Year:

  1.  15
    Making Sense of Akrasia.Matthew Burch - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):939-971.
    There are two extreme poles in the literature on akrasia. Internalists hold that it’s impossible to act intentionally against your better judgment, because there’s a necessary internal relation between judgment and intentional action. To the contrary, externalists maintain that we can act intentionally against our better judgment, because the will operates independently of judgment. Critics of internalism argue that it fails a realism test—most people seem to think that we can and do act intentionally against our better judgment. And critics (...)
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  2.  7
    Thinking Through Enactive Agency: Sense-Making, Bio-Semiosis and the Ontologies of Organismic Worlds.Paulo De Jesus - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):861-887.
    According to enactivism all living systems, from single cell organisms to human beings, are ontologically endowed with some form of teleological and sense-making agency. Furthermore, enactivists maintain that: there is no fixed pregiven world and as a consequence all organisms “bring forth” their own unique “worlds” through processes of sense-making. The first half of the paper takes these two ontological claims as its central focus and aims to clarify and make explicit the arguments and motivations underlying them. Our analysis here (...)
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  3.  5
    Enculturation and Narrative Practices.Regina E. Fabry - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):911-937.
    Recent work on enculturation suggests that our cognitive capacities are significantly transformed in the course of the scaffolded acquisition of cognitive practices such as reading and writing. Phylogenetically, enculturation is the result of the co-evolution of human organisms and their socio-culturally structured cognitive niche. It is rendered possible by evolved cerebral and extra-cerebral bodily learning mechanisms that make human organisms apt to acquire culturally inherited cognitive practices. In addition, cultural learning allows for the intergenerational transmission of relevant knowledge and skills. (...)
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  4.  2
    RECkoning with Representational Apriorism in Evolutionary Cognitive Archaeology.Duilio Garofoli - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):973-995.
    In evolutionary cognitive archaeology, the school of thought associated with the traditional framework has been deeply influenced by cognitivist intuitions, which have led to the formulation of mentalistic and disembodied cognitive explanations to address the emergence of artifacts within the archaeological record of ancient hominins. Recently, some approaches in this domain have further enforced this view, by arguing that artifacts are passive means to broadcast/perpetuate meanings that are thoroughly internal to the mind. These meanings are conveyed either in the form (...)
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  5.  6
    Hypnotic Experience and the Autism Spectrum Disorder. A Phenomenological Investigation.Till Grohmann - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):889-909.
    In recent decades, the focus in autism research progressively expanded. It presently offers extensive material on sensorimotor disturbances as well as on perceptive-cognitive preferences of people with autism. The present article proposes not only a critical interpretation of the common theoretical framework in autism research but also focuses on certain experiences common to some people with autism and which can be appropriately understood by phenomenology. What I will call “hypnotic experiences” in autism are moments in which some individuals withdraw into (...)
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  6.  17
    Shared Emotions: A Steinian Proposal.Gerhard Thonhauser - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):997-1015.
    The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based (...)
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  7.  21
    Pragmatism and the Predictive Mind.Daniel Williams - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):835-859.
    Predictive processing and its apparent commitment to explaining cognition in terms of Bayesian inference over hierarchical generative models seems to flatly contradict the pragmatist conception of mind and experience. Against this, I argue that this appearance results from philosophical overlays at odd with the science itself, and that the two frameworks are in fact well-poised for mutually beneficial theoretical exchange. Specifically, I argue: first, that predictive processing illuminates pragmatism’s commitment to both the primacy of pragmatic coping in accounts of the (...)
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  8.  16
    Understanding Phenomenological Differences in How Affordances Solicit Action. An Exploration.Roy Dings - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):681-699.
    Affordances are possibilities for action offered by the environment. Recent research on affordances holds that there are differences in how people experience such possibilities for action. However, these differences have not been properly investigated. In this paper I start by briefly scrutinizing the existing literature on this issue, and then argue for two claims. First, that whether an affordance solicits action or not depends on its relevance to the agent’s concerns. Second, that the experiential character of how an affordance solicits (...)
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  9.  22
    Split-Brain Syndrome and Extended Perceptual Consciousness.Adrian Downey - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):787-811.
