41 found

Year:

  1.  56
    Counterfactual Scheming.Sam Baron - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):535-562.
    Mathematics appears to play a genuine explanatory role in science. But how do mathematical explanations work? Recently, a counterfactual approach to mathematical explanation has been suggested. I argue that such a view fails to differentiate the explanatory uses of mathematics within science from the non-explanatory uses. I go on to offer a solution to this problem by combining elements of the counterfactual theory of explanation with elements of a unification theory of explanation. The result is a theory according to which (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Statistical Evidence, Normalcy, and the Gatecrasher Paradox.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):563-578.
    Martin Smith has recently proposed, in this journal, a novel and intriguing approach to puzzles and paradoxes in evidence law arising from the evidential standard of the Preponderance of the Evidence. According to Smith, the relation of normic support provides us with an elegant solution to those puzzles. In this paper I develop a counterexample to Smith’s approach and argue that normic support can neither account for our reluctance to base affirmative verdicts on bare statistical evidence nor resolve the pertinent (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Self-Locating Belief and Updating on Learning.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):579-584.
    Self-locating beliefs cause a problem for conditionalization. Miriam Schoenfield offers a solution: that on learning E, agents should update on the fact that they learned E. However, Schoenfield is not explicit about whether the fact that they learned E is self-locating. I will argue that if the fact that they learned E is self-locating then the original problem has not been addressed, and if the fact that they learned E is not self-locating then the theory generates implausible verdicts which Schoenfield (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  30
    Zahavi’s Husserl and the Legacy of Phenomenology: A Critical Notice of Husserl’s Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy, by Dan Zahavi.David R. Cerbone - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):603-620.
    As the title – Husserl’s Legacy – and subtitle – Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy – make clear, Dan Zahavi’s new book is centrally concerned with developing and defending a particular account of Husserl’s legacy. Rather than tracing lines of influence or measuring the impact of various of Husserl’s ideas, Zahavi is interested in Husserl’s legacy in a different and more demanding sense that pertains to what he refers to as ‘the overarching aims and ambitions of Husserlian phenomenology’. He is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  30
    To Shape a New World, Tommie Shelby and Brandon Terry.Myisha Cherry - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):656-664.
    To Shape a New World, ShelbyTommie and TerryBrandon. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. Pp. x + 449.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  88
    A Kantian Account of Emotions as Feelings1.Alix Cohen - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):429-460.
    The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. The Reduction of Necessity to Essence.Andreas Ditter - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):351-380.
    In `Essence and Modality', Kit Fine proposes that for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatsoever. Call this view Fine's Thesis. This paper is a study of Fine's Thesis in the context of Fine's logic of essence (LE). Fine himself has offered his most elaborate defense of the thesis in the context of LE. His defense rests on the widely shared assumption that metaphysical necessity obeys the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  47
    Learning From Conditionals.Benjamin Eva, Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):461-508.
    In this article, we address a major outstanding question of probabilistic Bayesian epistemology: how should a rational Bayesian agent update their beliefs upon learning an indicative conditional? A number of authors have recently contended that this question is fundamentally underdetermined by Bayesian norms, and hence that there is no single update procedure that rational agents are obliged to follow upon learning an indicative conditional. Here we resist this trend and argue that a core set of widely accepted Bayesian norms is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9.  16
    Understanding as a Source of Justification.Joachim Horvath - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):509-534.
    The traditional epistemological approach towards judgments like BACHELORS ARE UNMARRIED or ALL KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE is that they are justified or known on the basis of understanding alone. In this paper, I develop an understanding-based account which takes understanding to be a sufficient source of epistemic justification for the relevant judgments. Understanding-based accounts face the problem of the rational revisability of almost all human judgments. Williamson has recently developed a reinforced version of this problem: the challenge from expert revisability. This (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  22
    Monads, Composition, and Force: Ariadnean Threads Through Leibniz’s Labyrinth, by Richard Arthur. [REVIEW]Julia Jorati - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):664-673.
    Monads, Composition, and Force: Ariadnean Threads through Leibniz’s Labyrinth, by ArthurRichard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. ix + 329.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  18
    Compassionate Moral Realism, by Colin Marshall.Heidi L. Maibom - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):631-631.
    Compassionate Moral Realism, by MarshallColin. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 265 + xi.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  68
    The Mental Affordance Hypothesis.Tom McClelland - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):401-427.
