 to April 26 of 1794. With this book, English-speaking readers thus have at their disposal, [End Page 334] in a single volume, some of the most fundamental writings of Fichte's first philosophy. The precision and clarity of this translation will, if not "force the reader to understand," to use a well-known title of Fichte, at least help the reader to appreciate one of the culminating points of idealism.But there is much more to this edition than a precise, fluent, and illuminating translation. It includes, first, an introduction of about one hundred pages that details Fichte's bibliographical, historical, and philosophical journey; then, endnotes that clarify certain moments of the text by placing them in their context, identifying the opponents targeted by Fichte, and restoring the debates of the time; lastly, a German-English and English-German glossary and an index. It is a considerable work, the fruit of a lifetime of research, which will introduce many beginners to Fichte's philosophy and at the same time renew many specialist debates. And it is undoubtedly a strength of this edition that it can be read at several levels, by the beginner as well as by the most experienced researcher.As this review cannot deal with all the rich analyses in Breazeale's introduction, I will give just a few examples. Breazeale first endeavors to reconstruct the genesis of Fichte's questioning. Indeed, the work of the historian of philosophy—as R. G. Collingwood conceived of it—consists first of all in restoring as closely as possible the question to which the text is intended to provide an answer. So, what question or problem was the source of his philosophy that he felt the need to rename WL? Fichte's initial problem was that of the foundation of transcendental idealism. The criticisms of skeptics like Gottlob E. Schulze (also known as "Aenesidemus") or Salomon Maimon had revealed the inadequacy of the foundations laid down by both Kant and Reinhold. As Fichte says and Breazeale reminds us, "The system has to be rebuilt" (4). This rebuilding is the common object of these four translated texts. In this respect, the Zurich lectures (of which only a small part remains) are the witness of this foundation work. Reading these... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Kant's Tribunal of Reason: Legal Metaphor and Normativity in the Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. 208. Hardback, $105.00. -/- Even those with a passing knowledge of Kant's system will recognize his sustained use of legal metaphor and his appeal to lawfulness as a beacon of philosophical progress. He famously begins one of the most important (and impermeable) sections of the Critique of Pure (...) Reason with the juridical distinction between quid juris (what is the law) and quid facti (what is the fact) (A 84/B 116), insisting—against the empiricists—that the critique of our cognitive faculty must speak to the former and requires a Transcendental Deduction of the categories. In her book, Sofie Møller delves into the historical context and philosophical significance of such legal metaphors to reveal that their roots spread to the deepest foundations of Kant's project. In doing so, she contends that we should understand "philosophical systematicity as legal systematicity" (15). According to Møller, to accept this reading of Kant is to acknowledge that the legal system provides not just one helpful type of metaphor to be appreciated alongside many others, but the only proper symbol of the abstract nature of reason itself (173).For those interested in Kant's engagement with the natural-rights theory that prevailed during his lifetime, or in his familiarity with the concrete legal practices of eighteenth-century European courts, Møller's book proves to be thoroughly researched and informative. As the first English-language book-length study providing a comprehensive account of the legal aspects influencing Kant's system, it should serve as a valuable catchall resource. There are limits to its accessibility, however, as familiarity with basic legal distinctions—e.g. between civil and criminal codes—is assumed, and Latin terms and phrases often go untranslated. At times, this makes for a difficult intersection between the arduousness of Kant's own prose and the equally technical legal terminology that is meant to explain it. However, this barrier is mitigated by Møller's own interpretive work, which cautions that we should not let indeterminate legal terminology fix too much in our reading of Kant's texts, especially when considering the Transcendental Deduction and its reliance on the quid juris/quid facti distinction. As she concludes at the end of chapter 3, the procedure of legal deduction that Kant invokes "could be an investigation, an exposition, a thorough consideration, a review, explanation, description, account, dispute or procedure" (64). Thus, despite Kant's historically demonstrable familiarity with legal-deduction writings, on their own, they "do not present a sufficiently uniform argument structure to settle the question of the structures of the two versions of the transcendental deduction" (64). This observation serves both as a general warning as well as a criticism of Dieter Henrich's approach to Kant's system, which popularized attention to legal metaphor in Kant scholarship in the twentieth century. For Møller, little philosophical insight is won through Henrich's approach, since it "places too much weight on the importance of an origin" (60), taking its cue from a particular type of legal deduction whose assumption is unsupported, and which cannot be accurately projected onto Kant's text. As Møller argues, "The validity of the categories is not only grounded in their origin in pure apperception but in their being the necessary structures in the synthesis which creates objects of experience, which is an act of pure apperception" (60). Møller's suggestion, instead, is to read the Deduction as adopting the twofold structure of "judicial imputation," which does a more faithful job of capturing the structuring activity that Kant accords to the understanding. With the latter reading, emphasis shifts from whether the categories' application to objects of experience is valid because of their a priori origin, to the spontaneous activity of the judging subject as the originator of experience (75). Part of what is unique about this approach is that it does not read the... (shrink)

