60 found

Year:

  1.  43
    The Meaning of Belief: Religion From an Atheist’s Point of View, by Tim Crane. [REVIEW]Arif Ahmed - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1261-1270.
    The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an Atheist’s Point of View, by CraneTim. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2017. Pp. xiv + 203.
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  2.  10
    The Art of Philosophy: Visual Thinking in Europe From the Late Renaissance to the Early Enlightenment, by Susanna Berger.Roger Ariew - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1219-1229.
    © Mind Association 2018Some time ago I was at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris investigating the teaching of philosophy during Descartes’ time. Fine monographs had already been published on the various regimens and practices at Descartes’ college at La Flèche, and Jesuit institutions in general, as well as the collegiate curriculum in seventeenth-century France. But as interested as I was in the form of the teaching—how philosophy was taught, where, and when—I was more interested in its content—what was actually taught. (...)
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  3.  76
    The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1107-1168.
    This paper argues for a version of metalinguistic descriptivism, the Mill-Frege view, comparing it to a currently popular alternative, predicativism. The Mill-Frege view combines tenets of Fregean views with features of the theory of direct reference. According to it, proper names have metalinguistic senses, known by competent speakers on the basis of their competence, which figure in ancillary presuppositions. In support of the view the paper argues that the name-bearing relation—which predicativists cite to account for the properties that they take (...)
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  4.  39
    What is a Singular Proposition?Ephraim N. Glick - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1027-1067.
    An account of the distinction between singular and general propositions should reflect the core ideas that have motivated the distinction. Those core ideas can be appreciated independently of many commitments regarding the metaphysics of propositions, but theorists with differing views on the latter have given quite different explanations of what it is for a proposition to be singular or general. Many of those explanations turn out not to reflect the core ideas adequately after all, either by misclassifying certain propositions or (...)
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  5.  21
    Midlife: A Philosophical Guide, by Kieran Setiya.Christopher Hamilton - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1237-1245.
    _ Midlife: A Philosophical Guide _, by SetiyaKieran. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. Pp. 186.
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  6.  20
    Illocutionary Frustration.Samia Hesni - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):947-976.
    This paper proposes a new category of linguistic harm: that of illocutionary frustration. I argue against Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton’s notion of illocutionary silencing by challenging their claim that silencing occurs when there is a lack of uptake of the speaker’s illocutionary act. I look at two scenarios that their view treats differently and argue that these scenarios warrant the same kind of analysis; Hornsby and Langton’s notion of silencing can’t capture the purported difference they want it to capture. (...)
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  7.  38
    Uncommon Knowledge.Harvey Lederman - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1069-1105.
    Some people commonly know a proposition just in case they all know it, they all know that they all know it, they all know that they all know that they all know it, and so on. They commonly believe a proposition just in case they all believe it, they all believe that they all believe it, they all believe that they all believe that they all believe it, and so on. A long tradition in economic theory, theoretical computer science, linguistics (...)
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  8.  12
    Disabilities Are Also Legitimately Medically Interesting Constraints on Legitimate Interests.Chong-Ming Lim - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):977-1002.
    What is it for something to be a disability? Elizabeth Barnes, focusing on physical disabilities, argues that disability is a social category. It depends on the rules undergirding the judgements of the disability rights movement. Barnes’ account may strike many as implausible. I articulate the unease, in the form of three worries about Barnes’ account. It does not fully explain why the disability rights movement is constituted in such a way that it only picks out paradigmatic disability traits, nor why (...)
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  9.  30
    The Normativity of Rationality, by Benjamin Kiesewetter.Conor McHugh - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1245-1253.
    _ The Normativity of Rationality _, by KiesewetterBenjamin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xii + 314.
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  10.  20
    Adaptive Preferences, Adapted Preferences.Polly Mitchell - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1003-1025.
    People who have not experienced diseases and health conditions tend to judge them to be worse than they are reported to be by people who have experienced them. This phenomenon, known as the disability paradox, presents a challenge for health policy, and in particular, healthcare resource distribution. This divergence between patient and public preferences is most plausibly explained as a result of hedonic adaptation, a widespread phenomenon in which people tend to adapt fairly quickly to the state they are in, (...)