    In this paper I argue that split-brain syndrome is best understood within an extended mind framework and, therefore, that its very existence provides support for an externalist account of conscious perception. I begin by outlining the experimental aberration model of split-brain syndrome and explain both: why this model provides the best account of split-brain syndrome; and, why it is commonly rejected. Then, I summarise Susan Hurley’s argument that split-brain subjects could unify their conscious perceptual field by using external factors to (...)
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  10.  1
    Two Visual Systems in Molyneux Subjects.Gabriele Ferretti - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):643-679.
    Molyneux’s question famously asks about whether a newly sighted subject might immediately recognize, by sight alone, shapes that were already familiar to her from a tactile point of view. This paper addresses three crucial points concerning this puzzle. First, the presence of two different questions: the classic one concerning visual recognition and another one concerning vision-for-action. Second, the explicit distinction, reported in the literature, between ocular and cortical blindness. Third, the importance of making reference to our best neuroscientific account on (...)
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  11.  12
    Can Delusions Play a Protective Role?Rachel Gunn & Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):813-833.
    After briefly reviewing some of the empirical and philosophical literature suggesting that there may be an adaptive role for delusion formation, we discuss the results of a recent study consisting of in-depth interviews with people experiencing delusions. We analyse three such cases in terms of the circumstances preceding the development of the delusion; the effects of the development of the delusion on the person’s situation; and the potential protective nature of the delusional belief as seen from the first-person perspective. We (...)
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  12.  8
    Getting Stuck: Temporal Desituatedness in Depression.Michelle Maiese - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):701-718.
    The DSM characterizes major depressive disorder partly in temporal terms: the depressive mood must last for at least two weeks, and also must impact the subject "most of the day, nearly every day." However, from the standpoint of phenomenological psychopathology, the long-lasting quality of the condition hardly captures the distinctiveness of depression. While the DSM refers to objective time as measured by clocks and calendars, what is especially striking about depression is the distortions to lived time that it involves. But (...)
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  13.  5
    What Can Self-Disorders in Schizophrenia Tell Us About the Nature of Subjectivity? A Psychopathological Investigation.Helene Stephensen & Josef Parnas - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):629-642.
    The purpose of this article is to show how schizophrenia, understood as a distortion of the most intimate structures of subjectivity, illustrates the nature of subjectivity as such, while at the same time how philosophical considerations may help to understand schizophrenia. More precisely, schizophrenic experiences of self-alienation seem to reflect a congealing or concretization of a form of differentiation or potential alterity implicit in the dynamic nature of subjectivity. In other words, we propose that the structure of subjectivity includes potential (...)
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  14.  12
    Edith Stein’s Phenomenology of Sensual and Emotional Empathy.Fredrik Svenaeus - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):741-760.
    This paper presents and explicates the theory of empathy found in Edith Stein’s early philosophy, notably in the book On the Problem of Empathy, published in 1917, but also by proceeding from complementary thoughts on bodily intentionality and intersubjectivity found in Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities published in 1922. In these works Stein puts forward an innovative and detailed theory of empathy, which is developed in the framework of a philosophical anthropology involving questions of psychophysical causality, social ontology and (...)
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  15.  15
    Extended Functionalism, Radical Enactivism, and the Autopoietic Theory of Cognition: Prospects for a Full Revolution in Cognitive Science.Mario Villalobos & David Silverman - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):719-739.
    Recently, Michael Wheeler has argued that despite its sometimes revolutionary rhetoric, the so called 4E cognitive movement, even in the guise of ‘radical’ enactivism, cannot achieve a full revolution in cognitive science. A full revolution would require the rejection of two essential tenets of traditional cognitive science, namely internalism and representationalism. Whilst REC might secure antirepresentationalism, it cannot do the same, so Wheeler argues, with externalism. In this paper, expanding on Wheeler’s analysis, we argue that what compromises REC’s externalism is (...)
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  16.  19
    Situated Agency: Towards an Affordance-Based, Sensorimotor Theory of Action.Martin Weichold - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):761-785.