Abstractabstract:In his Pragmatism lectures, William James argued that philosophers' temperaments partially determine the theories that they find satisfying, and that their influence explains persistent disagreement within the history of philosophy. Crucially, James was not only making a descriptive claim, but also a normative one: temperaments, he thought, could play a legitimate epistemic role in our philosophical inquiries. This paper aims to evaluate and defend this normative claim.There are three problems for James's view: (1) that allowing temperaments to play a role (...) within inquiry replaces philosophical disagreement with psychological difference; (2) that including temperaments would allow arbitrary elements to influence the outcome of inquiry; and (3) that such a view assumes an implausible metaphysical picture. Through clarifying the nature of temperaments, and what counts as a satisfactory philosophical theory on a pragmatist account, this paper presents an interpretation of James's metaphilosophical claims that can provide satisfactory responses to these problems. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:In the following, I argue that Hegel took concepts—not propositions, judgments, or spatiotemporal objects—as the primary truth-bearer in his logic and attempt to offer a defensible interpretation of what it means for an individual concept (or "thought-determination") to be assessed as true or untrue. Along the way, I consider the shortcomings of several alternative interpretations of truth in Hegelian logic, paying particular attention to the now-common contention that a commitment to something like Frege's context principle prevents Hegel from assessing concepts (...) independently of the role that they play in judgments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Traité des premières véritésby Claude G. BuffierJeffrey D. BursonClaude G. Buffier. Traité des premières vérités. Édition, présentation et notes par Louis Rouquayrol. Textes cartésiens en langue française. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2020. Pp. 379. Paperback, €32.00.Born in Poland to French parents, Claude G. Buffier, SJ (1661–1737) emerged as one of the most influential of the Parisian scriptores librorumin the first decades of the eighteenth century. Buffier is (...) perhaps best known as one of the founding editors of, and contributors to, the influential French Jesuit periodical Mémoires de Trévoux, but his works on general grammar, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and logic earned him widespread renown. His Grammaire françaiseachieved translation into Spanish, German, Italian, and English, and his Cours de sciences sur des principes nouveaux et simples pour former le langage, l'esprit, et le cœur dans l'usage ordinaire de la vie(1715) was widely adopted in France and Spain throughout the eighteenth century. Buffier's eclectic approach to philosophy, science, moral philosophy, and practical theology developed across several significant works: Principes du raisonnement(1714), Traité des premières vérités(1724), Éléments de métaphysique(1725), and Exposition des preuves les plus sensibles de la véritable religion(1732). In these works, Buffier was prescient in selectively adopting perspectives from Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke, evincing thereby his avid interest and participation in early Enlightenment discussions. Many of Buffier's texts proved to be influential on contributors to the Encyclopédie, on Voltaire, and perhaps later, as harbingers of Scottish Common Sense philosophy. Given the growing recognition of Buffier's importance thanks to the work of Kathleen Wilkins, Catherine Northeast, Jeffrey Burson, Katharine Hammerton, and others, Louis Rouquayrol's new critical edition of Buffier's most influential work, Traité des premières vérités( Treatise of First Truths) is most welcome. Rouquayrol's critical edition of the Traitéis replete with helpful [End Page 156]intertextual explanatory notes to the texts and debates that Buffier addressed, and it includes an insightful synthetic introduction, which summarizes the Traitéand addresses aspects of its philosophical and historical significance. The editor also helpfully includes a detailed chronology of Buffier's life and works, a note about the textual bases for the edition, several instructive appendices to later editions and related works by Buffier, and a profoundly helpful bibliography that includes existing editions, copies, and translations of the Traité, in addition to scholarly studies of Buffier's life and work. Rouquayrol's critical edition is, in short, the best one currently available, and it is likely to remain the standard published edition for some time.In the editor's view, Buffier's primary significance is as the inaugural eighteenth-century figure who attempted to redress the weaknesses at the heart of Cartesian "innate ideas" in ways that might have avoided Berkeley's or Malebranche's immaterialism or Hume's skepticism: "pour lutter contre les 'conséquences idéalistes du cartésianisme,'" Buffier "avait eu plutôt recours au sens commun comme à un 'complément nécessaire du sense intime, qui garantit l'existence du monde extérieur'" (13n2, quoting Étienne Gilson). This "solution mitigée" allowed for a certain reconciliation between Descartes and the "empirisme tempéré" of Locke, and more broadly, a way of moderating "les principes des Modernes" with "les poncifs des Anciens" (13). This conciliation of Lockean empiricism and certain strands of Cartesianism found in Buffier was in fact a central point made by my earlier work on Buffier's contribution to eighteenth-century Enlightenment Catholicism (see Rise and Fall of Theological Enlightenment[South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010]; also "Claude G. Buffier and the Maturation of the Jesuit Synthesis in the Age of Enlightenment," Intellectual History Review21 [2011]: 449–72). Rouquayrol's effort to revisit the complexities of this conciliation in his introduction is a welcome development. He explicitly reminds us that while Jesuits such as Buffier were prohibited from teaching particular theses associated with Descartes after 1706, they were nevertheless increasingly influenced by aspects of Cartesianism (15–17). In many... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Catharine Macaulay's Republican Enlightenment by Karen GreenAlan CoffeeKaren Green. Catharine Macaulay's Republican Enlightenment. London: Routledge, 2020. Pp. 276. Hardback, $160.00.Though she was once one of the most recognizable and celebrated public intellectuals in Britain and was read avidly in both revolutionary America and France, after her death in 1791, Catharine Macaulay's work fell into almost total obscurity for around two hundred years. This began to change in the (...) 