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  11.  37
    The Value of Rationality, by Ralph Wedgwood.Joseph Raz - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1253-1261.
    _ The Value of Rationality _, by WedgwoodRalph. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 267.
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  12. When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.
    There is something puzzling about statistical evidence. One place this manifests is in the law, where courts are reluctant to base affirmative verdicts on evidence that is purely statistical, in spite of the fact that it is perfectly capable of meeting the standards of proof enshrined in legal doctrine. After surveying some proposed explanations for this, I shall outline a new approach – one that makes use of a notion of normalcy that is distinct from the idea of statistical frequency. (...)
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  13.  5
    Hegel’s Social Ethics: Religion, Conflict, and Rituals of Reconciliation, by Molly Farneth.Robert Stern - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1230-1237.
    Hegel’s Social Ethics: Religion, Conflict, and Rituals of Reconciliation, by FarnethMolly. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. Pp. xiii + 165.
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  14.  17
    Tragedy and Resentment.Carlsson Ulrika - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1169-1191.
    According to Kantian ethics, immoral actions convey disrespect. This negative attitude makes injuries inflicted by other persons worse than injuries caused by nature, ceteris paribus. As Strawson would later put it, the perpetrator’s attitude of disregard prompts in the victim the reactive attitude of resentment. But, I point out, we harbour and display plenty of other negative attitudes toward people aside from disrespect. What, if any, reactive attitudes are natural and appropriate in response to these? In unrequited love, for example, (...)
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  15. The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.
    I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics.
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  16.  13
    From Natural Character to Moral Virtue in Aristotle, by Mariska Leunissen.Sophia M. Connell - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):938-946.
    From Natural Character to Moral Virtue in Aristotle, by LeunissenMariska. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. vii + 216.
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  17.  8
    Spinoza on Reason, by Michael LeBuffe.Alexander Douglas - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):929-937.
    Spinoza on Reason, by LeBuffeMichael. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp xi + 217.
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  18.  15
    Inner Virtue, by Nicolas Bommarito.Iskra Fileva - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):902-911.
    © Mind AssociationThis article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model...Suppose I told you that the person you consider your best friend often dwells on your faults in his own mind; while he behaves in a warm and affectionate manner when the two of you are together, privately, he ruminates on his advantages over you. He likes to compare himself to you because he finds the comparisons flattering. He does not see (...)
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  19.  26
    Rethinking Race: The Case for Deflationary Realism, by Michael O. Hardimon.Joshua Glasgow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):911-919.
    © Mind Association 2018This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model...It starts when someone, often a highly visible someone, challenges a widely used and commonly accepted idea. In stage two, defenders of conventional wisdom recruit complicated and unexpected theories to save common sense. Statistics may be involved. Jargon is likely. In the third stage, the common-sense-preserving theories are themselves critiqued. At this point, some may rekindle the proposal to eliminate the (...)
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  20.  15
    Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic, by Gila Sher.Terry Horgan - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):881-890.
    © Mind Association 2018Gila Sher’s Epistemic Friction is a bold and ambitious book, with many interesting things to say not only about knowledge, truth, and logic but also about matters ontological. It often requires the reader to construe it hermeneutically, but repays the effort of doing so.She coins the expression ‘epistemic friction’ to refer to constraints on a system of knowledge, coming from both the world and the mind. She says, ‘The world as the object or target of our theories (...)
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  21.  28
    Chance and the Structure of Modal Space.Boris Kment - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):633-665.
    The sample space of the chance distribution at a given time is a class of possible worlds. Thanks to this connection between chance and modality, one’s views about modal space can have significant consequences in the theory of chance and can be evaluated in part by how plausible these implications are. I apply this methodology to evaluate certain forms of modal contingentism, the thesis that some facts about what is possible are contingent. Any modal contingentist view that meets certain conditions (...)
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  22.  67
    There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.Barry Maguire - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):779-805.
    A dogma of contemporary ethical theory maintains that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is the very same as the nature of normative support for actions. The prevailing view is that normative reasons provide the support across the board. I argue that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is importantly different from the nature of normative support for actions. Actions are indeed supported by reasons. Reasons are gradable and contributory. The support relations for affective attitudes are (...)
