Conversations between healthcare workers and patients are of ethical import and ought to be regarded as a significant healthcare practice in their own right. Yet patients’ ability to voice concerns about their care to a healthcare worker should not be taken for granted. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s embodied and interpersonal conception of human agency, I argue that phenomenology as a critical practice enables us to recognize that conversations with others, much like physical spaces, are places whose accessibility is not guaranteed. I (...) then examine how issues of conversational accessibility are at play in the larger context of public health research and how we might rethink existing practices in light of community-based participatory research. (shrink)

One way that we connect with others in we-experience comes through sharing time. However, questions have been raised as to whether time can be shared between normates and misfits. In this paper, I illustrate the concept of sharing time across bodily difference using Merleau-Ponty’s concept of body schematic temporality from the Phenomenology of Perception ([1945] 1962). I explore how we-experiences can be fostered through shared time across bodily difference in two contexts: becoming ill and playing music.

In this paper I meditate on what it means to be well by interspersing my reflections on my time in an Intensive Care Unit with my sister, Bronzino’s 1560 painting of Noli me Tangere, along with Jean Luc Nancy’s book by this name, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on embodied movement. I conclude that wellness is a stance before death; love and joy belong to wellness but can neither be planned for nor made to happen. In keeping with the coloniality of (...) which the Western medical system is a part, the normative stance for caregiving in the ICU does not take into account the complexity and interconnectedness of communicative contact, or recognize that contact happens when unexpected. There is contact between bodies, but it is not about presence, about one body physically touching another; the contact happens elsewhere. (shrink)

Weaving together personal experience, disability studies scholarship, and art criticism, this paper explores the relationship between embodied experience of the world and the demands placed on us to conform to it. Misfitting forces us to recognize the fundamental distinction between flesh and world, and with it both the limits and possibilities of the human capacity to act and to be. The fundamental misfit all humans share is that we emerge from the sheltering womb into a material world that is indifferent (...) to our individual existence. That is to say, mortality is the fundamental misfit of the human condition. It is in this sense that flesh emplaced in world is always a relationship of misfitting. The existential and social repair that misfitting calls for is attentive care and love, an attitude of welcome and openness to all body-minds, whether expected or unexpected, whether fit or misfit. (shrink)

This paper explores Cézanne’s art through the lens of disability gain. Disability gain defies the ability-disability binary, which defines disability as a lack of ability, by emphasizing what is gained through different disabilities. Central to my discussion are (1) Tobin Siebers’s description of modern art as vitally and thematically disabled and (2) Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s concept of misfitting, which allows for a phenomenological account of disability that emphasizes the depth of awareness and creative world-making possibilities that are gained through disability. By (...) bringing Siebers’s approach to disability aesthetics and Garland-Thomson’s concept of misfitting into conversation with Merleau-Ponty’s “Cézanne’s Doubt” and “Eye and Mind,” I will explain how Cézanne’s unique way of perceiving the world and capturing it in paint helps Merleau-Ponty to dismantle abstract, disembodied concepts of visual perception and trace the nuanced contours of lived perspective. In other words, what is gained through Cézanne’s disabilities is a revolutionary optics that overcomes the limitations of Cartesian optics. (shrink)

This paper uses the School for Peace in Israel-Palestine as an example of what it might look like to develop a global community rooted in a recognition of shared human vulnerability. Part I offers a phenomenological account of vulnerability, putting Butler’s work into dialogue with Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “intercorporeality” and phenomenology of perception. Part II argues that family systems theory offers a framework through which to articulate the nature of our shared vulnerability, allowing us to see the manners in which (...) problems reside not “in” individuals, but within the dynamic systems of which they are a part. Part III analyzes School for Peace “encounters” in order to explore the ways in which liberatory political change occurs through shifts in the behavioral dynamics at play in the political status quo. I conclude by arguing that our political identities are most fully realized through, rather than in spite of, our inherent vulnerability. (shrink)

Hendren’s What Can a Body Do? How We Meet the Built World (2020) shows how clocks are crucial to the design of the built world and its ways of disabilizing bodies that do not move according to societal clocks. Critical disability work on crip time similarly shows how time sediments normate presumptions about bodies. The paper contributes to these efforts by arguing that time cannot be understood as a fixed, transcendental framework or hypernom that stands above changes that “‘happen in (...) time.”’ Rather, time arises out of deep change: an an-archic change, that is not necessarily ordered by a sequencing principle. The argument proceeds by studying the metrology and phenomenology of our access to clocks and time, revealing how time always is accessed as formed in and out of change. The paper concludes with observations about consequences for thinking about ability, disability, and debility—and for philosophy itself. (shrink)

Literature on caring for those with advanced Parkinsonian dementia often urges caregivers to refrain from arguing with, or contesting, their hallucinatory landscape. The clinical advice tends to be to go with the flow and “play along.” It is the above prescription that I aim to trouble here, on phenomenological grounds. With reference to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the perceptual faith, I explore that idea that caregiving often requires the relaxation or expansion of the perceptual faith, not for the purposes of (...) “playing along” so much as being-with. At the intersection of the ethics of care and phenomenology, and in reference to my experience caregiving for my mother, this paper explores the ethics of caregiving for those with dementia. (shrink)

This piece lays out the framework for a special issue on the topic of "Fits and Misfits," published as volume 7, issue 1 of Puncta: A Journal of Critical Phenomenology. We discuss the relationship between the concept of misfitting, coined by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, and debility, coined by Jasbir Puar, in relationship to scholarship on Merleau-Ponty. We then introduce each of the eight articles in the special issue: Rosemarie Garland-Thomson's "What Misfitting Makes," Susan Bredlau's "Conversational Accessibility: Healthcare, Community, and the Ethics (...) of Everyday Encounters," Helen A. Fielding's "Being Touched by Wellness: Merleau-Ponty, Nancy, and the Intensive Care Unit," Ann Murphy's "The Spirited Interworld: Caregiving and the Liminal Phenomenology of Dementia," Rachel Elliott's "Sharing Time with Misfits: We-Experience across Bodily Difference," David Morris's "An-Archic Time: Melting the Clock as Hypernorm of the I Can -- and Philosophy," Rebecca Longtin's "Merleau-Ponty's Cézanne as Misfit Artist," and, finally, Laura McMahon's "The Politics of Vulnerability and the School for Peace: Insights from Butler, Merleau-Ponty, and Family Systems Theory.". (shrink)