1990s, since which time interest in Macaulay from historians, philosophers, and feminist scholars has gathered pace. In the last decade and a half, no one has likely done more to advance this scholarship than Karen Green, who has published numerous journal articles and book chapters probing deeply into Macaulay's thought and intellectual context, and who helpfully edited The Correspondence of Catharine Macaulay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), which had not previously been easily available to readers. As one would expect, Green's Catharine Macaulay's Republican Enlightenment builds on this depth of research. For a relatively slim volume, this is the most complete and detailed intellectual biography of Macaulay that I know of, an impressive feat given Macaulay's voluminous output.The aims of the book are twofold: first, to provide a narrative biography following Macaulay's life and the development of her works as they unfolded across her life, and second, to offer an overview and exposition of her ideas in their social and political context (4). These aims are important to bear in mind, since they establish what the book [End Page 158] is able to do and what it stops short of giving us. The volume is organized chronologically, divided into seven main chapters, each representing a short period in Macaulay's life, with an introduction and concluding chapter that considers her legacy, bringing the total chapters to nine. In each of the substantive chapters, Green mixes a biographical account of Macaulay's life with an often detailed analysis of one or more of her main works written during that period, as well as an assessment of how these works both engaged with, and were received within, some of the political and intellectual debates at the time. This is expertly done, with Green drawing on her intimate acquaintance with Macaulay's correspondence with many of the key figures of the period. The book, therefore, would make an excellent companion to anyone reading through the Correspondence as well as for those studying any of Macaulay's historical volumes, treatises, and tracts.An especially strong aspect of Green's book is the way she weaves an ongoing dialogue between Macaulay and several influential figures from her intellectual world across the chapters. One of these is David Hume, who, like Macaulay, had written an ideologically situated—even if both authors claimed impartiality—multivolume History of England. Though Hume's series was completed before Macaulay's had begun, hers can be seen as a philosophical and political rival to his. While the two would only correspond directly once on the subject, Green compares the impact that their respective philosophies have on their resulting political positions. In the 1760s, Green argues, Hume's naturalism, empiricism, and skepticism gave rise to a social conservative politics, whereas Macaulay's theological rationalism provided the basis for her optimistic and radical politics (50). By the 1790s, however, when Macaulay was writing her Letters on Education, Green detects some elements of a Humean philosophy of mind coming to influence Macaulay, albeit likely through David Hartley, particularly concerning the importance of sympathy on our moral psychology, even if there remain important differences between them (180–82). Green also analyzes Macaulay's engagement with Thomas Hobbes in her Loose Remarks and her two formal Observations on writings by Edmund Burke. Of particular value to historians of republicanism is Green's tracing and examination of Macaulay's ongoing intellectual relationship with key political figures, such as John Wilkes in Britain; Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Rush, John and Abigail Adams, James Otis, Mercy Otis Warren, and George Washington in America; Anne-Robert Jacques Turgot and Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville in France, among many others. Though Macaulay's reputation as an influential political writer... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant's Transcendental Deduction by Alison LaywineKatherine DunlopAlison Laywine. Kant's Transcendental Deduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. iv + 318. Hardback, $80.00.Alison Laywine's contribution to the rich literature on Kant's "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories" stands out for the novelty of its approach and conclusions. Laywine's declared "strategy" is "to compare and contrast" the Deduction with the Duisburg Nachlaß, an important set of manuscript jottings from the 1770s (...) (10). But her approach is also deeply informed by Kant's writings on metaphysics from the 1750s and 1760s; moreover, she gives attention to ancient Greek geometry and its importance for Kant's thought.I believe Laywine's most important interpretative claim is that the Transcendental Deduction's "final step" addresses "the question of how nature is possible" (210). Here, 'nature' is understood in what Kant calls the "formal sense," as "the totality of rules under which appearances must stand if they are to be thought as joined in one experience" (Prolegomena, §36; cf. B 165). This constitutes a novel answer to the problem posed in Dieter Henrich's landmark 1969 paper "The Proof Structure of the Transcendental Deduction" (Review of Metaphysics 22 [1969]: 640–59): how to understand §§21–26 of the (B-edition) Deduction as proving more than the thesis already stated in §20 (that the manifold in an intuition necessarily stands under the categories).Crucial support for Laywine's interpretation comes from §26 of the Deduction, which claims the possibility of cognizing objects "a priori through categories... as far as the laws of their combination are concerned, thus the possibility of as it were prescribing the law to nature and even making [nature] possible," is now "to be explained" (B 159). Kant does not use the term 'world' in this passage (as he does in Prolegomena §36). But Laywine contends that here the word 'nature' "has unmistakable, deliberate, cosmological connotations," and in fact "means 'world' in the sense of Kant's early cosmology": roughly, a whole unified by means of laws (12–13).The "cosmological" language of §26 does not recur in the following, officially concluding, section of the Deduction. So, we might ask whether Kant's explanation of how the understanding prescribes laws to nature is integral to the Deduction; Henry Allison, for instance, describes this explanation as an "appendix" (Kant's Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-Historical Commentary [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015], 9). The question of whether it belongs integrally has bite because, as Laywine makes clear in her "Conclusion," the universal laws at issue are just the Analogies of Experience. Thus, the passage could be read as the "promissory note with a forward-looking reference to the System of Principles" that she finds missing from the Deduction (289). Laywine meets such worries by arguing that "the reappropriation [from the pre-Critical period] of the general cosmology is actually [End Page 162] doing... a lot of hard work" in the Deduction (13). This sustained argument comes to a head in chapter 4, which contends that each of the two steps into which Laywine divides the first half of the (B-edition) Deduction, treated in chapters 2 and 3 (respectively), relies on cosmological presuppositions.Chapter 2 analyzes the conception of knowledge as relation to an object that is asserted (in §17) to rely on the synthetic unity of apperception. Laywine traces this conception to the Duisburg Nachlaß's account of "exposition," which relates concepts a priori to appearances, in something like the way that geometrical construction relates them to pure intuition. (Laywine further connects the Latin term expositio to the Greek ekthesis, which expositio translates in the context of geometrical proof. She thereby gives the notion of ekthesis broader importance than does Jaakko Hintikka, who noted its relevance to Kant's philosophy of mathematics in "Kant on the Mathematical Method" [Monist 51 (1967): 352–75]. Laywine claims that Borelli's edition of Euclid could have been Kant's source for the term, but I doubt it was known to Kant and his contemporaries, since it is not among the editions cited by Christian Wolff; Commandino seems likelier to me. Chapter 2 is concerned to articulate the notion of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotle on the Concept of Shared Life by Sara BrillZoli FilotasSara Brill. Aristotle on the Concept of Shared Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 304. Hardback, $100.00.This book is a sweeping survey of Aristotle's approach to human life. It covers what might seem to be an idiosyncratic set of topics: friendship, animal behavior, commerce, tyranny, and motherhood are among the more prominent. But Sara Brill pulls them (...) together into a cohesive and illuminating picture, showing how each reflects Aristotle's conception of the concept "life" and the two Greek words, zôê and bios, that he uses to discuss it.The book rebukes thinkers who draw too sharp a contrast between animal life, on the one hand, and human politics, on the other. Until recently, Brill writes, that has been the dominant trend, uniting thinkers otherwise as different as Giorgio Agamben and David Keyt. For writers like them, human beings must overcome and sublimate their base, animal instincts (zôê, "mere life") in order to develop rational, uniquely human "ways of life" (bioi) like the lives of the citizen and the philosopher.For Brill, by contrast, the relationship between a person and the polis in Aristotle is "an intensified form of the relations between any animal and its proper habitat" (29). Indeed, every animal species has a distinctive way of life, a bios. The lavish discussion of animal "personality" or "character" (ethos) in the History of Animals suggests their range: lions are brave, cattle are stupid, dolphins are gentle, and so on. A personality not only helps an animal flourish in some habitat (topos) but also defines its relationships with other members of its species. So although Aristotle only classifies a few animal species as "political," Brill reminds us that there is a clear sense in which all are social.Aristotle famously claims that we humans are the "most political" of all animals, but Brill shows that this claim is both incomplete and misleading. For although Aristotle thinks that we outdo even bees in organized cooperation, he also stresses that we outdo even "warlike" eagles in our capacity for violence and solitude. Confronted with the opposition between solitary and gregarious ways of life, human beings "dualize" or "play a double game" (epamphoterizei) (HA I.1, 488a7). That is, much as frogs have water-dwelling and land-dwelling inclinations, humans are socially amphibious. Indeed, every human behavior—communal, solitary, and contentious alike—turns out to be an expression of animal nature. Brill points out that much of the Politics emphasizes the negative, the way that human beings make their own and each other's lives unlivable. Thus, although Aristotle embraces the sweetness of life, which has a distinct and intrinsic pleasure, his political project anticipates Nietzsche in squarely and unflinchingly studying its "horrors" (254).For Brill, the apex of human sociality in Aristotle is not politics but the so-called "perfect" friendship that Aristotle describes in Nicomachean Ethics VIII–IX and Eudemian Ethics VII. Perfect friends, Aristotle says repeatedly, "share a life" (suzên, cognate with zôê rather than bios). Friends grieve and rejoice together, perceive together, and philosophize together too. Brill emphasizes that this list includes the full range of psychic functions, from appetite all the way up to the highest forms of abstract thought. As they live together, friends build up a "nexus of meaning and value," a "world as it is created through the sharing of pleasure, judgment, and action" in which there "emerges a subjectivity which cannot be easily or simply conceived as 'mine'" (43, emphasis in original). In the best kinds of friendship, we realize that human life is lived by the partnership itself, not just the friends individually. [End Page 149]But Brill stresses that Aristotle thinks few people will ever find "perfect friendship." It is completely out of reach for most citizens of any real-world city. Yet for Aristotle, the flawed and diverse citizens of every polis nevertheless engage in a form of shared life: shared perception of the just and unjust. How is that possible? Through fragile institutions and customs, what Aristotle calls an "adornment of habits and an arrangement of correct laws" (Politics II.5... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant and the Divine: From Contemplation to Moral Law by Christopher J. InsoleChris L. FirestoneChristopher J. Insole. Kant and the Divine: From Contemplation to Moral Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. v + 409. Hardback, $110.00.The extent to which the philosophy of Immanuel Kant converges with or diverges from Christian thought has been a hotly debated topic in recent years. Central to that debate has been the (...) resurgence of interest in Kant's classic Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (henceforth, Religion). The most insightful interpretations and applications of Religion, it seems, have utilized resources from a broad range of Kant's writings, emphasizing his philosophy considered as an integrated whole. Christopher Insole's recent monograph—Kant and the Divine: From Contemplation to Moral Law—attempts to redirect this debate with an argument spanning Kant's precritical and critical periods in performing a deep dive on the topic of freedom. On the face of it, the argument is not purely theological or even religious. It revolves, instead, around a metaphysical analysis of freedom, both as exemplified in Kant's writings and relative to his historical predecessors.Key to Insole's proposal is that Kant's critical notion of freedom evolves into something very different than that of his predecessors (on which his early writings depend) and, in its development, decisively "ruptures" with the Christian tradition. Human freedom, on Insole's analysis of Kant, must be "end-setting" and not constrained or directed by any type of external compulsion. This suggests that God cannot be understood to influence freedom causally, or at least not without human conscious and free consent. Numerous writers have thought they spied Christian connections in Kant's