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  23.  17
    Expressivism and Collectives.Michael Ridge - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):833-861.
    Expressivists have a problem with collectives. I initially illustrate the problem against the background of Allan Gibbard’s expressivist theory, where it is especially stark. I then argue that the problem generalizes. Gibbard’s account entails that judgments about what collective agents ought to do are contingency plans for what to do if one is in the circumstances facing the relevant collective agent. So, for example, my judgment that the United States ought not to have invaded Iraq is a contingency plan for (...)
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  24.  35
    Closure Scepticism and The Vat Argument.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):667-690.
    If it works, I can use Putnam’s vat argument to show that I have not always been a brain-in-a-vat. It is widely thought that the vat argument is of no use against closure scepticism – that is, scepticism motivated by arguments that appeal to a closure principle. This is because, even if I can use the vat argument to show that I have not always been a BIV, I cannot use it to show that I was not recently envatted, and (...)
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  25.  46
    The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.
    Suppose you’d like to believe that p, whether or not it’s true. What can you do to help? A natural initial thought is that you could engage in Intentionally Biased Inquiry : you could look into whether p, but do so in a way that you expect to predominantly yield evidence in favour of p. This paper hopes to do two things. The first is to argue that this initial thought is mistaken: intentionally biased inquiry is impossible. The second is (...)
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  26.  56
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu.Karl Schafer - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):919-928.
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. ix + 224.
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  27. Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.
    Epistemic Permissivists face a special problem about the relationship between our first- and higher-order attitudes. They claim that rationality often permits a range of doxastic responses to the evidence. Given plausible assumptions about the relationship between your first- and higher-order attitudes, it can't be rational to adopt a credence on the edge of that range. But Permissivism says that, for some such range, any credence in that range is rational. Permissivism, in its traditional form, cannot be right. I consider some (...)
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  28.  33
    Some Possibilities in Population Axiology.Teruji Thomas - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):807-832.
    It is notoriously difficult to find an intuitively satisfactory rule for evaluating populations based on the welfare of the people in them. Standard examples, like total utilitarianism, either entail the Repugnant Conclusion or in some other way contradict common intuitions about the relative value of populations. Several philosophers have presented formal arguments that seem to show that this happens of necessity: our core intuitions stand in contradiction. This paper assesses the state of play, focusing on the most powerful of these (...)
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  29.  23
    Ockham’s Razors: A User’s Manual, by Elliott Sober.Joel Velasco - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):891-902.
    Mind Association 2017Elliott Sober’s first book, Simplicity, defends the view that the simplicity of a theory or hypothesis is a measure of its informativeness – roughly, simpler theories require less new information to be added to them to answer relevant questions of interest. While this measure of simplicity is question-relative, it is still what you might call a global view of simplicity – simplicity means the same thing across different scientific problems and it is always an epistemic virtue. Ockham’s Razor (...)
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  30.  47
    Because Without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics, by Marc Lange.Holly Andersen - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):593-602.
    Because Without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics, by LangeMarc. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xxii + 489.
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  31. Counterfactual Attitudes and the Relational Analysis.Kyle Blumberg - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):521-546.
    In this paper, I raise a problem for standard precisifications of the Relational Analysis of attitude reports. The problem I raise involves counterfactual attitude verbs. such as ‘wish’. In short, the trouble is this: there are true attitude reports ‘ S wishes that P ’ but there is no suitable referent for the term ‘that P ’. The problematic reports illustrate that the content of a subject’s wish is intimately related to the content of their beliefs. I capture this fact (...)
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  32.  19
    Retrieving Realism, by Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor.Taylor Carman - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):585-593.
    Retrieving Realism, by DreyfusHubert and TaylorCharles. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015. Pp. 184.
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  33.  45
    Shape Perception in a Relativistic Universe.Peter Fisher Epstein - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):339-379.
    According to Minkoswki, Einstein's special theory of relativity reveals that ‘space by itself, and time by itself are doomed to fade away into mere shadows’. But perceptual experience represents objects as instantiating shapes like squareness — properties of ‘space by itself’. Thus, STR seems to threaten the veridicality of shape experience. In response to this worry, some have argued that we should analyze the contents of our spatial experiences on the model of traditional secondary qualities. On this picture—defended in recent (...)