    Recent empirical findings from social psychology, ecological psychology, and embodied cognitive science indicate that situational factors crucially shape the course of human behavior. For instance, it has been shown that finding a dime, being under the influence of an authority figure, or just being presented with food in easy reach often influences behavior tremendously. These findings raise important new questions for the philosophy of action: Are these findings a threat to classical conceptions of human agency? Are humans passively pushed around (...)
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  17.  48
    A Nice Surprise? Predictive Processing and the Active Pursuit of Novelty.Andy Clark - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):521-534.
    Recent work in cognitive and computational neuroscience depicts human brains as devices that minimize prediction error signals: signals that encode the difference between actual and expected sensory stimulations. This raises a series of puzzles whose common theme concerns a potential misfit between this bedrock informationtheoretic vision and familiar facts about the attractions of the unexpected. We humans often seem to actively seek out surprising events, deliberately harvesting novel and exciting streams of sensory stimulation. Conversely, we often experience some wellexpected sensations (...)
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  18.  9
    Depicting and Seeing-In. The ‘Sujet’ in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Images.Patrick Eldridge - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):555-578.
    In this paper I investigate an underappreciated element of Husserl’s phenomenology of images: the consciousness of the depicted subject, which Husserl calls the Sujetintention, e.g. the awareness of the sitter of a portrait. Husserl claims that when a consciousness regards a figurative image, it is absorbed in the awareness of the depicted subject and yet this subject some how withholds its presence in the midst of its appearance in the image-object. Image-consciousness is an intuitive consciousness that intends a being that (...)
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  19. The Bored Mind is a Guiding Mind: Toward a Regulatory Theory of Boredom.Andreas Elpidorou - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):455-484.
    By presenting and synthesizing findings on the character of boredom, the article advances a theoretical account of the function of the state of boredom. The article argues that the state of boredom should be understood as a functional emotion that is both informative and regulatory of one's behavior. Boredom informs one of the presence of an unsatisfactory situation and, at the same time, it motivates one to pursue a new goal when the current goal ceases to be satisfactory, attractive or (...)
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  20.  12
    Storytelling Agents: Why Narrative Rather Than Mental Time Travel is Fundamental.Rosa Hardt - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):535-554.
    I propose that we can explain the contribution of mental time travel to agency through understanding it as a specific instance of our more general capacity for narrative understanding. Narrative understanding involves the experience of a pre-reflective and embodied sense of self, which co-emerges with our emotional involvement with a sequence of events. Narrative understanding of a sequence of events also requires a ‘recombinable system’, that is, the ability to combine parts to make myriad sequences. Mental time travel shares these (...)
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  21.  1
    Biosocial Selfhood: Overcoming the ‘Body-Social Problem’ Within the Individuation of the Human Self.Joe Higgins - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):433-454.
    In a recent paper, Kyselo argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” ). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of (...)
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  22.  8
    Seeing What is Not Seen.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):503-519.
    This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.
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  23.  8
    Disordered Existentiality: Mental Illness and Heidegger’s Philosophy of Dasein.Schmid Jelscha - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):485-502.
    In this paper, I propose an existentialist-phenomenological model that conceives of mental illness through the terminology of Heidegger’s Being and Time. In particular, the concepts of existentiality, disturbance and the relation between ‘being-with’ and ‘the one’, will be implemented in order to reconstruct the experience of mental illness. The proposed model understands mental illness as a disturbance of a person’s existentiality. More precisely, mental illness is conceptualized as the disturbance of a person’s existential structure, the process of which leads to (...)
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  24.  8
    Is the Body Represented in Everyday Bodily Activities?Luis Alejandro Murillo Lara - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):591-604.
    There seem to be good reasons to think that there must be body representations or some kind of body content required for riding a bike or grabbing a cup of coffee. However, when I ride a bike or grab a cup of coffee, am I just representing the bike and the cup? Or am I actually also representing my body and bodily movements? The thesis of this paper is that the body not only figures in the content that guides everyday (...)
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  25.  35
    Sensorimotor Theory, Cognitive Access and the ‘Absolute’ Explanatory Gap.Victor Loughlin - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):611-627.