notion of freedom, such as the need for divine forgiveness, and even grace, to avoid the absurdum practicum. Insole resists all such attempts as being foreign to the novelty of the mature Kant's reflections on freedom. No external force can be brought to bear as a determining causal influence on human freedom, presumably because an end set before us from outside undermines our ability to set an end for ourselves. God is at best the "all-knowing distributor of happiness" (321) that makes end-setting and the kingdom of ends worthwhile moral pursuits. Insole's express intention is to "show the significance of Kant's denial that God can be our final cause" and that "his philosophical religiosity, understood on its own terms, and as expressed across his whole oeuvre" shows that "Kant cannot easily be called a Christian thinker" at all (2–4).Extricating Kant from Christianity proves to be a monumental task. Insole uses eighteen chapters and more than four hundred pages to make his case. The argument distinguishes itself from other such attempts in its rigorous analytic approach to unpacking the metaphysical underpinnings of issues supposedly at the root of Kant's philosophical theology. The book presents a cumulative case argument for Kant's supposed break with "the Christian theological tradition as he would have received it" (13). Much rests on whether or not this argument is cogent. Kant, according to Insole, is something akin to a theological Platonist and moral Stoic, who attempts to establish a unique form of "philosophical religiosity" (3 and 156). This makes Kant similar to the likes of Augustine and Ambrose, but different in terms of his theological aspirations. Insole casts Kant not as a pure philosopher seeking to understand philosophy relative to the Christian tradition, but rather as a philosophical [End Page 164] theologian bent on showing human freedom, free end-setting, and an ethical community of end-setters to be the exclusive means for attaining the highest good. Although this may sound Pelagian, Insole insists it is not, because "the Pelagian could still regard God as our final cause and efficient cause" (299). In other words, in Insole's interpretation, Kant is a strict philosophical humanist or what theologians might term a hyper-Pelagian.The difficult details of Insole's arguments are important to consider but not easily dealt with in the space provided here. Early in the book, Insole takes his reader on a metaphysical tour of "Divine Ideas" and "God... (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Plato's Republic X attack on imitative poetry is based in the metaphysics of appearance, since appearances are the objects and products of imitation. I offer a new reading, showing that Plato's account coherently introduces appearances as a new type of item, distinct from Forms and sensible particulars, and applies beyond imitation to a broad range of appearances. Focusing on the importance of perspective to Plato's reasoning, I argue that an appearance is a relation that comes about between a material particular (...) and an apprehending subject. Ordinarily, appearances are transparent: they confer determinate awareness on the subject, but are not the objects of our awareness insofar as we are appeared to. This reading resolves longstanding obscurities, grounds an improved account of imitation, and shows that Plato here presents the cornerstone of a general theory of appearance. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Was there a linguistic turn in Frankfurt School Critical Theory before Habermas's communications-theoretic one? Might later Wittgenstein and the early Frankfurt School have adopted similar pictures of language? I propose that both questions should be answered affirmatively, focusing on Horkheimer's Eclipse of Reason. I argue that, thanks to the picture of language that Horkheimer and Adorno share with (later) Wittgenstein, we can reconstruct their theory in a way that renders it more defensible. Insofar as the human life form and language (...) are inseparable, language can be an inextinguishable reservoir of what Horkheimer called "objective reason." Recognizing this allows us to answer Habermas's critique of Horkheimer and Adorno. Moreover, paying attention to this inseparableness can enable us to engage in disclosing social critique (for example, regarding current debates about sustainability). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good by Marta JimenezJerry GreenMarta Jimenez. Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 224. Hardback, $70.00.Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good is a close examination of an underappreciated topic in Aristotle's theories of moral psychology and moral development: shame. Jimenez argues that shame is a sui generis emotion that plays a crucial (...) role in the habituation of moral virtue in young humans who are not yet virtuous and therefore cannot fully see the moral landscape as accurately as the fully developed virtuous adult. On this view, shame acts as a protovirtue that orients the developing moral agent toward "the noble" (τό καλόν), using social cues to learn not only what actions should be avoided or performed, but also what makes those actions shameful or noble, allowing them to eventually see beyond these external correlates of the noble and develop a grasp of nobility itself. Shame is therefore an indispensable tool for cultivating the emotional, perceptual, and cognitive abilities of a person on the path to virtue.The treatment of shame presented here is meant to bridge what Jimenez calls the "moral upbringing gap." On the one hand, nonvirtuous people are able to engage in the same behavior as virtuous people: they can, in principle, eat moderately, stand firm in battle, use their money judiciously, and so on, in a way that is externally indistinguishable from the virtuous. But there is no guarantee that performing these behaviors will lead the nonvirtuous person to develop the psychological traits necessary to perform virtuous actions as the virtuous person does them, with the correct motivation, emotion, and reasoning (e.g. performing a virtuous action enthusiastically, because it is the right thing to do, in a clear-eyed, informed way). Jimenez argues that shame can bridge this gap between action and affect by using signs like the disapproval of others or the depictions of literary exemplars such as epic heroes, not only to see what actions should be done or avoided, but also to begin to appreciate how and why these actions are in fact noble. So understood, shame is directed at the noble itself, not merely at the things that tend to be superficially associated with the noble (such as the pleasures of social praise or the inconveniences of ill repute).The chapters of this short book naturally fall into three groups. The first section (chapters 1 and 2) focuses on common interpretations of shame's role in Aristotle's ethics and objections to these