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  34.  43
    Intellectual Isolation.Jeremy David Fix - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):491-520.
    Intellectualism is the widespread view that practical reason is a species of theoretical reason, distinguished from others by its objects: reasons to act. I argue that if practical reason is a species of theoretical reason, practical judgments by nature have nothing to do with action. If they have nothing to do with action, I cannot act from my representation of reasons for me to act. If I cannot act from those representations, those reasons cannot exist. If they cannot exist, neither (...)
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  35.  11
    Using Benevolent Affections to Learn Our Duty.Marina Folescu - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):467-489.
    The puzzle is this: I argue that for Reid, moral sense needs benevolent affections – i.e. some of our animal, non-cognitive principles of action – to apply the rules of duty. But he also thinks that duty can conflict with benevolent affections. So what happens in these conflict cases? I will argue that Reid takes moral psychology seriously and that he believes that our natural benevolent affections can be used as indicators of duty. Although creative, his account has a major (...)
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  36.  20
    Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature, by Alva Noë. [REVIEW]John Hyman - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):631-631.
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  37.  21
    The Wrong of Injustice, by Mari Mikkola.Katharine Jenkins - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):618-627.
    The Wrong of Injustice, by MikkolaMari. Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 285.
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  38.  37
    Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action and The Embodied Mind, by Andy Clark.Alva Noë - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):611-618.
    Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action and The Embodied Mind, by ClarkAndy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
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  39.  55
    Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.
    Intellectualists disagree with anti-intellectualists about the relationship between knowledge and truth. According to intellectualists, this relationship is intimate. Knowledge entails true belief, and in fact everything required for knowledge is somehow relevant to the probability that the belief in question is true. According to anti-intellectualists, this relationship isn’t intimate. Or, at least, it’s not as intimate as intellectualists think. Factors that aren’t in any way relevant to the probability that a belief is true can make a difference to whether it (...)
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  40. The Structure of Justification.Sven Rosenkranz - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):629-629.
    The paper explores a structural account of propositional justification in terms of the notion of being in a position to know and negation. Combined with a non-normal logic for being in a position to know, the account allows for the derivation of plausible principles of justification. The account is neutral on whether justification is grounded in internally individuated mental states, and likewise on whether it is grounded in facts that are already accessible by introspection or reflection alone. To this extent, (...)
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  41.  27
    On What Matters, Volume Three, by Derek Parfit and Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity, Edited by Peter Singer.John Skorupski - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):602-611.
    © Mind Association 2018Derek Parfit’s death just before the publication of the third, and now perhaps last, volume of On What Matters makes reviewing it a rather melancholy task. That his death is a serious loss to moral philosophy goes without saying. As for this review, it is sad that there is no longer the possibility of discussing with him the disagreements it raises, or learning from his responses. His ideas and arguments in this volume are as fresh and forceful (...)
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  42.  26
    Adequate Counterpart Translations.Alex Steinberg - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):547-563.
    An important motivation for believing in the modal realist’s ontology of other concrete possible worlds and their inhabitants is its theoretical utility, centrally the reduction of ordinary modal talk to counterpart theory as showcased by David Lewis’s 1968 translation scheme. In a recent paper Harold Noonan, following the lead of John Divers, argues that Lewis’s scheme is not strictly adequate by the modal realist’s own lights, and that nothing short of jettisoning de dicto contingency will help. In this paper, I (...)
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  43. Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.
    According to Veritism, true belief is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Epistemologists often take Veritism to entail that all other epistemic items can only have value by standing in certain instrumental relations—namely, by tending to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs or by being products of sources with this tendency. Yet many value theorists outside epistemology deny that all derivative value is grounded in instrumental relations to fundamental value. Veritists, I believe, can and should follow suit. After (...)
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  44. Fichte’s Normative Ethics: Deontological or Teleological?Owen Ware - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):565-584.
