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Mind
ISSN: 0026-4423
31 found
- "Deflecting Ockham's Razor: A Medieval Debate on Ontological Commitment".Susan Brower-Toland - 2023 - Mind 133:fzad007.William of Ockham (d. 1347) is well known for his commitment to parsimony and for his so-called ‘razor’ principle. But little is known about attempts among his own contemporaries to deflect his use of the razor. In this paper, I explore one such attempt. In particular, I consider a clever challenge that Ockham’s younger contemporary, Walter Chatton (d. 1343) deploys against the razor. The challenge involves a kind of dilemma for Ockham. Depending on how Ockham responds to this dilemma, his (...)
- On Deniability.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):372-401.Communication can be risky. Like other kinds of actions, it comes with potential costs. For instance, an utterance can be embarrassing, offensive, or downright illegal. In the face of such risks, speakers tend to act strategically and seek ‘plausible deniability’. In this paper, we propose an account of the notion of deniability at issue. On our account, deniability is an epistemic phenomenon. A speaker has deniability if she can make it epistemically irrational for her audience to reason in certain ways. (...)
- Finding Wrong.Ragnar Francén - 2023 - Mind 132 (526).In his interesting article ‘Evaluative Discourse and Affective States of Mind’, Nils Franzén argues that non-cognitivism gets support from the fact that we use certain verbs when we attribute moral judgments. More specifically he argues that our use of the subjective attitude verb ‘finds’ – as in ‘he finds dancing morally wrong’ – provides reason to think that moral judgments are affective attitudes. While I agree that there might be things to learn from the way we attribute moral judgments, I (...)
- Being Somehow Without (Possibly) Being Something.Peter Fritz - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):348-371.Contingentists—who hold that it is contingent what there is—are divided on the claim that having a property or standing in a relation requires being something. This claim can be formulated as a natural schematic principle of higher-order modal logic. On this formulation, I argue that contingentists who are also higher-order contingentists—and so hold that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are—should reject the claim. Moreover, I argue that given higher-order contingentism, having a property or standing in a (...)
- Trespassing Testimony in Scientific Collaboration.Mikkel Gerken - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):505-522.The term ‘epistemic trespassing’ has recently been coined to denote a person’s judgments regarding a domain where they are not epistemic experts. In this paper, I focus on expert trespassing testimony – that is, testimony by an expert in a domain of expertise other than his own. More specifically, I focus on intra-scientific trespassing testimony between scientific collaborators. By developing a number of distinctions, I argue that while intra-scientific trespassing testimony may seriously hamper scientific collaboration, it does not invariably do (...)No categories
- Valid Arguments as True Conditionals.Andrea Iacona - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):428-451.This paper explores an idea of Stoic descent that is largely neglected nowadays, the idea that an argument is valid when the conditional formed by the conjunction of its premises as antecedent and its conclusion as consequent is true. As it will be argued, once some basic features of our naıve understanding of validity are properly spelled out, and a suitable account of conditionals is adopted, the equivalence between valid arguments and true conditionals makes perfect sense. The account of validity (...)
- Accuracy and Probabilism in Infinite Domains.Michael Nielsen - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):402-427.The best accuracy arguments for probabilism apply only to credence functions with finite domains, that is, credence functions that assign credence to at most finitely many propositions. This is a significant limitation. It reveals that the support for the accuracy-first program in epistemology is a lot weaker than it seems at first glance, and it means that accuracy arguments cannot yet accomplish everything that their competitors, the pragmatic (Dutch book) arguments, can. In this paper, I investigate the extent to which (...)
- A Scheme Foiled: A Critique of Baron's Account of Extra-mathematical Explanation.Mark Povich - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):479–492.Extra-mathematical explanations explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. Philosophers disagree about whether there are extra-mathematical explanations, the correct account of them if they exist, and their implications (e.g., for the philosophy of scientific explanation and for the metaphysics of mathematics) (Baker 2005, 2009; Bangu 2008; Colyvan 1998; Craver and Povich 2017; Lange 2013, 2016, 2018; Mancosu 2008; Povich 2019, 2020; Steiner 1978). In this discussion note, I present three desiderata for any account of extra-mathematical explanation and argue (...)