    Sensorimotor Theory is the claim that it is our practical know-how of the relations between our environments and us that gives our environmental interactions their experiential qualities. Yet why should such interactions involve or be accompanied by experience? This is the ‘absolute’ gap question. Some proponents of SMT answer this question by arguing that our interactions with an environment involve experience when we cognitively access those interactions. In this paper, I aim to persuade proponents of SMT to accept the following (...)
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  26.  3
    Review of Real Hallucinations: Psychiatric Illness, Intentionality, and the Interpersonal World, by Matthew Ratcliffe. [REVIEW]Zeno Van Duppen - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):605-609.
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  27.  12
    Body, Skill, and Look: Is Bodybuilding a Sport?István Aranyosi - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):401-410.
    I argue that bodybuilding should not qualify as a sport, given that at the competition stage it lacks an essential feature of sports, namely, skillful activity. Based on the classic distinction between Leib and Körper in phenomenology, I argue that bodybuilding competition’s sole purpose is to present the Körper, whereas sports are about manifestations of Leib. I consider several objections to this analysis, after which I conclude that bodybuilding is an endeavor closer to both beauty competitions and classical sculpture rather (...)
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  28.  14
    The Puzzle of Mirror Self-Recognition.Johannes L. Brandl - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):279-304.
  29.  14
    The Cartesian Other.Alex Burri - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):325-342.
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  30.  12
    Understanding Others, Reciprocity, and Self-Consciousness.Katja Crone - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):267-278.
    The article explores the basic conceptual relationship between social cognition, intersubjectivity and self-consciousness. A much-debated recent approach to social cognition, the so-called interaction theory, is the view that the ability to perceive, understand and interpret the behavior of others relies on interaction in the sense of mutual coordination of the embodied agents involved. It will be shown that this notion of reciprocity is too weak in order to fully account for social understanding. It will be argued that the idea of (...)
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  31.  14
    Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity: Dimensions of the Social Self.Katja Crone & Wolfgang Huemer - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):225-229.
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  32.  34
    Can the Mind Be Embodied, Enactive, Affective, and Extended?Michelle Maiese - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):343-361.
    In recent years, a growing number of thinkers have begun to challenge the long-held view that the mind is neurally realized. One strand of critique comes from work on extended cognition, a second comes from research on embodied cognition, and a third comes from enactivism. I argue that theorists who embrace the claim that the mind is fully embodied and enactive cannot consistently also embrace the extended mind thesis. This is because once one takes seriously the central tenets of enactivism, (...)
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  33.  24
    Individualism Versus Interactionism About Social Understanding.Judith Martens & Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):245-266.
    In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode approach in the light of such developments. We argue that a problem seems to arise for these theories: an interactionist account of social cognition makes the capacity of shared intentionality a presupposition of social understanding, while the capacity of engaging in scenes of shared intentionality in turn presupposes exactly the kind of (...)
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  34.  39
    The Personal and the Subpersonal in the Theory of Mind Debate.Kristina Musholt - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):305-324.
    It is a widely accepted assumption within the philosophy of mind and psychology that our ability for complex social interaction is based on the mastery of a common folk psychology, that is to say that social cognition consists in reasoning about the mental states of others in order to predict and explain their behavior. This, in turn, requires the possession of mental-state concepts, such as the concepts belief and desire. In recent years, this standard conception of social cognition has been (...)
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  35.  8
    Phenomenological Constraints: A Problem for Radical Enactivism.Michael Roberts - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):375-399.
    This paper does two things. Firstly, it clarifies the way that phenomenological data is meant to constrain cognitive science according to enactivist thinkers. Secondly, it points to inconsistencies in the ‘Radical Enactivist’ handling of this issue, so as to explicate the commitments that enactivists need to make in order to tackle the explanatory gap. I begin by sketching the basic features of enactivism in sections 1–2, focusing upon enactive accounts of perception. I suggest that enactivist ideas here rely heavily upon (...)
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  36.  14
    A Critical Examination of Existential Feeling.Jussi A. Saarinen - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):363-374.