    One of the most controversial issues to emerge in recent studies of Fichte concerns the status of his normative ethics, i.e., his theory of what makes actions morally good or bad. Scholars are divided over Fichte’s view regarding the ‘final end’ of moral striving, since it appears this end can be either a specific goal permitting maximizing calculations (the consequentialist reading defended by Kosch 2015), or an indeterminate goal permitting only duty-based decisions (the deontological reading defended by Wood 2016). While (...)
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  45.  31
    Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform, by Tommie Shelby.Elizabeth Anderson - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):276-284.
    © Mind Association 2017By any credible theory of justice, the creation and perpetuation of the ghetto—racially segregated metropolitan areas of concentrated disadvantage to which many poor blacks are consigned—is profoundly unjust. In Dark Ghettos, Tommie Shelby develops a nonideal moral perspective centred on the injustices of the ghetto, through which he critically examines state policies directed towards ameliorating these disadvantages. He also proposes an interpretation of the conduct of some of the more alienated ghetto residents as justified resistance rather than (...)
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  46.  41
    The Things We Do with Identity.Alexis Burgess - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):105-128.
    Cognitive partitions are useful. The notion of numerical identity helps us induce them. Consider, for instance, the role of identity in representing an equivalence relation like taking the same train. This expressive function of identity has been largely overlooked. Other possible functions of the concept have been over-emphasized. It is not clear that we use identity to represent individual objects or quantify over collections of them. Understanding what the concept is good for looks especially urgent in light of the fact (...)
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  47. Will Done Better: Selection Semantics, Future Credence, and Indeterminacy.Fabrizio Cariani & Paolo Santorio - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):129-165.
    Statements about the future are central in everyday conversation and reasoning. How should we understand their meaning? The received view among philosophers treats will as a tense: in ‘Cynthia will pass her exam’, will shifts the reference time forward. Linguists, however, have produced substantial evidence for the view that will is a modal, on a par with must and would. The different accounts are designed to satisfy different theoretical constraints, apparently pulling in opposite directions. We show that these constraints are (...)
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  48. Intuitions Are Used as Evidence in Philosophy.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):69-104.
    In recent years a growing number of philosophers writing about the methodology of philosophy have defended the surprising claim that philosophers do not use intuitions as evidence. In this paper I defend the contrary view that philosophers do use intuitions as evidence. I argue that this thesis is the best explanation of several salient facts about philosophical practice. First, philosophers tend to believe propositions which they find intuitive. Second, philosophers offer error theories for intuitions that conflict with their theories. Finally, (...)
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  49.  40
    Backwards Causation and the Chancy Past.John Cusbert - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):1-33.
    I argue that the past can be objectively chancy in cases of backwards causation, and defend a view of chance that allows for this. Using a case, I argue against the popular temporal view of chance, according to which chances are defined relative to times, and all chancy events must lie in the future. I then state and defend the causal view of chance, according to which chances are defined relative to causal histories, and all chancy events must lie causally (...)
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  50.  11
    The Aesthetics of Argument, by Martin Warner.Richard Eldridge - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):294-298.
    © Mind Association 2017Exactly how radical change in commitments on matters of fundamental concern is possible has been a problem since at least Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus and Augustine's rejection of Pelagianism and defence of divine grace. If an act of will is required to accept the offer of grace, then isn’t something important left to us to do? And if so, can or does reason play any role in such radical change? If so, how? Martin Warner (...)
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  51.  59
    The Boundary Stones of Thought: An Essay in the Philosophy of Logic, by Ian Rumfitt. [REVIEW]Peter Fritz - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):265-276.
    In his book The Boundary Stones of Thought, Ian Rumfitt considers five arguments in favour of intuitionistic logic over classical logic. Two of these arguments are based on reflections concerning the meaning of statements in general, due to Michael Dummett and John McDowell. The remaining three are more specific, concerning statements about the infinite and the infinitesimal, statements involving vague terms, and statements about sets.Rumfitt is sympathetic to the premisses of many of these arguments, and takes some of them to (...)
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  52.  95
    Judgements About Thought Experiments.Alexander Geddes - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):35-67.
    Thought experiments invite us to evaluate philosophical theses by making judgements about hypothetical cases. When the judgements and the theses conflict, it is often the latter that are rejected. But what is the nature of the judgements such that they are able to play this role? I answer this question by arguing that typical judgements about thought experiments are in fact judgements of normal counterfactual sufficiency. I begin by focusing on Anna-Sara Malmgren’s defence of the claim that typical judgements about (...)
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  53.  19
    Between Logic and the World, by Bernhard Nickel.David Liebesman - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):284-293.
    © Mind Association 2017In Between Logic and the World, Bernhard Nickel distinguishes two tasks in understanding generics. The first task is to give a compositional semantics—ideally, one that coheres with independent theories of semantic phenomena like plurality and conjunction. Between Logic and the World undoubtedly makes a substantial contribution to this task. Nickel argues that his proposed semantics allows us to understand logically complex generics as well as generics containing gradable terms. The second task is to give a theory of (...)
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  54. What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
    Reasoning is a certain kind of attitude-revision. What kind? The aim of this paper is to introduce and defend a new answer to this question, based on the idea that reasoning is a goodness-fixing kind. Our central claim is that reasoning is a functional kind: it has a constitutive point or aim that fixes the standards for good reasoning. We claim, further, that this aim is to get fitting attitudes. We start by considering recent accounts of reasoning due to Ralph (...)
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  55.  80
    Can Perceptual Experiences Be Rational?Alan Millar - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):251-263.
    © Millar 2018This bold, provocative, and highly original book is in three Parts. Part I outlines a problem, sketches a solution, and defends a claim that is crucial to the solution—that ‘perceptual experiences and the processes by which they arise can be rational or irrational’. This claim is The Rationality of Perception. In Part II Siegel argues that the power of experiences to justify beliefs can be downgraded or upgraded by psychological precursors. Part III applies, and further develops, the theoretical (...)
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  56.  12
    Causation & Free Will, by Carolina Sartorio.Horacio Spector - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):299-307.
    © Mind Association 2017In Causation and Free Will Carolina Sartorio offers an intricate argument for the claim ‘that actual sequences are sufficient grounds for freedom: they ground freedom, and nothing is required to ground it other than themselves, or their own grounds’. On this view, free will with respect to a choice or action is not explained in terms of the agent’s having alternative possibilities. Like Harry Frankfurt, Sartorio rejects the Principle of Alternate Possibilities : Principle of Alternate Possibilities : (...)
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  57.  46
    Frege on Judgement and the Judging Agent.Maria van der Schaar - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):225-250.
    How is Frege able to claim that the notion of judgement is essential to his logic without introducing a form of psychologism? I argue first that Frege’s logical notion of judgement is to be distinguished from an empirical notion of judgement, that it cannot be understood as an abstract, idealized notion, and that there are doubts concerning a transcendental reading of Frege’s writings. Then, I explain that the logical notion of judgement has to be understood from a first-person perspective, to (...)
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  58.  17
    Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many?Daniel Watts - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):197-223.
    This paper re-examines Kierkegaard's work with respect to the question whether truth is one or many. I argue that his famous distinction between objective and subjective truth is grounded in a unitary conception of truth as such: truth as self-coincidence. By explaining his use in this context of the term ‘redoubling’ [ Fordoblelse ], I show how Kierkegaard can intelligibly maintain that truth is neither one nor many, neither a simple unity nor a complex multiplicity. I further show how these (...)
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  59. Unable to Do the Impossible.Anthony Nguyen - 2018 - Mind 1.
    Jack Spencer has recently argued for the striking thesis that, possibly, an agent is able to do the impossible—that is, perform an action that is metaphysically impossible for that person to perform. Spencer bases his argument on (Simple G), a case in which it is impossible for an agent G to perform some action but, according to Spencer, G is still intuitively able to perform that action. I reply that we would have to give up at least four action-theoretical principles (...)
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  60.  8
    Logical Mistakes, Logical Aliens, and the Laws of Kant’s Pure General Logic.Tyke Nunez - 2018 - Mind:fzy027.
    There are two ways interpreters have tended to understand the nature of the laws of Kant's pure general logic. On the first, these laws are unconditional norms for how we ought to think, and will govern anything that counts as thinking. On the second, these laws are formal criteria for being a thought, and violating them makes a putative thought not a thought. These traditions are in tension insofar as the first depends on the possibility of thoughts that violate these (...)
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