- Attention and (Painful) Interest: Revisiting the Interest Theory of Attention.Mark Textor - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):327-347.The nineteenth century saw the development of reductive views of attention. The German philosopher and psychologist Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) proposed an original reductive view according to which attention is nothing but interest and interest itself is a positive feeling. Stumpf’s view was developed by Francis Bradley (1846-1924), George Frederick Stout (1860-1944), and Josiah Royce (1855-1916), but has been overlooked in the recent literature. In this paper, I will expound Stumpf’s view of attention, trace it back to its Aristotelian roots and (...)
- Towards a Mechanistically Neutral Account of Acting Jointly: The Notion of a Collective Goal.Stephen A. Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):1-29.Many of the things we do are, or could be, done with others. Mundane examples favoured by philosophers include painting a house together (Bratman 1992), lifting.No categories
- Downwards Propriety in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):30-62.Epistemic Utility Theory is often identified with the project of *axiology-first epistemology*—the project of vindicating norms of epistemic rationality purely in terms of epistemic value. One of the central goals of axiology-first epistemology is to provide a justification of the central norm of Bayesian epistemology, Probabilism. The first part of this paper presents a new challenge to axiology first epistemology: I argue that in order to justify Probabilism in purely axiological terms, proponents of axiology first epistemology need to justify a (...)
- Getting Accurate about Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):158-191.There is a large literature exploring how accuracy constrains rational degrees of belief. This paper turns to the unexplored question of how accuracy constrains knowledge. We begin by introducing a simple hypothesis: increases in the accuracy of an agent’s evidence never lead to decreases in what the agent knows. We explore various precise formulations of this principle, consider arguments in its favour, and explain how it interacts with different conceptions of evidence and accuracy. As we show, the principle has some (...)No categories
- Undivided Self: Aristotle and the ‘Mind-Body Problem’, by David Charles.Klaus Corcilius - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):303-313.This important and challenging book is the fruit of many years of engagement with Aristotle’s thinking about the soul-body relation by one of the most distingui.
- Coordination and Harmony in Bilateral Logic.Pedro del Valle-Inclan & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):192-207.Ian Rumfitt (2000) developed a bilateralist account of logic in which the meaning of the connectives is given by conditions on asserted and rejected sentences. An additional set of inference rules, the coordination principles, determines the interaction of assertion and rejection. Fernando Ferreira (2008) found this account defective, as Rumfitt must state the coordination principles for arbitrary complex sentences. Rumfitt (2008) has a reply, but we argue that the problem runs deeper than he acknowledges and is in fact related to (...)
- Spinoza on Learning to Live Together, by Susan James.Aaron Garrett - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):288-295.Spinoza on Learning to Live Together is a collection of nine of Susan James’ previously published papers alongside four more essays published for the first time.
- Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry, by Anil Gupta.Christopher S. Hill - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):251-259.This dazzlingly original and ambitious book challenges the epistemological and metaphysical preconceptions of contemporary philosophers on many fronts, and prop.No categories
- Nietzsche on the Decadence and Flourishing of Culture, by Andrew Huddleston. [REVIEW]Claire Kirwin - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):243-251.
- Not Half True.Poppy Mankowitz - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):84-112.The word ‘true’ shows some evidence of gradability. For instance, there are cases where truth-bearers are described as ‘slightly true’, ‘completely true’ or ‘very true’. Expressions that accept these types of modifiers are analysed in terms of properties that can be possessed to a greater or lesser degree. If ‘true’ is genuinely gradable, then it would follow that there are degrees of truth. It might also follow that ‘true’ is context-sensitive, like other gradable expressions. Such conclusions are difficult to reconcile (...)