    Matthew Ratcliffe has argued that existential feelings form a distinct class of bodily and non-conceptual feelings that pre-intentionally structure our intentional experience of others, the world, and ourselves. In this article, I will identify and discuss three interrelated areas of concern for Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings. First, the distinct senses in which existential feelings are felt as background bodily feelings and as spaces of possibility calls for further clarification. Second, the nature of the suggested bi-directional relationship between existential feelings (...)
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  37.  12
    The Subject of “We Intend”.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):231-243.
    This paper examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind and the plural kind are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that “I intend” is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent differences, (...)
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  38.  3
    Enkinaesthesia: Proto-Moral Value in Action-Enquiry and Interaction.Susan A. J. Stuart - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):411-431.
    It is now generally accepted that human beings are naturally, possibly even essentially, intersubjective. This chapter offers a robust defence of an enhanced and extended intersubjectivity, criticising the paucity of individuating notions of agency and emphasising the community and reciprocity of our affective co-existence with other living organisms and things. I refer to this modified intersubjectivity, which most closely expresses the implicit intricacy of our pre-reflective neuro-muscular experiential entanglement, as ‘enkinaesthesia’. The community and reciprocity of this entanglement is characterised as (...)
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  39.  8
    Addiction and Embodiment.Ellen Fridland & Corinde E. Wiers - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):15-42.
    Recent experiments have shown that when individuals with a substance use disorder are confronted with drug-related cues, they exhibit an automatically activated tendency to approach these cues. The strength of the drug approach bias has been associated with clinically relevant measures, such as increased drug craving and relapse, and activations in brain reward areas. Retraining the approach bias by means of cognitive bias modification has been demonstrated to decrease relapse rates in patients with an alcohol use disorder and to reduce (...)
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  40.  31
    Presence in Absence. The Ambiguous Phenomenology of Grief.Thomas Fuchs - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):43-63.
    Despite its complex experiential structure, the phenomenon of grief following bereavement has not been a major topic of phenomenological research. The paper investigates its basic structures, elaborating as its core characteristic a conflict between a presentifying and a ‘de-presentifying’ intention: In grief, the subject experiences a fundamental ambiguity between presence and absence of the deceased, between the present and the past, indeed between two worlds he lives in. This phenomenological structure will be analyzed under several aspects: regarding bodily experience, as (...)
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  41.  7
    Sharing the Dance – on the Reciprocity of Movement in the Case of Elite Sports Dancers.Jing He & Susanne Ravn - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):99-116.
    In his recent works on daily face-to-face encounters, Zahavi claims that the phenomenon of sharing involves reciprocity. Following Zahavi’s line of thought, we wonder what exactly reciprocity amounts to and how the shared experience emerges from the dynamic process of interaction. By turning to the highly specialized field of elite sports dance, we aim at exploring the way in which reciprocity unfolds in intensive deliberate practices of movement. In our analysis, we specifically argue that the ongoing dynamics of two separate (...)
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  42.  12
    Weak Phantasy and Visionary Phantasy: The Phenomenological Significance of Altered States of Consciousness.Lajos Horváth, Csaba Szummer & Attila Szabo - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):117-129.
    In this paper we discuss the definitional problems of altered states of consciousness and their potential relevance in phenomenological investigation. We suggest that visionary states or visionary phantasy working induced by psychedelics, as extraordinary types of altered states, are appropriate subjects for phenomenological analysis. Naturally, visionary states are not quite ordinary workings of the human mind, however certain cognitive psychological and evolutionary epistemological investigations show that they can give new insights into the nature of consciousness. Furthermore, we suggest that contemporary (...)
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  43.  46
    Non-Representational Approaches to the Unconscious in the Phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.Anastasia Kozyreva - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):199-224.
    There are two main approaches in the phenomenological understanding of the unconscious. The first explores the intentional theory of the unconscious, while the second develops a non-representational way of understanding consciousness and the unconscious. This paper aims to outline a general theoretical framework for the non-representational approach to the unconscious within the phenomenological tradition. In order to do so, I focus on three relevant theories: Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, Thomas Fuchs’ phenomenology of body memory, and Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of (...)
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  44.  11
    Toward a Unified View of Time: Erwin W. Straus’ Phenomenological Psychopathology of Temporal Experience.Marcin Moskalewicz - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):65-80.