interpretations. Chapter 1 studies the moral upbringing gap discussed above, with emphasis on moral motivation; chapter 2 focuses on the role of pleasure and pain. Both chapters draw heavily on classic works on the topic, such as Miles Burnyeat's "Aristotle on Learning to Be Good" (in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. A. O. Rorty [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980], 69-92) and Nancy Sherman's The Fabric of Character (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).The middle section of the book describes the nuances of moral development in Aristotle's moral psychology. Chapter 3 is a case study on the varieties of states that resemble courage; this chapter may initially appear to be a digression, but it highlights the many distinct psychological components of true virtue, giving us a better sense of just how complex the path toward moral development is, and hence what role shame would need to play in this development. Chapter 4 focuses on honor, with special attention paid to the importance of genuine approbation of praiseworthy actions from reputable sources.The final section of the book examines shame itself and the indispensable role it plays in moral development. Chapter 5 argues that shame is a sui generis emotion, not quite a full disposition (hexis), but more than a mere passion (pathos). This chapter also argues that we need not posit any special distinctions to harmonize two key passages on shame from books IV.9 and X.9 of the Nicomachean Ethics that may appear to be in tension. Chapter 6 shows how shame operates in moral development and why it is a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The World According to Kant: Appearances and Things in Themselves in Critical Idealism by Anja JauernigPatricia KitcherAnja Jauernig. The World According to Kant: Appearances and Things in Themselves in Critical Idealism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 400. Hardback, $105.00.After Peter Strawson's withering criticisms of the "Metaphysics of Transcendental Idealism" in The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen, 1966), many Kant scholars devoted their labors to explaining and expanding (...) his project of transcendental epistemology. Recently, however, the tide has turned, and major Kant scholars have tried to fathom the intricacies of his metaphysical doctrines. With its new, systematic, and boldly idealistic interpretation of transcendental idealism, Anja Jauernig's The World According to Kant is an important contribution to this literature.Jauernig casts her reading of Kantian metaphysics in relation to two traditional accounts: the two-world interpretation that seemed obvious to Kant's first readers, and the two-aspect interpretation offered by Gerald Prauss (Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich [Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1974]) and Henry Allison (Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983]). On the second reading, there are not two sets of objects, one phenomenal and one noumenal, but just one set that can be regarded in two different ways. Jauernig effectively demolishes the original two-aspect reading, noting that it has the consequence that contradictory properties (being F and not being F) are attributed to the same thing (164). The serious competitor to her interpretation is a more recent reading that makes an analogy with secondary qualities. Rae Langton introduces this strategy in Kantian Humility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), and Lucy Allais offers a new version of it in Manifest Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). On Allais's version, the properties of empirical objects are real, but unusual. As the redness of a rose depends not just on the existence of the rose, but also on the existence of perceivers with retinal cones, the properties of empirical objects depend on cognitive subjects as well on as things in themselves. Jauernig takes Allais's secondary quality analogy and a closely [End Page 160] related view of Tobias Rosefeldt's as her principal foils and marshals many texts to support her new view. To my mind, however, some of the cited texts seem ambiguous, for example, "our sensible representation is in no way a representation of things in themselves, but merely of the manner in which they appear to us" (Ak. 4:287, cited on 256n22). The second part of the citation seems to imply that sensible representations are how things in themselves are "manifest" to us, as Allais would put it.Jauernig would focus on the first part of the citation: a sensible representation in no way represents the thing in itself. In her view, empirical objects or appearances are fully mind-dependent: each of their "ontological ingredients" (elements that make up an object) is mind-dependent. Since empirical objects are fully mind-dependent and things in themselves are mind-independent, they have no "ontological overlap" (32). Phenomena and noumena are therefore numerically distinct things (32). Appearances or empirical objects are "empirically real" (as opposed to illusory), not merely because they agree with the formal conditions of reality, but because cognition begins with the receipt of sensations through the affection of human sensibility by things in themselves. (Here Jauernig's appearances that are grounded in real things but have properties that are "fully" mind-dependent seem similar to Allais's appearances.) Because objects of empirical cognition involve sensations caused by things in themselves, they should be understood as existents, even though they are not part of "fundamental ontology," whose denizens are mind-independent. Appearances exist or perhaps "in-exist" only as "intentional objects" of representations (33). On Kant's theory, as on Leibniz's, there are different levels of reality (39–40).Jauernig energetically engages challenges confronting her strongly idealistic reading. If empirical objects are fully mind-dependent, how do they differ from illusions and fictions? Since Kant anchors empirical reality to empirical intuition, the question becomes, how are appearances or empirical objects the referents of empirical intuitions? Appearances are... (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Malebranche claims that God always, or nearly always, acts by general volitions. However, two possible interpretations of this claim have led to competing understandings of Malebranche's occasionalism. The General Content interpretation (GC) holds that God forms as few volitions as possible, and that aside from a limited number of particular volitions, God's normal mode of action consists simply in willing the general laws themselves. The Particular Content interpretation (PC) affirms that God forms a distinct volition for each event or state (...) of affairs, but that those volitions count as general when they are issued "in accordance with" some general law. This essay examines five lines of evidence that purport to reveal Malebranche's commitment to PC and explains why they all fail. As a result, GC emerges unscathed as a consistent and viable interpretation, and, at the same time, much of the case for PC is undermined. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Human Act by Can Laurens LöweThomas M. Osborne Jr.Can Laurens Löwe. Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Human Act. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. 225. Hardback, $99.99.This book is about the way in which Thomas Aquinas understands the human act to be composed of form and matter. It provides a fresh reading of many central texts from Thomas and (...) addresses philosophical concerns that are relevant to the contemporary literature. Although Löwe is not clear about this point, Thomas does not use in this context the terms 'formal' and 'material' in the strictest sense, as when he describes the soul as the form of the body, but in different extended senses, as when he says that charity is the form of the other virtues because it gives them a new character (Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 23, art. 8).Löwe focuses on choice, which he considers to be antecedent to the human act, and the commanded or exterior act, which he considers to be the entire human act. This focus simplifies his account, since in one and only one text—the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae—does Thomas appear to give as many as twelve acts that are stages or phases of a complete human act. Thomas devotes special attention to three acts of the will concerning the end, namely simple willing, intention, and enjoyment; and three acts of the will concerning the means, namely consent, choice, and use; and two intellectual acts, namely deliberation and command. Four other possible phases or stages are mentioned in passing, such as the judgment of choice. According to the standard interpretation, a human [End Page 152] act such as almsgiving might consist of intending to help an indigent person, deliberating about whether to give food or money, making a judgment of choice about the best means of helping (such as giving money), choosing to give the money, and then commanding the will's use of certain other powers, such as the movement of the hands and feet. In his other writings, Thomas mentions only some of these stages, and he often mentions only simple willing, deliberation, and choice. Scholars disagree over the number and importance of the acts or parts of acts discussed in the Prima Secundae and how to integrate them with what Thomas says in other texts. Löwe argues that the human act is what Thomas describes as the act's execution; he claims that this act has the intellect's command for its extrinsic form, the will's use for its intrinsic form, and the commanded act for its matter.This book has three parts. Part 1 provides a general account of the author's view that choice explains the act's freedom even if it is not part of the resulting act. In part 2, Löwe gives a novel account of Thomas's claim that the judgment of the intellect gives form to the act of choice. He draws on the distinction that Thomists make (although Thomas is less clear) between the composition of terms, or the enunciative proposition, and the judgement, or judicative proposition. For instance, the statement 'carrots are orange' as an enunciative proposition might be entertained as doubtful or likely, or placed in a conditional statement. However, someone might assent to this same composition by judging that it is true. Löwe's account is confusing on this point, as he describes as "judgment" what his Thomists describe as the enunciative proposition, which is the composition of terms (38–41). Terminological difficulties aside, Löwe draws on what he sees as the related distinction between the content of a judgment and the attitude toward the judgment, using this distinction to describe the freedom of the judgment that precedes choice. The intellect composes different precepts and then assents to one of them. According to Löwe, Thomas thinks that the agent's ability to choose between different goods is reduced to the intellect's ability to assent to the content of one precept and not the content of another according to a kind of second-order... (shrink)

Abstractabstract:This article examines Kant's response to the criticisms of natural theology that Hume articulates in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Though Kant was in agreement with the Dialogues' rejection of dogmatic theism, he equally viewed many of its arguments as a threat to his aim of constructing a critical theology. Kant is often taken to have successfully diffused this skeptical threat on the basis of a symbolic anthropomorphism articulated in the Prolegomena. However, I argue that the Prolegomena account remains susceptible (...) to Hume's criticisms, and that it was only several years later in the third Critique that Kant was able to show how the Dialogues' skeptical conclusions can be circumvented. In this manner, I aim to show that Hume's challenge is more significant, and Kant's response more complex, than has previously been acknowledged. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dutch Cartesianism and the Birth of Philosophy of Science by Andrea StrazzoniAaron SpinkAndrea Strazzoni. Dutch Cartesianism and the Birth of Philosophy of Science. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2019. Pp. ix + 245. Hardback, $124.99.Andrea Strazzoni's Dutch Cartesianism and the Birth of Philosophy of Science is a clear step forward in our understanding of the rise and fall of Cartesianism. The work, limited to the Dutch context with one (...) notable German excursion, covers roughly one hundred years starting from the 1630s. While the time frame is rather large in scope, the majority of the work is narrower in focus, with a heavy emphasis on the academic circles in mid-to-late seventeenth-century Leiden and Utrecht. It is thus a welcome addition to the growing body of literature dealing with the unique political, religious, and academic contexts in which Dutch Cartesians found themselves. While much of the book deals with the philosophy of Descartes and then Newton, Strazzoni is not concerned with giving any novel interpretations of either figure; instead, he sheds a great deal of light on a cast of characters who are only now coming to be appreciated for their contributions and influence on philosophical movements of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The book has two main explicit goals. First, Strazzoni wants to show why foundationalism came to play such a prominent role in Dutch Cartesian circles and what foundationalism's effects were. Second, through this examination, Strazzoni hopes to show that the multiplication of worldviews [End Page 154] shaped a new function for metaphysics and logic as tools for examining principles, which in turn determined a change in the function of