    Our successful engagement with the world is plausibly underwritten by our sensitivity to affordances in our immediate environment. The considerable literature on affordances focuses almost exclusively on affordances for bodily actions such as gripping, walking or eating. I propose that we are also sensitive to affordances for mental actions such as attending, imagining and counting. My case for this ‘Mental Affordance Hypothesis’ is motivated by a series of examples in which our sensitivity to mental affordances mirrors our sensitivity to bodily (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13.  13
    Rethinking Existentialism, by Jonathan Webber.Katherine J. Morris - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):638-646.
    Rethinking Existentialism, by WebberJonathan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 229.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Unable to Do the Impossible.Anthony Nguyen - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):585-602.
    Jack Spencer has recently argued for the striking thesis that, possibly, an agent is able to do the impossible—that is, perform an action that is metaphysically impossible for that person to perform. Spencer bases his argument on (Simple G), a case in which it is impossible for an agent G to perform some action but, according to Spencer, G is still intuitively able to perform that action. I reply that we would have to give up at least four action-theoretical principles (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  15
    What a Philosopher Is: Becoming Nietzsche, by Laurence Lampert.Antoine Panaïoti - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):621-631.
    What a Philosopher Is: Becoming Nietzsche, by LampertLaurence. London: University of Chicago Press, 2017. Pp. x + 349.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Synonymy Between Token-Reflexive Expressions.Alexandru Radulescu - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):381–399.
    Synonymy, at its most basic, is sameness of meaning. A token-reflexive expression is an expression whose meaning assigns a referent to its tokens by relating each particular token of that particular expression to its referent. In doing so, the formulation of its meaning mentions the particular expression whose meaning it is. This seems to entail that no two token-reflexive expressions are synonymous, which would constitute a strong objection against token-reflexive semantics. In this paper, I propose and defend a notion of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  32
    Thin Objects: An Abstractionist Account, by Øystein Linnebo.J. P. Studd - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):646-656.
    Thin Objects: Anionist Account, by LinneboØystein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xviii + 238.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  8
    Descartes, Malebranche, and the Crisis of Perception, by Walter Ott.Anik Waldow - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):673-681.
    Descartes, Malebranche, and the Crisis of Perception, by OttWalter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 272.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  86
    Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering, by Herman Cappelen. [REVIEW]Derek Ball - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):245-256.
    Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering, by CappelenHerman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. x + 212.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  21
    True Enough, by Catherine Z. Elgin.John Bengson - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):256-268.
    True Enough, by ElginCatherine Z. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017. Pp. 352.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Naturalness as a Constraint on Priors.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):179-203.
    Many epistemological problems can be solved by the objective Bayesian view that there are rationality constraints on priors, that is, inductive probabilities. But attempts to work out these constraints have run into such serious problems that many have rejected objective Bayesianism altogether. I argue that the epistemologist should borrow the metaphysician’s concept of naturalness and assign higher priors to more natural hypotheses.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence.David Builes - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):113-127.
    Our evidence can be about different subject matters. In fact, necessarily equivalent pieces of evidence can be about different subject matters. Does the hyperintensionality of ‘aboutness’ engender any hyperintensionality at the level of rational credence? In this paper, I present a case which seems to suggest that the answer is ‘yes’. In particular, I argue that our intuitive notions of independent evidence and inadmissible evidence are sensitive to aboutness in a hyperintensional way. We are thus left with a paradox. While (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. How to Solve the Puzzle of Dion and Theon Without Losing Your Head.Chad Carmichael - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):205-224.
    The ancient puzzle of Dion and Theon has given rise to a surprising array of apparently implausible views. For example, in order to solve the puzzle, several philosophers have been led to deny the existence of their own feet, others have denied that objects can gain and lose parts, and large numbers of philosophers have embraced the thesis that distinct objects can occupy the same space, having all their material parts in common. In this paper, I argue for an alternative (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  19
    Knowledge and Truth in Plato: Stepping Past the Shadow of Socrates, by Catherine Rowett.Sophie Grace Chappell - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):291-299.
    Knowledge and Truth in Plato: Stepping Past the Shadow of Socrates, by RowettCatherine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 305.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  21
    The Vulnerability of Integrity in Early Confucian Thought, by Michael D. K. Ing.Julianne N. Chung - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):299-307.
    The Vulnerability of Integrity in Early Confucian Thought, by IngMichael D. K.. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. x + 293.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  19
    Confirmational Holism and Theory Choice: Arrow Meets Duhem.Eleonora Cresto & Diego Tajer - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):71-111.