    The article covers Erwin W. Straus’ views on the problem of time and temporal experience in the context of psychopathology. Beside Straus’ published scholarship, including his papers dealing exclusively with the subject of time, the sources utilized in this essay comprise several of Straus’ unpublished manuscripts on temporality, with the primary focus on the 1952 manuscript Temporal Horizons, which is discussed in greater detail and subsequently published for the first time in this journal. In the first part of the article, (...)
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  45.  8
    Temporal Horizons.Marcin Moskalewicz - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):81-98.
    The article presents Erwin W. Straus’ unpublished manuscript “Temporal Horizons” from 1952. In the paper, in addition to an extensive philosophical discussion with St. Augustine, Henri Bergson and Sigmund Freud, Straus elaborates on his idea of a unified view of temporal experience, comprising both the personal and the impersonal dimensions of time. The manuscript also contains an interview with a psychotic patient, which is supposed to exemplify Straus' core idea on the psychotic temporal experience, according to which the break of (...)
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  46.  20
    Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness and Self Across Waking and Dreaming: Bridging Phenomenology and Neuroscience.Martina Pantani, Angela Tagini & Antonino Raffone - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):175-197.
    The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is central to debates about consciousness and its neural correlates. However, this distinction has often been limited to the domain of perceptual experiences. On the basis of dream phenomenology and neuroscientific findings this paper suggests a theoretical framework which extends this distinction to dreaming, also in terms of plausible neural correlates. In this framework, phenomenal consciousness is involved in both waking perception and dreaming, whereas access consciousness is weakened, but not fully eliminated, during (...)
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  47.  33
    Bodily Skill and Internal Representation in Sensorimotor Perception.David Silverman - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):157-173.
    The sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience claims that perception is constituted by bodily interaction with the environment, drawing on practical knowledge of the systematic ways that sensory inputs are disposed to change as a result of movement. Despite the theory’s associations with enactivism, it is sometimes claimed that the appeal to ‘knowledge’ means that the theory is committed to giving an essential theoretical role to internal representation, and therefore to a form of orthodox cognitive science. This paper defends the role (...)
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  48.  9
    Enactivism, Second-Person Engagement and Personal Responsibility.Janna van Grunsven - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):131-156.
    Over the course of the past few decades 4E approaches that theorize cognition and agency as embodied, embedded, extended, and/or enactive have garnered growing support from figures working in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Correspondingly, there has been a rising interest in the wider conceptual and practical implications of 4E views. Several proposals have for instance been made regarding 4E’s bearing on ethical theory, 505–526, 2009; Cash, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9, 645–671 2010). In this paper I contribute (...)
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  49.  7
    Choice in a Two Systems World: Picking & Weighing or Managing & Metacognition.Tillmann Vierkant - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):1-13.
    Intuitively, choices seem to be intentional actions but it is difficult to see how they could be. If our choices are all about weighing up reasons then there seems no room for an additional intentional act of choice. Richard Holton has suggested a solution to this puzzle, which involves thinking of choices in a two systems of cognition framework. Holton’s suggestion does solve the puzzle, but has some unsatisfactory consequences. This paper wants to take over the important insights from Holton (...)
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  50.  14
    Gender and the Senses of Agency.Nick Brancazio - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    This paper details the ways that gender structures our senses of agency on an enactive framework. While it is common to discuss how gender influences higher, narrative levels of cognition, as with the formulation of goals and in considerations about our identities, it is less clear how gender structures our more immediate, embodied processes, such as the minimal sense of agency. While enactivists often acknowledge that gender and other aspects of our socio-cultural situatedness shape our cognitive processes, there is little (...)
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  51.  25
    Husserl, Impure Intentionalism, and Sensory Awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    Recent philosophy of mind has seen an increase of interest in theories of intentionality in offering a functional account of mental states. The standard intentionalist view holds that mental states can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of their representational contents. An alternative view proposed by Tim Crane, called impure intentionalism, specifies mental states in terms of intentional content, mode, and object. This view is also suggested to hold for states of sensory awareness. This paper primarily develops an alternative to (...)
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