philosophy itself that eventually gave birth to a kind of philosophy of science familiar to us today.Strazzoni divides this project into eight chapters, with a focus on six figures: Henricus Regius, Johannes Clauberg, Johannes de Raey, Arnold Geulincx, Burchard de Volder, and Willem Jacob's Gravesande. In addition to a brief overview of the goals and structure of the work, the first chapter includes a survey of how methodologies have changed in the history of philosophy and the history of the philosophy of science, which will be helpful background for those less familiar with the fields.The following two chapters deal with the crises that emerged in Utrecht and Leiden over the spread of Cartesian philosophy. In chapter 2, building on Theo Verbeek's work, Regius takes center stage. While some context of the Utrecht crisis is given, Strazzoni spends much of the chapter detailing how Regius's medical background led to a more empirical approach and lack of metaphysical foundation. While Regius's own controversial positions embroiled both himself and Descartes in the Utrecht Crisis, ripple effects spread to Leiden, resulting in prohibitions against discussions of Cartesian philosophy. In the third chapter, Strazzoni highlights a group of anti-Cartesians, with Jacob Revius as the primary antagonist, and the responses from De Raey and Clauberg. Clauberg, the subject of Strazzoni's only sustained discussion of Cartesianism from Germany, coordinated with de Raey on both a positive campaign of promotion and strategizing responses to the anti-Cartesian front. Outside of discussing Clauberg's explicit role in Leiden, Strazzoni studies his logic and Ontosophia, neatly explaining his shift to more metaphysical foundations.Chapters 4, 5, and 6 continue exploring the various approaches and roles for foundational philosophy in more detail, delving into how these controversies motivated renewed analysis of core Cartesian principles with integration into an academic curriculum in mind. Apart from de Raey's efforts to show that Cartesianism was aligned with Aristotelianism, Strazzoni claims a period of Cartesian physics without an explicit preoccupation with metaphysical questions, especially in light of the restrictions imposed by the curators of Leiden's university. However, as Spinoza and Hobbes came to prominence, multiplying the number of philosophical worldviews, foundational arguments were needed to combat them. Strazzoni highlights how varied these responses could be, as Geulincx's own take on foundations leaned heavily toward ethics rather than epistemology, metaphysics, or logic. However, the discussion of Geulincx is much broader, also including illuminating expositions of Geulincx's theology, epistemology, and metaphysics.Chapter 5 expounds further... (shrink)

Abstractabstract:This paper discusses the anthropology, ethics, and politics of Helvetius, focusing on the theme of power and the passions that gravitate around it, and highlighting the transition from a position that could be broadly defined as "anarchic" (all powers are bad) to one that realistically takes power for granted as an insurmountable horizon (and which leads to the future-laden idea of a "democratic despotism"). By analyzing these themes, it questions the common interpretation of Helvetius's thought as a compact block ("Le (...) système d'Helvétius"), emphasizing the way in which the theoretical reworkings presented in De l'homme must be understood in light of the internal tensions of De l'esprit. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rudolf A. Makkreel 1936-2021Jack Zupko, Former Editor, Journal of the History of PhilosophyRudi Makkreel, longtime editor (1983–98) of the Journal of the History of Philosophy and President of its Board of Directors (1998–2018), died October 2021 in Atlanta, GA, of complications from ALS.Rudi was one of the foremost Kant scholars of his generation, helping to bring the Critique of Judgment into the broader currency it enjoys among philosophers today. (...) He also made important contributions to the fields of aesthetics, hermeneutics, and the philosophy of history. His Dilthey, Philosopher of the Human Studies (Princeton, 1975; 2nd edition, 1992), nominated for both a Pulitzer Prize and a National Book Award, introduced the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey to the anglophone world, explaining the significance of Dilthey’s work on the social and cultural dimensions of human experience as well as its influence on early analytic philosophers such as Carnap. With Frithjof Rodi, he completed the six-volume Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works (Princeton, 1985–2019), an enduring legacy for students and historians of German philosophy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.Rudi was born in Antwerp, Belgium in 1939. He immigrated to the United States in 1951 and completed his graduate studies in philosophy at Columbia University in 1966. He taught at the University of California, San Diego until 1973, after which he joined the faculty at Emory University, his academic home as Charles Howard Candler Professor of Philosophy for almost half a century. He was a native Dutch speaker, but equally at home in both English and German, always exemplifying for his students the importance of knowing the original languages of the philosophers one is researching.Rudi was not just a scholar’s scholar but a perceptive critic and outstanding teacher, as his many students in academic positions around the world can attest. As a colleague he was unfailingly supportive, in his gentle and softly spoken way, quietly putting opportunities in the path of younger historians of philosophy. He was committed to ensuring the Emory philosophy program remained solidly grounded in the history of philosophy, with faculty expertise in all of its canonical areas. He was dedicated to his students and to serving the profession through the JHP, guiding the work of its Board of Directors and providing invaluable advice (though only when asked) to later Editors.Rudi took over editorship of the JHP at a tumultuous time in its history; he brought stability to its operations and ensured that the JHP remained a “big tent” in the field, publishing research on all figures, movements, and periods in the history of western philosophy, by scholars with a variety of philosophical styles and research methods. This meant making room for original papers on understudied figures and topics, despite the pressure to publish the best work on better-known figures and more traditional or popular topics, with which he could have easily filled each issue.He leaves behind his wife, Frances, a daughter, Karen, and a grandchild, as well as many former students and colleagues, who miss his gentle demeanor, wry sense of humor, and penetrating intellect.Jack Zupko, Former Editor, Journal of the History of PhilosophyUniversity of AlbertaCopyright © 2023 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)