In exact epistemology Immanuel Kant’s statement on the priority of application of cognitive faculties is detailed as an intellectual process. Empirical regularities of the JSM–method of automated support for research are synthetic a posteriori judgements. Theoretical intelligence is primary, and its aspects are understanding (Verstand) and mind (Gemüt). The conditions of possible experience in Kant’s sense are implemented in the JSM–method of ASR in intelligent systems. And the JSM–method itself is the transcendental logic of artificial intelligence using two theories of (...) truth, the coherence theory and the correspondence theory. Exact epistemology, which is exact neo-Kantianism, can be naturally considered as a reflection of information society culture on its civilizational (technological) aspects. (shrink)

In one of his works, the modern neurophilosopher G. Northoff, developing the problems of Kantian transcendental cognitive science (epistemology), introduces the metaphor of Kant’s mind. In this article, we attempt to explicate this metaphor in order to propose a cognitive model of Kant’s mind (the Kantian mind as a sequence of cognitive syntheses), which could be used in modern research in cognitive science, neuroscience and artificial intelligence. At the same time, there is currently a question (task), on the one hand, (...) about the transition of transcendentalism to neurotranscendentalism, i.e. the development of neurocognitological research aimed at identifying the neural correlates of the components/structures of the Kant’s mind (the transition from Kant’s mind to the Kantian brain)), and, on the other hand, the creation of intelligent computer programs (systems) that implement the cognitive model of the Kant’s mind. This article outlines ways to solve both the first and second of these problems. (shrink)

From April 11 to April 13, 2024, the 9th annual International Scientific Conference “Transcendental turn in modern philosophy – 9: metaphysics, epistemology, theory of consciousness, cognitive science and artificial intelligence, theology” was held in Moscow. The focus of the conference remains the current and innovative ideas of transcendental cognitive science and artificial intelligence. The seminar also reflected metaphysical, epistemological and theological issues.

The article considers I.Kant's transcendental philosophy as a possible basis for further research in the field of artificial intelligence. It is demonstrated that the main criticism of transcendentalism associated with the exclusion of ontology "in its pure form" in I.Kant's philosophy is irrelevant if artificial intelligence is understood by "pure reason", since one of the features of the latter is the absence of an "ontological assumption". A number of I.Kant's propositions quite adequately describe the basic mechanisms of artificial intelligence, and (...) at the same time "pure reason" is considered in I.Kant's works not in isolation, but in connection with human consciousness as a whole, which makes his philosophy a productive basis for developments in the field of artificial consciousness. (shrink)

The author considers the methodological basis of neurotranscendentalism and discusses the question of whether its integration of the approaches of transcendentalism and neurosciences is effective and coherent. The study undertakes on the base of the comparative analysis of spatiotemporal and quantitative representations and how they are described in Kant’s philosophy and transcendental neuro-researches. The author infers that: 1) transcendentalism is not susceptible to the problem of the material correlate of a priori principles of the reason while neurosciences are primarily aimed (...) at detective it; 2) the integrated disciplines have essential diversities in the treatment of the crucial notions (a priori, representation, space, time, magnitude, perception, etc.); 3) neurosciences and transcendentalism have the ground for the integration on the level of the subject area; 4) neurotranscendentalism forms the interdisciplinary scope of researches which generates its own synthetic object – the “biological a priori”. (shrink)

This article shows what difficulties are connected with the enactivist interpretation of Heidegger and what options can be found to overcome them. First of all, the epistemological attitude of enactivism is outlined. This attitued forced the enactivist theoreticians (i.e. Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson) to turn to the “cognitive” understanding of Heidegger. The rejection of cognitivism and connectionism as equally “disembodied” ways of understanding consciousness in favor of an “embodied” approach led enactivist theorists to turn to the phenomenological tradition and, (...) in particular, to the cognitive interpretations of Heidegger. Secondly, the reasons for disappointment in the Heideggerian heritage, expressed by the theorists of enactivism, are considered. It is shown that the main reason for this disappointment was the basic incompatibility of the enactivist approach to consciousness, based on the Husserlian concept of intentionality, with Heidegger's approach. Natalie Depraz' non-intentional approach based on her interpretation of the concept of Gelassenheit is named as an example of overcoming the contradictions that arise in enactivism. (shrink)

The text provides a brief overview of the Anacharsis Annual Research Conference, which took place in September 2023. The author presents the main themes of the conference, emphasizing the role of the transcendental approach in conceptualizing the possibility of an Other philosophy.