- Nietzsche’s Metaphilosophy: The Nature, Method, and Aims of Philosophy, edited by Paul S. Loeb and Matthew Meyer.Allison Merrick - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):269-277.In his later works Nietzsche repeatedly underscores the importance of philosophical methods. In Beyond Good and Evil, for example, he takes issue with the ‘awkw.No categories
- Backlighting and Occlusion.Søren Overgaard - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):63-83.In the philosophy of perception, objects are typically frontlit. But according to Roy Sorensen, backlit objects have surprising lessons to teach us about perception. In backlit conditions, ‘the principles of occlusion are reversed’, Sorensen (2008, p. 25) maintains. In particular, he claims we see the back surfaces of backlit objects. But as I argue in this paper, Sorensen’s arguments in support of those claims are flawed. After criticizing Sorensen’s arguments, I attempt to address a residual puzzle about backlit objects. The (...)No categories
- Ethics Beyond the Limits: New Essays on Bernard Williams’ Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. [REVIEW]Matthieu Queloz - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):fzaa077.Bernard Williams’ books demand an unusual amount of work from readers. This is particularly true of his 1985 magnum opus, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (E.
- Living in a Material World: A Critical Notice of Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals by Timothy Williamson.Daniel Rothschild - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):208-233.Barristers in England are obliged to follow the ‘cab rank rule’, according to which they must take any case offered to them, as long as they have time in their.
- Correction to: Steps Towards a Minimalist Account of Numbers.Thomas Schindler - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):326-326.This is a correction to: Thomas Schindler, Steps Towards a Minimalist Account of Numbers, Mind, 2021; fzab060, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab060.No categories
- Unifying Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):136-157.Many theories of rational action are predicated on the idea that what it is rational to do in a given situation depends, in part, on what it is rational to believe in that situation. In short: they treat epistemic rationality as explanatorily prior to practical rationality. If they are right in doing so, it follows, on pain of explanatory circularity, that epistemic rationality cannot itself be a form of practical rationality. Yet, many epistemologists have defended just such a view of (...)
- Erratum to: The Force and Content of Judgment: A Critical Notice of Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, by Sebastian Rödl.Nicholas F. Stang - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):325-325.Mind, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab001.No categories
- Realisms Interlinked: Objects, Subjects, and Other Subjects, by Arindam Chakrabarti.Kurt Sylvan - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):278-287.Realisms Interlinked is a sublime work. It reanimates theoretical philosophy with a distinctive synthesis of ideas and methods drawn from the common-sense metap.No categories
- Recognition: A Chapter in the History of European Ideas, by Axel Honneth.R. Jay Wallace - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):259-269.Axel Honneth has done more than any other philosopher to develop and explore the significance of recognition to our social relations. On the broadly Hegelian ap.No categories
- Fiction: A Philosophical Analysis, by Catharine Abell. [REVIEW]Richard Woodward - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):295-303.The philosophical questions that arise in relation to our engagement with fiction are multifaceted. Fiction is often seen as a source of metaphysical and semant.No categories
- Logical Realism and the Riddle of Redundancy.Óscar Antonio Monroy Pérez - 2023 - Mind 131 (524):1083-1107.According to an influential view, when it comes to representing reality, some words are better suited for the job than others. This is elitism. There is reason to believe that the set of the best, or elite, words should not be redundant or arbitrary. However, we are often forced to choose between these two theoretical vices, especially in cases involving theories that seem to be mere notational variants. This is the riddle of redundancy: both redundancy and arbitrariness are vicious, but (...)
- Neo-Logicism and Gödelian Incompleteness.Fabian Pregel - 2023 - Mind 131 (524):1055-1082.There is a long-standing gap in the literature as to whether Gödelian incompleteness constitutes a challenge for Neo-Logicism, and if so how serious it is. In this paper, I articulate and address the challenge in detail. The Neo-Logicist project is to demonstrate the analyticity of arithmetic by deriving all its truths from logical principles and suitable definitions. The specific concern raised by Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is that no single sound system of logic syntactically implies all arithmetical truths. I set (...)No categories
- The Case for Rage: Why Anger is Essential to Anti-Racist Struggle, by Myisha Cherry, Oxford University Press. [REVIEW]Laura Silva - 2023 - Mind 1.Cherry builds the case for rage that boomed in Audre Lorde’s verse and prose. The Case for Rage delivers a systematic vindication of anger’s essential role in anti-racist struggle, where moral and productive anti-racist anger is named ‘Lordean rage’ after the poet, activist and teacher. The book is incredibly timely, offering the thorough investigation of political anger called for following the extensive uptake of the Black Lives Matter movement during the pandemic. The pandemic has, I think, made this book particularly (...)No categories
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