    In a recent paper Samir Okasha has suggested an application of Arrow’s impossibility theorem to theory choice. When epistemic virtues are interpreted as ‘voters’ in charge of ranking competing theories, and there are more than two theories at stake, the final ordering is bound to coincide with the one proposed by one of the voters, provided a number of seemingly reasonable conditions are in place. In a similar spirit, Jacob Stegenga has shown that Arrow’s theorem applies to the amalgamation of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27.  66
    We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.David Faraci - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):225-234.
    Barry Maguire argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. ‘There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to’ this thesis, he claims. In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. I first examine Maguire's purported differences between reasons for action and so-called reasons for affective attitudes. In each case, I argue that the differences are exaggerated and that to the extent they obtain, they are best explained by differences between actions and affective (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28.  66
    The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by Susanna Schellenberg.Craig French - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):339-349.
    The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by SchellenbergSusanna. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 272.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  20
    How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition, by Shannon Spaulding. [REVIEW]Mikkel Gerken - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):268-275.
    How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition, by SpauldingShannon. NY: Routledge, 2018. Pp. ix + 102.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Updating Data Semantics.Anthony S. Gillies - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):1-41.
    This paper has three main goals. First, to motivate a puzzle about how ignorance-expressing terms like maybe and if interact: they iterate, and when they do they exhibit scopelessness. Second, to argue that there is an ambiguity in our theoretical toolbox, and that exposing that opens the door to a solution to the puzzle. And third, to explore the reach of that solution. Along the way, the paper highlights a number of pleasing properties of two elegant semantic theories, explores some (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31. Composition and the Logic of Location: An Argument for Regionalism.Cody Gilmore & Matt Leonard - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):159-178.
    Ned Markosian has recently defended a new theory of composition, which he calls regionalism : some material objects xx compose something if and only if there is a material object located at the fusion of the locations of xx. Markosian argues that regionalism follows from what he calls the subregion theory of parthood. Korman and Carmichael agree. We provide countermodels to show that regionalism does not follow from, even together with fourteen potentially implicit background principles. We then show that regionalism (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  36
    Reconceiving Spinoza, by Samuel Newlands.Karolina Hübner & Róbert Mátyási - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):307-314.
    Reconceiving Spinoza, by Samuel Newlands. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. x + 283.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  45
    Austin’s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method, by Mark Kaplan.Guy Longworth - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):323-331.
    _ Austin’s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method _, by KaplanMark. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 192.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  23
    Critique of Forms of Life, by Rahel Jaeggi, Trans. Ciaran Cronin.Andreja Novakovic - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):283-290.
    Critique of Forms of Life, by JaeggiRahel, trans. Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. Pp. xx + 395.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  22
    Form, Matter, Substance, by Kathrin Koslicki.Michail Peramatzis - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):235-245.
    _ Form, Matter, Substance _, by KoslickiKathrin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xiii + 273.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  96
    A User’s Guide to Hybrid Tools.Caleb Perl - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):129-158.
    Hybrid metaethical theories have significant promise; they would have important upshots if they were true. But they also face severe problems. The problems are severe enough to make many philosophers doubt that they could be true. My ambition is to show that the problems are just instances of a highly general problem: a problem about what are sometimes called ‘intensional anaphora'. I'll also show that any adequate explanation of intensional anaphora immediately solves all the problems for the hybrid theorist. We (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  71
    Normative Uncertainty and the Dependence Problem.Abelard Podgorski - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):43-70.
    In this paper, I enter the debate between those who hold that our normative uncertainty matters for what we ought to do, and those who hold that only our descriptive uncertainty matters. I argue that existing views in both camps have unacceptable implications in cases where our descriptive beliefs depend on our normative beliefs. I go on to propose a fix which is available only to those who hold that normative uncertainty matters, ultimately leaving the challenge as a threat to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38.  32
    Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, by Jonathan Dancy.A. W. Price - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):314-323.
    _ Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning _, by DancyJonathan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xiii + 185.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39.  71
    As If: Idealization and Ideals, by Kwame Anthony Appiah.Adam Toon - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):275-283.
    As If: Idealization and Ideals, by AppiahKwame Anthony. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. Pp. xvi + 218.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  62
    Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, by Jean-Paul Sartre, Translated by Sarah Richmond. [REVIEW]Jonathan Webber - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):332-339.
    Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, by SartreJean-Paul, translated by Sarah Richmond. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018. Pp. xlvii + 848.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals, by Christine M. Korsgaard.Andrew Chignell - 2020 - Mind.
    A review of "Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals," by Christine M. Korsgaard. New York: Oxford, 2018. Pp. 271.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues